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ABSTRACT 
THE ANTICIPATION AND INTERPRETATION OF UK COMPANY 
ANNOUNCEMENTS: THE INCENTIVES TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION 
The objective of this thesis is to explain the behaviour of stock returns around the 
disclosure of different types of information release by UK companies. Previous 
literature has documented the existence of both market anticipation and the lagged 
impounding of value relevant information. The main objective of this research is, 
therefore, to identify the conditions under which investors choose to be informed in 
anticipation of and in response to, a corporate disclosure. More specifically, we 
explain the behaviour of stock returns in terms of the costs and benefits which 
investors must consider when deciding whether to acquire and interpret information. 
The results indicate that market anticipation is an increasing function of firm size, the 
number of years a firm has been trading and the volatility of prior stock returns. 
However, increased voluntary disclosure by firms would appear to reduce the ability 
of investors to and anticipate and interpret information. The volatility of stock 
returns, prior to the disclosure, is nevertheless the main driving force behind the 
explanation of post-announcement drift. There are also indications that investors' 
initial reactions to both earnings and non-earnings news are not based on informed 
judgements, and that bad news is generally associated with greater uncertainty than 
good news. Bad news would appear to be more difficult to anticipate and interpret, 
relative to good news. On further examination, however, investor anticipation is 
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1. SECURITY VALUATION AND 
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION 
1.1 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this chapter, is to conduct an overall review of the market efficiency 
literature. In this regard, we examine the process by which stock markets impound 
information into security prices. The chapter proceeds by: 
  explaining the meaning of market efficiency, by describing the role of 
information, rational expectations, and the implications of noise trading for security 
pricing; 
  providing an evaluation of current empirical evidence, reporting findings of 
both market overreaction (eg. DeBondt & Thaler 1989,1990) and underreaction (eg. 
Ou & Penman 1990) to publicly available information. This includes evidence that 
indicates earnings information is frequently ignored, and only impounded with a lag 
(Bernard & Thomas 1989,1990). 
1.2 INTRODUCTION 
Ball & Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) launched a new era of research into the role 
of accounting information in security valuation, during a period of rising and 
undeniable support for efficient markets. The ultimate test of accounting information 
is its `usefulness' - although the definition of usefulness and how it should be 
measured is rather elusive. Rather than formally defining usefulness, we observe the 
(economic) consequences of using accounting information by the major group of users 
- shareholders. With reliance on stock market efficiency, security prices were 
therefore used as benchmarks against which the `information content' of accounting 
numbers could be evaluated, and the issue of the usefulness of accounting information 
in firm valuation became of secondary importance. As a consequence of relying on 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, we have learned little of how accounting 
information can be used to give a measure of value independent of prices (Penman 
1991). 
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Fama (1970) was among the first to provide a formal definition of an efficient price. 
The prevalent hypothesis was one of market efficiency, with the market unbiasedly 
interpreting all available information and with reasonable speed. The definition was 
criticised on the grounds of being too ambiguous to be testable, and stimulated wide 
debate which remains unresolved. From the late 1970's growing evidence emerged 
of market inefficiency, which further questioned what we understood by the term 
efficiency'. Subsequently, Fama redefined efficiency in 1976 and again in 1991 (see 
later). The literature has also witnessed a number of other notable contributions 
towards the debate by Jensen (1978), Figlewski (1978), Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) 
and Beaver (1981), among others. 
Defining the term efficiency is a feat yet to be accomplished, but perhaps is an 
impossible task. For instance, is a singular definition of efficiency feasible when the 
degree of efficiency is a matter of opinion. Given heterogenous beliefs, what is 
efficient to one investor may be regarded as inefficient to another (Figlewski 1978, 
Beaver 1981). Despite problems of definition, it is well recognised that tests of 
market efficiency are a joint hypothesis of: (i) the efficiency with which information 
is processed, and (ii) the descriptive validity of the chosen asset pricing model. Tests 
can fail to reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency, either because one of the 
two hypotheses are false, or because both are false. Thus, if it is not possible to test 
whether the market is efficient, perhaps it is sufficient to determine if investor 
behaviour is rational in response to new information. However, what may be 
considered a rational action for an individual investor, may not be seen as rational 
from the market's point of view. For instance, trading on noise is considered to be 
irrational, though De Long, Schliefer, Summers & Waldmann (1990) prove it can be 
profitable. 
To determine if the stock market efficiently values securities, we need a benchmark 
with which we can compare security prices in order to recognise if they are correctly 
priced. To define efficiency we need to understand the role of information, for 
without information there would be no price. Section 1.3 below addresses the issue 
of defining an efficient price, discussing the role of information and rational 
8 
expectations, and the implications of noise trading for efficient pricing. Sections 1.4 
to 1.7 review recent evidence found both in support of, and against, market efficiency. 
More specifically, section 1.4 looks at the ability of the market to anticipate future 
earnings in advance of the release of current earnings (Collins, Kothari & Rayburn 
1987, Kothari & Sloan 1992). Section 1.5 briefly reviews evidence of return 
predictability in stock returns (French & Roll 1986, Keim 1983, DeBondt & Thaler 
1987). The market fails to impound historic information contained in security price, 
though unfortunately we cannot infer the type of information being ignored. Section 
1.6 identifies two information variables that have been widely documented in their 
ability to predict the cross-sectional behaviour of security returns: the price-earnings 
ratio (Basu 1983,1987), and the firm size effect (Banz 1981, Reinganum 1981). 
Section 1.7 examines in detail the phenomena of systematic underreaction to financial 
statement information, paying particular attention to the work of Bernard & Thomas 
(1989,1990) and Ou & Penman (1989a). The chapter concludes with section 1.8, 
questioning the conditions under which the market is able to anticipate future earnings, 
and when the market appears to be surprised. 
1.3 WHAT IS AN EFFICIENT PRICE ? 
1.3.1 The Role of the Price System in Communicating Information 
The price system is the mechanism used for communicating information, where 
equilibrium is dependent upon the markets' expectations of future stock prices. As 
investors act on their information, prices will reflect their diverse set of endowments, 
preferences and beliefs about the future states of nature (Beaver 1981). The role of 
the price system was characterised by Hayek (1945) as a 
`system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many 
people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different people in 
the same way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts 
of his plan ... their limited fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through 
many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all' which 
`brings about the solution which might have been arrived at by one single mind 
possessing all the information. ' 
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Hayek argues the total information set reflected in prices is unknown to all 
individuals. Each investor trades without knowing what information other investors 
have used in trading, and thus what information has influenced prices. An investor 
on the receipt of new information, must process the information to form an opinion 
of its effect on price, but also must decide whether other investors have used that 
mOil- information and so is already reflected in price. In other words, the market price 
embodies the aggregate opinion of all investors, and incorporates all of the information 
available to any of them. How well the price system communicates information 
depends on how efficiently priced the securities are perceived to be. 
1.3.2 The Role of Information 
An efficient capital market has been frequently defined as where `security prices fully 
reflect all available information' (Fama 1970). ' The sufficient (but not necessary) 
conditions for efficiency were (i) no transaction costs, (ii) all available information 
costlessly available to all investors, and (iii) all investors have homogenous 
expectations. This definition has been extensively criticised on the grounds that the 
terms `fully reflect' and `available information' are too vague and non-operational. 
For instance, how wide is the definition of available information, all publicly available 
information, does it include private information, or only the information reflected by 
security prices. If the latter, then by definition all security markets are efficient. 
In later years Fama (1976) redefined an efficient price as one always fully reflecting 
`all relevant information'. Could this imply not all public information is relevant or 
not all relevant information is publicly known'? However, an efficient market implies 
that the entire body of relevant information concerning a company's future prospects 
is `correctly' impounded into its share price. Furthermore, the stock market is rational 
in assimilating new information into price, instantaneously and unbiasedly. The 
mathematical interpretation of an efficient market is defined by Fama (1976) as the 
joint distribution of security prices, fm(P, t, P2t,..., Pot 
I(Dmt_, ), given the set of information 
that the market uses to determine security prices at t-1, is identical to the joint 
' Here we are concerned with the information efficiency hypothesis, as opposed to other definitions 
of operational efficiency. See Foster (1986) for a discussion. 
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distribution of prices that would exist if all relevant information available at t-1 were 
used, f(P,,, P2t...., ie. the market `correctly' uses all information. This is 
wntten as 
fm(Plt7P2t,..., PntI(Dmt-, ) = . 
f(P, t, P2t,..., PotI(D, -, 
) X1.1) 
In short, today's price is the best estimate of tomorrow's price given currently 
available information. 
Fama partitions information into three subsets, each of which is based on a different 
notion of what type of information is understood to be relevant: (i) weak-form 
efficiency, where an investor cannot earn excess returns by developing trading 
strategies based on historic price information; (ii) semi-strong form efficiency, which 
nullifies any trading strategies based on past prices and publicly available information 
to earn excess returns. Where publicly available information is defined as information 
that is accessible to all investors at precisely zero cost; (iii) strong-form efficiency, 
where no individual can profit from private information. 
Assuming efficiency, information is considered `relevant' if it invokes a price reaction 
upon its release, thereby prompting individuals to reassess their expectations (ie. the 
probability distribution), of the future payoffs of holding that asset (Beaver 1968). 2 
The information must tell us something we do not already know about the level and 
risk of future cash flows of the associated security. ' With respect to individuals, 
informational value will vary depending on whether or not they can act upon it, and 
2 Lev & Ohlson (1982) explains the dual role of information in the capital markets. `First, it aids 
in establishing a set of equilibrium security prices that affects the allocation of "real" resources and the 
productive decisions implemented by firms. Second, it enables individuals to exchange claims to 
present and future consumption across different states, thereby attaining both preferred patterns of 
lifetime consumption and the sharing of societal risks. ' 
3 In the original paper of price behaviour and volume reaction surrounding earnings announcements, 
Beaver (1968) quoted two definitions of information. Firstly, information represents a `change in 
expectations about the outcome of an event' which is reflected by a price reaction. Secondly, the 
change must be `sufficiently large to induce a change in the decision-maker's behaviour' to induce a 
volume reaction. 
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how the news coincides with their prior expectations. ' Price change is therefore 
proportional to both the unexpected (the `surprise') element and the announcements' 
relative importance across prior beliefs. Relative importance is contingent upon the 
precision of the announcement, or rather its perceived `quality' compared to that of 
pre-announcement information. 
Where price change reflects the average change in all traders' beliefs, the reaction of 
individual traders is dependent on the precision of their own prior information and 
beliefs. Hence, newly announced information is relatively more important to those 
with less precise knowledge and will have a greater impact on their beliefs. 
Therefore, the extent of the price change reflects the degree of informational 
asymmetry among individuals (Kim & Verrecchia 1991a and 1991b). 
With increasing research suggestive of market inefficiency, the precise definition of 
market efficiency has become a contentious issue. Consequently, a number of 
contributions have since been made towards the debate5. Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) 
rejected Fama's 1970 definition on the grounds that, for security prices to impound 
all available information requires information to be costless. Information costs 
comprise the cost of acquiring and processing the information, but also the costs of 
transacting on the basis of the information (Ball 1992). If market prices accurately 
reflect all available information at any time for free, there would be no incentive for 
anyone to collect information. Yet if no one collects information, there would be 
none for the market to reveal. Thus, given Fama's definition, an informationally 
efficient market is incompatible with costly information. As a consequence of the 
existence of information costs, at any one time price will only partially reveal a 
security's full information set. In equilibrium, price must reflect just enough 
information so that individuals are indifferent between producing private information 
° Of course, informational value also depends on whether the gain that can be earned from its 
knowledge is greater than the cost of the action from its use. The issues of transaction and processing 
costs will be discussed later in the text. 
I For example, Jensen (1978), Figlewski (1978), Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), and Beaver (1981). 
See Ball (1992) for a thorough review. 
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(ie. information which is not publicly available) or remaining uninformed. Private 
gains from producing private information are therefore allowed, but are exactly offset 
by the costs of processing. 
Fama's definition of efficiency also assumes investors have homogenous beliefs with 
respect to the same information set. The more risk adverse investors are and the more 
homogenous their information, the more efficient we expect the market to be 
(Figlewski 1978). In a market where beliefs are homogenous but the information item 
is not known by all, the market will be perceived to be less efficient to the relatively 
less informed. In a market of heterogenous beliefs, even if all investors possess the 
same information they may not necessarily agree on its implications, so not all will 
believe the market to be efficient 6 This is substantiated by the work of Figlewski 
(1978), which demonstrates the market can deviate relatively far from efficiency, when 
there is a wide range of expectations among investors. Consequently, Beaver (1981) 
defines the market as being efficient with respect to an information item as long as 
`prices act as if everyone knows the information'. Such a definition allows the 
existence of heterogenous beliefs, by permitting individuals to perceive the market to 
be inefficient even if it is not. 
Fama in 1991, in response to the recent tests of market efficiency and criticisms, 
reverted to his former broader definition of 1970, despite its shortcomings. The 
argument for doing so, was to provide a `clean benchmark' that allows one to sidestep 
the problem of quantifying what are `reasonable information and trading costs. ' It is 
then for the individual to judge the degree of efficiency. ' Thus, as of yet we do not 
have an operational definition of market efficiency, and therefore remains untestable. 
Perhaps instead, it is sufficient to determine whether investor behaviour is rational in 
response to new information. 
6 Plus, what is considered information to some is not necessarily information to others. 
'Fama(1991) also took the opportunity to change the categories of market efficiency: the definition 
of weak-form tests has been generalised to encapsulate all tests of return predictability. Semi-strong 
form tests are to be now known as event studies, and strong form tests as tests for private information. 
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1.3.3 Rational Expectations and Efficient Markets 
A sufficient but not necessary condition of market efficiency is for individuals to have 
rational expectations. Rationality implies that expected utility maximisers correctly 
use all information that is relevant in the determination of security prices. Rational 
individuals are therefore assumed to have full knowledge of all publicly available 
information, and will in turn make the best possible use of this information to remove 
any profitable opportunities (Muth 1961). An optimizing model where people exploit 
information until its marginal benefit equals its marginal cost. Hence, speculative 
behaviour is ruled out by rational expectations. However, generally a less stringent 
definition of rational expectations is adopted - people maybe unaware of the complete 
information set, but are at least expected to learn from their mistakes. If forecast 
errors follow a pattern, they hold information that can be used to make a more 
accurate forecast. The implication of this is not that rational people do not make 
mistakes, but rather their mistakes are random and not the same ones each time. 
A similarity between the efficient markets hypothesis and the hypothesis of rational 
expectations, is that they both assume all information is used correctly. Though unlike 
the former, the rational expectations hypothesis does not require an instantaneous and 
complete reaction to new information, but gradual impounding as the full implications 
become known. If the implications of an information item are uncertain, it is rational 
not to trade until further confirmation is received and the uncertainty (partially) 
resolved. Unfortunately, both rational expectations and the efficient markets 
hypothesis, tell us nothing of how information is processed by investors and 
impounded into price, as it is impossible to know all the different information sets 
faced by individuals. 
1.3.4 The Influence of Noise Trading 
Hayek (1945) described the price system as a `mechanism for communicating 
information'. Its ability to do so is hampered by the presence of noise, particularly 
in the short run. Noise can transpire for a number of reasons (see Black 1986, for a 
fuller description). Firstly, it reflects the actions of investors who need to trade for 
liquidity reasons and not due to information. Similarly, it reflects the impact of the 
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trading mechanism by which prices are set in the market, by capturing errors in the 
analysis and interpretation of information. For example, consider two `information 
traders' who trade on the same asset, for one to be selling and the other buying, one 
of these traders must be making a mistake, given they have the same information set. 
Noise trading is thus essential to the existence of a liquid market, but it also makes 
the market imperfect. Noise is unobservable, and its existence makes it impossible 
to distinguish between price movements due to new information, from noise trading. 
Consequently, the price system is only partially revealing of a security's intrinsic 
value. ' Thus, while noise increases the number of profitable opportunities available, 
at the same time, noise makes it difficult to trade profitably by increasing 
uncertainty. 9 Trade is therefore a function of noise. Similarly, if assuming 
homogenous expectations, if there was no noise there would be very little trade. In 
sum, prices do not change in sole response to information but also reflect the frictions 
of an operating market. 
However, noise trading is more generally thought of as the activity of those who trade 
on `irrelevant' information - `uninformed traders'. Those who trade on information 
as if it were fundamental. The greater the volume of uninformed trading, the greater 
the economic incentive for other investors to become informed (Grossman & Stiglitz 
1980). The further price deviates from its intrinsic value, the more aggressively 
`informed' traders will trade against the `uninformed'. The actions of the informed 
will slowly gravitate the stock price back towards its value. 10 Traditional thinking 
implies however, uninformed traders will on average fail to make excess returns due 
to their ignorance, and will eventually leave the market (Black 1986, Schliefer & 
Summers 1990). 
8 This is similar to the idea of Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), who argue prices are only partially 
revealing due to information costs. 
9 See Schliefer & Summers (1990) for the welfare implications of noise trading. 
1° This viewpoint is supported by Fama & French (1988) and Poterba & Summers (1988) who 
found significant serial correlation in long run returns. 
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Since intrinsic value is unobservable, informed traders can never be sure whether they 
are trading on relevant information or noise. Although this does not necessarily imply 
informed traders trade solely on fundamentals, as the key to investment success is not 
only predicting fundamentals but also the movement of others. Thus, when noise 
traders are optimistic about particular securities, it profits fundamentalists (informed 
traders) to `jump on the band-wagon' and generate further noise with the intention of 
increasing the securities' perceived value, taking advantage of the noise traders' 
naivety. 
Contrary to traditional thinking, De Long, Schliefer, Summers & Waldmann (1990) 
were able to show that noise traders do not only survive in the long run, but earn a 
higher than average return than the so-called informed traders. A return for bearing 
a disproportionate amount of risk that they themselves in part create. Increased noise 
trading amplifies the volatility of share price relative to its underlying value. It is 
therefore doubtful whether informed traders, especially if risk averse, will take a large 
enough position to fully eliminate noise. For information gathering in itself does not 
ensure increased profit, and secondly, and more importantly, an increasing position 
means greater risk (Black 1986). " 
The existence of `uninformed' noise traders brings into question the applicability of 
the theory of rationality and the implications their existence has for asset pricing 
models, especially as `irrational' behaviour can be profitable (DeLong et al 1990). 
Can it be irrational to use `irrelevant' information that increases ones expected utility? 
In addition, it highlights the problem of what may be considered a rational act on the 
part of an individual, may not necessarily be rational for the market. How can the 
necessity of liquidity trading be incorporated into a functional definition of efficiency? 
The existence of noise traders has a practical implication for information content and 
event studies, in that it becomes extremely difficult to quantify a large fraction of 
security price behaviour around public announcements (Roll 1988). Making it difficult 
to separate price movement due to the event under examination, from price movement 
" See for example, Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) and Dow & Gorton (1994) who consider the 
importance of the existence of arbitrage chains. 
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due to noise trading. 
1.3.5 Fundamental Information and Efficient Markets 
As previously stated, new information is considered `relevant' if it invokes a price 
reaction. Though not all price movements are in response to relevant information but 
also reflect noise trading. For instance, Shiller (1981) found stock returns were too 
volatile to be explained by shocks to future cash flows, and Roll (1988) was unable 
to quantify for more than one-third of monthly variation in stock returns. Cutler, 
Poterba & Summers (1989) found the days of the largest aggregate market movements 
were not the days of the most important fundamental news. The presence of noise 
makes it not only difficult to distinguish the extent to which stock prices move in 
response to relevant information, but more importantly, what type of information is 
considered as relevant in the pricing of securities. 
The work of the fundamental analyst is based on the belief that the stock market is 
inefficient in pricing securities, and it is their role to detect securities that are either 
under or overpriced. This involves using financial statement information to estimating 
a security's intrinsic value, and then comparing it to market price. Previously, when 
few doubted the market to be inefficient, the role of the fundamental analyst was 
viewed as nonessential as the market was considered efficient with respect to 
accounting information. However, the precise definition of intrinsic value is as 
ambiguous as is the concept of market efficiency. Intrinsic value is generally thought 
to be the security price when all investors possess the same endowments, preferences 
and more importantly, homogenous beliefs. Of course, in a society of heterogenous 
beliefs a security's intrinsic value could be one of many prices. Hence, the market 
will always appear to be inefficient to at least some investors at any one time. 
Alternatively, Graham & Dodd (1962) define intrinsic value as the `value which is 
justified by the facts', ie. a firms' intrinsic value can be identified by examining 
financial statement information. However, the method by which this value is extracted 
is unknown. 
The traditional valuation model is that of Miller & Modigliani (1961). They express 
17 
price, P, as the present value of the expected future payoffs to holding a particular 
security, 
E E( din I Z, ) (1.2) 
P_ z=o 
(1+P)` 
Where dtv is the expected dividend to be paid at wt, conditional on information 
available at time t, 7,, and p the rate at which expected future dividends are 
discounted. Alternatively, expected future payoffs may be defined as the sum of the 
capitalized current earnings and the present value of future investment opportunities, 
as derived from the dividend irrelevancy proposition. 12 
The former definition of expected future payoffs requires the fundamental analyst to 
distinguish between information which indicates future dividends, from that which 
indicates the risk of the firm. A security price is presumed to change only in response 
to new information about future real dividends, thereby value-relevant attributes are 
identified on the basis of their correlation with future dividend payoffs. The principle 
problem of this model, given the short dividend history, is that it is not possible to 
observe the full set of future dividend payoffs, ex ante. Secondly, share price 
movements appear too volatile to reflect solely underlying changes in dividend policy 
(Shiller 1981). In addition, dividend payments are generally viewed as arbitrary and 
discretionary: a firm doing very well with high growth prospects may pay no 
dividends, while a firm doing poorly with no growth prospects may pay substantial 
dividends. The direct relationship between price and future dividends is therefore 
brought into question (Penman 1991). 13 Consequently, researchers have substituted 
earnings for dividends as a proxy for expected future payoffs. However, the value 
relevance of accounting earnings is also debateable. 
12 The dividend irrelevancy proposition argues price is unrelated to dividends, given the separation 
of the financing decision from the investment decision, on the assumption of no personal taxation 
(Miller & Modigliani, 1961). 
" Price is based on future dividends but observed dividends do not tell us anything about price 
(Penman 1991). 
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Besides the results of Ball & Brown (1968) who found earnings to be valued 
positively by investors, ie. higher (lower) earnings implies higher (lower) value, there 
exists other supported intuition that earnings are relevant. Graham & Dodd (1962) 
consider future earning power to be the single most important determinant of a 
company's value. There is a fundamental link between accounting earnings and share 
price in that they both attempt to measure the change in value of the firm. Over the 
lifetime of a company, essentially all of the activities influencing the future value will 
ultimately be captured in earnings. In the long run, there is therefore a fundamental 
link between earnings and the return to shareholders. In the short run, the link is less 
precise due to the difficulties in calculating periodic earnings associated with the 
accrual based accounting system. It may be argued it is the discretionary nature of 
dividends that makes them uninformative but earnings are (largely) not at the 
discretion of management. 
More importantly, future dividends are paid from earnings: before wealth can be 
distributed it must first be created. Easton (1985) provides empirical evidence of 
earnings reflecting the dividend paying ability of the firm. Earnings are relevant to 
assessing the amount, timing and uncertainty of future cash flows of the firm. 
However, the payment of dividends has implications for future earning power. Based 
on this intuition Ohlson (1988,1991a) devised a model which incorporated (residual) 
earnings as a prime element in determining intrinsic value, Vi', " 
TT 
V, T =(PT-1)-, E[(EX, ý+E(PTý`-1)d, n) I Z, ] (1.3) 
Where Xt, represents expected future earnings in period t+i, and d,, is the expected 
dividend to be paid at t+i, conditional on information available at time t, Z1, and p the 
rate at which expected future cash flows are discounted. 
Value is based on projections of future accounting earnings from current information. 
Its advantage over the dividend discount model is that it does not involve the problem 
14 Where residual earnings are defined as profit minus a capital charge based on net assets 
employed. See O'Hanlon (1993) for a fuller discussion. 
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of timing. Creative accounting is not of concern if it merely results in timing 
differences that work their way through by period T. Dividends are included as their 
payment affects future earnings, rather than as an determining factor of value. '5 
Such a presentation is intuitively pleasing to the accountant and the analyst alike, as 
it is a representation of accounting data as fundamentals. Justifying earnings to take 
more of a measurement role as opposed solely to an information role, demonstrating 
the ability of earnings to measure the change in a security's value, rather than just 
provide an insight into what a security's value should be (Penman 1991), or will be. 
One danger of treating accounting earnings as the single most important indicator of 
intrinsic value, is that it may lead to researchers trying to identify descriptors of 
earnings rather than descriptors of price; an approach adopted by Ou & Penman 
(1989) to identify turns in the earnings series. Until the 1980's, relatively little 
attention had been given to the explanatory power of non-earnings data. Though on 
the whole, the research demonstrates it is difficult to find other data items that convey 
any information beyond that reflected in earnings (Easton 1985, Lipe 1986, 
Swaminathan & Weintrop 1991, Smith & Tremayne 1992). 16 Bernard (1989) 
questions the lack of information content in anything beyond bottom-line earnings, 
given a whole industry is devoted to dissecting financial statement data. The evidence 
also appears inconsistent with the findings of Ou & Penman (1989) (see later). 
Bernard rationalises the results to the poor quality of supplemental data and a naive 
research design. 
Only when the stock market is efficient can security prices be reliably used as 
benchmarks against which the information content of accounting attributes can be 
evaluated. The alternative is to develop a valuation model whereby one determines 
the types of information that should be used in the formation of price, as opposed to 
what information the market employs. Bearing in mind, indicators of intrinsic value 
SA potential problem with Ohlson's model is that it may lead to double-counting by including both 
earnings at time t and the later earnings that accrue when time t earnings are reinvested. 
16 See Lev & Ohlsen (1982) and Bernard (1989) for a comprehensive review. 
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will vary in importance across firms and industries, and will also vary across time 
reflecting ever changing economic conditions (Lev & Thiagaran 1994). Furthermore, 
knowledge of a security's intrinsic value will not necessarily earn the analyst a return. 
This knowledge is only of value if others will also become aware of it (Dow & 
Gorton 1994). It may be more profitable to know of the information of others, 
relevant or not. 
1.3.6 In Summary 
The debate continues as to the meaning of `efficiency', and to the role of information 
costs, heterogenous beliefs and the implication of noise trading in judging the 
efficiency of security valuation. Without a precise definition it is not apparent under 
what conditions efficiency can hold, making it therefore impossible to interpret tests 
of market efficiency. Alas, it is not surprising to find a deluge of evidence both for 
and against the existence of efficient financial markets. What follows is a brief 
discussion, which is by no means exhaustive, of this literature. 
1.4 THE ABILITY OF THE MARKET TO ANTICIPATE EARNINGS 
The seminal paper of Ball & Brown (1968) demonstrated the ability of the market to 
anticipate a substantial proportion of future earnings up to 12 months in advance of 
the announcement, and subsequently encouraged research into the predictability price 
changes of future earnings. Beaver, Lambert & Morse (1980) found prices lead 
earnings by up to two years, whereas, Collins, Kothari & Rayburn (1987) found the 
future earnings of larger firms to be anticipated by the market at least one year in 
advance, with the level of market anticipation an increasing function of firm size. 
The emergence of so-called earnings response coefficient studies, explicitly test the 
price-earnings relation, and are variations of a simple regression of returns on a 
measure of unexpected earnings (Kothari 1992, Kothari & Sloan 1992). The 
explanatory power of such models are generally found to be low, which may in part 
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reflect the simplistic relation assumed between returns and unexpected earnings". 
It more likely reflects the effect of prices leading earnings causing the downward bias 
in earnings response coefficients (Kothari & Sloan 1992). Kothari and Sloan utilized 
evidence of prices leading earnings by including leading period returns in the price- 
earnings regression. `8 By including one, two, and three year leading returns in the 
regression, as well as contemporaneous returns, increased the average earnings 
response coefficient from 4.69, to 5.08 and 5.45 respectively. 
The basic intuition underlying price leading earnings literature, is the ability of stock 
prices to incorporate information from alternative and more timely sources, adjusting 
promptly to events that have future earnings implications which are only reflected in 
earnings with a lag. For example, on the announcement of a long term sales contract 
or new investment, stock prices will adjust instantaneously to reflect changing 
expectations of future earnings and cash flows. However, the implications of the new 
contract or investment will only be partially reflected in this period's earnings. In the 
short term, earnings are most limited in their ability to contemporaneously reflect 
shareholders' changing expectations of future cash flows. Over longer intervals, the 
contemporary relation between aggregated earnings and stock prices grows stronger 
(Easton, Harris & Ohison 1992, Dechow 1994). Over longer periods the estimation 
problems of accrual accounting constitute a lower proportion of the variability in 
earnings. 
Undoubtedly prices do lead earnings to a certain extent, and of course this has 
implications for the role of accounting. Most it questions the timeliness of earnings 
as an information signal. Much of the earnings figure appears to be anticipated before 
it is announced, Kothari and Sloan show by up to 4 years in advance. Whether this 
" See the papers of Beaver, Lambert & Ryan (1987) (BLR) and Kothari (1992) which evaluate 
different aspects of alternative specifications of the price-earnings relation. BLR employ reverse 
regression (regressing percentage change in earnings on percentage change in prices as opposed to the 
reverse) and finds both procedures give equivalent results. Kothari finds while earnings level 
specification outperforms the earnings change specification, both are noisy estimates of the market 
unexpected earnings. An accurate proxy for unexpected earnings is therefore preferred. 
18 Furthermore, they find this technique produces less biased earnings response coefficients than 
incorporating longer windows for both returns and earnings. 
22 
low contemporaneous price-earnings association is seen as a weakness in the 
accounting measurement process depends on the objective of earnings measurement. 
If the two sets of information should be identical, then accounting practice needs to 
be changed to fully reflect the market's unbiased expectation of future cash flows. 
From the analytical work of Figlewski (1978), we can observe that when there is 
diversity of expectations among investors, the market may deviate relatively far from 
efficiency. Thus, the ability of price in predicting earnings relies on the diversity of 
expectations. More importantly, evidence of price leading earnings would appear to 
assume away the anomalous `post-announcement drift'. 
1.5 THE FAILURE OF THE MARKET TO IMPOUND PAST PRICES 
Evidence of price leading earnings is suggestive of efficient pricing, however the 
literature documents a number of technical anomalies, of the failure of the market to 
recognise systematic patterns in the time series behaviour of stock returns. Once 
unthinkable, the late 1980's found us even questioning weak-form efficiency - the 
ability to predict future stock returns from past stock returns. French & Roll (1986) 
found negative autocorrelation in the daily returns of individual stocks on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), argued not to be price correcting behaviour to noise 
trading. Lo & Mackinley (1988) found positive autocorrelation in weekly portfolio 
returns on the NYSE, induced by non-synchronous trading. Fama & French (1988) 
reported significant serial correlation in returns, when returns are measured over long 
(3 to 10 year) intervals. Although, often these tests have been argued to be low in 
statistical power (Fama 1991), the debate has been one of whether the predictability 
of long term returns is the result of irrational bubbles in prices or of rational time- 
varying swings in expected returns; it still remains unclear. 
The literature also reports a number of seasonal anomalies. A weekend effect where 
returns on a Monday are lower than the average return on other week days (French 
1980). The most well noted is the January effect, where small stocks earn above 
average returns in January compared to other months (Keim 1983, Roll 1983). Early 
volatility papers implied that expected returns were too volatile to be driven entirely 
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by shocks in expected dividends (Shiller 1981). 19 
DeBondt & Thaler (1985,1987) find NYSE stocks identified as the most extreme 
losers over a3 to 5 year period tended to outperform past winners during the 
following years, particularly in January. They attributed the results to market 
overreaction to extreme news (both good and bad) about firms, with investors 
overweighing recent information in making forecasts. Chan (1988) and Ball & 
Kothari (1989) argue that the winner-loser results are due to the failure to risk-adjust 
returns. Zarowin (1990) attributes this overreaction effect to the size effect, where 
small stocks (often losers) have higher expected returns than larger stocks. The 
extreme past losers were found to be significantly smaller than the extreme winners 
at the time of the portfolio formation, which explains their ability to outperform the 
winners. After size was controlled for, the losers were only able to outperform the 
winners in January, revealing that firm size rather than investor overreaction is driving 
the phenomenon. A similar phenomena has been more recently noted by Lakonishok, 
Shleifer & Vishny (1994), who found value stocks (those for example with high book 
to market values), on average outperformed glamour stocks (those with low book to 
market values) over the period 1968 to 1989. 
In sum, short run and long run autocorrelation in returns, seasonal anomalies, excess 
volatility and investor overreaction all have implications for weak-form efficiency. 
This begs the question: why do such seemingly exploitable patterns of price behaviour 
exist'.? Unfortunately, studies of return predictability tell us nothing more than 
expected returns vary through time, and offer no explanation as to why. This gives 
no indication as to what type of information the market is inefficient, and therefore 
whether such behaviour is irrational or not. 
1.6 THE FAILURE OF THE MARKET TO IMPOUND PUBLIC 
INFORMATION 
Subsequent studies investigate systematic differences across security returns. The 
19 See Cochrane (1991) for a review. 
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price-earnings ratio and firm size have both been found to possess explanatory power 
in predicting future expected returns after controlling for risk. 20 A common 
explanation is that they proxy for risk other than that captured by beta. It remains 
uncertain whether these anomalies arise from the use of deficient asset pricing models 
or represent systematic mis-pricing of securities from the failure to impound public 
information. 
1.6.1 The Price-Earnings Ratio 
The price-earnings ratio (PE) is an indicator of the market's perception of the future 
earning power of a security. Basu (1977) found the PE ratio to have marginal 
explanatory power in predicting future abnormal returns after controlling for risk. 
During the period 1957 to 1971, Basu observed that portfolios composed of low PE 
securities earned on average higher risk-adjusted rates of return than those consisting 
of high PE securities. Similar in nature to the overreaction hypothesis of DeBondt & 
Thaler (1989), investors appear unduly optimistic about the performance of high PE 
securities and unduly pessimistic about the performance of low PE securities. Thus, 
high (low) PE ratios tend to be followed by lower (higher) PE ratios in future years. 
In a later re-examination, Basu (1983) was unable to support the contention of 
Reinganum (1981) that the PE effect was merely the size effect in disguise. Cook & 
Rozeff (1984) rationalised the contrary findings by the use of different methods of 
portfolio formation, finding evidence of both a size and a earnings-price (EP) effect 
at work together. Both effects are operative throughout the year, with half of each 
occurring in January, although there exists no interaction between the two anomalies. 
It is possible that both size and EP ratio measure separate aspects of a single 
underlying effect, but it does not appear that one effect subsumes the other. 
The PE ratio can be interpreted as a comparison of two information sets, the 
information about current and future earnings that is summarized in price, relative to 
the information in current earnings alone. Accordingly, evidence of mean-reverting 
20 Leverage (Chan, Chen & Hsieh 1985) and book-to-market value (Fama & French 1992) have 
similarly been found to have explanatory power, but for reasons of brevity will not be discussed here. 
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behaviour of PE ratios has been interpreted as price indicating future changes in 
earnings relative. High (low) price-earnings ratios indicate that earnings will be higher 
(lower) in the future. When these higher (lower) earnings are ultimately recorded, 
observed PE ratios revert back towards the mean. In support of this, Beaver & Morse 
(1978) found PE ratios to be positively correlated with subsequent earnings changes, 
and negatively correlated with current earnings changes. Thus, PE ratios appear to 
indicate reversals in the direction of future earnings, but also identify the extent of 
transitory behaviour of current earnings. Extremely low (high) PE ratios indicate that 
earnings are transitorily low (high), and non-extreme PE ratios indicate that earnings 
are largely permanent (Ou & Penman 1989). The explanatory power of PE supports 
the theory of price leading earnings, but further implies that PE ratios lead both prices 
and earnings. 
1.6.2 The Firm Size Effect 
Firm size, as measured by market capitalisation, has consistently been found to be a 
better predictor of expected returns than estimated betas (Banz 1981, Reinganum 1981, 
Fama & French 1991). 2` Reinganum (1981) finds the PE effect, as reported by Basu 
(1977), disappears when he controls for firm size, but there is still a significant size 
effect when he controls for the PE ratio. Banz (1981) reports an above average risk- 
adjusted return for small firms, though the relationship appears to be non-linear. 
Average returns on small stocks are too high given their beta estimates, and average 
returns on large stocks are too low. 
Collins, Kothari & Rayburn (1987) find the level of market anticipation to be an 
increasing function of firm size. The prices of smaller firms capturing little 
information with respect to future earnings beyond that conveyed in the past time 
series of earnings. Future earnings of larger firms are anticipated by the market at 
least one year in advance. They attribute this result to the broader information set 
available for larger firms and the greater number of individuals processing this 
21 This literature can be classified into two groups: cross-sectional differences in expected returns 
(see Banz 1981, Reinganum 1981) and the time series behaviour of the size effect (see Reinganum 
1983, Keim 1983 and Roll 1983). We are only concerned with the former. 
26 
information. Similarly, Freeman (1987) demonstrates that security prices of large 
firms begin to reflect reported earnings 22 months before the announcement date. 
Abnormal returns for small firms can be detected 3 months later. More specifically, 
the percentage of abnormal returns for large firms realized in the early months exceed 
the percentage for small firms. However, the cumulative abnormal returns of small 
firms ultimately exceed the total for large firms by 44 per cent. 
The question that remains unanswered, is why information in firm size that is publicly 
available and easy to process, is so comprehensively ignored by investors in their 
pursuit of abnormal returns. Several explanations exist in the literature. Firm size 
may proxy for the costs of information acquisition and processing. Though the precise 
relation between firm size and information costs remains unknown, there are reasons 
to expect private information production to increase with firm size (Atiase 1985 and 
1987, Bhushan 1989, and Ho 1993). Bhandari (1988) speculates the small firm effect 
could reflect smaller firms being more highly levered. Chan & Chen (1991) explain 
the phenomena being due to a distressed firm factor which increases risk not captured 
by beta. When size is defined as the market value of equity, small stocks may include 
depressed firms that are sensitive to business conditions 22 Stoll & Whaley (1983) 
and Schultz (1983) provide evidence that transaction costs partially explain the 
anomaly. While not fully understood, the evidence implies the size effect is proxying 
for expected returns (Ball 1992). 
1.7 THE FAILURE OF THE MARKET TO IMPOUND PUBLIC FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT INFORMATION 
1.7.1 Post-Announcement Drift 
For nearly thirty years there has been evidence of increased price and volume activity 
around announcements of stock splits, changes in corporate control and macro- 
economic announcements, but in particular earnings announcements (Beaver 1968, 
Morse 1981). The majority of this early literature indicated an almost complete and 
instantaneous price adjustment to the release of corporate announcements, displaying 
22 In a similar vein, Chen (1983) and Chan, Chen & Hseih (1985) found that the firm size effect 
is essentially captured by a multi-factor pricing model. 
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negligible `drift'. Patell & Wolfson (1984) reported the level of abnormal returns to 
be greatest within 30 minutes of the announcement, with most of that return being 
earned within the first 5 to 10 minutes. 23 Papers that have examined a longer post- 
announcement interval found the initial reaction to be incomplete, with the full 
adjustment taking several days. Ball & Brown (1968) noticed the market anticipated 
a substantial amount of the content of future earnings up to 12 months in advance, but 
prices continued to `drift' after the announcement. Prices continued on an upward 
drift for `good news' firms and a downward drift for `bad news' firms, for up to two 
months after the event. ' Morse (1981) detected the most significant price changes 
and trading volume, the day prior to and on the day of Wall Street Journal earnings 
announcements, with the market continuing to adjust for several days afterwards. 
Hence, a large proportion of the price response to new information is instantaneous, 
but a portion is delayed with the complete reaction taking several days. 
Many of these earlier studies were viewed with scepticism due to limitations in 
research design and a failure to control adequately for risk (Beaver 1989). With 
known design flaws having been corrected in more recent papers (Bernard & Thomas 
1989), post-announcement drift is more apparent than ever, with prices taking in some 
cases several months to completely adjust to the new information (Bernard & Thomas, 
1989 and 1990). It has subsequently been shown to be even more pronounced for 
quarterly earnings announcements (Foster, Ohlsen & Shevlin 1984, Bernard & 
Thomas 1989 and 1990, Freeman & Tse 1989, Wiggins 1991 and Bartov 1992). In 
general, the sign and magnitude of security returns in the post-announcement period 
are positively correlated with the sign and magnitude of the unexpected element of the 
earnings announcement, but also inversely related to firm size. 
23 Ederington & Lee (1994) found major price adjustment occurs within one minute of the release 
of scheduled macroeconomic news announcements for the interest rate and foreign exchange futures 
markets. Although price continued to be considerably more volatile for several hours. Quicker 
adjustment than indicated by Patell & Wolfson (1984) in the equity market suggests greater trading 
volume, using announcements that are more widely anticipated (and different microstructure of the two 
markets), may all partially improve the efficiency of the futures market. 
' Good (bad) news represents an increase (decrease) in the earnings figure from the previous year. 
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Bernard & Thomas (1989) conducted an exhaustive investigation of approximately 
100,000 quarterly earnings announcements over the period 1974 to 1986 for 
NYSE/AMEX firms. Firms were assigned to one of ten portfolios on the basis of 
their standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). u Over the subsequent 60 trading days 
to the announcement, firms with extreme good earnings news experienced a mean 
abnormal return of approximately 2 per cent, while firms with extreme bad news 
earned a negative return of similar magnitude. By going long in the top performers 
and short in the worst performers, earned an estimated 4.19 per cent abnormal return, 
before transaction costs. A similar trading strategy over a 180 trading period earned 
approximately 7.74 per cent, or 10 per cent, 9 per cent and 4.5 per cent for small, 
medium and large firms, respectively. Beyond 180 trading days the drift is 
statistically insignificant. 
Encouraged by this, Bernard & Thomas (1990) using a similar methodology, 
investigated the hypothesis that the market systematically fails to fully reflect the 
implications of current earnings for future earnings. 26 The time series behaviour of 
quarterly earnings confirmed previous findings that a change in the earnings of quarter 
t tend to be followed by progressively smaller changes of the same sign for quarters 
t+l, t+2 and t+3 (sample mean autocorrelations of 0.34,0.19 and 0.06). A fraction 
of this earnings change is reversed in quarter t+4 (negative mean autocorrelation of 
-0.24). Only the remaining portion of the initial change represents a permanent shock. 
This pattern was found to be consistent across firms, industry and firm size, where 
large firms were associated with greater positive autocorrelations. 
These findings were used to test the more general hypothesis that prices fail to reflect 
a naive earnings expectation: a seasonal random walk, where expected earnings will 
be equal to earnings for the corresponding quarter from the previous year. If this is 
25 SUE represents forecast errors calculated as the difference between actual earnings and a 
statistical forecast of earnings. Where the forecast is estimated using a first-order autocorrelation 
earnings expectation model (see Foster 1977). The errors are then scaled by their historic standard 
deviation. 
26 SUES are calculated this time using an earnings expectation model based on a seasonal random 
walk with drift. 
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not the case and the autocorrelations mimic the same earnings pattern described above, 
then stock price responses are predictable. 27 If a market impounds all prior earnings 
information, the forecast errors should not autocorrelated. 
Bernard and Thomas found the three-day abnormal return around each earnings 
announcement to be predictable at least four quarters in advance. 8 With the pattern 
(both sign and magnitude) of abnormal returns in accordance with the autocorrelation 
pattern of earnings. In other words, if a firm announces an earnings increase 
(decrease) in quarter t, the market would be positively (negatively) surprised to learn 
of further increases (decreases) over the prior year, in quarters t+ 1, t+2 and t+3. With 
the magnitude of the surprise declining over each of the three quarters. The market 
continues to be surprised in quarter t+4, when the earnings pattern is reversed. 
Specifically, 23 to 31 per cent of the post-announcement drift is `delayed' until the 
subsequent quarter's earning announcement. The behaviour of returns from quarter 
t+1 through to t+3 suggest the market initially underreacts to quarter t earnings 
announcement, with quarter t+4 correcting for an overreaction. The greatest abnormal 
returns are concentrated in the first few days of the first quarter, suggesting most of 
the correction occurs early on in the financial year. 
A long position in quarter is extreme good news firms and a short position in the bad 
news firms, earned a three-day abnormal return of 1.32 per cent, 0.7 per cent and 0.04 
per cent over quarters t+l to t+3, respectively. The same position yielded a three-day 
abnormal return around the fourth quarter of -0.66 per cent. To establish the 
economic importance of these results, Bernard and Thomas devised a trading strategy 
which involved taking a position 15 days before the expected quarterly announcement, 
and holding the position throughout the announcement period; to take advantage of 
the concentration in abnormal returns focused around each announcement. The 
portfolio earned an estimated abnormal return of 4.2 per cent for an average holding 
' Just as the forecast errors of a naive expectation model are predictable due to autocorrelation - 
Freeman & Tse (1989). 
I The three-day window includes 2 days prior to the announcement and the disclosure date. 
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period of 15 days. Hence, from only using historic earnings information Bernard and 
Thomas were able to generate an abnormal return about as half as large as that based 
on the perfect foresight of earnings. 
Supporting evidence was obtained by Freeman & Tse (1989), Wiggins (1991) and 
Bartov (1992). Bartov (1992) shows that the market failure to recognise the time 
series process underlying earnings explains the full extent of the post-announcement 
drift, as opposed to a risk explanation. Bartov argues the strength of these results lies 
in the use of information only available to the market in quarter t rather than using 
actual reported earnings for quarter t+l (hence, which are unavailable in t) to control 
for unexpected earnings in quarter t+l. 
In short, the market does not seem to fully appreciate the time series behaviour of 
quarterly earnings, assuming a seasonal random walk in quarterly earnings, unaware 
of the complete implications of current earnings for the next four quarters. The 
market seems to expect that future earnings will be equal to earnings for the 
corresponding quarter of the previous year. Kothari & Sloan (1992) incorporated the 
findings of Bernard & Thomas (1989,1990) by including a lagged return of 9 months 
as well as a three year leading return in the price-earnings regression (see section 
1.4). 29 This increased the estimated average earnings response coefficient from 5.45 
to 6.92. Thus, evidence of post-announcement drift is not wholly inconsistent with 
evidence of price leading earnings - the two effects appear to persist side by side. The 
question is thus, what are the conditions under which the market anticipates earnings 
and when is the market continually surprised. 
1.7.2 Annual Report Information 
Ou & Penman (1989a) studied the `usefulness' of a wide variety of financial statement 
items in predicting changes in future earnings. The basis of their hypothesis being, 
that financial statement items other than current earnings capture fundamentals not 
utilized by the market, and so subsequently can be used to generate abnormal returns. 
29 Nine months is consistent with the results of Bernard & Thomas (1989) who find the majority 
of the drift occurs over a 180 day period. 
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From an original set of 68 accounting variables, data was gathered over the two 
subperiods 1965 to 1972, and 1973 to 1977, from which 28 variables were selected 
purely on their ability to predict earnings. 30 They develop a LOGIT model 
incorporating these variables to predict changes in annual EPS one year ahead, using 
publicly available information. Based on the assumption the pattern of annual EPS 
follows a random walk plus drift. 
More specifically, Ou and Penman formed portfolios on the basis of a Pr measure, 
which is essentially the outcome of a computerised fundamental analysis. Where Pr 
represents an estimate of the probability of an annual earnings increase in the coming 
year, based on a function of historic financial statement items. The Pr indicator is 
calculated by weighting the selected accounting variables by coefficients estimated 
using LOGIT estimation techniques during a prior estimation period. These weighted 
accounting variables are summed and transformed into an estimated probability as 
follows, 
Pr, =[1+ exP(-e'X, ) ]-' (1.4) 
Where X;, is the set of accounting variables in the financial accounts for firm i in year 
t, and 8 is the estimated coefficient weights applied to the variables. The value of Pr 
ranges from zero to unity, with values of Pr away from 0.5 indicating the direction of 
future earnings (increase or decrease) while those close to 0.5 indicate that the 
financial statement variables are unable to predict changes in future earnings. 
They developed an investment strategy by forming a hedge portfolio that takes a long 
position in 45.3 per cent of the stocks with highest predicted probability of an earnings 
increase, and a short position in the lowest 10.8 per cent of all stocks. 31 This 
strategy earned a pure profits of 8.3 per cent over a 12 month holding period, and 20.8 
'° Sixteen from the former subperiod and eighteen from the other, with only six in common. The 
six variables being return on assets, return on equity, change in return in equity, debt/equity ratio, 
percent change in dividend per share, and percent change in inventories. 
These proportions were determined using arbitrary cut-off points 0.6 and 0.3 for the Pr measure, 
respectively. See Ou & Penman (1989a) for details. 
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per cent annual abnormal return over the following three years. 
The Pr measure is shown to identify not only the direction of future earnings changes 
but also has the ability to predict abnormal returns of up to three years. The results 
suggest that the market fails to utilise fundamental information contained in financial 
statements. Replication of their work by Grieg (1992), Holthausen & Larcker (1992) 
and Stober (1992) however, seriously questions the validity of their results. 
Holthausen & Larcker (1992) replicate the Pr strategy instead for the period 1978 to 
1988. Their results were markedly different from Ou and Penman's, producing 
average annual returns of between -0.1 and 1.6 per cent, depending on the metric of 
excess returns. Implying the performance of the trading strategy is sensitive to the 
period examined. They refine the strategy slightly to test whether it is indeed the 
unexploited link between the various financial statement items and future earnings, 
that is driving the Pr measure. Their strategy of correlating the financial statement 
items directly with abnormal, returns rather than earnings changes, outperforms the OP 
strategy. 
Holthausen and Larcker also find evidence of continuing increasing abnormal returns 
for up to four years after the earnings announcement. This is consistent with the 
replication of Ou and Penman's work by Stober (1992) who shows Pr predicts 
abnormal returns for at least six years. Is it possible for stock prices to consistently 
underreact to fundamental information for such a long time? For instance, Bernard 
& Thomas (1990) find little or no drift occurs beyond 180 trading days. It would 
appear more likely that the Pr strategy is proxying for cross-sectional differences in 
expected returns. 
Grieg (1992) tested whether the abnormal returns of Ou and Penman could be 
explained by factors that act as a proxy for expected returns. The Pr measure would 
then merely be `a function of accounting ratios' which of course vary systematically 
across firms and across time reflecting cross-sectional differences in risk, size, and 
other determinants of expected returns. Thus, forming portfolios on the basis of Pr 
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is equivalent to forming portfolios on the basis of current earnings changes, prior stock 
performance and firm size. After controlling for beta and implementing a more 
precise control for size, Pr would appear to lose its apparent ability to predict for 
abnormal returns, from which Grieg draws the conclusion that the Ou and Penman 
result is dominated by the size effect. 
The likelihood of the Pr measure proxying for expected returns, is augmented by the 
manner in which accounting variables were selected for inclusion in the Pr measure 
(Ball 1992). Many of the descriptive variables (eg. return on equity, dividend payout, 
change in gross assets) possibly proxy for expected returns, on an individual basis. 
Therefore their combined effect of proxying for expected returns is presumably 
magnified. Moreover, their choice of accounting variables had no theoretical 
underpinnings, as they were chosen purely on their predictive ability of one year ahead 
earnings. This increases further the likelihood of an association between the chosen 
variables, of factors other than those hypothesised. 
Bernard (1992) draws a similarity between the findings of Ou and Penman to those 
of DeBondt & Thaler (1987). He contributes the success of Pr as a predictor of future 
earnings changes to mean reversion in earnings scaled by equity. On closer 
inspection, firms with recent earnings declines (growth) have high (low) Prs and 
subsequently increasing (falling) earnings. The high (low) Pr firms correspond to 
DeBondt and Thaler's losers (winners). Furthermore, high Pr firms stock 
underperform low Pr firms during the portfolio formation period, just as DeBondt and 
Thaler's losers underperformed winners. Bernard contends that Ou and Penman find 
instead further evidence of the stock market overreacting to current changes in 
earnings, and not an underreaction to financial statement items. Though despite these 
criticisms, Ou and Penman highlight the ability of various financial statement items 
to predict future abnormal returns. 
1.8 CONCLUSIONS 
There is considerable evidence that security prices anticipate future earnings, in some 
cases by up to 4 years in advance (Kothari & Sloan 1992), and that the level of 
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anticipation is an increasing function of firm size (Collins, Kothari & Rayburn 1987, 
Freeman 1987). Such evidence would suggest the market is using alternative more 
timely information sources, besides the information from the firm's financial 
statements. Both Ou & Penman (1989) and Bernard & Thomas (1990) show the 
market underreacts to this same publicly available information that can be used to 
predict future earnings changes. Bernard and Thomas find the market not only fails 
to fully impound current earnings, but appears to systematically ignore the full 
implications of current earnings for future earnings, and only impounds this 
information with a lag. It could possibly be construed the market is awaiting 
confirmation, but this does not explain why information in firm size, that is publicly 
available, is so comprehensively ignored by investors in their pursuit of abnormal 
returns. Several papers highlight the ability of other financial variables in predicting 
abnormal returns, in particular the PE ratio (Basu 1983). However, evidence of price 
leading earnings appears not to be inconsistent with evidence of lagged impounding, 
as Kothari & Sloan (1992) go on to demonstrate. The question is therefore, when 
does the market anticipate earnings and when is it consistently surprised. 
Post-announcement drift, in particular, has been extensively documented for nearly 30 
years. Such a result could indicate an intriguing anomaly related to potential market 
inefficiency, but many argue that (like other known anomalies) it is a mere statistical 
artifact. The extensive anomalies literature of the late 1970's and 1980's shows how 
far we have advanced in the efficiency debate. Until we fully understand the role of 
information costs and differential expectations, and implications of noise trading for 
security pricing, we cannot define efficiency. Without a precise definition we cannot 
conclude lagged impounding and persistent underreaction to accounting information, 
are examples of market inefficiency. However, tests of market efficiency remain 
impossible with dependence on the joint hypothesis problem. With the impossibility 
of testing market efficiency, perhaps it will suffice to determine if investors respond 
rationally to information releases. 
The underlying assumption of individuals is that they make rational choices based on 
rational expectations. However, people are subject to loss aversion, in that they treat 
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gains and losses differently, with losses looming larger than gains. People also seem 
subject to excessive optimism or pessimism. This may certainly be the case regarding 
P/E ratios. P/E ratios can be interpreted as the market forecast of future earnings 
growth. With hindsight, evidence suggests P/E ratios are systematically too extreme, 
explaining why low P/E stocks outperform high P/E stocks. Similarly, DeBondt & 
Thaler (1995) found by investing in prior losers outperforms prior winners. 
At first sight, the evidence of Bernard & Thomas (1990) certainly implies investors 
are irrational: they fail to recognise that if the first quarters' earnings are up on last 
years' first quarter, then the second quarter will also tend to be up on last year too. 
Though to correctly determine rational behaviour, we still need to fully understand the 
role of information costs and the implications of differential expectations for security 
pricing. More importantly, to distinguish between price changes due to information 
and those reflecting the actions of noise traders. 
The presence of any pre-announcement effects or indeed the absence of any post- 
announcement drift is not evidence enough to suggest the market is in fact 
informationally efficient. Information efficiency is only a sufficient condition in the 
context of information content studies (Lev & Ohlson 1982). If it is the case 
information that is worthwhile in stock valuation is being ignored, it has serious 
implications for market efficiency and also for the relevancy of accounting data in 
equity valuation. 
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2. EXPLANATIONS FOR LAGGED IMPOUNDING 
2.1 OBJECTIVES 
Chapter 2 discusses explanations in the literature for the apparent lagged impounding 
of public information disclosures. The main explanations reviewed in the chapter are: 
  the mis-estimation of abnormal returns; 
  the inappropriate use of analysts' forecasts; 
  investors' fixation on bottom line numbers; 
  short term investors who overlook long term information; 
  investors who `herd' on the information of others. 
The chapter also reviews the explanation implied by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), and 
identified by Kim & Verrecchia (1991a and 1991b), McNichols & Trueman (1994) 
and Demski & Feltham (1994), that investors choose not to be informed. This is 
because the expected costs of being informed exceed the expected benefits. 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
Drift in prices following earnings announcements has been extensively documented, 
along with growing evidence of the predictive power of financial statement 
information for future returns. For example, the observation by Bernard & Thomas 
(1990) that the (three day) stock price response to current quarter's earnings 
announcement is partially predictable from past earnings, directly challenges market 
efficiency. In addition they find, the market systematically fails to reflect the 
implications of current earnings for future earnings, questioning the rational behaviour 
of investors. These findings may indicate a potential market inefficiency with respect 
to certain information types or irrationality on the part of investors, or both. 
Alternatively, markets could be efficient and these apparent anomalies may be no 
more than statistical artifacts. This chapter proposes a rational explanation for the 
apparent underreaction by investors to public information. This is investors will only 
choose to be informed if they can earn a return. 
We address first, in section 2.3, the traditional criticism that the abnormal returns 
37 
which investors can expect to earn are mis-estimated. This covers the issues of: 
failing to capture unmeasured risk (Ball, Kothari & Watts 1992, Dontoh, Ronen & 
Sarath 1994); the exclusion of transaction costs (Stoll 1991, Bhushan 1994); and the 
mis-calculation of investor's rates of return. Section 2.4 explains the observed 
behaviour also as a fault of the research design, by the inappropriate use of analyst 
forecasts as a proxy for earnings expectations. Both Mendenhall (1991) and DeBondt 
& Thaler (1990) suggest that inefficient analyst forecasts and recommendations may 
be the originating source of any price under or overreaction. Section 2.5 argues 
investors are irrationally fixated by accounting numbers and pay little attention in how 
they are generated (Hand 1990). 
Sections 2.6 to 2.8 explain the dichotomy that what at first sight appears to be 
irrational investor behaviour is in fact rational. Section 2.6 suggests investors with 
short term horizons overlook information with long term implications. Prices will 
therefore fail to incorporate all available information (Dow & Gorton 1994). Section 
2.7 argues it may more profitable to `herd' on somebody else's information even if 
it is incorrect, than trade on one's own private information (Bikchandani, Hirshleifer 
& Welch 1992, Trueman 1990 and 1994). Section 2.8 discusses the idea that the 
market rationally chooses not to be informed, when the costs of being informed 
exceed the benefits (Kim & Verrecchia 1991a and 1991b, McNichols & Trueman 
1994, Demski & Feltham 1994). Section 2.9 concludes the chapter. 
2.3 ABNORMAL RETURNS ARE MIS-ESTIMATED 
A common criticism of event study findings is that measured abnormal returns are 
biased estimates of true economic profits investors can expect to earn. This is a 
consequence of our limited knowledge of the asset pricing theory. The mis- 
measurement is a function of the failure to control fully for risk, residual uncertainty, 
transaction costs, and the incorrect estimation of investors' rates of return. 
2.3.1 The Mis-measurement of Risk 
A frequent criticism of event studies is the failure to control adequately for risk. In 
instances where the post-announcement drift lasts for years, it is difficult to suggest 
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it could be anything other than a risk problem, although Bernard & Thomas (1989 and 
1990) and Ou & Penman (1989a) go to great lengths to eliminate this likelihood. One 
possibility is that trading strategies based on accounting variables reflect a risk 
premium not captured by beta or the market index (Bernard & Thomas 1989). It is 
plausible that changes in accounting variables (such as earnings) used to derive trading 
strategies are inevitably correlated with changes in the underlying economic 
characteristics, and therefore the risk profile of the firm (Ball, Kothari & Watts 1992). 
An alternative explanation is where the changing risk profile observed over event 
periods is not captured by the research design (Ball, Kothari & Watts 1992, Ball & 
Kothari 1991). Bare obviously a concern in a design that estimates betas in 
one period, and uses these betas in another period to measure abnormal returns. After 
controlling for changes in beta, Ball Kothari and Watts estimate the difference in 
abnormal returns between the extreme portfolios to be only 2.98 per cent, considerably 
smaller than the drift estimated elsewhere. Their evidence suggests that beta shifts 
might explain a large proportion of post-announcement drift (hereafter abbreviated as 
PAD). However their research design is a more likely explanation. For instance, the 
use of a change in annual earnings as opposed to quarterly earnings in forming 
portfolios. Much of the change in annual earnings is old news by the time its 
announced, so this approach tends to reduce the power to capture the full magnitude 
of PAD. Also, using annual data magnifies the importance of PAD and therefore 
cannot provide clear indications about the extent to which drift is explained by risk. 
However, this is less of a concern for Bernard and Thomas who do not rely on 
estimates of betas, but instead assume all security betas are equal in the post- 
announcement period. Under this assumption, the combined long position in extreme 
good news firms and short position in extreme bad news, has zero systematic risk. 
Their concern is therefore to explain any difference in the level of betas for high and 
low SUE firms in the post-announcement period. 
If mis-measured betas are the explanation, then the sign of the drift should vary 
according to whether the excess return on the market is positive or negative. 
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Specifically, good news stocks, which would have to be riskier than assumed, should 
have positive estimated returns in rising markets but negative abnormal returns for 
falling markets. However, Bernard and Thomas find for extreme good news abnormal 
returns are positive for both rising and falling markets, and are on average negative 
for extreme bad news. A result that is consistent with Ball, Kothari and Watts, who 
provide evidence that good news firms suffer temporary risk increases, and bad news 
firms suffer temporary risk decreases following annual earnings announcements. The 
magnitude of the shift around earnings announcements however appears to fall short 
of the amount necessary to explain the magnitude of the drift (Bernard & Thomas 
1989). 
Other aspects of the evidence of Bernard and Thomas also cast doubt on a risk 
explanation. Their trading strategy of a zero-investment portfolio, with long (short) 
positions in extremely good (bad) news firms, consistently earned positive returns. 
Secondly, the mean returns for extreme bad news stocks were so low it is doubtful 
whether declines in risk of any kind could plausibly explain their magnitude. 
Specifically, returns were less than that on Treasury bill rates during the 
announcement week, and only slightly greater during the first two months of the post- 
announcement period. Most compelling is how the failure to account for risk could 
explain the seasonal pattern of the earnings anomaly observed by Bernard and 
Thomas. It requires that the risk changes occur over short periods that coincide with 
the earnings announcement date. 
2.3.2 Partially Revealing Prices and Residual Uncertainty 
The existence of noise makes it impossible to distinguish between price changes due 
to new information, from changes due to liquidity trading. As a result there will be 
some residual uncertainty in the price process, and prices will only be partially 
revealing (Grossman & Stiglitz 1980). Prices will fail to reveal private information, 
but also fail to reveal consensus beliefs regarding future prices based on public 
information. Dontoh, Ronen & Sarath (1994) demonstrate that prices will therefore 
exhibit correlated drifts because `observed prices do not reveal the entirety of private 
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information held by traders, and hence, do not allow for accurate risk adjustments. " 
More specifically, in a partially revealing equilibrium, when investors receive a new 
signal (given that they are risk averse), they will not act with complete confidence 
regarding its implications. An additional signal which reflects the same underlying 
information as the first signal, will reduce residual uncertainty and generate demands 
(or sales) correlated with those that were obtained on receiving the first signal. 
Consequently, price changes will also exhibit serial correlation and produce a price 
series consistent with an underreaction to information. Hence, investors while fully 
comprehending their information, will rationally await further confirmation before 
trading. Dontoh, Ronen and Sarath go on to illustrate with high negative correlation 
between public signals, produces patterns of stock price overreaction. In sum, they 
show that apparent delays in the impounding of public information can be rationally 
explained by the mis-measurement of risk, caused by liquidity trading and 
heterogenous beliefs. 
2.3.3 Transaction costs 
The role of transaction costs is little understood, but it seems doubtful whether 
transaction costs are wholly responsible for lagged impounding, as the size of 
abnormal returns appear too large. For instance, the trading rule of Bernard and 
Thomas earned a return of 7.74 per cent over the first 180 post-announcement days. 
Stoll (1991) calculated a crude measure of the average transaction cost by comparing 
the sum of economy wide commission income, market maker trader gains and 
underwriting profits with aggregate trading volume on all stock exchanges. He 
estimated the mean round-trip transaction cost to be 1.2 per cent, and 0.75 per cent 
for institutions. Even after doubling these average costs they are far too low to 
explain abnormal returns. In contrast, Bhushan (1994) presents evidence that the 
magnitude of the post-announcement drift is an increasing function of direct and 
indirect costs of trading. 2 The observed inverse relation between drift and firm size 
' See Dontoh, Ronen & Sarath (1994) (p1). 
2 The direct costs of transacting include percent bid-ask spreads and commissions, while the indirect 
costs include the price pressure effect and the delay in getting the entire order filled. These are proxied 
by share price and annual dollar trading volume, respectively. 
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disappears when transaction costs are controlled for. 
Those who trade aggressively may face higher costs, but lagged impounding lasts for 
several months and so it does not make sense for traders to continue trading in this 
manner. Transaction costs are likely to predict a delayed price response to 
announcements until the information is impounded by traders for whom the costs are 
lower. As Bernard & Thomas (1990) propose, it is hard to understand why the mis- 
pricing continues for so many months, presumably the market would process less 
costly information in the meantime. Although it prevents investors initially from 
trading, it does not explain why information is not fully impounded. More mystifying 
is why it would be related to the time series behaviour of earnings (Bernard & 
Thomas 1990). 
2.3.4 The Mis-measurement of Investors' Rates of Return 
The estimates of returns are unlikely to be the true returns of investors, due to inherent 
measurement problems. The recorded prices are unlikely to be the prices investors 
have traded at, on the basis of the earnings information. As the recorded price may 
equal either the closing-bid, the closing-ask, or even a bid-ask average, but not 
necessarily the transaction price. Therefore, the returns of portfolios that trade 
frequently over short intervals are more likely to be biased in comparison to portfolios 
with long holding stocks (with the probable exception for small priced stocks which 
trade less frequently). This will bias the results in studies that sell short and buy long 
frequently (Ball 1992). 3 The return estimates also ignore the possible effects on 
security returns of differential tax treatment of dividend income and capital gains, 
which are likely to be correlated with earnings (Ball 1992). 
2.4 ANALYSTS' FORECASTS OF AS A PROXY FOR EARNINGS 
EXPECTATIONS 
This section surveys a number of papers which suggest analysts produce inefficient 
forecasts. This subsequently has implications for researchers who use analyst forecasts 
Bid mask bias appears not to be a problem in Bernard & Thomas (1990). 
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as a proxy for earnings expectations. Therefore, any measured post-announcement 
drift would reflect a fault in the research design of the inappropriate use of analyst 
forecasts. 
There has been increased use of analyst forecasts as a proxy for investors' earnings 
expectations, in an attempt to identify with greater accuracy the unexpected element 
of earnings. Both Mendenhall (1991) and DeBondt & Thaler (1990) suggest that 
inefficient analyst forecasts and recommendations may be the originating source of 
any price under or overreaction. We would expect at least, analysts to produce 
superior forecasts over times series models as they are able to survey a richer set of 
information, plus they have direct access to the statistical models themselves. Brown 
et al (1987) draws caution to inferring conclusions from use of a proxy for market 
expectations when we do not sufficiently understand what is driving the market's 
response to earnings announcements. ` The use of analysts' earnings forecasts implies 
a certain decision process on the part of investors. 
Butler & Lang (1991) found analysts either tend to be persistently optimistic or 
pessimistic relative to the use of consensus forecasts. ' So the efficiency of analysts' 
forecasts may be in doubt, but evidence suggests their predictive ability relative to 
other proxies is significantly more accurate in forecasting abnormal returns (Brown 
et al 1987, O'Brien 1988, Bhushan 1989, Kross, Ro & Schroeder 1990). Kross, Ro 
and Schroeder show the advantage of Value-Line analysts' over time series models 
is positively related to the amount of coverage of the firm in the Wall Street Journal, 
earnings variability and their timing advantage, but negatively related to number of 
Brown et al (1987): "If the unexpected earnings proxy measures the market's assessment with 
error, the results can, in certain experimental designs, lead to incorrect inferences. This issue is 
potentially important when the researcher attempts to hold constant the effects of unexpected earnings 
while testing hypotheses for other financial variables. Any correlation between the measurement error 
in the unexpected earnings proxy and the other financial variables results in biased statistics. " 
5 Butler & Lang (1991) and O'Brien (1988) found no statistically significant evidence of 
differential analyst forecast accuracy (using IBES data). 
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lines of business and firm size .6 
Abarbanell (1991) reveals that Value-Line analysts do not fully incorporate prior price 
changes in their earnings forecast revisions, and that it is possible to predict the sign 
of the forecast error from the price change. Elgers & Murray (1992) evaluate the 
relative performance of IBES consensus financial analyst forecasts and forecasts based 
on the anticipatory behaviour of security prices. Security price based models are 
envisaged to be superior forecasters, encompassing a broader set of publicly available 
information presumably including analyst forecasts. The relative accuracy depends 
upon the extent to which analysts exploit the earnings relevant information in security 
returns, as well as upon the degree to which analysts' forecasts reflect information not 
yet impounded in security returns and even information not relevant to security 
evaluation. Elgers and Murray find that neither forecast source dominates the other 
with respect to their accuracy to predict earnings growth, or their contemporaneous 
association between unexpected earnings and security returns. Instead they appear to 
be complementary sources of information, each providing a unique source of 
information. 
Analysts would appear to underestimate the persistence of earnings forecast errors 
when revising their earnings forecasts (Mendenhall 1991), which investors in turn use. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, Mendenhall found a significant positive association 
between forecast revisions and the abnormal returns around subsequent earnings 
announcements, implying investors also underestimate the persistence level signalled 
by earnings forecast revisions, as a likely result from using analyst revisions. 
Abarbanell & Bernard (1992) examined the extent to which Value-Line analyst 
responses to earning announcements could explain post-announcement drift, and found 
the magnitude of the autocorrelations in analyst forecast errors were only 
approximately half as large as necessary to explain the magnitude of the delayed price 
6 Philbrick & Ricks (1991) found that the source of analysts' forecast data is not as important as 
the selection of actual EPS data, although Value-Line data appears to represent the most appropriate 
source of actual EPS data. Studies that use IBES forecasts ad especially COMPUSTAT are likely to 
find a greater overreaction effect (Bartov 1992). 
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reaction to earnings. Hence, stock prices appear to underreact to even a greater extent, 
consistent with the results of Mendenhall (1991), and perhaps suggests stock prices 
reflect less information than analyst forecasts. 
Implicit in the use of analyst forecasts, is that they reflect analysts' own private 
information in an unbiased manner. Trueman (1994) shows that analysts are subject 
to herding behaviour. Analysts prefer to give a forecast that is close to prior earnings 
forecasts, even if issuing a more extreme forecast is justified by their own private 
information. Such behaviour is motivated by the analyst's objective of maximising 
his or her client's assessment of their forecasting ability, which may in part determine 
their compensation. Analysts with greater forecasting ability are not only less 
influenced by previous forecasts, but are also likely to release their forecasts first as 
they have no incentive to delay it. This contradicts conventional wisdom, that later 
forecasts are therefore more accurate as more information becomes available. 
The greater the variability of the firm's earnings, the less likely a weaker analyst will 
deviate from their unbiased opinion. Trueman postulates that investors are aware of 
this herding behaviour among analysts, as well as their forecasting ability, and so 
realise forecasts close to prior forecasts in actual fact justify a more extreme forecast. 
An implication of this is that the price reaction surrounding earnings releases will not 
be as large as expected assuming analysts are unbiased. Investors are also expected 
to be aware that a small positive forecast warrants the belief that the analyst has 
information that the expected earnings are even more positive. 
With regard to the UK, the evidence is inconclusive. Lonie, Lonie & Powers (1989) 
find data to justify overreaction among analysts, whereas O'Hanlon & Whiddett 
(1991) find IBES analysts are prone to underreaction. Their 1990 paper found 
overreaction due to biased expectations of analysts' forecasts, so confirming with the 
earlier results of O'Brien (1988). 
A question that remains is why have analysts not traded on known stock price 
anomalies, thereby eliminating their existence. While instead they continue to make 
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systematic errors in forecasting earnings. One suggestion may be that it is a reflection 
of psychological forces, or perhaps the incentive structure analysts face (see 
McNichols 1989, Kang, O'Brien & Sivaramakrishnan 1994). Evidence suggests that 
analysts tend to give optimistic forecasts which tend to result in a greater number of 
trades, than pessimistic forecasts. This enables analysts to augment their 
compensation. 
2.5 FUNCTIONAL FIXATION HYPOTHESIS 
By examining the market reaction to information we are testing the hypothesis that the 
market is rational in its interpretation and assimilation of information into security 
prices in a rapid and unbiased manner. Rationality implies that expected utility 
maximising investors correctly use all information that is relevant in security 
valuation. The functional fixation hypothesis (FFH) claims that investors who are 
unfamiliar with the numerable accounting techniques used to produce financial 
statements, rely on `bottom line' accounting figures without paying attention to the 
procedures in generating them. Investors should be able to distinguish whether a 
change in accounting figures represents a change in underlying economic factors or 
is a result of reshuffling numbers. FFH asserts investors are unable to distinguish 
between the two. This area of research was one of the most active in the 1970's 
where research was concerned with whether the market could `see through' the 
impacts of alternative accounting methods. On the whole, investors appeared able to 
differentiate between the effects on accounting numbers of alternative methods. ' 
Hand (1990) examined the stock price reaction to quarterly earnings announcements 
of firms that undertook debt/equity swaps during 1981 to 1984. Using a modified 
version of FFH, in which he assumes only `unsophisticated' investors fail to correctly 
distinguish the true cause of a change in earnings. On occasions the price of a stock 
may be determined by the sole actions of a unsophisticated marginal investor, the 
coincidence of which is believed to be greater in smaller firms. Since the financial 
repercussions of a debt/equity swap for accounting earnings are disclosed at the time 
7 See Beaver (1989) for a brief review. 
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of the swap transactions are announced, the accounting gain produced by the swap 
should not cause a further stock price reaction when the quarterly earnings are 
announced for that period. Hand shows that abnormal returns in the earnings 
announcement period are positively related to the magnitude of the previously known 
swap gain, surely supporting evidence that investors are fixated by numbers. Tinic 
(1990) begs to differ, and suggests that due to a number of conceptual and empirical 
problems not addressed by Hand, the evidence is neither conclusive one way or the 
other. Large abnormal returns may in part be explained by the non-trivial transaction 
costs associated with swap transactions. Ball & Kothari (1991) argue that the effect 
Hand observes is indistinguishable from the firm size effect. 
In an earlier study, Harris & Ohlsen (1987) found the book value of oil and gas 
producers contained useful information in determining a firm's market value, during 
1979 to 1984. Furthermore, they showed the market could discriminate between full 
cost and successful efforts method of accounting. Based on these initial findings, they 
later examined in 1990 whether the observed relationship between book and market 
values is driven by the value relevance of the book values or by the actions of 
investors who are fixated by balance sheet figures. Harris and Ohisen find investors 
to be fixated with balance sheet figures. By extending the time period covered by 
Harris and Ohlsen by four years, Tinic (1990) however found the reverse of these 
results. 
The results thus far are inconclusive, neither supportive nor unsupportive of the FFH. 
It is entirely plausible that there are investors who are fixated by numbers, but unless 
they are also irrational, they would soon realise that relying on the `bottom line' is not 
financially beneficial. Unless of course, it is not cost-effective to look beyond the 
bottom line figures. It is arguable whether they need to incur costs to become more 
`sophisticated' in the interpretation of accounting numbers, and can instead merely 
observe the interpretation of others by observing the market price. There is little 
doubt that the market uses accounting information, but whether it correctly interprets 
it or how much weight it places on it relative to other sources is unclear. 
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Choice of accounting methods is more likely to be governed by financial incentives 
rather than providing for a `true and fair view'. The change in accounting method is 
likely to be as important as the figure itself, as changes in accounting methods are 
often seen as signs of changing operational or financial characteristics. The inability 
to control for whether the market's reaction to accounting changes is caused by 
unexpected changes in the real characteristics of the firm or purely by the altered 
accounting procedures, reduces the power of these tests. Furthermore, the importance 
placed on accounting information and likewise the importance of accounting method, 
may alter systematically across firms - it may be more evidence of the small firm 
effect in disguise. 
2.6 LONG VERSUS SHORT HORIZONS 
Traditional information based asset pricing models implicitly assume traders have long 
term horizons and will hold assets until their liquidation. There are many instances 
when this is not the case. For instance, investors may need to trade for liquidity 
reasons, or a portfolio manager may need to liquidate his funds for his performance 
to be assessed. Also, the meaning of long term information may be less explicit than 
for short term information. Therefore, short term information may be more easily 
interpreted. Dow & Gorton (1994) show investors may adopt a shorter trading 
horizon because of increased risk, transaction fees and the opportunity cost associated 
with a buy and hold policy over an extended period of time. The question is, does 
a market with numerous short term traders operate less efficiently than one with 
traders who adopt a buy and hold policy? We look to Dow and Gorton for an answer. 
Conventional wisdom assumes as long as traders are rational, trading horizons should 
not affect asset prices. A trader who plans to sell his stock in five minutes is 
concerned with the expected price at that time. That price, in turn, depends on the 
expected price five minutes hence, and so on. Backward deduction assures that short 
term traders will replicate the actions of long term traders, by speculating on long run 
fundamentals. Hence, the asset must be correctly priced today. Dow and Gorton 
argue although this may apply to public information, it does not include private 
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information. 8 For a privately informed trader to engage in costly arbitrage, the asset 
price must not adjust immediately to reflect his information, but have adjusted by the 
time he closes out his position. If he believes this not to be the case, he will not 
purchase the stock and its price will not reflect his information. So the initial trader's 
actions are dependent upon the belief that another similarly informed trader will arrive,,, 
before the end of his trading horizon, and also purchase the stock. Although, for the 
second trader to trade he must also believe that other traders will arrive otherwise he 
will not buy, and so on. Slowly a continuous `chain of arbitrageurs' will develop. 
In short, a trader will only trade if there is a high enough probability of another trader 
arriving in the market within the same horizon. This implies a privately informed 
trader is unlikely to trade a long time in advance of an event. Long term information 
may be worthless therefore to short term traders. Consequently not all private 
information will be impounded into price due to the associated risk. This risk is likely 
to be an decreasing function of firm size. Larger firms are associated with a higher 
volume of trade, and so increase the probability of different investors trading on the 
same information. ' Dow and Gorton conclude, short term horizons can cause security 
mis-pricing with respect to private information, even when traders are fully rational. 
2.7 THE `HERDING' OF INFORMATION AND ACTIONS 
If traders have long horizons, it is assumed long term information is more valuable 
to them than short term information. It is considered more profitable for traders to 
learn information that others do not know. This behaviour is contrary to the practice 
of professional traders, whose objectives include predicting short term changes in 
assets' prices. Instead traders may `herd' on the same information, trying to learn 
what others also know. They may consequently trade on information that is profitable 
but which is not necessarily fundamental. Consider an informed trader who wishes 
to liquidate his position before any public news arrives. He can only profit from his 
8 However, this presumes that public information is precise and therefore requires no interpretation; 
i. e. the implications are known and immediately impounded into price. This contradicts the existence 
of post announcement drift, which is the lagged impounding of public information. 
9 This may explain why earnings are anticipated earlier for larger firms (Freeman 1987). 
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information if it is impounded into price by other similarly informed traders. For the 
trader to be better off therefore, others must act on the same information. 
Froot, Scharfstein & Stein (1990,1992) show theoretically that rational short term 
traders induce short term informational inefficiency; a conclusion consistent with Dow 
& Gorton (1994). As more speculators study a given piece of information more of 
that information disseminates into the market, and therefore profits from that learning 
early decrease. Hence, traders will tend to focus on one source of information rather 
than a diverse set of data. This may lead to other fundamental information being 
ignored, which may explain why data in the financial statements is often not 
incorporated into security prices (Ou & Penman 1989a and 1989b). Herding may also 
explain the behaviour of traders who focus on different variables over different periods 
of time (see Lev & Thiagaran 1994). 1° 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch (1992) address the behaviour of traders who herd 
on the actions of previous traders, as opposed to herding on similar information. They 
term such behaviour as an `information cascade' - when an individual follows the 
actions of those ahead of him without regard to his own private information. The 
earlier in the sequence of actions the cascade starts, the greater the probability that the 
traders will be wrong in their decisions. Alternatively, to start a cascade may be the 
rational decision for a trader who is late in the sequence, assuming all prior trades 
reflect information. The former scenario highlights the problem with cascades, by 
everyone following suit they may prevent the aggregation of information. It more 
importantly shows, cascades will always eventually occur whether traders trade on 
information or others' actions. But once a cascade has started all further trades are 
uninformative. 
A similar idea is entertained by Brennan (1990). Although the market may 
systematically use the wrong procedure in valuing securities the reward to knowing 
the correct procedure may be slight, unless there is a sufficient degree of coordination 
1° This does not necessarily imply the underlying valuation model is continually changing. 
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among investors' information acquisition activities (and interpretation), especially 
when it is costly to do so. Brennan explains `while too much information acquisition 
activity will compete away the rewards to acquiring information..., too little 
information acquisition also may make it not worthwhile for any individual to 
undertake it. ' As a result, two states of equilibrium may exist, one in which there is 
information acquisition and another where asset values remain latent even despite 
relatively low information costs. 
Whether a cascade causes individuals to converge on the `wrong' or `correct' decision, 
will depend on the sequence of individuals, the precision of their respective 
information, and if the sequence of traders is known. The trader with the most precise 
information may have more to lose by not trading on new information immediately, 
before it is disseminated by others. Less precise traders will therefore have the 
incentive delay their decision, and free-ride on these earlier more precise decisions. 
Similarly, the more uncertain an individual is about the correctness of his judgement, 
the more susceptible he is to free-riding. Alternatively, if the same precise trader acts 
on her own judgement later in the sequence, such an action could `shatter' the 
cascade. 
In a similar vein to Bikhchandani et al (1992), Trueman (1994) explains the 
forecasting behaviour of analysts. Implicit in the use of analyst forecasts is that they 
reflect information. By employing a theoretical model to examine the behaviour of 
two analysts who release their forecasts sequentially, Trueman finds analysts are also 
subject to herding. Especially if the second analyst's ability is `weak', he will 
condition his forecast on the previous forecast of the first analyst, even if his own 
private information warrants a more extreme forecast. But unlike Bikhchandani et al's 
paper, the second analysts' forecast is still informative. 
This is similar to previous research (Trueman 1990) that shows an analyst may be 
reluctant to revise a previously issued forecast upon the receipt of new information. 
This is because a forecast revision implies the analyst's original information was 
incorrect, and may affect the investor's assessment of the analyst's ability. The 
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analyst's objective for biasing his forecast arises from how he is compensated; i. e. if 
the fee he can charge for his forecasts directly depends on his client's assessment of 
his forecasting ability. This suggests the weaker analyst has an incentive to delay his 
forecast to after that of the stronger analyst. So as Trueman states, later forecasts in 
the financial year do not necessarily reflect more information but may instead replicate 
earlier forecasts. Hence, earlier forecasts may be more accurate forecasts of future 
earnings. 
Trueman presumes investors are aware of analysts' forecasting behaviour, and they 
recognize that an analyst who issues a forecast close to prior forecasts may have 
information that justifies a more extreme forecast. Thus, the observed price reaction 
to an extreme earnings announcement may be smaller than expected, if former 
expectations were based on analyst forecasts (which are assumed to be unbiased). 
Additionally, analysts appear optimistic for forecasts that represent an negative change 
from prior expectations, as opposed to those reflecting a positive change. This is 
supportive of evidence that buy recommendations often accompany optimistic 
forecasts, as buy recommendations generate greater stock turnover than sell 
recommendations, and analyst compensation methods is partly based on sales 
commission. This begs the question, that if investors are aware of analyst behaviour 
why should analysts try to deceive them. An alternative explanation may be investors 
do not use analyst forecasts (see Bhushan 1994). 
2.8 INVESTORS CHOOSE NOT TO BE INFORMED 
The above sections have surveyed a number of explanations for why the market 
appears not to instantaneously impound new information. A further explanation is that 
market agents choose not to be informed, so consequently not all potential information 
is reflected by price. The seminal paper in this area was by Grossman & Stiglitz 
(1980), who identify the conditions under which information search will take place. 
It was one of the first papers to suggest that prices in equilibrium are unlikely to fully 
reflect all information, because the costs of information search exceed the expected 
benefits. The more recent papers of Kim & Verrecchia (1991 a, 1991 b), McNichols 
& Trueman (1994) and Demski & Feltman (1994), have tackled the problem 
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analytically. They collectively identify several incentives for investors to be informed. 
These four papers derive theoretical models under similar frameworks, that rationalise 
and explain the behaviour of market participants around public corporate 
announcements. 
The papers employ a multi-period rational expectations model of three distinct trading 
periods with endogenous private information acquisition. In the first period traders 
achieve their optimal portfolio by trading on public pre-disclosure information and any 
private information they are privy to, in the expectation of the forthcoming event. The 
information arrives in the second period which may change traders' beliefs and induce 
them into a new round of trading securities. In the third period the return is realized 
and consumed. Beyond this, the papers have several distinguishing features with 
respect to underlying assumptions regarding the assumed information structure and the 
required equilibrium conditions. Before we discuss each of these later papers in 
greater depth, we will briefly review the seminal paper on information efficiency by 
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980). 
2.8.1 Grossman & Stiglitz 
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) address the conflict between an informationally efficient 
price and the incentives to acquire information. While rejecting to Fama's 1970 (and 
1991) definition of market efficiency; that an efficient price is defined as one which 
`fully reflects all available information'. Grossman and Stiglitz suggest that for 
security prices to impound ALL available information, information must be costless. 
Or similarly, for profits to be eliminated, arbitrage must be costless. If market prices 
accurately reflect all available information at any one time for free, there is no 
incentive to acquire any further information. Thus, an informationally efficient 
market, as defined by Fama, would appear to be incompatible with costly information. 
Their statement is based on an equilibrium model that consists of two sets of traders: 
the informed who acquire information at a cost, and the uninformed who can observe 
only price. As more individuals become informed, the more informative price 
becomes. The proportion of those being informed will depend on the cost of 
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information, the level of noise in the price system, and the quality of the information 
acquired by the informed traders. The smaller information costs and the higher the 
level of noise, the greater the incentive to become informed. An increase in noise 
reduces the informativeness of price. This in turn increases the return to information 
and leads to more individuals becoming informed, ceteris paribus. What Grossman 
and Stiglitz show/, is that the two effects exactly offset each other, so the level of price 
informativeness remains constant. The effect of an increase in the quality of the 
informed traders' information is similarly a two edged sword. Increased quality will 
increase the demand for further information, reflected in increased price 
informativeness. Increased price informativeness reduces the benefits of being 
uninformed, ceteris paribus. Thus a point will be reached when the costs of being 
informed exceedSthe benefits. 
Through theoretical deduction, they show equilibrium can only exist when information 
is very inexpensive, or when informed traders receive very precise information. 
Hence, an efficient price is a noisy estimate of the asset's future payoff; i. e. security 
prices are only partially revealing. This can be simply explained by observing two 
extreme conditions of price informativeness. When there is no noise, prices will 
convey all information (both public and private), decreasing the incentive to be 
informed. Conversely, if everyone is uninformed, it clearly pays a single individual 
to become informed and trade against the uninformativeness of other traders. 
Grossman and Stiglitz finally highlight a further conflict (p404): `whenever there are 
differences in beliefs that are not completely arbitraged, there is an incentive to create 
a market. ' They cite an earlier paper of Grossman (1970), which examined how the 
presence of noise in a commodity's spot price led to different expectations as to its 
future price. This led to the opening of a futures market. Thus, uninformed traders 
were able to observe two prices reflecting information, and thereby eliminating any 
noise. The underlying assumption being that differences in beliefs are endogenous, 
arising from the acquisition of information and the informativeness of the price 
system. Assuming the creation of markets is costless, equilibrium is unlikely to ever 
exist, and the whole theory becomes untenable. 
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2.8.2 Kim & Verrecchia 
Kim & Verrecchia (1991a and 1991b) (hereafter KV), use a rational expectations 
framework to model the market's anticipation of and reaction to accounting 
disclosures. They theoretically deduce that market anticipation is an increasing 
function of: 
  the precision of the public disclosure, 
  the precision of private information, 
  the level of noise in the price system, 
  the risk aversion of the investor, and 
  the cost of information. 
(i) Kim & Verrecchia 1991a 
More specifically, KV assume traders are diversely informed and differ in the 
precision of their private information. Some traders are therefore more informed than 
others and will hold differing expectations, and hence, upon an announcement will 
respond in different ways creating a positive volume of trade. Traders will be aware 
that the securities' prices reflect, although only partially, the private information of 
other traders, and so influence their own demand for further information (i. e. price acts 
as a substitute for information that would otherwise be acquired). If security prices 
were to fully reflect all private information, all traders' beliefs would converge and 
there would be no inducement to trade. 
When information is publicly announced, investors will revise their beliefs unless it 
equals their prior expectations. The price reaction measures the average change in 
investors' beliefs, whereas trading volume reflects the accumulated reaction of all 
investors. More precisely, KV defines the price reaction to a public release as 
PZ -P 1=K 
Surprise + Noise j (2.1) 
2 
Where the change in price (P2 - P1) at the time of the announcement is proportional 
to both the unexpected element of the announcement (plus noise), and its relative 
importance across the posterior beliefs of traders. Its relative importance is increasing 
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in the precision of the announced information, n, and decreasing in the average 
precision of traders total private information after the public announcement, K2. Noise 
provides an additional source of uncertainty and prevents security prices from fully 
revealing all private information; this in turn supports the incentive to acquire costly 
private information (see Grossman & Stiglitz 1980). 
Trading volume is not only an increasing function of the absolute change in price, but 
also reflects the level of information asymmetry prevailing before the announcement, 
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Where f r, I s; -sI di is the weighted average of the absolute deviations of the 
precision of traders' private information, s;, from the average precision, s, weighted 
by investor i's risk tolerance, r;. A trader's risk tolerance determines the degree of 
aggressiveness with which he exploits his position. The greater the information 
asymmetry across investors, the greater the expected volume reaction due to the extent 
of belief revisions. " 
Hence, the expected volume and price reaction are increasing functions of the 
precision of the announced information and decreasing functions of the amount of 
preannouncement public and private information. As the quality of the announcement 
increases, traders react to the news with greater conviction. As the quality of 
preannouncement information increases, the relative importance of the announcement 
decreases, and so traders respond less strongly to the announcement. 
Atiase & Bamber (1994) are the first to empirically test KV's trading volume 
proposition, using 5,282 annual earnings announcements. As a proxy for the 
unobservable level of pre-disclosure information asymmetry, both the dispersion and 
" Volume, hence, may be a noisier indicator than a change in price of the precision of the event 
and of private information. 
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range in analyst forecasts were used. One limitation in using analyst forecasts, is that 
their divergence in beliefs are likely to underestimate the true divergence in beliefs of 
a broader, more heterogeneously and a less well informed, set of investors. Secondly, 
analyst forecasts reflect divergent expectations rather than differential precision of 
information. The use of expectation variables is likely to reflect more than 
information asymmetry, as differential expectations can occur even if investors are 
privy to information of the same precision. 
By employing a multivariate analysis, trading volume is regressed on the abnormal 
return metric, proxies for information asymmetry, and firm size as a control variable. 
As shown in equation (2.2) above, the difference between the precision of each 
investor's private information and the average precision of all investors' private 
information is weighted by each investor's risk tolerance. Of course, empirically this 
is not possible to assess, so Atiase and Bamber assume that investors' risk tolerance 
is uncorrelated with the precision of their private information. Using various volume 
measures, they examine the market response over both a two day event window (t=- 
1,0) and a seven day window (t=-1, +5). 
The results are consistent with KV's theoretical proposition that the trading volume 
reaction to earnings announcements is an increasing function of both the magnitude 
of the associated price reaction on the day, and the level of information asymmetry. 
Moreover, even after controlling for the absolute price reaction, the level of 
information asymmetry is significantly positively related to investors' trading volume 
reactions to earnings announcements. This provides insight into the market's 
assimilation of information by suggesting that pre-disclosure information asymmetry 
in part explains the relationship between the volume and price reactions to public 
disclosures. The greater the level of pre-disclosure information asymmetry, the greater 
the earnings announcement's effect on the investors' trading activity, ceteris paribus. 
(ii) Kim & Verrecchia 1991b 
In a later paper, KV develop the theory by incorporating more fully the implications 
of investor risk preferences and the marginal cost of information acquisition. An 
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important result of the paper is that the behaviour of information asymmetry is 
unimodal; i. e. informational asymmetry increases as the precision of the public 
announcement increases up to some point, and steadily decreases thereafter. Here, the 
extent of information asymmetry is greatest when anticipating a less precise disclosure 
than when anticipating either a perfect announcement or no announcement at all (the 
equivalent of an announcement of zero precision). If the quality of an announcement 
is so precise (i. e. dominates all investors' beliefs) there exists no need to acquire 
further private information, and consequently individual beliefs will converge. 
Similarly, if no announcement is expected there exists little incentive for acquiring 
further private information, as there will be few profitable opportunities. In between 
these two extremes, the impact of the announcement must be large enough and 
sufficiently imprecise (although above zero precision) to create a large divergence in 
investors' beliefs providing enough profitable opportunities to induce trade. 
Regarding risk preference, the lower the risk aversity of the investor, the lower their 
demand for more accurate private information. Similarly, the higher the marginal cost 
of acquiring information, the greater the reluctance to acquire high quality information. 
The reduction in information acquisition is assumed greater for those relatively more 
informed than for the less well informed. The differential in precision levels between 
individuals will become closer, reducing informational asymmetry. Thus, the price 
reaction at the time of the announcement will be stronger reflecting a greater 
unexpected element. The volume reaction may either increase or decrease, depending 
on which is the greater - an increased price variance relative to the reduction in 
information asymmetry. 
The greater the presence of noise in prices, the greater the demand for more accurate 
information. As the level of noise declines (or as the quality of prior information 
increases), the quality of free information improves perfectly offsetting the reduction 
in the cost of information acquisition. The overall quality of the trader's total 
information remains the same. KV assume each investor reduces his private 
information acquisition by the same amount, so average precision remains the same 
and the level of informational asymmetry is unaltered. Consequently, both the 
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variance of price change and expected trading volume both decline because residual 
uncertainty is reduced. 
On the assumption that the announcement and its precision are correctly anticipated 
by investors, KV demonstrate that anticipating an announcement encourages relatively 
more information gathering, implying a weaker price reaction at the time of the 
announcement. The volume reaction is less clear, as the price reaction is smaller but 
information asymmetry has increased. Relaxing the assumption of known precision 
of the announcement until it is released, further increases both the price and volume 
response. 
2.8.3 McNichols & Trueman 
The paper of McNichols & Trueman (1994) (hereafter MT) contrasts with the work 
of KV, and Demski & Feltham (1994) (hereafter DF) in the following ways. MT 
focus on the activities of a single informed trader, who chooses the precision of his 
information, who is risk neutral and takes into account how his demand for a firm's 
shares affects the firm's market price. 12 MT argue this allows them to extract from 
the risk implications and understand more fully the impact a public signal has on 
information acquisition. MT hypothesise market anticipation to be an increasing 
function of: 
  the precision of the public disclosure, 
  the precision of the private information, 
  the level of noise in the price system, and 
  the probability of the public disclosure. 
More specifically, the informed trader has a finite horizon, so he can only gain profit 
from his information if the firm makes a public disclosure during third period (see 
Dow & Gorton 1994). More importantly, MT assume the announcement is released 
in period 2 with probability p, whereas KV and DF assume that p is equal to one; i. e. 
its probability of occurrence is known with accuracy. The higher the probability or 
'2 KV and DF assume demand does not affect price and traders are risk averse. 
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greater the expected precision of an announcement, the greater the expected trading 
profits of the informed trader which gives him an incentive to increase the precision 
of his information. 
By holding constant the precision of the informed trader's private information, MT 
demonstrate the trader's expected trading profits are an increasing function of the 
covariance between the errors in the public and private signals. This implies the 
informed trader can capitalise upon his informational advantage, by trading against the 
less well informed. His expected return is an increasing function of noise and the 
imprecision of the announcement. The more precise the informed trader's 
information, the more aggressively he acts on it, and the greater its impact on pre- 
announcement price. This relation arises because the greater the covariance, the 
greater is the informed traders ability to predict the price change that will occur when 
the public signal is announced. A trader will therefore prefer to collect information 
that is highly correlated with the firm's forthcoming disclosure. " 
Finally, they observe the absolute price change is an increasing function of both the 
probability and precision of the public disclosure. As a consequence, the magnitude 
of the announcement date price change is decreasing in the probability of the 
disclosure, and in some cases, is also decreasing in its precision. Hence, it is not 
always possible to use the magnitude of the announcement date price reaction to 
assess the informativeness of a public disclosure. ' 
Their model supports the opinion that traders have short term horizons, as opposed to 
holding their positions in the firm until its liquidating value is revealed, as 
alternatively assumed by KV and DF. Through theoretical deduction, MT show it is 
more valuable to the trader to be informed with respect to the forthcoming 
" The papers of KV and DF assume the errors in the public and private signals are independent. 
There is considerable empirical evidence in support of greater association between earnings forecast 
errors and contemporaneous stock price changes than for any other financial statement variables, 
suggesting that private information about forthcoming earnings is more valuable to investors than private 
information about forthcoming cash flows. 
14 This has implications for post announcement drift studies. 
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announcement than of the firm's liquidating value. A public disclosure is likely to be 
of little value to a long term trader. 
2.8.4 Demski & Feltham 
Demski & Feltham (1994) (hereafter DF) assume all traders, who are risk averse, 
receive the same signal of a fixed precision. Their model consists of two sets of 
traders, those who are informed and the uninformed (i. e. noise traders). Consistent 
with KV, they presume that the public signal is sufficient for the private signal; i. e. 
the public signal is of a quality to dominate all beliefs, so all parties are on an equal 
information footing after its release. As informed traders have the same information 
of equal precision, price is uninformative to them. Whereas price is the only 
information available to the uninformed. In short, DF hypothesise market anticipation 
to be an increasing function of: 
  the precision of the public disclosure, 
  the precision of private information, 
  the level of noise in the price system, 
  the cost of information, and 
  the accessibility of information. 
More specifically, DF apply their model in questioning the timeliness of accounting, 
and query whether increased quality in public disclosure affects the demand for more 
timely alternative sources of information. They tackle the answer by varying the level 
of accessibility of the information contained in the report prior to its release, combined 
with the proportion of the market informed, with the assumption the information is 
`knowable'. In an inaccessible case (equivalent to no-one being informed), increased 
disclosure (increasing the information content of the report) increases the trader's risk 
in period 1 due to the great uncertainty as to price in period 2 after the announcement. 
This increased risk reduces the aggressiveness by which traders trade, reduces the 
level of information acquisition resulting in a less informative price (assuming the 
fraction informed remains constant). Greater the information content of an 
inaccessible announcement the greater the change in price variance, due to a larger 
unexpected element. 
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In the accessible case (i. e. the information is available from more timely sources), 
increasing disclosure reduces the risk of the informed investor, and so increases their 
aggressiveness to trade (take larger speculative positions) thereby increasing the 
informativeness of price. The amount of information acquired depends on the 
proportion already informed, which is in turn dependent on the cost of information. 
Initially, increased disclosure in an accessible case, increases the risk differential 
between informed and uninformed traders. Hence, the value of being informed 
increases and the risk premium falls, thereby increasing the aggressiveness of his 
trade. The proportion of traders increase up to a point, when price informativeness 
decreases the incentive to be informed. 
Increasing prior information acquisition, increases prior price informativeness and 
reduces the impact of the announcement, reflected as a decline in price change 
variability. The effect on the proportion of those that become informed depends on 
the relative informativeness of price compared to the costs of further information 
acquisition. Initial increases in the quality of prior information increases the risk 
differential between those informed and those uninformed, thereby further increasing 
the value of becoming informed. As price increases in informativeness about the 
forthcoming event, decreasing returns set in from investing further in costly 
information acquisition. Hence, there exists a point where the costs of increased 
private informativeness outweigh the benefits. 
DT conclude that the magnitude of the price change at the time of the announcement 
depends on the precision of the public announcement with respect to the future value 
of the firm. This depends on the extent to which prior information has resulted in the 
forthcoming public information being impounded in prior prices, and the amount of 
variation in prices due to noise. The extent to which the information contained in the 
report is impounded into prior prices depends on two key factors: 
(i) the extent to which the information in the public report is knowable prior 
to its release, and 
(ii) the extent to which this knowable information is impounded into price. 
This in turn depends on the proportion of investors that are informed, and the amount 
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of noise in prices. The proportion of those that become informed depends on the cost 
of information acquisition, the precision of both prior and public information, and the 
amount of noise prevalent in price in period one. 
DT's results have important implications for financial reporting. Increased public 
disclosure can result in either an increase or decrease in price variance after its 
publication depending upon information priors, or in particular its accessibility prior 
to the event. The highest price variance will occur when the public report contains 
precise knowledge about the future value of the firm, and is costly to obtain 
foreknowledge of that report. Hence, if information is relatively more costly for small 
firms, DT's findings are consistent with a higher price variance following 
announcements of smaller firms when compared to larger firms. 
These findings imply that no reaction following an announcement does not necessarily 
imply the event is of no value. The event can be so precise that it dominates all 
beliefs; i. e. all traders receive the same signal. Any change in trading volume is thus 
due to differences in information held by investors (as is the case in KV). If all or 
none of the traders acquire the accessible public information only normal (noise) 
trading occurs. Yet if only some of the traders are informed, then trading volume 
increases due to speculative positions taken at the prior information acquisition date 
and the reversal of these positions after the release of the public report (ie. investors 
are risk adverse). 
2.8.5 In Summary 
The papers reviewed in this section, all identify conditions under which information 
search will take place. Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) were among the first to suggest 
that prices in equilibrium are unlikely to reflect all information, because the expected 
costs of information search exceed the expected benefits. The papers of Kim & 
Verrecchia (1991a, 1991b), McNichols & Trueman (1994) and Demski & Feltham 
(1994) identify precise factors which determine the extent to which investors will 
choose to become informed. Although their respective models are based on different 
assumptions regarding the information structure and equilibrium conditions, their 
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findings are nonetheless very similar. 
Kim and Verrecchia demonstrate how the expected precision of public and private 
information, investors' risk preference, noise and the expected cost of information, all 
influence the level of market anticipation of a forthcoming disclosure. McNichols and 
Trueman show the extent to which investors become informed, is also dependent on 
the expected probability an event arriving at the market place. However, Demski and 
Feltham show that no matter the expected probability of an event, to extent to which 
investors can be informed depends on the accessibility of the information prior to the 
disclosure. 
To derive workable theories it is necessary to make a number of simplifying 
assumptions, so instances exist when the models will not be applicable. Hence, there 
remain a number of issues yet to be addressed. MT and DF assumed, both that the 
precision of the announcement and the announcement date are known with accuracy 
beforehand. The greater the uncertainty introduced surrounding announcements can 
only further complicate the price and volume reaction, regardless of the effect of 
increased noise induced by the greater uncertainty. It is also commonly assumed that 
if investors examine the same signal, their expectations will converge. Surely, this 
will depend to a large extent on the precision of the announcement. The testability 
of these models is questionable, as they include variables that are unobservable: the 
level of information asymmetry, investor's risk preferences, the cost of information, 
the probability of the event, and a measure of noise. Thus, the use of inaccurate 
proxies may have a material effect on the results. 
2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter attempts to reconcile apparent findings of investor irrationality with 
rational explanations. Explanations that abnormal returns are attributable to 
unmeasured risk and transaction costs have not proved conclusive. A plausible reason 
for lagged impounding may be a reflection of investors awaiting confirmation that a 
previous earnings change was not transitory (Dontoh, Ronen & Sarath 1994). Or 
alternatively, the use of inappropriate proxies measuring investor expectations, such 
64 
as analysts forecasts may explain this lagged impounding effect (DeBondt & Thaler 
1990, Mendenhall 1991). 
Evidence is growing that investor psychology plays an important role in decision 
making. Abarbanell & Barnard (1992) suggest that anomalous stock price behaviour 
around earnings announcements is caused by a failure to infer correctly, the 
distribution of future earnings based on past earnings. Stock prices appear to reflect 
even less information than analyst forecasts (Mendenhall 1991, Abarbanell & Barnard 
1992). Investors are possibly fixated by accounting numbers, and appear unconcerned 
with how these figures are derived (Hand 1990, Harris & Ohlsen 1990). Herding 
behaviour may be partly due to the belief of investors that they can outwit other 
market participants. However, it is human nature to `follow the crowd' (Trueman 
1994). 
Investors who are irrational are expected to lose wealth and leave the market when 
trading against rational traders. De Long et al (1990b, 1991) show that, in some 
circumstances, noise traders may actually earn higher returns than rational traders, for 
bearing greater risk. Can such behaviour be termed irrational if it is profitable'? It can 
be more profitable to trade on others' information, even if incorrect, than on one's 
own information. Consequently, some public information may be ignored. 
Alternatively, prices may only partially reflect earnings information, as investors 
choose not to be informed - investors will only become informed if they can earn a 
return. Collectively, Kim & Verrecchia (1991a and 1991b), McNichols & Trueman 
(1994), and Demski & Feltham (1994) identify a number of incentives to being 
informed which are: 
  the expected probability of a public signal, 
  the expected precision of the public signal, 
  the precision of private information, 
  the level of noise in the price system, 
  the costs of accessing and processing information. 
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Consequently, if it is costly for investors to determine the full implications of financial 
statement information for future earnings, they may wait until future earnings are 
announced before adjusting prices. However, it is unlikely processing costs explain 
the results of Bernard and Thomas. As investors are only required to recognise that 
if the first quarters' earnings are better than last years' first quarter, then the second 
quarter will also tend to be up on last year too. 
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.1 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of chapter 3, is to develop a testable specification of the theory 
discussed in the previous chapter, that investors choose not to become informed. 
Specifically, it is intended to explain stock market behaviour in terms of the costs and 
benefits of information, which investors must consider when faced with the decision 
of whether to acquire and interpret information. The chapter proceeds by: 
  identifying proxies for the associated costs and benefits of being informed; 
  developing a measure of the extent to which investors choose to become 
informed both prior to a disclosure, and following the disclosure's release. The 
subsequent model will be used later to explain the cross-sectional behaviour of 
security returns surrounding corporate disclosure. 
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
In order to gauge the effects of information release on security prices, we need a 
theory of how the security market processes new information. Hence, we need to 
understand what type of information is impounded into security prices and why. 
Specifically, this research is an examination of the stock market anticipation of, and 
reaction to, different classes of information. Chapter 2 discussed different 
explanations for the apparent lagged impounding of stock returns, following the 
release of earnings related news. However, it is the explanation that investors choose 
not to be informed which is investigated throughout the remainder of this thesis. The 
seminal paper in this area is by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), who identify the 
conditions under which information search will take place. It was one of the first 
papers to suggest that prices in equilibrium are unlikely to fully reflect all information 
because the costs of information search exceed the expected benefits. 
The theoretical papers of Kim & Verrecchia (1991a and 1991b), McNichols & 
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Trueman (1994) and Demski & Feltham (1994) explain stock market behaviour in 
relation to the incentives facing investors deciding on whether to devote resources to 
being informed of a forthcoming announcement. The rationale for this is that, a 
rational investor will only invest in the acquisition and processing of information, in 
order to improve the precision of their own private information, providing it is cost- 
effective to do so. Collectively, these papers identify several incentives for investors 
to become informed, which include: 
  the expected probability of a public signal; 
  the expected precision of the public signal; 
  the precision of private information; 
  the level of noise in the price system; and, 
  the costs of accessing and analysing the information. 
Thus, the intention is to explain the structure of the impounding process in terms of 
the associated costs and benefits of information, which investors must consider when 
faced with the decision of whether to acquire and interpret information. 
Since we are unable to determine the costs and benefits of information faced by 
investors, we look to the empirical literature to help identify suitable proxies. 
Previous evidence suggests that cross-sectional differences in security returns around 
corporate announcements, can in part be explained by various characteristics related 
to the firm's pre-disclosure information environment; the information regarding a 
firm's activities available prior to an event. ' The theory assumes increasing levels 
of pre-disclosure information, increases the informativeness of price and the ability to 
anticipate the content of forthcoming disclosures. In this sense, the information 
content of an earnings announcement is pre-empted by the level of pre-disclosure 
information. 2.3 The difference across securities in the level of `surprise' following 
' See for exvnple, Atiase (1985,1987), Brookfield & Morris (1992), and Pope & Inyangete (1992). 
2 The share price reaction to earnings announcements has dominated this area of research, with 
little attention paid to non-earnings announcements; see Brookfield & Morris (1992). 
' The notion of information content has not been formerly defined, only implied by event study 
procedures. If measured, for instance, as the variability of stock returns given an announcement, the 
relationship assumes that the variability of stock returns associated with an (earnings) announcement 
will be an inverse function of the amount of pre-disclosure information available; this is generally 
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an announcement is therefore attributed to the availability of pre-disclosure 
information. 
The empirical literature has adopted various firm-specific characteristics expected to 
proxy for the level of pre-disclosure information. These include firm size (Atiase 
1985, Freeman 1987), exchange listing (Atiase 1987, Pope & Inyangete 1992), analyst 
following (Bhushan 1989), institutional ownership (O'Brien & Bhushan 1990), press 
coverage (Shores 1990, Ho 1993) and option listed firms (Ho 1993). All of these 
characteristics are believed to be positively related to information production. 
Both firm-specific characteristics and different information types are chosen to proxy 
for the associated costs and benefits of being informed. These are firm size, the 
number of years a firm has been trading, the number of disclosure a firm makes, and 
the volatility of stock returns prior to the disclosure under examination. Different 
information types are chosen to examine whether the anticipation and the 
interpretation of an event varies according to its expected probability and expected 
precision. The information types examined are the annual earnings report, the interim 
earnings report, the annual general meeting, notification of a board change and of a 
change in shareholding. In sum, this research is an attempt to further our 
understanding of how and why investors react to new information, and may provide 
a further explanation for post-announcement drift. 
The chapter begins with characterising the environment in which information search 
and processing takes place, defining the terms and conditions associated with being 
informed, in section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 identify suitable proxies for the pre- 
disclosure environment. Section 3.6 extends the theory of anticipation to the theory 
of interpretation. We argue that the incentives to interpret and to work out the 
implications of a signal are the same as for anticipating the signal. The experimental 
design is outlined in section 3.7. This includes identifying the impounding process 
referred to as the differential information hypothesis (see Atiase 1985,1987 and more recently Pope 
& Inyangete 1992). 
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for a set of company signals, which measures the extent to which the information in 
the signal is anticipated prior to, impounded on, and impounded after the 
announcement. Finally, section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
3.3 THE INCENTIVES TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION 
This section characterises the environment in which information search and processing 
takes place. In order to do this, and to develop the link between the incentives and 
the pre-disclosure environment, it is crucial that the terms and conditions associated 
with the costs and benefits of being informed, are clearly defined. Definitions are 
more often implied in the literature rather than formally specified, and consequently 
they are often too vague. To address this problem, we provide the following 
definitions. 
Investors are motivated to acquire information in order to anticipate the future value 
of a security, by trading against the less well informed. Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) 
theorise the demand for information as a function of its expected utility, which all 
depends on the proportion of those informed. The higher the proportion of those 
informed, the more informative the price system. This reduces the divergence 
between the information sets of the informed and uninformed investors, and 
accordingly, the per capita gain that investors can earn from being informed. Thus, 
as the proportion of those informed increases, the expected utility from being informed 
falls relative to being uninformed. The more precise the private information of 
investors, the more aggressively they trade, improving price informativeness and 
increasing the incentive to be informed. However, the extent to which price reveals 
the information of the informed, is offset by the level of noise in the price system. 
The incentive to acquire information will therefore depend on the extent the expected 
benefits of being informed exceed the expected costs (Grossman & Stiglitz 1980). 4 
Using the theory of Kim & Verrecchia (1991a and 1991b), McNichols & Trueman 
(1994) and Demski & Feltham (1994), we can identify several factors associated with 
Where the expected benefit is the expected risk-adjusted return. 
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the benefits of being informed. We therefore hypothesise the expected benefits of 
being informed to be an increasing function of 
(i) the `depth' of the market, 
(ii) the expected probability of a public signal, 
(iii) the expected precision of that public signal. 
(i) The `depth' of the market. 
For there to be expected benefits from information, relies on there being opportunities 
to trade. Trading opportunities reflect the divergence of beliefs across investors (Kim 
& Verrecchia, 1991a and 1991b), but more importantly is a function of the `depth' 
of the market. The market must be `deep' enough so that price is not easily affected 
by a single informed trader's actions, so as to not reveal her information at the time 
of the trade. The more thinly traded a stock, the easier it is to spot trading by 
informed investors and the less the potential gain from private information (Atiase 
1985). 5 Instead, price must have adjusted by the time she closes out her position. 
(ii) The expected probability of a public signal. 
Dow & Gorton (1994) show a trader will not enter into costly arbitrage, unless there 
is a high enough probability of a similarly informed trader arriving in the market 
within the same trading period. ' If the informed trader believes this not to be the 
case, she will not purchase the stock and its price will consequently not reflect her 
private information. Along similar intuition to Dow and Gorton, McNichols & 
Trueman (1994) demonstrate how the expected gain of an informed trader will 
increase if the firm makes a public disclosure within their trading period. ' Inevitably, 
this also increases the likelihood of similarly informed traders entering the market. 
Hence, an increase in the expected probability of a public disclosure increases the 
expected benefits to being informed, and provides the trader with greater incentive to 
s Atiase (1980) refers to this as the partial signalling hypothesis. 
6A similarly informed trader is one who trades in the same stock, but is of the opposing view to 
whether it is under or overvalued. 
' For a proof of this proposition refer to equation (15) of McNichols & Trueman (1994). 
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increase the precision of her prior information. 
(iii) The expected precision of that public signal. 
The greater the expected precision of the public disclosure the greater expected 
benefits of being informed (Kim & Verrecchia 1991a and 1991b, McNichols & 
Trueman 1994). Jennings & Starks (1985) observed earnings reports of high 
information content were associated with greater anticipation. The expected degree 
of precision of the forthcoming disclosure is all important. 8 If the quality of the 
announcement is so precise to cause individual beliefs to converge, there is no further 
incentive to improve the precision of private information prior to the event. Similarly, 
if the announcement is expected to be of zero precision (equivalent to no 
announcement being expected) there exists little incentive to acquire information, as 
profitable opportunities will be few. The announcement must be expected to be 
sufficiently imprecise (although above zero precision), to create a wide divergence 
across investors' beliefs providing enough profitable opportunities to induce trade 
(Kim & Verrecchia 1991a and 1991b). 
Once the expected benefits of being informed have been estimated, they must be 
weighed against the expected costs. The expected costs of information are 
hypothesised to comprise: 
(i) the expected cost of access - searching for and obtaining information, 
(ii) the expected cost of analysis - processing and interpreting the information. 9 
(i) The expected cost of access. 
This reflects the ease of acquiring more timely information from alternative sources 
(Demski & Feltham 1994). This can be related to the case of small versus large firms 
8 Choi & Jeter (1992) observes the market's responsiveness to earnings announcements declines 
significantly after the issue of qualified audit reports. Audit qualifications may be interpreted as a 
signal of the persistence of noise in the earnings figure. Similarly, Lev & Thiagaran (1994) noted 
investors view audit qualifications as bad news. 
9 Expected costs also include the cost of transacting, for which we do not provide a proxy for in 
our analysis on the basis that transaction costs are unrelated to the process of accessing and analysing 
information. 
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documented in the literature (eg. Atiase 1985). It is generally held, that information 
is more readily available for larger firms in the public domain, prior to an 
announcement. To access equivalent information for a smaller firm entails higher 
marginal costs, ceteris paribus. The level of anticipation by the market, or the 
proportion of those informed, is hypothesised to be a decreasing function of the 
expected cost of access. 
(ii) The expected cost of analysis. 
Once acquired, information only becomes `information' after it has been processed and 
interpreted, involving time and effort ie. the cost of analysis. If it is too costly for 
investors to determine the full implications of the information for future earnings, they 
will not do so. Instead, they will wait for future earnings to be announced before 
adjusting prices. 
In summary, the level of anticipation is therefore hypothesised to be a function of 
both the expected benefits and expected costs of being informed. The level of 
anticipation therefore: 
(i) increases with the depth of the market, the expected probability of an 
announcement and its expected precision; but 
(ii) decreases with respect to the costs of accessing and analysing information. 
For example, an increase in the expected precision of an announcement results in an 
increase in the magnitude of the pre-announcement price change, and potentially, a 
decrease in the price reaction to the announcement itself. Whereas, high expected 
costs of access and analysis result in a lower fraction of the market being informed 
prior to the event, and potentially, a greater price reaction on its announcement. Thus, 
a highly precise announcement can either increase or decrease the price reaction on 
the report date, depending on the accessibility of the announcement's content 
beforehand. If the revealed quality of the announcement is higher (lower) than 
expected, the price reaction will be stronger (weaker) to its release. 
An added dimension, is that information costs vary according to the type of investor, 
and consequently investors will differ in the precision of their private (prior) 
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information. Newly announced information will therefore be more informative to 
traders of less precise information, and thus will have a greater impact on their beliefs. 
We are unable to measure the individual investors' costs and benefits of being 
informed. However, by observing the average price reaction to announcements, we 
are in effect examining the average costs or benefits to being informed. 
The expected benefits and costs of acquiring information may vary across securities, 
and hence, so will the rate and level of anticipation of the information content of their 
respective announcements. For some firms, information may easily be discovered and 
at a relatively low cost. For others, the cost of acquiring information may be 
disproportionately high relative to the expected benefits, and as a result, relatively 
little will be anticipated prior to an announcement. Consequently, across securities, 
there will remain a cost-efficient amount of unexploited information (Ball 1992). 
3.4 THE CHOICE OF PROXY VARIABLES 
Chapter 2 described several factors, identified by Kim & Verrecchia (1991a and 
1991b), McNichols & Trueman (1994) and Demski & Feltham (1994), believed to 
promote the acquisition of information in anticipation of a forthcoming announcement. 
This discussion plus our specification of the information acquisition process (section 
3.3), helps to identify suitable proxies from the pre-disclosure environment for the 
expected costs and benefits of being informed. The chosen firm characteristics 
include: 
  firm size (as measured by market capitalisation); 
  the age of the firm; 
  the disclosure policy of the firm; and 
  the volatility of stock returns prior to the announcement. 
All the characteristics except firm size, have not been previously tested in the 
empirical literature. 
3.4.1 Firm Size 
By and large, profitability of information varies in direct proportion to market value. 
For example, knowledge that a large firm's security is mispriced by one percent, earns 
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a higher return than information that generates a one percent adjustment in the market 
value of a small firm's stock. Since any potential profit from small firms is reduced 
by the problem of thin-trading. Stocks in larger firms are generally more frequently 
traded than those of smaller firms, so an informed trade in a larger firm is more likely 
to be seen as a liquidity trade and arouse less suspicion. As a consequence of this 
partial signalling, the potential return from small firm information is reduced more 
severely than the return from large firm information (Atiase 1985). Firm size is thus 
a proxy for the `depth' of a security's market. 
Intuition suggests the costs of access are a decreasing function of market 
capitalisation. There are several reasons to expect private information production to 
increase with firm size (Atiase 1985 and 1987). There is a greater availability of 
`free' public information regarding larger firms, supplied through the efforts of market 
analysts and through the firm's own voluntary disclosure policy. " The financial 
press and market analysts have incentives to focus on large firms because they are 
more widely held (Atiase 1985, Bhushan 1989, Ho 1993). `1,12 Bhushan (1989) finds 
that the number of analysts following a firm is positively related to the percentage of 
institutional holding in the firm's ownership structure. It follows, since institutions 
do not generally invest in firms with low market capitalisations due to liquidity 
problems, analyst following is believed to be positively related to firm size. 
Similarly, the cost of analysis is believed to increase with firm size. Larger firms 
have generally more complex structures, with greater lines of business, and wider 
geographical dispersement, all of which increase the marginal cost of interpreting the 
implications of earnings figures and various announcements. It may be this increased 
cost that discourages analysts following firms with greater lines of business (Bhushan 
1° Brennan, Jegadeesh & Swaminathan (1994) find analyst following is positively related to speed 
of adjustment, however the effect is non-linear. So that a significant effect is found only for large firms 
and those listed on the NYSE. 
" O'Brien & Bhushan (1990) were unable to find a definite link between analyst following and firm 
size. 
'- Or perhaps more is reported about large firms because there is more to report. 
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1989). Kross, Ro & Schroeder (1990) show the advantage of Value-Line analysts 
over time series models in predicting future earnings, decreases with the number of 
lines of business. 13 
The combined expected cost of access and analysis will determine the relation 
between the level of anticipation and firm size, although the evidence implies market 
anticipation to be an increasing function of firm size (Grossman & Stiglitz 1980, 
Freeman 1987, Collins, Kothari & Rayburn 1987). Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) find 
the informativeness of price is positively related to the proportion of traders who are 
informed with respect to a given signal. Assuming the amount of information 
available and the number of informed traders is a positive function of firm size, the 
announcements of larger firms will be anticipated earlier than those of smaller firms, 
ceteris paribus. We know from the work of Freeman (1987) that security prices of 
larger firms begin to reflect reported earnings 22 months before the announcement 
date. The anticipation process of smaller firms begins 3 months later. More 
specifically, the percentage of abnormal returns for large firms realized in the early 
months exceeds the percentage for small firms. However, the cumulative abnormal 
returns of small firms ultimately exceed the total for large firms by 44 percent. This 
is later corrobated by Collins, Kothari & Rayburn (1987), who find the stock prices 
of smaller firms capture little information beyond that conveyed in the past time series 
of earnings. 
3.4.2 Age of the Firm 
Age affects the pool of background information available in the public domain. Age 
therefore measures the accessibility of the information content of a public 
announcement prior to its release, from alternative information sources. The shorter 
a firm's track record, the lower the available information due to the time constraint. 
The ability to anticipate is therefore impeded by the lack of past information, in 
1z In addition, the relation between firm size and information costs of access and analysis, is 
expected to be non-linear. As more is known about a company's activities, for an investor to have an 
informational advantage over the rest of the market traders, new information can only be obtained at 
increasing marginal costs. 
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addition giving rise to problems of interpretation. The younger the firm, the less well 
acquainted is the market, not only with the outcome of an event, but also with the 
future implications of available information. Therefore, on average, we expect 
younger firms to more likely suffer from greater mispricing reflecting the uncertainty 
and wider divergence in beliefs across investors. The level of surprise associated with 
a public signal is therefore expected to be a decreasing function of a firm's age, 
ceteris paribus. For firms about which relatively little is known, Lang (1991) observes 
the magnitude of the stock price response to earnings announcements decreases over 
time as a longer time series of earnings becomes available. Hence it follows, the 
younger the firm the lower the availability of information. Consequently, a firm's age 
proxies for the costs of access and analysis. Though in some instances, the early 
growth potential of some firms may attract the attention of analysts, offsetting the cost 
disadvantage. 
3.4.3 Disclosure Policy 
The market receives a continuous flow of information, supplied through the work of 
analysts and the financial press, but also by the companies themselves. The London 
Stock Exchange and company law provides a basic framework and minimum 
requirements for financial disclosures. However, considerable latitude remains with 
managers who determine what information is actually provided. Some firms go well 
beyond the required disclosures, while others are extremely stark. " 
The number of disclosures made by a company, either mandatory or voluntary, 
increases the availability of `free' information. 15 Presumably increased disclosure 
reduces the cost of access, trusting the disclosure is of sufficient precision to reduce 
private information production. For instance, if interim information is of value 
14 See Lang & Landholm (1993) for a thorough analysis of the incentives underlying corporate 
disclosure. 
15 This is the first known use of the number of firm-specific announcements. A comparable proxy 
for information production, found in the literature, is press coverage: the number of related articles in 
the Wall Street Journal Index in US studies (Shores 1990, Ho 1993), or the number of news releases 
identified using the McCarthy Information fiche service in the UK (Brookfield & Morris 1992). In 
either case, the coverage of company announcements is not comprehensive suffering from selection-bias, 
but does include third-party comments and forecasts. 
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relevance (ie. has earnings implications), the theory assumes the information will be 
reflected in security prices prior to the release of annual earnings. 16 The greater the 
availability of interim information, the more acquainted the market is of the firm's 
performance, reducing the level of surprise associated with the earnings announcement 
(Shores 1990). In fact, Kross, Ro & Schroeder (1990) find the predictive ability of 
analysts is a positive function of press coverage in the Wall Street Journal. The 
market's expectations can therefore be conditioned on the level of interim information. 
On the contrary, the paper of Brookfield & Morris (1992) finds non-earnings news 
announcements to have little impact upon security prices. This implies the market 
does not continually update its expectations as new information arrives. Either much 
of the interim information contains news of little economic relevance, or the cost of 
interpreting vague signals outweighs the expected benefit. Interim information of low 
precision may increase the costs of analysis of the disclosure. 
If a company is a frequent discloser of voluntary information, this will increase the 
probability of voluntary announcements in the future. Increased voluntary disclosure 
will increase the likelihood of similarly informed traders arriving in the market (Dow 
& Gorton 1994). This will in turn increase the expected gain to being informed, and 
further encourage the acquisition of information (McNichols & Trueman 1994). 
Alternatively, increased voluntary disclosure may reduce the incentive to acquire 
information (Diamond 1985). Stickel (1989) finds analysts are reluctant to update 
forecasts frequently in case new information renders their forecasts out-of-date and 
inaccurate. " More recently, Trueman (1994) suggests analysts are reluctant to 
update forecasts upon the receipt of new information, as it reflects the poor quality of 
their information, and adversely affects the investor's assessment of their capabilities. 
Investors may be similarly perturbed from acquiring costly information, if they expect 
their expectations will soon need be revised on the release of new information. Prices 
16 Interim information, in this context, refers to all the information releases made by a firm 
throughout its trading year. It does not solely refer to interim earnings reports. 
" Forecast revisions are greater approaching the end of the financial year than earlier on. 
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will not consequently reflect their information. Furthermore, why invest in costly 
information acquisition if the company produces free information; presuming public 
information is a substitute for the production of private information. 
Alternatively, the frequency of disclosure may capture the ease with which investors 
can interpret a given news announcement. The rationale is that the more frequently 
a company tends to make announcements, the more difficult it will be for investors 
to disentangle the effect of a given release. The content of voluntary disclosures may 
be less precise than mandatory disclosures, thereby the constant release of information 
to the market may augment uncertainty associated with a given announcement. In 
summary, increased voluntary disclosure may either have a negative or positive effect 
on the level of market anticipation. 
3.4.4 The Volatility of Stock Returns, Prior to the Disclosure 
The relative increase in the volatility of stock returns surrounding the announcement 
of earnings, compared to non-announcement periods, is well documented. '8 An 
increase in volatility is interpreted as an indicator of more information arriving in the 
market, on average, during periods when earnings are reported than at other times. 
Attempts are made to explain the cross-sectional variation in stock return volatility as 
a function of various firm-specific characteristics expected to be related to the pre- 
disclosure environment, as a proxy for prior uncertainty (Atiase 1985, Freeman 1987, 
Pope & Inyangete 1992). Higher volatility surrounding earnings announcements, is 
associated with firms with relatively low levels pre-disclosure information (in 
particular small firms), given the relatively higher levels of investor uncertainty that 
may exist for these firms. 19 However, the explanatory power of these various proxies 
of the pre-disclosure information environment, for the volatility of stock returns tends 
to be very low. 20 
78 See Beaver (1968), Patell & Wolfson (1979), Brook field & Morris (1992), and Pope & Inyan gete 
(1992). 
I" Otherwise known as the differential information hypothesis; see Atiase (1985). 
20 The adjusted R2 is often less than 10%; see Pope & Inyangete (1992) for a recent example. 
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Pre-announcement volatility measures the trading activity of market participants in 
response to their revised expectations, in anticipation of the forthcoming 
announcement. The degree of pre-announcement volatility reflects the divergence in 
prior beliefs across investors, as to the implications of pre-disclosure information for 
future value. Investors may trade in response to their own private information, or in 
response to the information of other investors inferred from their actions. Volatility 
increases the number of (profitable) trading opportunities, encouraging others to 
become informed and trade. Indeed, analyst following is found by Bhushan (1989) 
to be a positive function of return variability. 21 
Alternatively, increased volatility may reflect a rise in the number of transactions by 
speculators; those who do not necessarily trade on information (Froot, Scharfstein & 
Stein 1990 and 1992, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welsh 1992). Speculators like risk, 
so the greater the expected volatility the better, and will be therefore looking to take 
positions prior to an announcement. As the number of opportunities to trade varies 
cross-sectionally, so will to some extent the number of trades by speculators. 
Speculators may similarly be encouraged by the probability of an announcement and 
its expected precision 22 
As investors acquire information and revise their expectations in anticipation of an 
event, and therefore price, stock return variability will increase in advance of an 
announcement. Stock return volatility prior to an event is therefore argued to measure 
the extent which investors choose to become informed. High return variability before 
an event is therefore associated with high anticipation, ceteris paribus. Volatility 
therefore also proxies for reasons to trade other than those identified in section 3.3. 
If an informed trader will only trade if there is a high enough probability of another 
similarly informed trader arriving in the market before she closes her position, she is 
21 O'Bhushan & Brien (1990) find analysts avoid volatility. 
22 The proportion of uninformed trading is likely therefore to increase during announcement periods 
relative to non-announcement periods, but not necessarily relative to informed trading. The percentage 
of uninformed trading may be inferred from the fraction of post-announcement drift relative to pre- 
announcement volatility, ceteris paribus. Of course, the precision of the announcement may `shatter 
the cascade'; see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welsh (1992) for a discussion of information cascades. 
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unlikely to trade a long time in advance of an event in stocks not actively traded 
(Dow & Gorton 1994). Since smaller firms are notably less actively traded, we expect 
to observe greater stock return volatility for small firms in the pre-announcement 
period than for larger firms (Bamber 1987). 
3.5 INFORMATION TYPES 
The impounding process is argued also to be function of the information type. We 
predict that the level of anticipation will vary according to the information type, 
reflecting the expected probability and expected precision, of the event. Different 
events therefore provide varying incentives to being informed, ceteris paribus. The 
information types chosen to test empirically the above theory of anticipation include, 
  the annual earnings report, 
  the interim earnings report, 
  the Annual General Meeting (AGM), 
  notification of a board change, and 
  notification of a change in shareholding. 23, Z4 
The probability of a mandatory event occurring is of course equal to one, although 
there remains uncertainty with respect to its exact timing. The expected probability 
of a voluntary disclosure will be greater than or equal to zero, but less than one, and 
will partly depend on whether the firm is a frequent discloser of voluntary 
information. Though, neither the announcement of a board change nor a change in 
shareholding, are strictly voluntary, as their disclosure forms part of the minimum 
requirements as prescribed by the London Stock Exchange (see section 4.4.1). 
Besides, the extent to which a board change is expected depends if it is on rotation 
or completely unexpected. 
The future prospects of a company are largely determined by the capabilities and 
'-' The selection of these information types was based on the available sample sizes; see chapter 4. 
' The company must notify the Stock Exchange of any transaction made by a shareholder who has 
at least a3 per cent stake in the company. 
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actions of its board members. Consequently, the appointment of a new board member 
may lead to major changes in corporate goals, and have unforseen implications for the 
future operation of the company. Whereas a change in shareholding may be 
interpreted as a signal by a large market player who possesses inside information; as 
opposed to a liquidity trade. However, the significance of the signal can only be 
inferred from the size and sign of the transaction. Thus, the implications of qualitative 
information for security valuation are therefore vague. 
However, the implication of `a number' or rather quantitative information, for the 
future value of a security is probably more easily interpreted than the appointment of 
a new board member. Thus, an earnings announcement is argued to be of greater 
precision than a board change, for example. The relative precision between 
quantitative announcements will reflect the reliability of the information. For 
example, an unaudited statement (ie. interim report) is associated with greater 
uncertainty or noise in the measurement of the variable of interest (earnings). 25 The 
greater the precision of an announcement, the clearer its implications for security 
valuation. Accordingly, we expect to observe different levels of anticipation according 
to the information type, reflecting the precision and probability of the event. 
3.6 THE ANNOUNCEMENT 
A public announcement will either confirm or deny expectations. If the variable of 
interest is annual earnings, only at the end of the financial reporting period is it 
possible for investors to check whether the effects of interim information were 
correctly estimated. If the market perfectly anticipates the information content of the 
signal, there will be no further price reaction upon its release. If a signal is only 
partially anticipated, and is sufficiently imprecise not to dominate beliefs, the price 
reaction will continue until there is a consensus of opinion in the marketplace. The 
theory thus implies, there is a trade-off between pre-announcement anticipation and 
post-announcement drift. 
u The market's responsiveness to subsequent earnings announcements is reduced after a qualified 
earnings report (Choi & Jeter 1992). 
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For imprecise events, we postulate that the extent of lagged impounding following 
their release, is also a function of the incentives to be informed. We extend the above 
theory of anticipation to the theory of interpretation. The incentives to interpret and 
to work out the implications of a signal are presumed to be the same as for 
anticipating the signal. 
A public announcement is a source of `free' information, but depending on its 
precision it will require interpretation. 26 However, investors will only interpret the 
signal if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. Presuming the event is 
value relevant, the greater its precision and therefore the clearer its meaning for 
security valuation, the lower the required costs of analysis. Similarly, the more 
precise the information the lower the demand for private information, thereby also 
offsetting the cost of access. However, an investor will not spend resources to 
interpret a signal if they believe there are no opportunities to trade on the information 
(Dow & Gorton 1994). Where the opportunity to trade is an increasing function of 
the depth of the market. 
3.7 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.7.1 Measuring Returns Performance 
In an efficient market, returns should not systematically differ from those expected 
(Beaver 1968). However, for almost 30 years numerous studies have acknowledged 
the presence of excess returns around major corporate announcements (Beaver 1968, 
Firth 1981, Brookfield & Morris 1992). In order to capture this announcement effect 
upon share prices, it is commonplace in event studies to cumulate any excess returns 
arising over the event window. Where the excess return is defined as the difference 
between the actual share price, and the share price that would of been observed had 
no new information arrived. We therefore need to predict what share prices would of 
been had the announcement not occurred. However, the use of residual analysis is 
argued not to be a completely satisfactory test of information content (Beaver 
26 Of course, not all investors have free and direct access to the wires of communication. 
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1968). ' A statistically significant measure of excess returns might reflect mis- 
specification of investors' expectations, rather than employing a superior portfolio 
strategy. Nevertheless, subject to the joint hypothesis problem, we measure return 
performance in the following manner. 
The technique adopted for cumulating returns is the Abnormal Performance Index 
(API); for an early example, see Ball & Brown (1968) Calculated as 
T 
API« = 11 (1 + ei, ) (3.1) 
t-r 
API is a compounding measure which follows the value of one pound (£) invested in 
security i from period i, and holding the security until the end of some arbitrary 
period T. 29 Where e1, represents the estimate of excess returns for company i at 
period t. 
In order to examine the changing returns profile surrounding company news 




(1 + e«) (3.2) 
I-T 
Equation (3.2) estimates the value from investing one pound in security i over a given 
event window. The window is therefore the time span over which excess returns 
performance is measured, and can be one of three periods: 
prior - the period over which the content of the announcement is anticipated, 
where (t=-20,..., -1); 
27 And therefore neither a satisfactory test of market efficiency, for that case. 
28 The popular alternative to the API is Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) (see Fama et al. 
1969). CAR represents simply the summation of excess returns, e;,, for security i over the event 
window t, ie. CAR; i=Eeg. Its use implicitly assumes daily portfolio rebalancing and leads to an upward 
bias in returns cumulated over a long period. Written as CAR=CAI,, _, +AR,,, 
CAR is therefore by 
construction a random walk plus drift, which may be positive or negative depending on the sign of the 
abnormal returns. In the presence of no abnormal performance, the plot of any random walk series can 
give the impression of a significant drift even if there is none. Hence, when abnormal returns are non- 
zero the drift is over-emphasised (see Roll 1983, Blume & Stambaugh 1983, Dimson & Marsh 1986). 
29 See Ohlson (1975) for alternative definitions of the API metric. 
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ann - the announcement period, where (t=0), the report date; 
post - the period following the announcement period, where (t=+ 1,. .., +20). 
The excess return for a given security is calculated as the difference between its actual 
ex post return, R; t, and the ex ante expected return, 
E(Rj, 
eit = Rit -E (Rid (3.3) 
Where E(R;, ) is generated from one of three benchmark models: 
MM - the expected return of security i estimated using the market model; 
MKT - the return on the market over the event window t; 
MN - the estimated mean return of security i 
The estimation period used to calculate MM and MN immediately precedes the prior 
period, where (t=-220,... -21). 
(i) Market Model Adjusted Returns, MM 
The model assumes returns are generated according to the following process, where 
Rit = a, +Q, Rmt + uit (3.4) 
The security's return is comprised of a systematic component, ß which is linearly 
related to the market return, R., and an unsystematic component, u; t, which 
has an 
expected value of zero. 3° The outcome of firm specific events are assumed to be fully 
captured by the residual, the assumption being that the information signal and the 
market return are uncorrelated. 3' The predicted excess return is calculated thus 
eit = Rit - (at +QlRmt) (3.5) 
where at and A are estimated using equation (3.4) over a prior period. The procedure 
used for estimating market model parameters will be discussed later. 
'o The API takes the form of a geometric series and therefore the market index used should 
similarly be calculated geometrically (ie. FTA All Share). 
31 The assumption of independence between R., and R;, is required by OLS for the purposes of 
efficient statistical estimation. Yet correlation may arise for two reasons: the inclusion of security i in 
the market index and secondly, due to possible intra-industry effects. 
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(ii) Market Adjusted Returns, MKT 
The ex post excess return, for security i, is given as the difference between the actual 
return and the market return at time t, ie. E(R; )=Rmt, 
e« = RI, - Rmt (3.6) 
This model assumes ex ante expected returns are equal across all securities and are 
therefore equal in any period to the expected market return. The market adjusted 
returns model is also consistent with Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) assuming 
all securities have systematic risk of unity. 
(iii) Mean Adjusted Returns, MN 
The predicted excess return, for security i, is defined as the difference between the ex 
post actual return on day t and the expected return calculated from past returns, where 
t`k 
E'" 
Where k represents the number of past returns. The process assumes the ex ante 
expected return for a given security is constant across time, although may vary across 
firms. The mean adjusted returns model is consistent with the CAPM under the 
assumption interest rates, risk premia and security risk remain constant over time. 
These models are among the most popular found in the literature used to estimate 
expected returns. 33 The rationale for using alternative models, is to examine the 
sensitivity of the results to different `abnormal' return metrics. Is it necessary to 
adjust for risk or marketwide effects, or will the use of simpler methods suffice ? In 
theory, the return generating process of the market model may appear more accurate 
by incorporating additional information about the determinants of realized returns, 
such as the security's systematic risk and the market's return. However, the market 
model implicitly assumes that the firm's systematic risk remains stationary 
surrounding the event window. The plausibility of this assumption has been 
See Strong (1994) for a discussion of these and alternative abnormal return metrics. 
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questioned recently by Ball & Kothari (1991) for earnings announcements. 
Whereas, subtracting the market return, R,, controls for ex post bull and bear markets 
which would otherwise affect the measurement of excess returns over the event 
window. However, if R. and e;, are correlated, removing R. will cause a bias towards 
accepting the null hypothesis of no information content. Similarly, estimating 
expected returns from historic data may also introduce bias towards accepting the null, 
when returns evidently anticipate the information content of future releases, in some 
cases by several months (Freeman 1987, Kothari & Sloan 1992). Unfortunately, 
correct specification of the equilibrium model of returns is not sufficient to provide 
a more powerful test of abnormal performance. ' 
Brown & Warner (1985) find there is little overall difference in the ability of the 
alternative procedures in detecting abnormal performance using daily data. On closer 
scrutiny, the market model (MM) and market adjusted returns (MKT) typically 
generate similar results of detecting abnormal performance on the event day, with 
event date clustering further reducing the power of the mean adjusted model (MN). 
In contrast, when the event period is extended from 1 to 11 days, the mean adjusted 
model (MN) provides a more powerful test, relative to MM and MKT. Hence, the 
relative power of these models appears highly dependent on the length of the event 
window, event date clustering, sample size and the level of abnormal performance. 
3.7.2 A Note on the Estimation of Market Model Parameters 
In the estimation of ä; and B;, the length of the estimation period, the proximity of the 
estimation period to the event window, and whether to adjust for infrequent trading 
are among the details to be considered. The longer the estimation period, the smaller 
the component of the variance of excess returns due to parameter estimation error 
(Salinger 1992). Even so, greater statistical accuracy must be weighed against the 
concern of parameter non-stationarity. The length of the estimation period used in 
event studies using daily data has varied enormously ranging from 60 to 600 
' See Brown & Warner (1980) for a more thorough discussion. 
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observations (Strong 1992). 35 The estimation period chosen is usually the period 
immediately prior to the event window, but one under which the disclosure events 
under study are expected to have no net effect on security prices. 36 This is to ideally 
estimate parameters when there are no systematic excess returns, to attain an unbiased 
estimate. Hence, it is commonplace to remove a window from the returns series 
surrounding earnings announcements from the estimation period. All other events are 
assumed to have nil effect upon returns, an assumption yet to be tested. 
Invariably the observed, or rather measured return of a security may not necessarily 
equal its true return. Not all securities trade in each return interval, so the end of 
period price used to calculate returns will more likely reflect a transaction in a 
previous period. 37 Calculated returns will thus be non-synchronous across securities. 
Accurate calculation of returns over any fixed interval becomes difficult for securities 
that trade infrequently, the problem being particularly severe when the interval is a 
day (Schwartz & Whitcomb 1977). The use of non-synchronous data in simple 
regressions, results in an errors-in-variables problem, when measured returns are used 
as proxies for true unobservable returns. As a consequence, OLS estimates of both 
&; and ß; for many securities will be biased and inconsistent. Securities which suffer 
from non-trading effects, have their covariance with the market substantially 
underestimated, and their variance overestimated. Infrequently traded stocks have 
downward biased ß estimates, and those frequently traded have upwardly biased 
estimates (see Dimson 1979). As a consequence, biased (3 estimates may result in 
biased estimates of excess returns and consequently misspecified test statistics. 
Although by construction, OLS residuals for a security sum to zero in the estimation 
35 In a recent UK study, Briston, Saadouni, Mallira & Coutts (1992) used the estimation period 
t=-220,..., -41. 
36 The use of parameters estimated prior to the event implicitly assumes that the systematic risk of 
securities around event time does not alter, contrary to the findings of Ball & Kothart (1991). 
Consequently, abnormal returns calculated using a constant beta pre-estimated prior to the event may 
over or understate the information content of the announcement. In an attempt to counter for non- 
stationarity of parameters, `moving' betas methods have been devised, see for example, Ball 1972, Bar- 
Yosef & Brown 1977. 
" Price adjustment delays and trading frictions, as well as infrequent trading, are other possible 
explanations which may cause the observed returns on securities to depart from their true values. 
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period, so that a bias in the estimate of ß is compensated for a bias in a (see Cohen 
et al 1986). 
Dimson's technique is chosen to adjust for thin-trading, on the basis that it makes no 
assumption about the trading frequency within each return interval. 38 The beta 
estimator, hence, is calculated as 
ß; = Eßk k=-l 
(3.8) 
Where ß; is a summation of the slope coefficients estimated using equation (3.9), 
i 
R,, = &, +E 1k Rm. r+k + Lt (3.9) 
k=-r 
of the multiple regression of the return of security i in period t against lagged (t-1), 
matching (t), and leading (t+l) period returns on the market. The values of k are 
discretionary and can only be inferred from previous research. 39.4° Consistent with 
Dimson & Marsh (1984) we employ the values of (k=-1,..., 5). 
3.7.3 Measuring the Level of Anticipation and Drift 
We argue investor response to the disclosure of new information is a function of the 
level of prior anticipation. The theory presumes there is a trade-off between pre- 
announcement anticipation and post-announcement drift. For example, if we are 
interested in the initial price reaction to an announcement on day 0, we measure the 
variable ANN; as 
118 An alternative adjustment by Scholes & Williams (1977) assumes a transaction occurs in each 
returns interval. 
39 Examples include Dimson & Marsh (1984) who used (k=-1,..., 5), alternatively Ball & Brown 
(1985) and Fama & French (1992) both employed (k=-1,..., 1). Fama and French found an additional 
lead and hag of the market had little effect on the sum (3s. 
40 Ball and Brown found both the techniques of Scholes & Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) 
reduced the bias in OLS estimates, but neither improved the specification or the power of the tests. So 
adjusting for thin trading in this way does not increase the ability to detect abnormal performance on 
daily returns for thinly traded stocks. 
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ANN; =I API;,,,,,,, -1I/I API; 4,,; O, - 
11 9 (3.10) 
Where ANN; measures the absolute value of the market reaction to information in the 
announcement period, as a proportion of the absolute level of market anticipation in 
the prior period 41 In effect, ANN; measures the absolute marginal return to being 
informed in the announcement period. 42 
The rationale behind the construction of the dependent variable is illustrated in Table 
3.1. See Figure 3.1, also below, for a graphical representation. Smaller values of 
ANN; are interpreted as a greater amount of market anticipation of the event. For the 
model to be operational, the denominator in the variableI ANN; cannot be zero. 
Therefore, events that are a complete surprise or have been fully anticipated prior to 
the examination period, are excluded from the sample. 
41 The requirement of using absolute values will be explained later. 
42 We also measure a second variable, POST;, where the price response over the post-announcement 
period is similarly conditioned upon the level of prior anticipation. Where POST; is measured as 





ie. the absolute value of the market reaction to information in the post-announcement period as a 
proportion of the absolute market reaction in the prior and announcement periods. POST; therefore 
measures the absolute marginal return to being informed in the post period. 
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Table 3.1 
Measurement properties of ANN;. ANN; measures the proportion of information 
impounded in the announcement period relative to the prior period 43 
Values of ANN' (ANN; before taking absolute values), for 4 good news and 4 bad news scenarios 4° 
EQN I is when the announcement is perfectly anticipated in the prior period. EQN 2 is when the sign 
of the news in the prior period continues in the announcement period. EQN 3 is when the sign and 
magnitude of the news in the prior period, is partially reversed in the announcement period. EQN 4 








1) / (API 
, ;,,: 
1) 
Panel A: Good news in the prior period 
EQN 1 1.25 1.00 1.2500 0.0 
EQN 2 1.25 1.05 1.3125 0.2 
EQN 3 1.25 0.95 1.1875 -0.2 
EQN 4 1.25 0.70 0.8750 -1.2 
Panel B: Bad news in the prior period 
EQN 4 0.75 1.30 0.9750 -1.2 
EQN 3 0.75 1.05 0.7875 -0.2 
EQN 2 0.75 0.95 0.7125 0.2 
EQN 1 0.75 1.00 0.7500 0.0 
' The POST; variable is similar in structure, but measures the proportion of impounding which 
takes place in the post announcement period relative to prior and announcement periods combined. 
°' The sign of the news is determined by the value of API over the prior period. An API of a value 
greater than 1.0 is representative of good news, and an API less than 1.0 represents bad news. 
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Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of Table 3.1 
Panel A: Good news in the prior period Panel B: Bad news in the prior period 
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Figure 3.1: contd 
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Panel A portrays good news in the prior period (an API value greater than 1.0, ie. 
1.25). Whereas Panel B, portrays bad news in the prior period (an API value less than 
1.0, ie. 0.75). The level of anticipation therefore in the prior period, between panels, 
is of equal magnitude but of opposite sign. 
Equation I is where the announcement of either good news or bad news, is perfectly 
anticipated in the prior period. Equation 2 is where the good news or bad news of the 
prior period continues during the announcement period, indicative of an initial 
underreaction. The size of news in the anticipation period between panels is the same, 
but of the opposite sign. In both cases the dependent variable, ANN*, is 0.2, ie. the 
reaction in the announcement period is 20 per cent larger than prior anticipation. 
Equation 3 is where the information impounding in the prior period is partially 
reversed during the announcement period, indicative of a minor overreaction. The 
news in the announcement period is of the opposite sign to that in the prior period, 
but of smaller magnitude. The dependent variable this time is -0.2, ie. the minus sign 
indicative of an overreaction. Note the similarity between equations 2 and 3, in all 
cases the absolute size of the reaction in the announcement period is the same. 
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Equation 4 is where the information impounding in the prior period is completely 
reversed, indicative of a major overreaction. The news in the announcement period 
is of the opposite sign to that in the prior period, but of larger magnitude. The 
dependent variable is once again the same for both panels, -1.2. Note that the size of 
reaction in the announcement period, between equations, is of equal magnitude but of 
opposite sign. Hence, Panel B is the mirror image of Panel A. 
The table illustrates why the dependent variable ANN; needs to be unsigned. For 
positive values, larger values (ie. 0.2 as opposed to 0.0) of ANN' imply less 
anticipation. However, for negative values, larger values (ie. -0.2 as opposed to - 1.2) 
of ANN` imply more anticipation. A negative sign suggests an overreaction is less 
well anticipated than an underreaction of equal magnitude. Yet from figure 3.2 we 
can see clearly the level of anticipation is equal in all cases, ignoring the sign of the 
news. Therefore, the negative signs attached to ANN* values in equations 3 and 4 
need to be removed so as to be consistent with equation 2. Hence, the larger the 
absolute value of ANN*, the lower the level of anticipation 45 
3.7.4 The Model 
We employ a standard OLS multiple regression model to test the above hypothesised 
relationships. The dependent variable is therefore modelled as a linear function of the 
above mentioned explanatory variables, 
ANN; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM, + a4VOLPR; + u;, (3.11) 
Where 
LN_MV; = the natural log of the market capitalisation of company i, a measure of 
firm size as at the beginning of the year in the year of announcement. 
AGE; = the number of years the company has been registered as a private limited 
company or from its date of incorporation. 
45 The equivalent analysis is applicable for the POST; variable, where POST; measures the 
proportion of impounding which takes place in the post-announcement period, relative to the prior and 
announcement periods combined. 
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NUM; = the number of disclosures made by company i to the London Stock 
Exchange during the sample period examined. 
VOLPR, = the volatility of prior stock returns of security i, as measured by the 
standard deviation of stock returns over the prior period. Where VOLPR1 captures 
the volatility of stock returns due to both firm specific and market factors a6 
The coefficient sign reflects the relation between the measure of pre-disclosure 
information and the level of anticipation. The incentives to be informed are therefore 
presumed to be the same for anticipation of a forthcoming event, as for the 
interpretation of an event. If the level of anticipation is an increasing function of the 
explanatory variables, we expect them to be negatively related to ANN;. This relation 
further implies a negative association between the explanatory variable and the costs 
of being informed. 
The sign on firm size will largely depend on the length of the event window under 
investigation. If the cost of being informed is a decreasing function of firm size, then 
we hypothesise the larger the firm, the higher the level of anticipation. Therefore 
LN_MV; will be negatively related to ANN;. However, this relation all depends on 
the length of the event window - whether the window extends back far enough to 
capture the full level of market anticipation of the forthcoming announcement. For 
instance, since ANN; is scaled by the absolute API over the prior period, larger 
companies may have larger values of ANN; due to a relatively smaller price 
movement in the prior period. If the event window covers only a relatively short 
period of the whole anticipation process, most of the information content of large firm 
news may have been already anticipated, so larger firms may be less heavily traded 
in the days approaching the announcement than smaller firms (Bamber 1987). Any 
surprise, no matter how small, will appear disproportionately high for larger firms 
46 Similarly, POST; is modelled as 
POST; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a3NUM, + a, VOL, PR+A; + U. 
Where VOLPR+, 4; represents the volatility of prior stock returns of security i. As measured by the 
standard deviation of stock returns over the prior and announcement periods. 
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against a prior period of little trading activity. In sum, if the event window does not 
capture full anticipation, firm size and ANN; will be positively related. To illustrate, 
we adapt figure (1) from Freeman (1987). 
Figure 3.2: The Level of Market Anticipation of Forthcoming Announcements by 
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Announcement 
The graph depicts the predicted anticipation process of both large and small firms, as 
measured by the level of market anticipation, based on taking a long position for good 
news and going short for bad news. The market begins to anticipate the 
announcements of larger firms earlier than those of smaller firms. With the 
percentage of abnormal returns for large firms realized in the early months exceeding 
the percentage for small firms. Much of the anticipation process of large firms 
completed by the time the market has largely anticipated the information content of 
small firm disclosures. 
(i) The use of multiple regression 
The technique of multiple regression tests directly the association between the security 
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return metric and the chosen pre-disclosure proxies. This technique measures the 
incremental effect of a single variable, whilst holding the others constant, in the 
anticipation of the announcement's content. Similarly, we hypothesise the variation 
in coefficient size between information types will reflect their expected probability and 
relative precision. For example, holding all explanatory variables constant, the level 
of anticipation (as measured by dependent variable, ANN) will vary across 
information types. Thus, for some information types the expected benefit of being 
informed will exceed, to a greater extent the expected costs, reflecting incentives 
related to the information type rather the pre-disclosure proxies. Where the incentives 
are an increasing function of the expected probability and expected precision of the 
information type. 
An alternative approach would be to form portfolios on the values of the explanatory 
variables. Portfolio analysis has the advantage that it makes no assumption about the 
specific functional form of the relation between market anticipation and the level of 
pre-disclosure information. However, the use of portfolios results in a potential loss 
of information from the aggregation of data, since it fails to recognise cross-sectional 
differences of the information proxy within each portfolio (Stober 1992). 
(ii) The selection of the explanatory variables 
Given there is not a direct measure of the level of pre-disclosure information, and the 
lack of any formal theory concerning the relationship between firm specific factors 
and information flows, it may be difficult to conclude that the above explanatory 
variables cause cross-sectional differences in returns behaviour. The inclusion of other 
omitted variables might provide alternative explanations for the results. The use of 
inappropriate variables increases the probability of a Type I error, favouring the null 
hypothesis of no information content. 
There is the concern of possible correlation between the explanatory variables. For 
instance, the longer a firm has been trading the larger it is more likely to be. Lang 
& Lundholm (1993) demonstrate firm size is associated with the frequency and quality 
of disclosure. More frequent disclosure may be in response to stronger pressure from 
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analysts to provide information, and greater market interest. Perhaps, larger firms 
have more to report, or economies of scale contribute to large firms disclosing more. 
Likewise, the volatility of stock returns may capture activity associated with firm size, 
age and the number of disclosures made. 
At first sight the relationship between the dependent variable and VOLPR; may appear 
tautological, and therefore naturally negative. However, each variable has 
discriminating features. The denominator of the dependent variable is a measure of 
excess returns over the period prior to the event, and is regressed against a variable 
(VOLPR) which measures the standard deviation of (unadjusted) returns over the same 
period. Both variables are measures of variation: API; measures the average 
movement in returns between two points in time, whereas, VOLPR measures the daily 
variation about the mean. A possible interpretation maybe, API; measures the level 
of anticipation, ie. how much the market knows, whereas VOLPR indicates how hard 
the market has looked for information. 
To illustrate, for example, if we are interested with the correlation between ANN; and 
the standard deviation of excess returns over the prior period, 6e;, where e11= R1 R, 
In the absence of information arrival, e1 is a random variable with a zero mean. R; t 
is also random where E(Rd) = E(R. ) for all i. Under conditions of repeated sampling 
6e1t is constant and equal to zero, but ANN; will change. Therefore, there is no 
automatic definitional correlation between ANN; and 6e;, 47 
3.9 CONCLUSIONS 
The drift in prices following earnings announcements has been extensively researched, 
with explanations of failing to adequately control for risk, to the irrational behaviour 
of investors ignoring value relevant information. The anomaly would thus appear the 
result of an inefficient or perhaps an irrational market. Alternatively, this chapter bids 
to explain investor behaviour as rational - investors choosing not to be informed. 
More specifically, we explain stock return behaviour in relation to the costs and 
47 The equivalent analysis applies to POST;. 
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benefits facing investors deciding on whether to spend resources on information to 
improve the precision of their private information, in anticipation of a forthcoming 
event. 
The papers of Kim & Verrecchia (1991a and 1991b), McNichols & Trueman (1994), 
and Demski & Feltham (1994), provide the basis for identifying various factors argued 
to affect investors' incentives and ability to anticipate information, and react swiftly 
to it. These include the `depth' of the market, the expected probability and expected 
precision of the forthcoming event, and the costs of accessing and analysing 
information. We select four firm specific variables to proxy for these costs and 
benefits associated with being informed, namely firm size, the age of the firm, the 
number of corporate disclosures and the volatility of prior stock returns. Relying on 
the assumption that these explanatory variables provide a link with the level of pre- 
disclosure information. These explanatory variables are used to model the anticipatory 
and impounding behavie of five information types: the annual earnings report, the 
interim report, the AGM, notification of a board change and a change in shareholding. 
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4. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 OBJECTIVES 
The principal objective of chapter 4 is to describe the data used, and the separate 
sources from which it was obtained. The descriptive statistics, as well as identifying 
the correlation structure of the explanatory variables, serve to demonstrate that the data 
does not possess any special properties. The chapter also outlines the regulatory 
environment in which firms release information to the marketplace, as prescribed by 
the London Stock Exchange. This provides a background to the nature of the events 
investigated, but more importantly, shows how the institutional setting of corporate 
disclosure has important implications for market expectations. 
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter begins with a brief description of the data set employed, and the separate 
sources from which it was obtained. The primary data source, EXTEL Financial, 
provides the corporate announcement dates. However the coverage is limited, 
restricting the available sample of firms and time period examined. In addition, the 
chapter outlines the regulatory environment in which firms release information to the 
marketplace, as prescribed by the London Stock Exchange. To maintain a full listing, 
securities must abide by the regulations of the exchange, which include strict 
guidelines as to the release of price sensitive information. The discussion provides 
a background as to the nature of the events examined, and identifies how the 
institutional setting influences the market's expectations of corporate disclosure. The 
majority of market based accounting research is conducted in the United States, 
therefore the extent to which market reaction studies between the two countries (US 
and UK) are comparable, will in part reflect the respective disclosure practices of the 
two domiciles. To aid the comparison we report the findings of Frost & Pownall 
(1994) who surveyed the accounting disclosure practices of both US and UK 
securities. 
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Various descriptive statistics are reported for the explanatory variables, with the 
purpose of identifying any special properties that the data may possess. This includes 
details of the correlation structure of the explanatory variables, in order to identify any 
potential problems of multicollinearity. We also explicitly test the extent to which our 
chosen measures of the availability of pre-disclosure information (ie. the explanatory 
variables), overlap. 
The chapter therefore proceeds with section 4.3 describing the data set. The 
regulatory framework of corporate disclosure is reviewed in section 4.4, detailing the 
continuing obligations of listed firms regarding the disclosure of information. Section 
4.5 considers the disclosure practices of US firms and how this affects the comparison 
of market reaction studies between the US and UK. The various descriptive statistics 
of the explanatory variables are reported in section 4.6. Finally, section 4.7 concludes 
the chapter. 
4.3 DATA SOURCES 
The data set comprises a number of different datatypes: (i) corporate announcement 
dates, (ii) share price data, (iii) the age of the firm and (iv) the number of disclosures 
made by a firm. The data was collected from separate sources as detailed below. 
However, due to the large quantity of data, FORTRAN programming was employed 
to collate the individual data sets, to make all the preliminary calculations, and to 
organise the data into a readable format to enable further analysis. ' 
(i) Corporate announcement dates 
EXTEL Financial produce a CD-ROM database, which among other things, includes 
a record of the news announcements made by fully listed firms to the London Stock 
Exchange (hereafter LSE), over the period January 1985 to June 1992.2 During this 
' See Appendix 1 for the program. 
Z An alternative source of corporate announcement dates is available from the McCarthy Information 
Service. The service reproduces newspaper and journal cuttings from approximately 60 broadsheets and 
specialist trade journals, and includes the forecasts and recommendations of third parties, as well as 
details of corporate releases. One of the problems of using this database, is that the coverage is by no 
means exhaustive and open to selection bias. More importantly, the exact release date is not known 
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period, the coverage of announcements has varied and consequently limited the 
available sample size. 3 Initially, only ex-dividend announcements and ex-capital 
changes were listed. In late 1989, the dates of interim and final earnings 
announcements were introduced. From January 1991 onwards, all announcements as 
requested by the LSE were catalogued. The entire range of announcements are 
categorised into 87 different news headings, ranging from the notification of a new 
contract the proposed name change of a company. 
The announcement date given by EXTEL, is the release date of the Regulatory News 
Service (RNS) of the LSE, which is responsible for the public announcement of 
company news to the market via a computerised system. If the company adheres to 
the guidelines of the exchange with regard to the publication of information, the 
company announcement date and the announcement date of RNS are one of the same 
thing, with few exceptions. The coverage by EXTEL, from January 1991 onwards, 
can therefore be considered to contain all potentially `price sensitive' announcements. 
To examine the market reaction surrounding an announcement, one technique will 
involve using clear event windows; ie. where there is no other announcement, besides 
the event under examination, within the event window. This enables the isolation of 
the market reaction to individual events, and subsequently increases the power of the 
tests. So as not to introduce bias about what type of information investors are 
expected to respond to, all information types are treated equally regarding their price 
sensitivity. With this requirement, we are limited to examining the period between 
January 1991 to June 1992, the only period which EXTEL lists all news releases. A 
potential problem of examining a relatively short time period, may be the extent to 
which the results can be generalized across different time periods. For example, it is 
quite conceivable that during a period of rising expectations earnings announcements 
may tend to be, on average, good news. The market reaction to which, may be quite 
different to that experienced during a bad news or intermediate period. 
and can only be inferred from when the article is published. 
' The coverage may also vary between different versions of the CD-ROM. 
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For the purposes of this research all companies that were acquired, suspended, 
cancelled, or went into administration or receivership, during the sample period 
examined were disregarded. Their inclusion could potentially bias the results, since 
the market reaction may be biased to the announcements of companies not in a normal 
trading status. This yielded a final sample size of 1,343 companies, who released a 
total of 24,204 various news announcements over the period I January 1991 to 30 
June 1992. 
(ii) Share price data 
Daily closing share price data, market values, including the market index (FT- 
Actuaries All Share Index), were all collected from DATASTREAM International. 
The price data is already adjusted for capital changes, but no adjustment is made for 
dividends. This is in accordance with the market index which makes no specific 
allowance for dividends, and therefore to adjust individual returns accordingly may 
introduce a potential bias. Secondly, one plausible assumption is that the payment of 
dividends is already impounded into price. Security returns are therefore calculated 
as the proportional change in price. Accordingly, the volatility of prior stock returns 
(ie. VOLPR, and VOLPR+A; ) is measured as the standard deviation of stock returns 
over the relevant period; and not the standard deviation of excess returns. ' Firm size 
(LN_MV; ) is measured as the natural log of market capitalisation, as at the beginning 
of the year, in the year of announcement. 
(iii) The age of the firm 
A firm's age (AGE) is calculated as the number of years the company has been 
registered as a private limited company on the LSE, or from the year of incorporation, 
as documented in the London Stock Exchange Official Yearbook. 
(iv) The number of disclosures 
The number of corporate disclosures (NUM) made by a firm, is determined by the 
° Where VOLPR; measures the standard deviation of returns over the prior period (t=-20,..., -1) when 
used to model anticipation as measured by ANN;, and VOLPR+A; includes the announcement period (t=- 
20,..., 0) when used to model POST;. 
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number of announcements listed by EXTEL over the sample period examined; from 
January 1991 until June 1992. Ideally, for reasons of accuracy, a longer time span 
would have been preferred to estimate the average disclosure rate of firms. Due to 
the unavailability of a reliable measure, and with no reason to expect the disclosure 
rate of firms over the sample period to differ greatly from other periods, we argue our 
estimate is fair. For descriptive statistics of these variables, see section 4.6 below. 
4.4 THE PROCESS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
When examining the market reaction to corporate announcements, it is important to 
have an understanding of the environment in which public disclosures are made. The 
institutional setting of corporate disclosure has important implications for market 
expectations. In the UK, the disclosure requirements of listed securities are regulated 
by the LSE. The LSE provides strict guidelines as to what information is required, 
its format, how it should be processed and the timing of its release. All securities are 
subject to producing annual and interim reports, and disclosing material information 
to the market in a timely manner, to maintain their listing. Assuming investors are 
also aware of these disclosure requirements, and know what they can expect from 
companies, the regulatory setting should help to improve the anticipation process of 
investors. 
4.4.1 What Information is Required by the LSE 
The "Listing Requirements" of the LSE are strict and extremely detailed, and must be 
adhered to for companies to maintain a listing. Once a company is listed, there exist 
a number of `continuing obligations' which must be observed regarding the 
notification of information to the Company Announcements Office (CAO) of the 
exchange. One aim of the exchange is to maintain `an orderly market' ensuring that 
all market participants have simultaneous access to the same information. To 
accomplish this there exists a general obligation of disclosure for all companies to 
notify the exchange `without delay' of: 
(i) `any information necessary to enable holders of its listed securities and the 
public to appraise the position of the company and avoid the creation of a false 
market in its listed securities; and 
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(ii) any major new developments in its sphere of activity which are not public 
knowledge which may lead to substantial movements in the price of its listed 
security. ' 
There is an exception to this rule if the directors of the company consider the 
disclosure to the public might prejudice the company's legitimate interests. 
Information that is required to be notified to the CAO, must not be given to a third 
party prior to its announcement, except in certain circumstances. For example: 
negotiations with advisers in view of a future transaction or raising finance; 
information provided in strict confidence to the Bank of England, or say the Mergers 
and Monopolies Commission; or a proposal, subject to negotiations with employees 
or trade unions. In addition, if the announcement is to be made to a meeting of 
shareholders, and contains price sensitive information, arrangements must be made so 
that the announcement at the meeting is made no earlier than the time at which the 
information is published to the market. 
With regards to financial information, a company must notify the CAO immediately 
after board approval of: a preliminary announcement of results, half-year or any other 
period; any decision to pay or make any dividend or other distribution; any proposed 
change in capital structure or decision to change the general character or nature of the 
business; any change in notifiable interests and directors' shareholdings. All board 
decisions must be relayed (if possible) to the CAO before 5.30pm the same day. The 
CAO must be notified at least 10 days in advance of the date fixed for any board 
meeting at which decisions on dividends, the annual results or half-yearly report. 
Other information requirements include notification of any major interest in the share 
capital of the company, any board change, plus information relating to the interests 
and dealings of directors and connected persons in any securities of the company. 
In addition to, the particulars of acquisitions or realisations of assets (within certain 
materiality criteria). 
4.4.2 The Format of the Information 
The CAO passes the news release to the Regulatory News Service (RNS), which 
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provides guidelines regarding the content and method of disclosure. Upon the receipt 
of a news release, the RNS first validates the source of the announcement, then 
processes it before selling the information via a computer readable form to RNS 
subscribers. Subscribers include public quote vendors and information systems such 
as the Commercial Company News Service of the Stock Exchange, Telerate, Reuters 
and the Stock Exchange Automated Quotations System. 
Each announcement has two elements: 
(i) a headline, containing the company name and type of announcement, as 
prepared by the RNS; and, 
(ii) the full text of the announcement as prepared by the company. 
Companies are recommended to sununarise the key points of any lengthy or detailed 
announcement at the beginning of the announcement, in order to assist `rapid 
assimilation' of the information by the market. After validation, announcements are 
then prioritised for publication. 
Issuers are encouraged to use the news release service of the LSE for all corporate 
releases, by the guarantee of the security of the information until its release, which 
cannot otherwise be guaranteed if delivered to any number of other parties. If the 
RNS is not the company's sole means of releasing price sensitive information, the 
RNS can issue an unvalidated announcement to subscribers in an attempt to lessen the 
possibility of a fragmented distribution of price sensitive news. 
4.4.3 The Timing of the Release 
The company can state a specific time of release to the RNS, which can only be 
guaranteed if not issued to a third party as well. Announcements can be delivered to 
the CAO 24 hours a day, but they will only be processed between the hours of lam 
to 6pm, on each business day. The RNS releases information from 7.30am onwards, 
in the attempt to reduce the backlog of announcements at the beginning of each day, 
but also to enable the market to assimilate the news before the start of the trading day 
at 8.30am. Announcements delivered by 5.30pm, for publication that day, will be 
processed that evening to be released first thing the next morning. Any received after 
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5.30pm will not be processed until the next business day. If the company wishes to 
make an immediate announcement after 5.30pm, when the CAO is closed, the 
company must ensure adequate coverage by distributing it to at least two UK national 
newspapers and two newswire services where appropriate. Plus, also ensure a copy 
of the announcement is delivered to the CAO, for the RNS will process and publish 
the next day. 
4.5 THE PROCESS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE OF US SECURITIES 
The majority of market based accounting research is conducted in the US. Though 
the extent to which we can compare the findings of US studies, with this and other 
UK research, is limited by the differences in the regulatory environment of the two 
countries. If the minimum disclosure requirements of listed companies differ between 
the US and UK, so may the level of anticipation of the content of corporate disclosure 
differ between US and UK investors, ceteris paribus. The purpose of this section is 
therefore to highlight any differences in the disclosure practices of US and UK 
securities. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the LSE's American counterpart, 
and places very similar restrictions and disclosure requirements upon US firms. One 
distinguishable difference is, not all press releases need necessarily to be filed with 
the SEC. However, the SEC is considered to be a tough regulator in comparison to 
the LSE, and more stringent in the monitoring and enforcing of disclosure rules. An 
opinion that is consistent with the finding of greater compliance with disclosure rules 
in the US than the UK (Frost & Pownall 1994). 
The regulations of both the US and UK, focus on the probability the information may 
change investors' valuation of, or market activity in, the firm's securities. The rules 
of the UK and the US appear to mandate the same sort of disclosure, but of course, 
if capital market differences in the two countries lead to different probabilities that 
information will cause price or volume changes, then disclosures to conform with the 
rules will differ between both countries. 
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A survey was conducted by Frost & Pownall (1994) into the accounting disclosure 
practices of both United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) securities listed on 
the NYSE and LSE, during 1989. Frost and Pownall define an accounting disclosure 
as a release containing information about the firm's financial position; eg. both the 
annual and interim reports, plus selected media disclosures. The study reports that 
both mandatory and voluntary accounting disclosures are substantially more frequent 
in the US than the UK. US domestic firms released an average of 12.3 disclosures 
compared to 4.3 for UK domestic firms, during 1989. The median number of annual 
and interim reports for US and UK firms is 5.0 and 2.0 respectively, with median 
reporting lags of 45 and 86 days respectively. This variation reflects both differences 
in disclosure rules and significant differences in the frequency and timing of voluntary 
disclosures. 5 In both countries, the timely disclosure of earnings reports is found to 
be partially correlated with firm size. With a correlation of 23 per cent in the US, and 
25 per cent in the UK. Furthermore, firms which are listed in both the US and UK, 
disclose twice as much in the US. 
Higher voluntary disclosure by US firms may be explained by a stronger pressure to 
produce information in the US than the UK, by investors and analysts alike. Such a 
belief is consistent the higher trading volume observed in US exchanges, and the 
narrower bid-ask spreads of US securities reflecting a lower level of uncertainty 
possibly associated with the wider availability of information. However, the variation 
in disclosure policy has practical implications for the comparability of stock price 
responses to corporate announcements, between the US and the UK. The wider 
availability of pre-disclosure information, assuming public information is value 
relevant and precise, should enable investors to anticipate the content of corporate 
disclosures to a greater extent, in the US relative to the UK (Donnelly & Walker 
1995). Consequently, this may lead to a smaller stock price response to disclosures 
in the US, and possibly less drift. Though this must be weighed against the 
5 For example, US firms must file annual reports within 90 days of the accounting year-end, and 
quarterly reports within 45 days of the ends of the first three quarters. Whereas, UK firms need only 
file annual reports within six months of the accounting year-end, and the half-yearly reports within four 
months of the accounting period. 
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complication of, isolating the impact of a single event when firms are so frequently 
issuing news. 
4.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.6.1 The Distribution Properties of the Explanatory Variables 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of each explanatory variable for each class 
of information, for both clear and unclear event windows. A clear event window is 
defined as, where no other announcement (as listed by EXTEL) occurs during the 20 
trading days preceding, or following the event under examination. For unclear event 
windows, there is no restriction as he number of announcements that may occur over 
the event window. ' Using clear event windows therefore allows the isolation of the 
price impact of a single event. However, if for example firm size and the frequency 
of disclosure are correlated, examining clear windows will bias the sample towards 
smaller firms. 
6 However, in an unclear window no more than one announcement occurs on the event day itself. 
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Table 4.1a 
Distribution Properties of the Explanatory Variables for Each Class of Information 
Clear Event Window 
MV LN MV AGE NUM VOLPR VOLPR+A 
Annual Earnings (n=116) 
Minimum 0.490 -0.713 1.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 5452.000 8.604 123.000 51.000 0.103 0.101 
Mean 274.400 3.737 38.612 19.957 0.019 0.023 
Std. Dev. 702.120 2.099 31.786 9.861 0.017 0.019 
Skewness 4.503 0.225 0.769 0.553 2.196 1.810 
Kurtosis 27.817 2.263 2.537 2.697 9.560 6.727 
Interim Earnings (n=152) 
Minimum 0.360 -1.022 2.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 2875.000 7.964 122.000 40.000 0.374 0.369 
Mean 61.326 2.144 44.796 13.408 0.019 0.023 
Std. Dev. 270.880 1.612 32.673 8.365 0.034 0.034 
Skewness 7.900 1.182 0.417 1.355 7.918 6.894 
Kurtosis 78.847 4.570 2.026 4.448 82.269 67.676 
AGMs (n=106) 
Minimum 1.000 0.482 1.000 7.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 6042.000 8.706 111.000 41.000 0.045 0.055 
Mean 198.380 3.734 40.462 17.953 0.013 0.014 
Std. Dev. 631.450 1.540 26.534 6.382 0.010 0.011 
Skewness 7.524 0.490 0.496 1.064 1.095 1.302 
Kurtosis 67.148 3.139 2.481 4.168 3.776 4.726 
Board Changes (n=387) 
Minimum 1.000 0.058 1.000 4.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 15818.000 9.628 150.000 46.000 0.160 0.156 
Mean 437.720 3.843 41.240 19.346 0.015 0.015 
Std. Dev. 1360.300 2.055 32.725 7.512 0.015 0.015 
Skewness 5.903 0.626 0.676 0.720 3.776 3.744 
Kurtosis 48.198 2.673 2.501 3.172 27.728 27.232 
Changes in Shareholdings (n=927) 
Minimum 0.390 -0.942 1.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 3008.000 8.009 135.000 73.000 0.263 0.257 
Mean 155.480 3.706 42.455 19.906 0.014 0.014 
Std. Dev. 320.630 1.639 31.819 7.686 0.016 0.016 
Skewness 4.023 0.110 0.516 0.973 6.083 5.835 
Kurtosis 23.524 2.612 2.284 5.348 73.612 66.817 
Notes: n represents the number of observations, 
MV represents firm size as measured by market capitalisation (£m) as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
LN_MV is the natural log of MV, 
AGE measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20..... -1), 
VOLPR+A measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement periods, where (t=-20,..., 0). 
110 
Table 4.1b 
Distribution Properties of the Explanatory Variables for Each Class of Information 
Unclear Event Window 
MV LN MV AGE NUM VOLPR VOLPR+A 
Annual Earnings (n=1830) 
Minimum 0.440 -0.821 1.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 20230.000 9.915 263.000 87.000 0.178 0.197 
Mean 388.840 3.865 44.624 20.407 0.014 0.018 
Std. Dev. 1383.130 1.967 32.932 10.054 0.015 0.018 
Skewness 8.021 0.471 0.632 1.517 3.339 3.052 
Kurtosis 85.025 2.788 3.440 7.472 23.301 19.192 
Interim Earnings (n=1452) 
Minimum 0.360 -1.022 1.000 3.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 25620.000 10.150 264.000 87.000 0.374 0.369 
Mean 495.580 3.805 43.914 20.295 0.014 0.017 
Std. Dev. 1935.500 2.046 32.985 10.347 0.017 0.019 
Skewness 7.141 0.617 0.826 1.439 8.994 6.678 
Kurtosis 63.065 3.052 4.794 6.694 99.999 93.142 
AGMs (n=481) 
Minimum 1.000 0.278 1.000 5.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 15730.000 9.663 264.000 87.000 0.088 0.086 
Mean 639.490 4.697 47.310 25.012 0.014 0.015 
Std. Dev. 1592.300 1.931 32.891 10.692 0.010 0.011 
Skewness 5.000 0.269 0.779 1.660 2.134 1.968 
Kurtosis 34.308 2.423 5.553 8.509 11.790 8.971 
Board Changes (n=1807) 
Minimum 0.540 -0.616 1.000 4.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 17920.000 9.793 264.000 87.000 0.272 0.265 
Mean 682.060 4.313 43.748 25.131 0.018 0.019 
Std. Dev. 1890.800 2.219 33.304 11.310 0.020 0.021 
Skewness 5.292 0.286 0.835 1.590 4.334 4.075 
Kurtosis 37.688 2.321 4.956 7.316 34.352 29.633 
Changes in Shareholdings (n=4354) 
Minimum 0.390 -0.942 1.000 3.000 0.540 0.000 
Maximum 17440.000 9.766 264.000 87.000 0.304 0.297 
Mean 260.230 4.048 42.644 25.243 0.018 0.018 
Std. Dev. 761.300 1.749 33.314 10.044 0.020 0.020 
Skewness 9.777 0.115 0.836 1.377 4.300 4.189 
Kurtosis 99.999 2.782 4.584 8.090 34.829 32.672 
Notes: n represents the number of observations. 
MV represents firm size as measured by market capitalisation (£m) as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
LN_MV is the natural log of MV, 
AGE measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20...., -1). 
VOLPR+A measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0). 
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As expected, by allowing the event window to contain other announcements vastly 
increases the available sample size. While using unclear windows may reduce the 
potential power of the tests, the restriction that the window be clear from other 
announcements, biases the sample towards both smaller, younger firms, and those who 
disclose less frequently. This relation also hints of possible correlation between the 
explanatory variables. For clear windows (see Table 4.1 a), the age range varies 
between 1 to 150 years, compared to 1 to 264 years for unclear windows (see Table 
4.1b). Likewise for the frequency of disclosure across firms, where for clear windows 
NUM ranges between 3 to 56 disclosures, with the exception of 73 disclosures for a 
change in shareholding. For unclear windows, NUM ranges from 3 to a maximum 
of 87 disclosures. A similar relationship holds for firm size, though there is greater 
variation between information types. So as an example, the range in firm size 
associated with annual earnings, increases from between £0.5M to £5452. OM for clear 
windows, to between £0.4M and £20230. OM for unclear windows. The volatility of 
prior stock returns is lower for clear windows, supporting the theory that price 
behaviour is a function of information, with the exception of interim earnings where 
the mean level of volatility increases under clear windows. 
Each explanatory variable seems to emulate a symmetrical distribution more closely 
for clear event windows, from excluding the more extreme observations. The 
distribution properties (ie. the level of skewness and kurtosis) of the variables AGE 
and NUM, vary little across the different information types, suggesting these firm 
characteristics do not vary to a great extent according to the event. For example, 
older firms appear no more prone to board changes than younger firms, nor are 
frequent announcers any more associated with changes in shareholdings. On the other 
hand, the mean values indicate board changes are most likely to be associated with 
larger firms. Though the distribution properties of firm size vary greatly across 
information types depending on whether clear or unclear windows are examined. 
However, using the natural log of market value improves the symmetry of the 
distribution, indicated by a reduction in the level of skewness and kurtosis across 
information types. 
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A similar relationship holds true for the volatility of stock returns, with both VOLPR 
and VOLPR+A subject to a high degree of kurtosis. The extent of kurtosis may be 
interpreted as indicating the divergence in beliefs associated with a particular 
information type. Given this intuition, AGMs appear to generate the least volatility 
in prior stock returns as opposed to the forthcoming release of interim earnings. 
Furthermore, following the announcement the degree of kurtosis is reduced, implying 
the event partially reduces the divergence in beliefs across investors. 
4.6.2 The Correlation Structure of the Explanatory Variables 
The sign and level of (simple) correlation between the explanatory variables, for each 
information type, is reported in Table 4.2; again for clear and unclear event windows. 
The figures presented lend support to the expected relations implied previously in 
section 3.4, and are robust across all information types. Firm size appears to be an 
increasing function of a firm's age, however, the level of the correlation is relatively 
low, ranging between 5 to 12 per cent. So contrary to belief, the largest trading 
corporations are not necessarily always the oldest. The positive correlation between 
firm size and the number of disclosures is considerably stronger, ranging between 34 
to 55 per cent. Implying, larger firms release information more often than their 
smaller counterparts. A firm's age on the otherhand is negatively related to the 
number of disclosures, although the relationship is only weak. 
Tables 4.2a and 4.2b, also report a negative correlation between firm size and the 
volatility of prior stock returns, during the 20 trading days leading up to the 
announcement. Thus, smaller firms are associated with greater market activity before 
their disclosures than larger firms, an observation in agreement with Bamber (1987) 
and Dow & Gorton (1994). In turn this implies, a greater portion of the content of 
large firm disclosures is previously anticipated (Freeman 1987). This is consistent 
ýG 
with the stronger price reaction to stall firm news, as indicated by the higher level 
of correlation between firm size and VOLPR+A, rather than VOLPR. 
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Table 4.2a 
The Simple Correlation between Explanatory Variables for Each Class of Information 
Clear Event Window 
LN_MV AGE NIJM VOLPR VOLPR+A 
Annual Earnings (n=116) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.111 1.000 
NUM 0.539 0.077 1.000 
VOLPR -0.077 -0.092 0.074 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.150 -0.155 -0.048 0.848 1.000 
Interim Earnings (n=152) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.085 1.000 
NUM 0.377 -0.075 1.000 
VOLPR -0.141 -0.135 0.051 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.156 -0.162 0.029 0.963 1.000 
AGMs (n=106) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.068 1.000 
NUM 0.338 0.239 1.000 
VOLPR -0.147 0.074 0.195 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.184 0.044 0.141 0.924 1.000 
Board Changes (n=387) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.099 1.000 
NUM 0.420 -0.050 1.000 
VOLPR -0.075 -0.038 0.052 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.074 -0.037 0.056 0.998 1.000 
Changes in Shareholdings (n=927) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.069 1.000 
NUM 0.405 -0.048 1.000 
VOLPR -0.189 -0.001 0.040 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.190 -0.006 0.045 0.987 1.000 
Notes: 
n represents the number of observations, 
MV represents firm size as measured by market capitalisation (£m) as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
LN_MV is the natural log of MV. 
AGE measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1), 
VOLPR+A measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement periods, where (t=-20,..., 0). 
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Table 4.2b 
The Simple Correlation between Explanatory Variables for Each Class of Information 
Unclear Event Window 
LN_MV AGE NUM VOLPR VOLPR+A 
Annual Earnin gs (n=1830) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.050 1.000 
NUM 0.492 -0.014 1.000 
VOLPR -0.057 -0.073 0.140 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.120 -0.075 0.080 0.855 1.000 
Interim Earnings (n=1452) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.072 1.000 
NUM 0.545 -0.018 1.000 
VOLPR -0.074 -0.069 0.078 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.112 -0.070 0.037 0.883 1.000 
AGMs (n=481) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.119 1.000 
NUM 0.489 0.027 1.000 
VOLPR -0.056 -0.061 0.182 1.000 
VOLPR+A 
-0.090 -0.090 
0.158 0.896 1.000 
Board Changes (n=1807) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.110 1.000 
NUM 0.427 -0.018 1.000 
VOLPR -0.127 -0.039 0.131 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.148 -0.049 0.125 0.938 1.000 
Changes in Shareholdings (n=4354) 
LN_MV 1.000 
AGE 0.106 1.000 
NUM 0.408 -0.028 1.000 
VOLPR -0.180 -0.057 0.065 1.000 
VOLPR+A -0.191 -0.062 0.061 0.983 1.000 
Notes: 
n represents the number of observations, 
MV represents firm size as measured by market capitalisation (fm) as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
LN_MV is the natural log of MV, 
AGE measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20..... -1), 
VOLPR+A measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement periods, where (t=-20,..., 0). 
115 
Other observations from Table 4.2 include, the negative correlation between AGE and 
volatility (ie. both VOLPR and VOLPR+A). Higher volatility may reflect the greater 
uncertainty associated with younger firms due to the relative unavailability of 
information (Demski & Feltham 1994). The positive relation between volatility and 
disclosure frequency (NUM), suggests increasing corporate disclosure does not reduce 
the demand for private information, as argued in Diamond (1985) and Stickel (1989). 
Interim information may therefore be of little economic relevance as implied by 
Brookfield & Morris (1994), be of poor quality, or frequent disclosure may increase 
the expected probability of a future announcement. 
The use of unclear event windows has a mixed effect upon the level of correlation 
between the variables. Though the use of unclear windows has no effect on sign, 
except for the relation between a firm's age (AGE) and how often it discloses (NUM). 
With the exception of the relation between firm size (LN_MV) and the number of 
disclosures (NUM), the overall level of correlation between the explanatory variables 
is no greater than 20 per cent. Therefore abating any potential problems of 
multicollinearity, and demonstrates each explanatory variable contains independent 
information. 
4.6.3 The Extent to which the Information Variables Overlap 
We hypothesised in section 3.4.4, that the volatility of stock returns measures the 
extent to which investors choose to be informed, and will therefore subsequently 
capture similar information contained in firm size, age and the number of disclosures. 
Although Table 4.2 indicates the level of correlation between the explanatory variables 
is no higher than 20 per cent. To test explicitly the extent to which these information 
variables overlap, we ran the following OLS regressions, 
VOLPR; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + u; (4.1) 
and, 
VOLPR+A; = ao + a, LN MV; + aAAGE, + a3NUM; + u; (4.2) 
The regression results are presented in Tables 4.3a and 4.3b below. 
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Table 4.3a 
OLS Results of the Volatility of Prior Stock Returns Regressed Against Firm Size, Age and 
the Number of Corporate Disclosures, for Each Class of Information 
VOLPR; = ao + a, LN_MV; + u2AGE; + u3NUM; + u; 
and, 
VOLPR+A, = ao + a, LN MV, + a2AGE, + a3NUM; + u, 
Clear Event Window 
Annual Interim AGMs Board Changes in 
Earnings Earnings Changes Shareholdings 
VOLPR; 
ao 0.0202"' 0.0264"' 0.0112- 0.0146"" 0.0167'"" 
(4.930) (3.937) (3.538) (6.140) (10.457) 
a, -0.0013 -0.0036" -0.0015"' -0.0009" -0.0024'** 
(-1.403) (-1.969) (-2.390) (-2.047) (-7.006) 
112 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
(-0.931) (-1.384) (0.269) (-0.617) (0.301) 
It-3 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004"" 0.0002' 0.0003"' 
(1.487) (1.231) (2.612) (1.817) (3.969) 
n=116 n=152 n=106 n=387 n=927 
R2=0.006 R2=0.026 RZ=0.063 R2=0.007 R2=0.049 
F13,1121=1.235 93.1481=2.322 93.1021=3.350 F(3.3831=1.956 F(3.43501=17.499 
VOLPR+n; 
Ito 0.0300"' 0.0332" 0.0142"' 0.0145"' 0.0167- 
(6.675) (4.858) (3.980) (6.181) (10.446) 
a, -0.0014 -0.0038" -0.0018"' -0.0008" -0.0024"' 
(-1.463) (-2.025) (-2.597) (-2.055) (-7.103) 
a, -0.0001 -0.0001' 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
(-1.513) (-1.736) (0.077) (-0.606) (0.122) 
a, 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004" 0.0002' 0.0003- 
(0.448) (0.982) (2.202) (1.900) (4.159) 
n=116 n=152 n=106 n=387 n=927 
R2=0.018 R2=0.034 R2=0.054 R2=0.008 R2=0.051 
F[3,1121=1.702 F(3,148)=2.746 F[3,102]=2.994 F(3,383)=2.023 F13,4350)=17.499 
Notes: VOLPR; measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20..... -1), 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement periods, where (t=-20 ,..., 0), 
LN_MV; represents firm size, ie. the natural log of market capitalisation (£m) as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
statistically significant at the 10,5 and I per cent level, respectively, 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors, n represents the number of observations, R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
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Table 4.3b 
OLS Results of the Volatility of Prior Stock Returns Regressed Against Firm Size, Age and 
the Number of Corporate Disclosures, for Each Class of Information 
VOLPR; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM, + u; 
and, 
VOLPR+A; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE, + a3NUM; + u, 
Unclear Event Window 
Annual Interim AGMs Board Changes in 
Earnings Earnings Changes Shareholdings 
VOLPRI 
a0 0.0138"' 0.0146"` 0.0128"' 0.0165"' 0.0212- 
(14.080) (12.291) (9.241) (12.522) (22.538) 
a, -0.0012"` -0.0013"` -0.0009"` -0.0020"' -0.0027"' 
(-6.151) (-5.139) (-3.592) (-8.711) (-15.007) 
a, -0.0000"' -0.0000"` -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000' 
(-2.681) (-2.112) (-1.055) (-0.459) (-1.765) 
a3 0.0003"' 0.0003"' 0.0003"' 0.0004"' 0.0003"' 
(8.308) (5.287) (5.388) (8.920) (10.138) 
n=1830 n=1452 n=481 n=1807 n=4354 
R2=0.043 R2=0.026 R2=0.057 R2=0.057 R2=0.056 
F[3,18261=28.225 F[3,1448)=14.106 F[3,4771=10.724 F[3,18031=37.181 F[3,43501=86.241 
VOLPR+A; 
ao 0.0203"' 0.0200"' 0.0152"' 0.0187"" 0.0221- 
(17.725) (14.725) (9.846) (13.301) (23.335) 
a, -0.0018*" -0.0017"' -0.0012"' -0.0023"" -0.0029- 
(-7.796) (-5.886) (-4.096) (-9.600) (-15.655) 
a, -0.0000'"' -0.0000" -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000'. 
(-2.693) (-2.107) (-1.625) (-0.793) (-2.040) 
a, 0.0003"" 0.0003"' 0.0003" 0.0004"' 0.0003- 
(6.851) (4.371) (5.175) (9.056) (10.116) 
n=1830 n=1452 n=481 n=1807 n=4354 
R2=0.042 R2=0.027 R2=0.061 R2=0.064 R2=0.060 
F[3,18261=27.774 F[3,1448]=14.640 F[3,477]=11.390 F[3,1803]=42.161 F(3,43501=92.934 
Notes: VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20..... -1). 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0), 
LN_MV; represents firm size, ie. the natural log of market capitalisation (em) as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGEi measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM measures the number of disclosures made by the fine over the sample period, 
statistically significant at the 10,5 and I per cent level, respectively, 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors, n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
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The overall joint explanatory power of the explanatory variables is very low, with an 
R2 value no greater than 6.4 per cent 7 From Table 4.3b, for unclear event windows, 
prior volatility is least explained for interim earnings, and increases in the order of 
annual earnings, changes in shareholdings, AGMs and finally board changes. For 
clear windows the relation is less clear cut (see Table 4.3a), though one noticeable 
effect is the relatively large reduction in the explanation of volatility around board 
changes. However, what is evident, if the volatility of prior stock returns (VOLPR and 
VOLPR+A) measures the extent to which investors choose to be informed, our 
remaining explanatory variables capture only a small portion of the incentives to be 
informed. 
Consistent with Table 4.2, the relationships have the correct sign. The volatility of 
prior stock returns is negatively related to firm size, and positively related to number 
of disclosures. Firm size is statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level) in the 
explanation of the variability of stock returns prior to isolated announcements, with 
respect to all information types except annual earnings. By allowing other events in 
the window, increases the overall significance of the model (see Table 4.3b); though 
this maybe because there is more activity to explain. For example, the level of 
significance increases above the 1 per cent level for both firm size (LN_MV) and the 
number of disclosures (NUM), for all information types. Though the coefficient of 
NUM, a2, is no greater than 0.0004. 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
To ability to evaluate the value relevance of a corporate disclosure, by measuring the 
impounding of information, relies heavily on the ability to control for noise in the 
price system. This means controlling for price movements unrelated to the event 
under investigation. The database produced by EXTEL Financial, records all (or at 
least the majority of) corporate disclosures released to the LSE, by all fully listed 
firms during the period January 1990 to July 1992. The database therefore enables 
us to exclude all event periods from the sample which include more than one 
' Although the R' values are higher than those obtained by Pope & Inyangete (1992) 
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corporate disclosure. Assuming noise is a function of disclosure, this procedure 
thereby reduces the potential level of noise in security prices, and increases the power 
of the tests. Plus it allows a more accurate examination of the anticipation by 
investors of corporate disclosure. Whereas in previous research, it is the norm to 
assume non-earnings events are value irrelevant, and not exclude them from the event 
window. 
However, investor anticipation may also be a function of the frequency of corporate 
disclosure. Increased disclosure over the event period could therefore either have a 
positive or negative impact upon the anticipation of the expected event. Thereby 
excluding event periods with more than one disclosure, will not only bias the sample 
towards smaller and younger firms (see Table 4.1), but also restricts the general 
applicability of the results. The analysis therefore examines security returns over both 
clear and unclear event windows. 
Although the sample period is limited, the coverage of the EXTEL database allows 
us to examine a larger and broader sample of firms, than has been previously 
examined in UK. For example, recent work of Brookfield & Morris (1992) employed 
a sample of only 25 firms with a the minimum market capitalisation of £25M, over 
the period October 1983 until October 1984; in order to examine the variability of 
stock returns in response to corporate disclosure. Unfortunately, the available sample 
sizes of alternative disclosure types reported by EXTEL, were too small to produce 
efficient estimates. To overcome this limitation the approach of Brookfield & Morris 
(1992) could of been adopted, by grouping the different information types into 
portfolios. However, this technique was not employed so as not to introduce 
subjective bias as to what are considered like events. 
Given the selected data set, the objective of this chapter was to examine both the 
properties of the data employed, and the level of correlation between the explanatory 
variables. Table 4.2 reports the correlation structure, and lends support to the 
hypothesised relationships stated in chapter 3. Firm size is an increasing function of 
age, and the number of disclosures. The negative correlation between firm size and 
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stock return volatility observed prior to the announcement, suggests small firms are 
associated with greater market activity before their disclosures than large firms. This 
supports our earlier notion, that the information content of large firm announcements 
is largely anticipated beforehand, and therefore not captured by our event window. 
In addition, younger firms and more frequent disclosers are associated with higher 
volatility. 
However, the overall level of correlation between the explanatory variables is no 
greater than 20 per cent, with the exception of the correlation between firm size and 
number of disclosures which is 55 per cent. This general low level of correlation 
abates any potential problems of multicollinearity, and illustrates that each explanatory 
variable contains independent information. 
We argued previously in chapter 3, that the volatility of prior stock returns measures 
the extent to which investors choose to be informed. Although the level of correlation 
between explanatory variables is generally low, we explicitly test the extent to which 
the information variables overlap. Or in other words, the extent to which the volatility 
of stock returns captures the same information set as measured by firm size, age and 
the number of disclosures. However the joint explanatory power of firm size, age and 
disclosure frequency, for the volatility of prior stock returns, is found to be no greater 
than 6.4 per cent. Thus, the volatility of stock returns captures incentives to become 
informed not proxied by either firm size, a firm's age or the frequency of disclosure. 
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5. THE PATTERN OF ANTICIPATION 
AND INTERPRETATION 
5.1 THE OBJECTIVE AND MAIN FINDING 
Chapter 5 firstly examines the pattern of average stock returns over the event period, 
for each class of information, in order to identify the impounding behaviour of 
investors. The second objective of the chapter is to test the variables identified in 
chapter 3, hypothesised to explain the process of anticipation and interpretation for 
each information type. Several observations are made but the main finding, is that the 
volatility in stock returns, prior to the disclosure, is significant in explaining lagged 
impounding. 
5.2 INTRODUCTION 
The first objective of this chapter is to identify the behaviour of stock returns 
surrounding the selected information types, and to determine the rate at which the 
information released is disseminated and impounded into returns. This is an attempt 
to further our understanding of how market participants react to new information; and 
may uncover the possibility of significant investment opportunities. That is, our 
analysis may uncover patterns of impounding behaviour by investors surrounding 
corporate disclosure, which could possibly be incorporated into profitable trading 
strategies. Considerable evidence exists showing the value relevance (as measured by 
price reaction) of annual earnings reports (Ball & Brown 1968), interim reports 
(Beaver 1968, Firth 1981, Brookfield & Morris 1992), and to a lesser extent annual 
general meetings (AGMs) (Firth 1981, Rippington & Taffler 1995). In these studies, 
although earnings announcements are to a large extent anticipated by the market, the 
share price reaction to their announcement suggests their release conveys new 
information. However, relatively little market reaction is found following the AGM. 
Evidence relating to the value relevance of board changes and changes in 
shareholdings, is sparse and needs further investigation. 
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The second objective of this chapter, is to explain the level of market anticipation as 
a function of the costs and benefits of being informed; as identified by Kim & 
Verrechia (1994), McNichols & Trueman (1994) and Demski & Feltham (1994). 
Specifically, for each information type, we examine the relationship between the 
impounding of information and (1) firm size, measured by market capitalisation, (2) 
the number of years the firm has been trading, (3) the number of disclosures made by 
the firm, and (4) the volatility of stock returns during the pre-announcement period. 
The results of this analysis will be discussed in two parts. Firstly, section 5.3 
identifies the impounding behaviour of stock returns, for each information type. The 
results highlight the sensitivity of the information metric, APIs, to the model of 
expected returns employed. Although in general, the results indicate the market 
largely anticipates the event, but continues to adjust after its release as the full 
implications become known. The second part of the analysis, in section 5.4, attempts 
to explain the impounding behaviour described in section 5.3. It specifically provides 
an empirical test of the variables identified in chapter 3, hypothesised to explain the 
process of anticipation and interpretation, for each class of information. The volatility 
of stock returns, prior to the disclosure, materialises as the main driving force behind 
the explanation of lagged impounding. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
5.3 THE PATTERN OF STOCK RETURNS 
To determine the impounding behaviour of stock returns, we observe the average 
value of the abnormal performance index (API) over the event window for the sample 
of firms for each event; annual earnings, interim earnings, the AGM, a board change 
or a change in shareholding. The measure of API used for this analysis is calculated 
as, 
n 20 
API, =1E ][I (I+ e«) (5.1) n fzl r: _20 
The API, tracks the value of one pound invested equally in each of the n securities, 
over the event window (t=-20,..., +20); where day 0 is defined as the report date. The 
number of firms in the sample, n, varies according to the information type. The 
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measure of excess return, e1, is calculated using one of three expected returns models: 
market model adjusted returns (MM), market adjusted returns (MKT) or mean adjusted 
returns (MN). The rationale for employing alternative models, is to examine the 
sensitivity of different measures of expected returns (see section 3.7.1). 
Initially we use clear event windows, examining stock return behaviour surrounding 
isolated events, to infer the relative anticipation (as measured by the level of abnormal 
returns) of the different information types. ' However, in chapter 4 we found firm size 
and the frequency of disclosure are correlated (see Table 4.1). The use of clear event 
windows therefore biases the sample towards both smaller and younger firms, and 
those who disclose less frequently. If on the other hand, market anticipation is a 
function of the frequency of corporate disclosure, increased disclosure over the event 
period will therefore either positively or negatively affect anticipation of the expected 
event. The analysis therefore examines security returns over both clear and unclear 
event windows. 
Figures 5.1 to 5.5 below, plot the changing value of APIS for isolated events, for each 
information type; annual earnings, interim earnings, AGMs, board changes and 
changes in shareholdings, respectively. More detailed information of the price 
reaction to these separate information types can be found in Tables 5.1a to 5.1b. 
Together with reporting the daily average abnormal return (AAR) for the sample of 
firms, the tables include the results of two-tailed t-tests used to evaluate their 
statistical significance. The figures illustrate the speed of price adjustment to new 
information, but we are unable to ascertain whether the direction or the magnitude of 
the adjustment is correct. At this stage we give no indication as to the nature of the 
news. The direction of the market effect for each information type is difficult to 
predict depending on the nature of the news, and the former expectations of investors. 
If the average event conveys new information, then one can expect to observe 
A clear event window is defined as, where no other announcement (as listed by EXTEL) occurs 
during the 20 trading days preceding, or following the event under examination. For unclear event 
windows, there is no restriction as the number of announcements that may occur over the event window. 
Using clear event windows therefore allows the isolation of the price impact of a single event. 
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abnormal returns. The basic null hypothesis of this investigation is therefore as 
follows: no event (on average) will generate stock returns significantly different from 
those expected. Briefly, the results show that: 
The analysis distinguishes between event periods which exclude other 
disclosures from those that allow other disclosures. 
Results amlicable to both conditions: 
The APIs metric is highly sensitive to the measure of expected returns. 
The market appears to anticipate part of the information content of the 
average corporate disclosure, but continues to adjust after the report date, 
perhaps as the full implications become known. 
A higher level of anticipation and a higher level of drift is associated with 
both interim and annual earnings reports, relative to other information 
types. 
On the announcement day, there is a significantly larger price adjustment 
to the release of interim earnings, relative to the annual report. 
Allowing other disclosures within the event period: 
This notably reduces both the level of anticipation and drift, but also 
reduces the overall significance of daily abnormal returns. This reduction 
may in part reflect the small firm bias of analysing isolated events. 
The significance of abnormal returns over many days of the event period 
surrounding a change in shareholding, is indicative of possible herding by 
investors. 
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Figure 5.1: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Annual Earnings Reports, 
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Figure 5.2: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Interim Earnings Reports, 
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Figure 5.4: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Board Changes, Using 















Figure 5.5: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Changes in Shareholdings, 
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5.3.1 The Comparison of Expected Returns Models 
Figures 5.1 to 5.5 serve to demonstrate the APIs measure is sensitive to the measure 
of excess return employed, though the relative pattern between measures is uniform 
across information types. The pattern between mean adjusted (MN) and market model 
adjusted returns (MM), are most closely related, with MN always associated with a 
higher level of return. For both MN and MM, on average, events appear to contain 
`good' news relative to prior expectations. However, using market adjusted returns 
(MKT) produces a mirror image, suggesting on average events contain `bad' news 
relative to prior expectations. What explains this variation between the three measures 
of excess returns? 
One possible explanation for the drift in market model adjusted returns (MM) is 
provided by Ball & Kothari (1991), of an increase in systematic risk over the event 
period. In constrast, use of the market model, implicitly assumes that the firm's 





returns from pre-estimated betas will not fully account for this increased risk and will 
subsequently over emphasise any drift. Using market adjusted returns (MKT), the 
level of API, prior to the average event would suggest there is little (if any) 
anticipation prior to the average event. Or an alternative explanation may be that 
much of the anticipation has already occurred before the event period. While 
possible, this scenario would appear unlikely given the broad sample of firm size 
employed. 
To explain why the market model (MM) produces consistently a higher return than a 
zero-one model (MKT), implies the average event time beta is less than one. ' Thus, 
adjusting security returns using the market return may remove too much information, 
little security return activity left to be explained. The problem is further exacerbated 
if the level of market return has risen over the event window, relative to the estimation 
period. Thus, if we observe both an increase in the level of systematic risk and the 
level of market return, relative to ex ante expectations, the use of mean adjusted 
returns (MN) will further exaggerate the level of return investors can earn, over and 
above that claimed by using market model adjusted returns (MM). 3 
For example, between 01/01/91 to 31/12/91 the level of the market (as measured by 
the level of the FTA All Share price index) rose from 1032.25 to 1187.70, a 15 
percent increase. Over the period 01/01/92 until 30/06/92, the market rose to the level 
of 1216.62, a further 2.44 per cent increase. An overall increase over the sample 
period of 17.86 per cent. However, this disguises the large increase of 34.32 per cent 
that arose over the period 16/01/91 to 11/05/92. Such high expectations may produce 
a further knock-on effect among investors in that exaggerate good news and 
underestimate relatively bad news. 
2 On further investigation, the average beta of the sample was found to be only 0.7, for the period 
concerned. 
3 See Appendix 2, which compares the distribution properties of API calculated over the different 
event windows, for each excess return metric. We find for the event period the value of API is very 
similar across return metrics, only when excess returns are cumulated over time does the similarity 
disappear. 
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The implications of this are not as significant as initially implied. Firstly, Figures 5.1 
to 5.5 are only representative of the average reaction. Secondly, to complete our 
empirical analysis, the level of return is not as important as the magnitude of drift 
relative to the magnitude of anticipation, hence, a more accurate measure of beta is 
unnecessary. Which ever method is correct in the calculation of excess returns, it 
cannot successfully be determined, but the sensitivity of the results to the measure of 
expected returns furthers the need to use these different approaches in analysing the 
market reaction to events. However, this means the frequency and size of significant 
returns will vary across excess return metrics for each announcement type and 
consequently so will increase the probability of a Type I error. Given the above 
intuition, the true level of return that the average investor can expect to earn, most 
likely lies between the benchmark models MKT and MM. The following analysis 
will therefore concentrate on the interpretation of findings related o MKT and MM, 
but for reasons of comparison, will also report the results related to MN. 
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Table 5.1a 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Annual Earnings (n=116) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adjusted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-scat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0027 1.5367 -0.0011 -0.6403 0.0043 2.4456- 
-19 0.0041 1.9466" 0.0013 0.6160 0.0060 2.7125""" 
-18 0.0023 1.2703 -0.0011 -0.6307 0.0038 2.2020- 
-17 0.0016 0.9688 -0.0015 -0.9282 0.0039 2.2721- 
-16 0.0048 2.7918""' 0.0017 0.9321 0.0066 3.7305'"' 
-15 0.0026 1.5751 -0.0013 -0.7858 0.0053 3.0199- 
-14 0.0035 2.1583'" 0.0012 0.8084 0.0055 3.9562"" 
-13 0.0068 3.0615"'" 0.0039 1.7572" 0.0079 3.4669"'" 
-12 0.0067 2.4791- 0.0039 1.4654 0.0094 3.4796- 
-11 0.0026 1.2505 -0.0003 -0.1325 0.0031 1.5601 
-10 0.0028 1.1203 -0.0002 -0.0759 0.0045 1.7409' 
-9 0.0028 1.2632 0.0011 0.5334 0.0048 2.1908- 
-8 0.0033 2.0132"" 0.0005 0.3224 0.0055 3.2605- 
-7 0.0050 1.6114 0.0027 0.9001 0.0066 2.1693"" 
-6 0.0002 0.0410 -0.0027 -0.7231 0.0011 0.2997 
-5 0.0041 1.4719 0.0009 0.3506 0.0074 2.6768- 
-4 0.0096 2.5993""' 0.0062 1.7470 0.0138 3.7601 ' 
-3 0.0052 1.5278 0.0025 0.7679 0.0067 2.0448"" 
-2 -0.0001 -0.0547 -0.0032 -1.3813 0.0009 0.3796 
-1 0.0015 0.6847 -0.0011 -0.5369 0.0043 2.0138"' 
0 0.0076 1.0326 0.0052 0.7036 0.0095 1.2795 
1 0.0101 2.3267""" 0.0071 1.6629" 0.0113 2.6087"' 
2 0.0066 2.1591"` 0.0043 1.4952 0.0080 2.7060- 
3 0.0066 1.5886 0.0042 1.0176 0.0083 2.0187"" 
4 0.0050 1.8416' 0.0019 0.7061 0.0049 1.7324" 
5 0.0016 0.5642 -0: 0020 -0.6975 0.0031 1.0747 
6 0.0002 0.0984 -0.0012 -0.5949 0.0010 0.4659 
7 -0.0003 -0.1917 -0.0028 -1.5049 0.0011 0.6039 
8 -0.0001 -0.0409 -0.0029 -1.1679 0.0005 0.1947 
9 0.0023 0.9979 -0.0002 -0.0878 0.0029 1.3015 
10 0.0042 1.6056 0.0020 0.7534 0.0053 2.0690- 
11 0.0021 0.8805 0.0004 0.1679 0.0045 1.9898" 
12 0.0057 2.8106'** 0.0026 1.4540 0.0071 3.6739""" 
13 0.0061 2.8573"'" 0.0023 1.0820 0.0070 3.3333"' 
14 0.0064 2.3384""" 0.0039 1.4252 0.0081 2.9403""" 
15 0.0051 1.8877' 0.0024 1.0011 0.0070 2.7848- 
16 0.0034 2.1540'" 0.0001 0.0616 0.0055 3.5553'** 
17 -0.0010 -0.5848 -0.0040 -2.3455"'" 0.0014 0.8332 
18 -0.0008 -0.5416 -0.0043 -2.6833'"" 0.0009 0.6105 
19 0.0051 1.8352" 0.0012 0.4642 0.0064 2.4376- 
20 0.0087 2.2405"" 0.0056 1.4796 0.0108 2.8155'"" 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '; '; " statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 5.1b 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Interim Earnings (n=152) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adjusted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0014 0.7630 -0.0021 -1.1757 0.0020 1.1730 
-19 -0.0001 -0.0441 -0.0027 -0.9366 0.0003 0.0926 
-18 0.0029 1.1242 -0.0000 -0.0080 0.0041 1.5229 
-17 0.0035 1.6186 0.0004 0.1835 0.0032 1.4385 
-16 -0.0002 -0.1006 -0.0025 -1.5931 0.0004 0.2500 
-15 0.0016 0.7909 -0.0015 -0.6597 0.0021 0.9993 
-14 0.0022 1.0577 0.0003 0.1277 0.0023 1.1214 
-13 0.0047 2.9967'** 0.0014 0.8533 0.0047 3.1049- 
-12 0.0011 0.9286 -0.0017 -1.4672 0.0026 2.2963" 
-11 0.0025 1.0968 -0.0011 -0.4564 0.0032 1.4109 
-10 -0.0027 -0.5614 -0.0052 -1.0579 -0.0017 -0.3455 
-9 0.0075 1.1219 0.0043 0.6484 0.0081 1.2031 
-8 0.0052 2.2319" 0.0020 0.8790 0.0056 2.4314- 
-7 0.0011 0.7277 -0.0015 -0.9771 0.0015 1.0096 
-6 0.0047 2.4076"' 0.0024 1.1997 0.0053 2.7313"' 
-5 0.0029 1.3764 -0.0001 -0.0370 0.0037 1.7542' 
-4 -0.0006 -0.2417 -0.0037 -1.4563 -0.0002 -0.0657 
-3 0.0038 1.8774' 0.0014 0.7173 0.0044 2.1971 
-2 0.0016 0.8291 -0.0009 -0.4496 0.0022 1.0593 
-1 0.0046 1.9182' 0.0014 0.6018 0.0061 2.4699- 
0 -0.0167 -2.3526"' -0.0204 -2.8637"` -0.0163 -2.2882" 
1 0.0028 0.6642 0.0006 0.1320 0.0036 0.8320 
2 0.0010 0.2963 -0.0023 -0.7293 0.0017 0.5258 
3 -0.0005 -0.1811 -0.0038 -1.4986 0.0008 0.3298 
4 0.0031 1.0155 -0.0004 -0.1160 0.0028 0.9250 
5 0.0025 1.5262 0.0002 0.1168 0.0043 2.7905- 
6 0.0023 1.1042 -0.0002 -0.1104 0.0023 1.1399 
7 0.0014 0.6180 -0.0017 -0.8151 0.0029 1.3600 
8 0.0041 1.5642 0.0014 0.5218 0.0035 1.3728 
9 0.0013 0.5476 -0.0018 -0.7477 0.0021 0.8683 
10 0.0031 1.2681 -0.0002 -0.0760 0.0042 1.8180' 
11 0.0049 2.7333"' 0.0013 0.7204 0.0052 2.9137- 
12 0.0051 2.4143"' 0.0027 1.2220 0.0063 2.9513"' 
13 0.0043 1.8439' 0.0017 0.7015 0.0049 2.1583- 
14 0.0026 1.0510 0.0001 0.0499 0.0038 1.5681 
15 0.0041 1.9403' 0.0003 0.1546 0.0053 2.4826- 
16 -0.0005 -0.1358 -0.0032 -0.9711 0.0009 0.2744 
17 0.0020 1.1204 -0.0014 -0.7756 0.0020 1.1773 
18 -0.0019 -0.4106 -0.0048 -1.0726 -0.0002 -0.0436 
19 0.0013 0.3622 -0.0019 -0.4909 0.0014 0.3566 
20 0.0010 0.3139 -0.0017 -0.5588 0.0018 0.5830 
Notes: n represents the number of observations ; ', ", "' statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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5.3.2 Earnings Announcements 
Annual Earnings Reports 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates a gradual upward trend of the APIS, preceding and following 
the average annual earnings report, for all expected returns models. In other words, 
the market gradually anticipates the event, but continues to adjust after its release as 
the full implications become known. In comparison, Figures 5.2 to 5.5 show a much 
lower level of anticipation and post-announcement drift, is associated with the release 
of other information types. We can only speculate at this stage, that greater 
anticipation of the annual earnings report is a function of the information's 
characteristics. For example, not only is the probability of release known with 
certainty, but the content of the annual report is more likely to be of greater precision 
and relevance for security valuation. 
From Table 5.1 a, we can see that the pattern, significance, and the level of return 
varies according to the measure of expected returns. 4 The highest average abnormal 
return occurs the day after the report's release. Table 5.1a reports a return on day +1 
of 1.01 per cent and 0.71 for MM and MKT respectively, with corresponding t- 
statistics of 2.3267 and 1.6629. For MM, we also observe several significant positive 
returns on event days, -16, -14 through to -12, -8, -4, +2, +12 to +14, +16 and again 
on +20. Beyond this, any negative returns are rare and always statistically 
insignificant. In contrast, for the zero-one model (MKT), significant returns are few 
and always negative; occurring only on event days +17 and +18. 
The most sizeable price movement occurs after the event date, though the overall 
returns pattern is one of an upward trend preceding and following the average annual 
earnings report. Given the general low significance of daily average abnormal returns, 
we are unable to confirm that the average annual earnings report conveys new 
information. However, the lagged impounding effect continuing at least until the day 
after the reports release, is consistent with other UK work by Firth (1981), Mitra & 
Owers (1995). 
4 For an abnormal return to be quoted as being significant, the level of significance must be at least 
5 per cent, unless otherwise stated. 
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Interim Earnings Report 
The APIS pattern for the average interim earnings report, depicted in Figure 5.2, is 
markedly different from the other figures. The returns series is considerably more 
volatile in anticipation of the release, relative to both the post-announcement period, 
and to the returns series of other information types. This behaviour of returns, implies 
there is possibly wider disagreement across investors' beliefs, concerning the 
implications of available information for the release, or the expected outcome, of the 
interim report. This impression of uncertainty is substantiated by an notable drop in 
price upon the report's release. The average interim earnings report therefore appears 
to convey, at least initially, `bad' news relative to prior expectations. 
The lowest return of the event period arises on the report date. Tables 5.1 b reports 
a significant return equal to -1.67 per cent for MM, and -2.04 per cent for MKT; with 
respective t-values of -2.3526 and -2.8637. This price adjustment is stronger than that 
observed for annual earnings, a finding consistent with earlier studies (Atiase 1985). 5 
Over and above this, the extent of significant returns are haphazard and less frequent 
than observed for the annual report, despite the more volatile nature of the returns 
series. For example, using the market model (MM), the null of no significant 
abnormal returns can be rejected only on event days: -13, -8, -6, the report date, +11 
and +12. Overall the return series follows an upward trend, suggesting the average 
interim report bears favourable news. When beta is assumed to be one (MKT), then 
the overall pattern of drift is downward. This implies the opposing view to the market 
model, that the average interim earnings report bears disappointing news. However, 
the lowest and most significant return of the event period is similarly observed on the 
report date, of -2.04 per cent (t-value of -2.8637). Beyond this, we fail to reject the 
null on any of the other event days. 
Therefore, due to the inconsistent results of MM and MKT, we provisionally conclude 
that the average interim earnings report stirs less investor interest than the annual 
report, perhaps a reflection of its lower information content. Not only is the overall 
S The interim announcement therefore presents an opportunity to go short, although the position 
must be closed rapidly as the negative response only lasts a day. 
134 
level of return lower (as indicated by the level of drift), but interim reports appear to 
generate a smaller price response upon their release. 
5.3.3 Annual General Meetings 
The AGM is held some time after the preliminary earnings announcement, but is 
commonly used as a vehicle by the chairman to announce future plans, and we would 
therefore expect the event to signal new information. From Figure 5.3, the lower level 
of return seen over the event period suggests the AGM may reveal little new 
information relative to the earnings report, consistent with the earlier work of Firth 
(1981). 
From Table 5.1 c, the most sizeable price movement occurs over the pre-announcement 
period. For the market model (MM), the most significant returns are earned prior to 
the average meeting, on event days -14, -11 until -8, and -4, compared to +3 and + 13 
post the event. The day following the AGM, reports a negative though insignificant 
return. However, for the zero-one model (MKT) the only significant but negative 
return (-0.37 per cent), arises on day +1. Once again, use of the zero-one model 
implies the average AGM conveys disappointing news. The inconsistent results of 
MM and MKT, we tentatively conclude that the content of the average AGM is 
largely anticipated, but conveys little new information relative to earnings. 
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Table 5.1c 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
AGMs (n=106) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adjusted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0028 1.9749" 0.0020 1.2771 0.0047 2.6046- 
-19 0.0009 0.4789 -0.0014 -0.6999 0.0025 1.4189 
-18 0.0005 0.2948 -0.0006 -0.3468 0.0019 1.0696 
-17 0.0016 0.8207 -0.0003 -0.1474 0.0024 1.2679 
-16 0.0023 1.4595 0.0008 0.5263 0.0038 2.4956- 
-15 0.0016 1.0279 -0.0004 -0.2545 0.0014 0.8710 
-14 0.0036 2.6286""' 0.0021 1.5109 0.0039 2.8344- 
-13 0.0024 1.1447 -0.0001 -0.0600 0.0036 1.6974' 
-12 0.0010 0.6893 -0.0006 -0.4025 0.0014 0.9500 
-11 0.0034 1.9655" 0.0010 0.6273 0.0039 2.4274"' 
-10 0.0035 2.4450"' 0.0022 1.5319 0.0048 3.2751- 
-9 0.0048 2.0635" 0.0023 1.0783 0.0062 2.6940"" 
-8 0.0040 2.5302"' 0.0023 1.4264 0.0036 2.3246- 
-7 0.0022 1.4586 0.0009 0.5673 0.0025 1.6828' 
-6 -0.0011 -0.6834 -0.0031 -1.8257' -0.0014 -0.8434 
-5 0.0008 0.5365 -0.0007 -0.4722 0.0008 0.5264 
-4 0.0031 2.0151" 0.0017 1.1475 0.0041 2.6920- 
-3 0.0015 1.4428 0.0005 0.4675 0.0016 1.4800 
-2 0.0010 0.8154 -0.0002 -0.1302 0.0008 0.6729 
-1 0.0026 1.3853 0.0018 0.9767 0.0033 1.7711' 
0 0.0046 1.2997 0.0037 1.0361 0.0047 1.2988 
1 -0.0027 -1.6958' -0.0037 -2.2964" -0.0022 -1.4116 
2 0.0004 0.2233 -0.0015 -0.7575 0.0007 0.3614 
3 0.0048 2.3309"' 0.0031 1.5790 0.0048 2.3840- 
4 0.0015 0.5968 -0.0002 -0.0833 0.0018 0.7235 
5 0.0027 1.9396" 0.0012 0.8976 0.0030 2.1482'" 
6 0.0019 0.9345 0.0013 0.6172 0.0027 1.3274 
7 -0.0005 -0.2343 -0.0024 -1.1970 -0.0010 -0.4604 
8 -0.0022 -0.9157 -0.0028 -1.1405 -0.0018 -0.7524 
9 0.0012 0.7824 -0.0002 -0.1051 0.0007 0.4571 
10 0.0002 0.1952 -0.0011 -0.8345 -0.0003 -0.2275 
11 0.0028 1.8236` 0.0016 1.0569 0.0021 1.3842 
12 0.0013 0.8884 0.0007 0.4263 0.0007 0.4417 
13 0.0024 2.0287" 0.0009 0.8058 0.0011 0.9803 
14 -0.0001 -0.0837 -0.0006 -0.3971 0.0001 0.0892 
15 -0.0002 -0.1954 -0.0012 -1.0363 -0.0003 -0.2603 
16 0.0000 0.0097 -0.0009 -0.7184 0.0003 0.2213 
17 0.0002 0.1583 -0.0005 -0.3478 0.0005 0.3066 
18 -0.0021 -0.9069 -0.0029 -1.3797 -0.0027 -1.2936 
19 -0.0024 -0.5994 -0.0032 -0.7973 -0.0037 -0.9141 
20 -0.0021 -1.4015 -0.0033 -1.9889" -0.0032 -2.0861" 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '; ', "' statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 5.1d 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Board Changes (n=387) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adjusted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0043 2.4526""' 0.0025 1.4868 0.0051 2.9579- 
-19 0.0018 1.1632 0.0000 0.0011 0.0022 1.5334 
-18 0.0023 2.1388" 0.0003 0.3214 0.0033 3.1010"' 
-17 0.0004 0.3529 -0.0016 -1.3483 0.0006 0.5226 
-16 -0.0001 -0.0701 -0.0018 -1.5995 0.0001 0.0689 
-15 0.0003 0.3557 -0.0014 -1.8963' 0.0004 0.5523 
-14 -0.0000 -0.0157 -0.0016 -1.6766' 0.0005 0.4704 
-13 0.0011 1.0889 -0.0006 -0.5728 0.0017 1.6702' 
-12 -0.0022 -1.6470' -0.0030 -2.1943" -0.0021 -1.5917 
-11 0.0014 1.3929 0.0004 0.4101 0.0017 1.6261 
-10 0.0004 0.3814 -0.0011 -0.9417 0.0005 0.4742 
-9 0.0017 1.2449 -0.0001 -0.0781 0.0013 0.9421 
-8 0.0006 0.6829 -0.0008 -0.9437 0.0008 0.9435 
-7 0.0012 2.1438" -0.0003 -0.5683 0.0015 2.5403- 
-6 0.0007 0.7684 -0.0004 -0.5060 0.0003 0.3779 
-5 0.0008 0.7564 -0.0005 -0.4855 0.0012 1.1544 
-4 0.0019 2.2930" 0.0004 0.4517 0.0021 2.4855- 
-3 0.0007 0.6932 -0.0005 -0.5616 0.0008 0.7981 
-2 0.0006 0.6568 -0.0008 -0.8421 0.0013 1.3456 
-1 0.0004 0.3907 -0.0012 -1.3176 0.0002 0.1833 
0 0.0001 0.1386 -0.0009 -1.0661 0.0007 0.8329 
1 -0.0005 -0.4839 -0.0014 -1.4523 0.0010 0.9789 2 0.0006 0.6304 -0.0003 -0.3590 0.0010 1.0359 
3 -0.0011 -1.0071 -0.0026 -2.3692"'" -0.0014 -1.2424 
4 -0.0015 -1.1841 -0.0025 -2.0294" -0.0008 -0.6330 
5 -0.0006 -0.5505 -0.0024 -2.1961" -0.0002 -0.1588 
6 0.0001 0.0718 -0.0016 -1.6389 0.0001 0.0852 
7 -0.0000 -0.0082 -0.0014 -1.3110 0.0004 0.3567 
8 0.0016 1.3730 -0.0001 -0.0939 0.0016 1.3913 9 -0.0001 -0.0983 -0.0014 -1.4747 0.0004 0.3990 
10 0.0012 1.3434 -0.0003 -0.2935 0.0013 1.4057 
11 0.0006 0.6541 -0.0009 -1.0777 0.0007 0.7819 
12 -0.0010 -0.7398 -0.0023 -1.6461 -0.0017 -1.2088 13 0.0002 0.2534 -0.0010 -1.0891 0.0004 0.4543 
14 0.0023 2.1819'" 0.0008 0.8018 0.0030 2.9545"' 
15 0.0015 1.6648 0.0002 0.2220 0.0017 1.8382' 
16 0.0009 0.7738 -0.0006 -0.5179 0.0007 0.6364 17 -0.0000 -0.0443 -0.0015 -1.6333 0.0003 0.2765 18 -0.0001 -0.8505 -0.0023 -1.9676"' -0.0010 -0.8340 
19 0.0018 1.4889 0.0009 0.7155 0.0022 1.7454 
20 -0.0008 -0.3428 -0.0018 -0.7514 -0.0005 -0.2321 
Notes: n represents the number of observations ; '; '. '** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 5.1e 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Changes in Shareholdings (n=927) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adj usted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0004 0.5945 -0.0009 -1.4700 0.0003 0.5259 
-19 0.0017 1.6166 0.0002 0.2314 0.0020 1.9085' 
-18 0.0009 1.4788 -0.0006 -1.0455 0.0009 1.6065 
-17 0.0000 0.0587 -0.0015 -2.0071"` 0.0007 0.9362 
-16 -0.0002 -0.1942 -0.0012 -1.4521 0.0005 0.5538 
-15 0.0010 1.7964' -0.0003 -0.5753 0.0018 3.1314"' 
-14 0.0018 2.6711- 0.0004 0.6345 0.0024 3.4090- 
-13 0.0006 0.9831 -0.0008 -1.2644 0.0010 1.6200 
-12 0.0000 0.0184 -0.0011 -1.6864' 0.0010 1.4732 
-11 0.0005 0.7303 -0.0006 -0.9280 0.0011 1.7124 
-10 0.0010 1.9958" -0.0004 -0.7655 0.0013 2.4256"" 
-9 0.0004 0.4991 -0.0011 -1.4266 0.0009 1.2219 
-8 0.0012 1.6131 0.0001 0.1972 0.0019 2.5328"' 
-7 0.0019 3.1552"" 0.0008 1.3406 0.0023 3.7640- 
-6 0.0022 3.1425- 0.0011 1.5776 0.0022 3.1480- 
-5 0.0027 3.9690'"' 0.0016 2.3873"' 0.0029 4.2500- 
-4 0.0022 4.0671- 0.0010 1.7688' 0.0023 4.2826- 
-3 0.0017 2.1982" 0.0005 0.6779 0.0018 2.3212- 
-2 -0.0000 -0.0598 -0.0009 -1.4698 0.0002 0.3772 
-1 0.0009 1.2963 -0.0002 -0.2464 0.0007 1.0757 
0 0.0024 3.1604"' 0.0013 1.8198' 0.0021 2.8165- 
1 0.0004 0.4916 -0.0007 -0.8872 0.0006 0.8225 
2 0.0017 2.7222"' 0.0006 0.9401 0.0017 2.7035- 
3 0.0015 2.6481'"" 0.0002 0.3832 0.0016 2.8922"' 
4 0.0023 3.2546"' 0.0010 1.5265 0.0024 3.3974- 
5 0.0012 2.5812"' 0.0001 0.3062 0.0012 2.6514- 
6 0.0008 1.6193 -0.0002 -0.4331 0.0016 3.0934- 
7 0.0014 2.5050'"' 0.0002 0.4221 0.0016 2.9954"' 
8 0.0005 0.8504 -0.0007 -1.2416 0.0008 1.3689 
9 0.0006 1.0510 -0.0007 -1.2229 0.0007 1.1501 
10 0.0003 0.5674 -0.0006 -0.9996 0.0005 0.8531 
11 0.0015 2.5877"' 0.0002 0.3307 0.0014 2.2832- 
12 0.0015 2.9253"' 0.0006 1.0638 0.0013 2.4817- 
13 0.0006 0.9699 -0.0006 -1.0111 0.0005 0.9386 
14 0.0010 1.5186 -0.0005 -0.7285 0.0008 1.2170 
15 0.0013 2.1534" 0.0002 0.3394 0.0013 2.2188- 
16 0.0012 2.0961" 0.0004 0.7501 0.0015 2.5736- 
17 0.0000 0.0279 -0.0012 -1.5200 0.0000 0.0019 
18 -0.0001 -0.1727 -0.0009 -1.2704 -0.0000 -0.0017 
19 0.0011 1.3648 0.0002 0.2338 0.0012 1.4759 
20 0.0001 0.0.530 -0.0009 -0.9514 0.0004 0.4189 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; 77- statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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5.3.4 Board Changes 
A change of board member may prove critical in the running of the firm, and alter its 
long run operating strategy. Moreover, if the change has not arisen on rotation, 
uncertainty may temporarily increase until the market is fully acquainted with the 
capabilities of the new board member. The apparent importance of a board change 
varies substantially between the measure of expected returns used to calculate 
abnormal returns. Figure 5.4 depicts a much smoother trend in the returns series 
surrounding board changes than for either earnings or AGMS. Both the level of 
anticipation and the level of drift is lower than for the other events. 
Similarly, for the market model (MM), both the level and the extent of significant 
returns reported in Table 5.1d for board changes, is much lower. The sizeable price 
movement arises over the prior period. With the most significant returns arising on 
event days -20, -18, -7, and -4, compared to the post period on day +14. This implies 
that either board changes are viewed with relatively little importance. Or alternatively, 
if the average board change occurs on rotation and therefore does not involve a new 
appointment, there may be little to anticipate. 
Considering the results for the zero-one model (MKT), board changes would appear 
on average to convey `bad' news relative to prior expectations. In contrast to MM, 
the implications of a board change appear largely unanticipated. Instead the most 
significant price movements are few, but mostly arise over the post-event period; i. e. 
on day -12 compared with days +3 to +5, and +18. 
5.3.5 Changes in Shareholdings 
The nature of this event is different from those examined above, in that a change in 
shareholding is mostly random and generally unexpected. Shareholding changes are 
therefore more likely to represent information that security markets must respond to, 
rather than anticipate. However, it may be possible to anticipate a shareholding 
change, if they coincide with patterns in market behaviour. Figure 5.5 shows the APIs 
follows a very smooth trend leading up to, and following the announcement, with drift 
of relatively low magnitude to the other information types. Little anticipation is 
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consistent with there being no expectation of the event. However, a change in 
shareholding is generally executed by an important or large market player, whose 
actions may be interpreted as a response to privileged information and thereby act as 
a signal to the less well informed. 6 Therefore, we might expect to see a marked 
response to their action, and possibly initiating a run of transactions magnifying the 
drift. The smooth pattern depicted in Figure 5.5, implies the average change in 
shareholding is not regarded an important signal by the uninformed, unless many 
transactions go unobserved. The pattern is very similar as to the returns behaviour 
around board changes. 
From Table 5.1e, the level and frequency of significant abnormal returns is 
considerably higher when estimated using the market model (MM), as opposed to the 
zero-one model (MKT). However, for both MM and MKT, the highest average 
abnormal return (AAR) is realized on the same day; 5 days prior to the announcement, 
with respective returns of 0.27 per cent and 0.16 per cent. The corresponding t-values 
of 3.97 and 2.39, suggest a significant delayed response to the shareholding change. 
Similar to the above event, use of the market model leads to greater rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no significant returns. For MM we can repeatedly reject the null 
on event days -14, -10, from -7 through to -3,0, and days +2 to +5, +7, +11 to +12, 
and again on days +15 to +16. For MKT, there is only one other significant return 
beyond day +5, arising on day -17. 
The market model, implies the likelihood of a change in shareholding increases after 
a period of active trading. The low but significant returns following the change, may 
be a delayed response of market participants mimicking the original shareholder's 
actions. The zero-one model, on the other hand, finds no indication of possible 
herding among investors. 
5.3.6 The Effect of Allowing Other Disclosures within the Event Window 
The above investigation is repeated, but this time allowing other disclosures alongside 
6 In a recent study, Gregory et al (1994) found once the size effect has been accounted for, the 
apparently significant abnormal returns that can be earned from mimicking director's trades diminishes. 
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the event under examination. In section 4.6 above, not surprisingly we found by 
allowing the event window to contain other disclosures vastly increased the available 
sample size. By not isolating the price behaviour associated with a particular event, 
we are unable to determine the relative importance of different information types. 
Therefore, while using unclear event windows may reduce the potential power of the 
tests, the restriction that the window be clear from other events, biases the sample 
towards both smaller, younger firms, and those who disclose less frequently. 
If market anticipation is a function of the frequency of corporate disclosure, greater 
disclosure over the event period may either positively or negatively influence the level 
of anticipation associated with the event of interest. Thereby excluding event periods 
with more than one disclosure, may also restrict the general applicability and 
practicality of the results. The effect on the pattern of returns is illustrated in Figures 
5.6 to 5.10, and documented in Tables 5.2a to 5.2e below. 
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Figure 5.6: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Annual Earnings Reports, 
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Figure 5.7: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Interim Earnings Reports, 
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Figure 5.9: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Board Changes, Using 
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Figure 5.10: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Changes in 
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Inspection of Figures 5.6 to 5.10, shows a smoothing in the API pattern from the 
inclusion of other disclosures within the event window. Also, on comparing Figures 
5.1 and 5.6, there is a noticeable reduction in the level of drift for annual earnings 
reports. To a lesser extent, this is also true of interim earnings reports and AGMs. 
However there is little notable alteration for board changes and a change in 
shareholding. This apparent reduction in both anticipation and post-announcement 
drift, may in part reflect the small firm bias of employing clear windows (see section 
4.6). 
If market anticipation increases with firm size, a higher proportion of large firms in 
the sample, will have the effect of reducing the overall significance of the returns, as 
displayed in Tables 5.6 to 5.10. Alternatively, reduced significance may reflect 
increased noise generated by the inclusion of confounding events within the window, 
making it more difficult to identify a clear market response to the event under 
scrutiny. For instance, if larger companies are more frequent disclosers, it is more 
difficult to separate the effect of individual events on security prices. 
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Table 5.2a 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Annual Earnings (n=1830) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adjusted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-Stat AAR t-scat 
-20 0.0020 0.1154 0.0005 0.0268 0.0029 0.1639 
-19 0.0019 0.0933 0.0004 0.0213 0.0025 0.1214 
-18 0.0019 0.1026 0.0003 0.0153 0.0026 0.1402 
-17 0.0015 0.0869 0.0002 0.0085 0.0023 0.1304 
-16 0.0012 0.0502 -0.0003 -0.0119 0.0016 0.0669 
-15 0.0010 0.0536 -0.0006 -0.0305 0.0018 0.0986 
-14 0.0019 0.0994 0.0005 0.0260 0.0025 0.1299 
-13 0.0024 0.1108 0.0009 0.0422 0.0032 0.1468 
-12 0.0005 0.0191 -0.0009 -0.0344 0.0015 0.0592 
-11 0.0017 0.0549 0.0003 0.0097 0.0024 0.0765 
-10 0.0008 0.0357 -0.0009 -0.0364 0.0015 0.0633 
-9 0.0010 0.0509 -0.0001 -0.0070 0.0016 0.0753 
-8 0.0011 0.0576 -0.0003 -0.0164 0.0016 0.0860 
-7 0.0006 0.0291 -0.0009 -0.0411 0.0011 0.0504 
-6 0.0009 0.0421 -0.0004 -0.0193 0.0012 0.0573 
-5 0.0011 0.0520 0.0000 0.0018 0.0016 0.0729 
-4 0.0020 0.0803 0.0009 0.0355 0.0024 0.0958 
-3 0.0019 0.0803 0.0007 0.0288 0.0021 0.0897 
-2 0.0012 0.0571 0.0003 0.0120 0.0019 0.0869 
-1 0.0025 0.1008 0.0015 0.0579 0.0028 0.1110 
0 0.0048 0.0614 0.0036 0.0456 0.0052 0.0669 
1 0.0042 0.1057 0.0031 0.0780 0.0045 0.1129 
2 -0.0001 -0.0039 -0.0014 -0.0413 -0.0000 -0.0002 
3 0.0007 0.0269 -0.0005 -0.0205 0.0013 0.0492 
4 0.0009 0.0414 -0.0004 -0.0169 0.0008 0.0398 
5 0.0012 0.0492 -0.0003 -0.0109 0.0015 0.0621 
6 0.0012 0.0532 0.0001 0.0044 0.0016 0.0682 
7 -0.0001 -0.0066 -0.0015 -0.0680 0.0002 0.0090 
8 0.0001 0.0037 -0.0015 -0.0693 0.0007 0.0318 
9 0.0007 0.0288 -0.0008 -0.0336 0.0008 0.0350 
10 0.0010 0.0379 -0.0003 -0.0129 0.0016 0.0634 
11 0.0012 0.0586 -0.0003 -0.0165 0.0018 0.0908 
12 0.0011 0.0431 -0.0005 -0.0196 0.0014 0.0563 
13 0.0010 0.0575 -0.0008 -0.0448 0.0018 0.0989 
14 0.0019 0.0904 0.0005 0.0251 0.0022 0.0999 
15 0.0005 0.0286 -0.0007 -0.0349 0.0014 0.0736 
16 0.0023 0.1222 0.0005 0.0285 0.0029 0.1530 
17 0.0013 0.0710 -0.0002 -0.0107 0.0019 0.1006 
18 0.0014 0.0857 -0.0001 -0.0084 0.0019 0.1130 
19 0.0017 0.0786 0.0004 0.0171 0.0022 0.1034 
20 0.0020 0.0871 0.0006 0.0263 0.0027 0.1168 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; ', "; " statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 5.2b 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Interim Earnings (n=1452) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adjusted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0002 0.3708 -0.0013 -2.6816"' 0.0009 1.8829' 
-19 0.0006 1.2405 -0.0007 -1.3961 0.0016 3.0130- 
-18 0.0007 1.2724 -0.0003 -0.6322 0.0012 2.2750" 
-17 0.0014 3.4259"' -0.0001 -0.1482 0.0014 3.3666"' 
-16 0.0007 1.6573' -0.0004 -0.9147 0.0014 3.1051 "' 
-15 0.0010 2.0562" -0.0004 -0.7916 0.0020 4.1298- 
-14 0.0014 2.9560"' -0.0002 -0.3780 0.0020 4.1780"' 
-13 0.0010 2.2441" -0.0003 -0.5647 0.0014 3.1132- 
-12 0.0002 0.6626 -0.0011 -2.9628" 0.0007 2.0480" 
-11 0.0010 2.0305" -0.0003 -0.5951 0.0019 3.6227"' 
-10 0.0005 0.7358 -0.0007 -1.1708 0.0015 2.4238- 
-9 0.0017 1.9915" 0.0004 0.4574 0.0025 2.8664"' 
-8 0.0013 2.7410" 0.0002 0.4104 0.0016 3.3807- 
-7 0.0008 1.6159 -0.0003 -0.5376 0.0011 2.2969" 
-6 0.0007 1.3565 -0.0005 -1.1010 0.0009 1.8357' 
-5 0.0012 2.4949" -0.0001 -0.2452 0.0013 2.7002"' 
-4 0.0010 1.7679' -0.0002 -0.3707 0.0013 2.2251" 
-3 0.0018 2.8301"' 0.0007 1.0886 0.0019 2.9631 
-2 0.0006 0.6451 -0.0007 -0.7567 0.0004 0.3900 
-1 0.0009 1.1585 -0.0003 -0.4124 0.0010 1.2735 
0 -0.0046 -2.3501"' -0.0060 -3.0577"' -0.0042 -2.1626- 1 0.0013 1.2440 0.0002 0.2193 0.0015 1.4450 
2 0.0002 0.2413 -0.0010 -1.1244 0.0001 0.0644 
3 0.0015 1.9877" 0.0002 0.2451 0.0014 1.8253' 
4 0.0014 2.1841" 0.0004 0.5500 0.0014 2.1935" 
5 0.0015 2.6322"' 0.0004 0.7045 0.0016 3.0011- 
6 0.0009 1.7172' -0.0003 -0.5003 0.0011 2.0105" 
7 -0.0013 -2.1145" -0.0024 -3.9524*'* -0.0009 -1.5762 
8 0.0003 0.6082 -0.0009 -1.7120 0.0003 0.5944 
9 0.0007 1.1879 -0.0006 -0.9428 0.0011 1.8946' 
10 0.0016 3.0296"' 0.0002 0.3587 0.0020 3.8111"' 
11 0.0011 2.5577'** -0.0003 -0.6831 0.0014 3.1231"' 
12 0.0025 4.7109"' 0.0014 2.5201"' 0.0029 5.3826- 
13 0.0004 0.7938 -0.0009 -1.7664' 0.0009 1.7068' 
14 0.0001 0.1666 -0.0011 -1.4752 0.0003 0.4735 
15 0.0007 1.1683 -0.0007 -1.2204 0.0011 1.9307' 
16 0.0011 1.6929' -0.0002 -0.2665 0.0012 1.8520' 
17 0.0010 2.1536" -0.0003 -0.6204 0.0011 2.1826" 
18 0.0001 0.1565 -0.0012 -1.6060 0.0006 0.8372 
19 0.0009 1.6504' -0.0003 -0.4479 0.0011 1.8400' 
20 0.0004 0.6229 -0.0010 -1.4585 0.0009 1.3133 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; ', "; " statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Annual Earnings Report 
Figure 5.6 depicts the API, as an continuous upward trend over the event window, for 
all expected returns models. Once again, we see from Figures 5.6 to 5.10, the annual 
earnings report is associated with a higher level of anticipation, and post- 
announcement drift, than for other information types. Although, the overall level of 
drift is much reduced from the inclusion of other events within the window. In 
addition, the inclusion of other events results in the failure to reject the null of no 
significant abnormal returns, over the entire event window for each measure of 
expected returns; see Table 5.2a. For both the market model and the zero-one model, 
the highest return instead occurs on the report date, as opposed to t=1 previously using 
clear windows. Table 5.2a reports values of 0.48 per cent and 0.36, for MM and 
MKT respectively. Given the overall low significance of average daily abnormal 
returns, we cannot reliably conclude that an investor can earn a positive return from 
either anticipating, or trading upon, the information released by the average annual 
earnings report. 
Interim Earnings Report 
Figure 5.2b displays the inclusion of other disclosures within the event window, 
reduces the overall level of drift associated with the interim report. As before, use of 
the market model implies good news relative to prior expectations, whereas the zero- 
one model indicates bad news. Figure 5.2b also demonstrates a notable reduction in 
the volatile nature of stock returns. Table 5.2b, on the other hand, reports an overall 
increase in the level of significance of daily average abnormal returns. A significant, 
though diminished negative price adjustment is still observed upon the release of the 
report; with returns of -0.46 per cent and -0.60 per cent for MM and MKT, 
respectively. To illustrate the increase in overall significance, use of the market model 
increases the number of instances the null is rejected, from 6 to 18 instances. With 
respect to the zero-one model, from a single significant negative return on the report 
date, we now also observe significant negative returns on event days -20, -12 and +7, 
and a significant positive return on day +12. 
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Table 5.2c 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
AGMs (n=481) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adjusted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0017 2.2685"" 0.0008 0.9901 0.0033 3.9941- 
-19 0.0010 1.2085 -0.0005 -0.5980 0.0023 2.8802""' 
-18 0.0002 0.2716 -0.0009 -1.1740 0.0012 1.4623 
-17 0.0016 2.1315" 0.0002 0.3148 0.0028 3.6292"' 
-16 0.0010 1.1952 -0.0004 -0.4252 0.0021 2.4064- 
-15 0.0008 0.8503 -0.0006 -0.6442 0.0014 1.4970 
-14 0.0026 3.3766`"" 0.0015 1.9710" 0.0033 4.2535"" 
-13 0.0010 1.1690 -0.0005 -0.6355 0.0021 2.3376" 
-12 0.0008 0.9105 -0.0003 -0.3124 0.0017 1.8891" 
-11 0.0017 2.0881'" 0.0001 0.1237 0.0023 2.7940- 
-10 0.0022 3.1269"'" 0.0010 1.3730 0.0039 5.4827"'" 
-9 0.0012 1.3669 -0.0001 -0.0883 0.0026 2.8502- 
-8 0.0010 1.3436 -0.0003 -0.4361 0.0015 2.0159- 
-7 0.0019 2.2887" 0.0009 1.1107 0.0028 3.2882'"' 
-6 0.0002 0.3340 -0.0010 -1.4549 0.0010 1.4511 
-5 0.0023 2.7913"" 0.0010 1.2612 0.0026 3.0386'"' 
-4 0.0015 2.0135"" 0.0002 0.3024 0.0018 2.4502- 
-3 0.0018 2.5832'"' 0.0008 1.2068 0.0024 3.3288- 
-2 0.0011 1.7522" -0.0001 -0.2365 0.0017 2.6391- 
-1 0.0005 0.5684 -0.0003 -0.3488 0.0011 1.3149 
0 -0.0013 -0.6801 -0.0022 -1.1507 -0.0009 -0.4935 
1 0.0008 0.7779 -0.0002 -0.1938 0.0011 1.0811 2 0.0009 1.1330 0.0000 0.0442 0.0018 2.1357" 
3 0.0010 1.0262 0.0003 0.2904 0.0015 1.3970 
4 0.0008 0.8452 -0.0001 -0.0914 0.0010 1.0035 
5 0.0001 0.0729 -0.0009 -1.0578 0.0005 0.5238 
6 0.0014 1.4607 0.0005 0.5569 0.0016 1.6823 
7 0.0001 0.0621 -0.0008 -0.9207 0.0000 0.0043 
8 0.0012 1.1989 0.0003 0.3398 0.0014 1.4089 
9 0.0005 0.6508 -0.0002 -0.2535 0.0007 1.0147 
10 0.0009 0.9679 -0.0004 -0.4013 0.0006 0.6433 
10 0.0013 1.8033" 0.0007 0.9465 0.0010 1.3906 
12 -0.0003 -0.3180 -0.0008 -0.8783 -0.0003 -0.2849 
13 0.0006 0.5001 -0.0003 -0.2310 0.0001 0.0529 
14 -0.0002 -0.2112 -0.0009 -1.2010 0.0001 0.1715 
15 -0.0000 -0.0157 -0.0009 -1.0728 -0.0004 -0.4201 
16 -0.0004 -0.4403 -0.0012 -1.2170 -0.0015 -1.4879 
17 0.0001 0.0859 -0.0005 -0.8001 -0.0003 -0.4025 
18 -0.0010 -1.1766 -0.0018 -2.2553" -0.0016 -1.9477' 
19 -0.0001 -0.0576 -0.0006 -0.4893 -0.0004 -0.3791 
20 0.0009 1.0187 0.0003 0.3660 0.0004 0.4673 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; ', ", "' statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 5.2d 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Board Changes (n=1807) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adjusted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0009 0.0274 -0.0007 -0.0220 0.0016 0.0485 
-19 -0.0005 -0.0139 -0.0023 -0.0632 0.0001 0.0024 
-18 0.0009 0.0284 -0.0007 -0.0236 0.0015 0.0485 
-17 0.0006 0.0250 -0.0011 -0.0464 0.0011 0.0440 
-16 0.0003 0.0131 -0.0014 -0.0575 0.0007 0.0286 
-15 0.0008 0.0358 -0.0005 -0.0250 0.0015 0.0649 
-14 0.0009 0.0394 -0.0003 -0.0136 0.0018 0.0736 
-13 -0.0007 -0.0272 -0.0021 -0.0846 -0.0002 -0.0094 
-12 -0.0005 -0.0137 -0.0015 -0.0433 0.0002 0.0049 
-11 -0.0003 -0.0075 -0.0014 -0.0409 0.0004 0.0129 
-10 -0.0001 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0413 0.0005 0.0139 
-9 0.0008 0.0335 -0.0007 -0.0282 0.0011 0.0420 
-8 0.0017 0.0787 0.0003 0.0125 0.0020 0.0907 
-7 0.0011 0.0446 -0.0004 -0.0180 0.0015 0.0621 
-6 -0.0008 -0.0266 -0.0021 -0.0685 -0.0007 -0.0224 
-5 0.0013 0.0468 -0.0001 -0.0044 0.0015 0.0526 
-4 0.0012 0.0506 -0.0005 -0.0188 0.0015 0.0598 
-3 0.0019 0.0741 0.0004 0.0174 0.0021 0.0797 
-2 0.0014 0.0538 -0.0001 -0.0029 0.0018 0.0677 
-1 0.0009 0.0331 -0.0004 -0.0131 0.0011 0.0413 
0 -0.0037 -0.0545 -0.0053 -0.0777 -0.0036 -0.0523 
1 -0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0399 0.0008 0.0222 
2 0.0002 0.0040 -0.0011 -0.0243 0.0003 0.0063 
3 0.0007 0.0244 -0.0007 -0.0223 0.0009 0.0283 
4 0.0011 0.0442 -0.0001 -0.0050 0.0013 0.0541 
5 0.0007 0.0310 -0.0008 -0.0366 0.0008 0.0365 
6 0.0002 0.0075 -0.0013 -0.0541 0.0005 0.0202 
7 0.0009 0.0371 -0.0008 -0.0330 0.0011 0.0448 
8 0.0007 0.0307 -0.0009 -0.0367 0.0010 0.0425 
9 -0.0018 -0.0620 -0.0032 -0.1126 -0.0011 -0.0393 
10 0.0010 0.0367 -0.0005 -0.0189 0.0012 0.0401 
11 0.0015 0.0673 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0018 0.0805 
12 0.0014 0.0492 -0.0001 -0.0018 0.0011 0.0396 
13 0.0012 0.0478 -0.0002 -0.0084 0.0012 0.0497 
14 0.0002 0.0074 -0.0010 -0.0342 0.0007 0.0244 
15 0.0005 0.0170 -0.0010 -0.0324 0.0005 0.0165 
16 0.0004 0.0130 -0.0012 -0.0412 0.0003 0.0098 
17 -0.0005 -0.0229 -0.0019 -0.0853 -0.0004 -0.0175 
18 0.0003 0.0100 -0.0011 -0.0426 0.0003 0.0120 
19 0.0005 0.0195 -0.0009 -0.0380 0.0006 0.0253 
20 -0.0004 -0.0116 -0.0020 -0.0535 -0.0006 -0.0153 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; 77- statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 5.2e 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Cha nges in Sharehol dings (n=4354) 
Day Market Model Market Adjusted Mean Adj usted 
t AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
-20 0.0009 2.4253"" -0.0006 -0.0252 0.0014 3.7939- 
-19 0.0006 1.1953 -0.0009 -0.0282 0.0013 2.6415"'" 
-18 0.0008 1.8438' -0.0008 -0.0267 0.0014 3.2097- 
-17 0.0011 2.8031"' -0.0004 -0.0156 0.0018 4.6547**' 
-16 0.0009 2.1630" -0.0004 -0.0157 0.0013 3.2573- 
-15 0.0013 2.9132'"" -0.0001 -0.0050 0.0018 4.1081*** 
-14 0.0012 2.9894"" -0.0001 -0.0034 0.0019 4.6050"" 
-13 0.0009 2.7013"" -0.0004 -0.0180 0.0013 3.8422"` 
-12 0.0010 2.2977" -0.0003 -0.0094 0.0016 3.8587- 
-11 0.0006 1.3153 -0.0007 -0.0236 0.0010 2.1098" 
-10 0.0014 3.7887`"' -0.0001 -0.0038 0.0018 4.9421"' 
-9 0.0009 2.0449" -0.0004 -0.0147 0.0015 3.4081' 
-8 0.0011 2.7049"' -0.0002 -0.0059 0.0017 4.0196- 
-7 0.0003 0.5315 -0.0009 -0.0254 0.0006 1.0512 
-6 0.0013 2.6050"' 0.0001 0.0031 0.0014 2.8732'"" 
-5 0.0015 3.5244"" 0.0003 0.0110 0.0018 4.1772- 
-4 0.0009 2.2254" -0.0003 -0.0122 0.0012 2.7121- 
-3 0.0010 2.5673"" -0.0002 -0.0084 0.0012 2.9664- 
-2 0.0017 4.0489"' 0.0006 0.0220 0.0018 4.2763- 
-1 0.0019 4.0750"" 0.0007 0.0239 0.0019 4.1046"' 
0 0.0022 4.6543"' 0.0010 0.0315 0.0021 4.5162"" 
1 0.0018 4.6455"' 0.0006 0.0244 0.0020 5.1610- 
2 0.0015 4.1099"' 0.0003 0.0127 0.0015 4.0710"' 
3 0.0012 3.5078"" -0.0001 -0.0039 0.0015 4.2685- 
4 0.0013 3.3113"' 0.0001 0.0030 0.0014 3.5881- 
5 0.0014 4.3279"' 0.0002 0.0109 0.0016 5.0834- 
6 0.0001 0.1929 -0.0012 -0.0530 0.0005 1.3201 
7 0.0008 2.0590" -0.0004 -0.0166 0.0010 2.3928- 
8 0.0007 2.0448" -0.0005 -0.0232 0.0010 2.9584- 
9 0.0011 3.1234"" -0.0001 -0.0041 0.0013 3.7757"' 
10 0.0011 3.5159"' 0.0000 0.0002 0.0013 4.2444"" 
11 0.0007 2.0089" -0.0005 -0.0215 0.0007 2.2399" 
12 0.0007 2.0934" -0.0004 -0.0172 0.0008 2.350(1"' 
13 0.0010 3.0910"" -0.0002 -0.0088 0.0010 3.1544"' 
14 0.0000 0.0360 -0.0012 -0.0410 0.0001 0.2603 
15 0.0007 1.8411' -0.0004 -0.0169 0.0009 2.3273- 
16 0.0009 2.4579"' -0.0002 -0.0072 0.0010 2.8481- 
17 0.0011 3.0959"" -0.0001 -0.0051 0.0012 3.3993- 
18 0.0002 0.5018 -0.0008 -0.0372 0.0005 1.3549 
19 0.0008 2.3164`" -0.0004 -0.0186 0.0009 2.5978"'" 
20 0.0005 1.4572 -0.0005 -0.0210 0.0008 2.2790" 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; ', '. "' statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
150 
Annual General Meetings 
Figure 5.8 demonstrates a reduction in the level of anticipation and the level of drift, 
from the use of unclear event windows. However, the inclusion of other disclosures 
within the event window notably increases the significance of returns prior to the 
meeting, for the use of the market model (MM). From Table 5.2c, we can repeatedly 
reject the null at 5 per cent significance, on event days -20, -17, -14, -11 to -10, -7, 
and then on day -5 through to -3. Akin to interim earnings, the most sizeable price 
movement occurs prior to the meeting, although returns are generally insignificant. 
In contrast, for the zero-one model, only event days - 14 and + 18 are reported as being 
statistically significant (MKT). Again, a negative return is observed on the day of the 
meeting, for both MM and MKT. 
Board Changes 
There is little notable difference in the patterns of returns behaviour depicted for clear 
and unclear event windows, in figures 5.4 and 5.9 respectively. Other disclosures 
within the event window appear to have less of an effect upon the anticipation and the 
interpretation of board changes, relative to earnings or AGMs. The picture presented 
for board changes in Table 5.2d, is very similar to that of annual earnings, in that the 
overall significance of returns is much reduced. We again witness a slight upward 
(downward) trend of the APIs over the event window for MM (MKT), though none 
of the 41 daily returns prove to be significant. 
Changes in Shareholdings 
As for board changes, Figure 5.10 shows the pattern of returns behaviour little changes 
between using clear and unclear event windows. Other events appear to have little 
influence upon how investors react to a change in shareholding. Table 5.2e illustrates 
the sensitivity of the API metric, to the model of expected returns employed. 
However, allowing other disclosures in the same event window, little changes the 
overall return that investors may possibly earn, calculated using either the market 
model (MM) or the zero-one model (MKT). For MM, Table 5.2e reports a general 
increase in the level of significance of daily abnormal returns over the event window. 
For instance, we only fail to reject the null for 9 of the possible 41 event days 
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examined. In the days leading up to the announcement, abnormal returns are positive 
(though no greater than 0.19 per cent) and often highly significant. 
This supports the earlier notion of the likelihood of a change in shareholding, 
increasing after a period of active trading. The most significant returns occur prior 
to the announcement, from t=-2, and persist to t=+2. Although, abnormal returns are 
repeatedly significant over the remainder of the event window, this apparent lagged 
impounding suggests a change in shareholding is interpreted as an important signal, 
and mimicked by investors over the subsequent days. However, these observations 
greatly contrast with the API1 pattern depicted from using MKT. Daily abnormal 
returns are instead on average negative, but none are shown to be statistically 
significant. 
5.3.71n Summary 
The information metric, APIs, is highly sensitive to the model of excess returns 
employed. The sensitivity of APIs therefore encourages the use of different 
approaches in analysing the market reaction to corporate disclosures. Consequently, 
both the frequency, size, and the statistical significance of daily average abnormal 
returns, varies across excess return metrics for each information type. Although the 
above analysis is representative only of the average reaction, to complete our empirical 
analysis it is not necessary to have a more accurate measure of systematic risk. 
The pattern of the APIS, estimated using the market model (MM), follows a gradual 
upward trend over the event window for all information types. However using a zero- 
one model (MKT), produces almost a mirror image for all information types (except 
for annual earnings). Instead the APIS follows a gradual downward trend over the 
duration of the event window. Thus, the market model implies the information 
content of the average event conveys good news relative to prior expectations, whereas 
the zero-one model implies the average event contains bad news. In other words, the 
market gradually anticipates the event, but continues to adjust after its release as the 
full implications become known. 
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The level of anticipation and the level of drift, is noticeably higher for earnings reports 
than that reported for the other information types. However, these results must be 
viewed tentatively by the predominantly low significance of the abnormal returns. 
One cannot therefore reach a reliable conclusion that these events cause a persistent, 
positive or even negative impact on stock returns. The trend may therefore indicate 
possible model misspecification in the calculation of unexpected returns. Bear in 
mind, no price response to an announcement cannot be interpreted as the 
announcement being of little use to investors. As the price reaction may only reflect 
the actions of those who trade immediately on the information. Some investors may 
make use of the information, but not take immediate action (Bernard & Thomas 1989, 
1990). 
The inclusion of other disclosures in the event window, noticeably reduces the level 
and significance of returns, across all information types except for a change in 
shareholding. This apparent reduction of both the level of anticipation and post- 
announcement drift, may in part reflect the small firm bias of examining isolated 
events (see section 4.6). If market anticipation increases with firm size, a higher 
proportion of large firms in the sample will therefore reduce the general significance 
of the returns. Alternatively, reduced significance may reflect increased noise 
generated by the inclusion of confounding events within the window, making it more 
difficult to identify a clear market response to the event under scrutiny. The 
examination of stock returns surrounding isolated events, allows us to infer the relative 
information content of differing information types. 
5.4 EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF STOCK RETURNS 
The purpose of this section is to explain the cross-sectional behaviour of security 
returns surrounding corporate disclosures, using the empirical model developed in 
chapter 3. To recap, the papers of Kim & Verrecchia (1991 a, b), McNichols & 
Trueman (1994) and Demski & Feltham (1994), explain stock market behaviour in 
relation to the incentives facing investors deciding on whether to devote resources to 
being informed about a forthcoming disclosure. The idea is that a rational investor 
will only invest in the acquisition and processing of information, providing it is cost- 
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effective. Chapter 3 identifies four firm-specific characteristics, presumed to be 
related to the availability of pre-disclosure information, to proxy for the expected costs 
and benefits of being informed. The underlying is that, increasing levels of pre- 
disclosure information improves the informativeness of price, and thereby the ability 
of the market to anticipate the content of forthcoming disclosures. The greater the 
level of anticipation, the lower the extent of drift, all things remaining equal. 
More specifically, for each information type, we empirically test the relationship 
between the level of market anticipation and (1) firm size as measured by market 
capitalisation, LN_MV;, (2) the number of years a firm has been trading, AGE;, (3) 
the frequency of disclosure by a firm, NUM;, and (4) the volatility of stock returns 
prior to the disclosure, VOLPR, or VOLPR+A;. 7 Collectively modelled using a 
standard OLS multiple regression, the model takes the form of 
ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a4VOLPR; + u;, (5.2) 
and, 
POST; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a4VOLPR+A; + U, (5.3) 
Where, ANN; measures the price impact of information impounded over the 
announcement period (t=0), relative to the prior period (t=-20,..., -1). POST; measures 
the price impact of information impounded following the event (t=+1,..., +20), relative 
to both the prior and announcement periods (t=-20,..., O). 
The dependent variables, ANN; and POST;, are both functions of the API metric (see 




II (1 + e« ) (5.4) 
1-v 
Equation (5.4) estimates the value from investing one pound in security i over a given 
' Where VOLPR; measures stock return volatility over the prior period (t=-20,.... -1), and used to 
model ANN;. VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement periods (t=- 
20,..., 0), and used to model POST;. 
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event window, which can be one of three periods (prior, ann, or post), where e; 1 
represents the estimate of excess returns for company i, at period t. For any particular 
stock, the actions of investors and the sign of their information they are trading upon, 
will be offsetting over the event window. Equation (5.4) therefore provides an 
estimate of the net value of the information impounded over the event window. 
However, if we adapt equation (5.4) to 
T 
i'windenv =J (1 +Ie, 
I) (5.5) 
the API metric will capture the total value of the information impounded over the 
event window, by ignoring the sign of the information ie. the absolute abnormal 
return. 
If lagged impounding is an inverse function of anticipation, and the level of market 
anticipation is an increasing function of the explanatory variables, the coefficient signs 
are expected to be negative. However, if the event window fails to capture the full 
anticipation process of larger firms, we expect firm size to be of positive sign (see 
section 3.7.3). Similarly, increasing disclosure can have either a positive or negative 
effect on anticipation. We further hypothesise, the variation in coefficient size 
between information types to proxy for the announcement's expected probability and 
expected precision. This is an idea similar to that of McNichols & Trueman (1994) 
and Demski & Feltham (1994). Holding all explanatory variables constant, the level 
of anticipation (ANN; and POST) will vary across information types. Thus, the 
expected return to being informed, ie. the expected marginal benefit relative to the 
expected marginal cost, will vary across information types. This greater incentive to 
be informed, we hypothesise, will reflect the information's characteristics of expected 
probability, and the expected precision of its content. 
During preliminary investigations, the dependent variables ANN; and POST; (which 
take the form of ratios) were found to be highly skewed, giving rise to significant 
heteroscedasticity. Consider the case of large firms: if much of the information 
content of their forthcoming disclosure is anticipated in advance of the price 
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movement captured by the event window, larger firms will be less actively traded in 
the days approaching the disclosure relative to smaller firms. If this is coupled with 
any sizeable price reaction to the announcement's release, or over the post- 
announcement period, then the measures ANN; and POST; will be disproportionately 
large. Transforming the dependent variable, by taking the natural log of ANN; or 
POST;, (ie. LN_ANN; or LN_POST) was successful in eliminating a substantial 
portion of the heteroscedasticity. However, in some cases the Breusch-Pagan 
Chi-Squared test of heteroscedasticity was still significant at the 5 per cent level (a 
critical value of 9.46). Any remaining heteroscedasticity in the model is assumed to 
arise from cross-correlation between the independent variables. Accordingly, all the 
standard errors were adjusted using White's (1980) consistent estimator. 8 
The regression results for each information type, using equation (5.4), are reported in 
Tables 5.3 to 5.6, for both clear and unclear windows. Likewise, the regression results 
using equation (5.5) are reported in Tables 5.7 to 5.10. The significance of the 
explanatory variables in the explanation of market anticipation, varies considerably 
according to the model of expected returns. Therefore, for reasons of clarity we shall 
only focus on the regression results found to be robust across all three return metrics. ' 
$ The OLS standard errors are not reported, due to their similarity. 
Other variations to the above tests were conducted, excluding outliers and extending the event 
window to thirty trading days either side of the event. Neither procedure produced markedly different 
results, changing the significance of variables nor their sign in any meaningful way. 
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Briefly, the results show that: 
The analysis distinguishes between event periods which exclude other 
disclosures from those that allow other disclosures. 
Results anylicable to both conditions: 
Market anticipation is found to: i) increase with firm size, the number of 
years a firm has been trading, and the volatility of prior stock returns; and 
ii) decrease with the number of disclosures made by a firm. In addition, 
firm size explains announcement returns (ANN) better than post- 
announcement drift (POST). 
The model explains post-announcement drift better than announcement 
returns. This may indicate investors initial reactions are not based on 
informed judgements. 
The stock return behaviour surrounding the announcement of interim 
earnings is least explained, relative to the other information types. This 
is surprising given the higher level of drift observed for interim reports. 
The volatility of prior stock returns is predominant in the explanation of 
post-announcement drift; in particular for a change in shareholding. This 
is also true when we model the total impact of information, by 
accumulating absolute returns. 
Allowing other disclosures within the event period: 
This increases the overall power of the model in the explanation of the 
behaviour of stock returns. However, the volatility of prior stock returns 




OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN_ANN; ) Estimated Using Market 
Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN_ANN, = ao + a, LN MV, + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a4VOLPR, + u, 
a0 a, a, a, a, 
Annual Earnings 
-1.4868"' 0.1937` -0.0041 -0.0045 -15.8710' 
(0.5466) (0.1017) (0.0061) (0.0207) (8.1160) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0245, F[4,1111 = 1.7221, BP(4) = 6.6503 
Interim Earnings 
-1.1216"' 0.0360 -0.0055 -0.0215 -1.5846 
(0.4762) (0.1154) (0.0051) (0.0221) (3.8370) 
n= 152, R2 = -0.0150. F[4,1471 = 0.4422, BP(4) = 2.2455 
AGMS 
-2.4397**' 0.0388 -0.0055 0.0453 -23.7380 
(0.7038) (0.1355) (0.0058) (0.0298) (18.8500) 
n= 106. R2 = 0.0005, F[4,101) = 1.0132. BP(4) = 12.1783 
Board Changes 
-3.1410"` 0.1362"' 0.0032 0.0158 -9.0317` 
(0.2390) (0.0437) (0.0024) (0.0109) (5.4880) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.0516, F(4,382] = 6.2552, BP(4) = 10.5417 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.1653- 0.1781"' -0.0015` 0.0105 -8.0470" 
(0.1770) (0.0373) (0.0008) (0.0081) (3.7640) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0439, F[4,9221 = 11.6223. BP(4) = 7.6069 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM). as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firn over the sample period. 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors. 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.3b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using Market 
Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN MV; + a, AGE, + a3NUM, + a, VOLPR, + u; 
ao a, a2 a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
-1.0823" -0.1043 -0.0022 
0.0330 -10.2280 
(0.4715) (0.0889) (0.0040) (0.0201) (6.6150) 
n= 116, R2 = -0.0009, F(4,1111 = 0.9742, BP(4) = 9.7950 
Interim Earnings 
-0.8051" 0.0817 -0.0029 -0.0289 -4.6315 
(0.3782) (0.1109) (0.0044) (0.0192) (4.7220) 
n= 152, R2 = -0.0014,94,1471 = 0.9467, BP(4) = 5.6523 
AGMs 
-1.8645'** 0.0799 -0.0047 0.0419 -42.8450- 
(0.5257) (0.1070) (0.0055) (0.0245) (17.5500) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.0509, F[4.101] = 2.4067, BP(4) = 1.7134 
Board Changes 
-2.3747"` 0.1472"' 
0.0008 0.0017 -19.5800 
(0.2437) (0.0426) (0.0024) (0.0115) (5.0080) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.0644, F(4,3821 = 7.6382, BP(4) = 2.2127 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.3687'** 0.1076"' -0.0005 0.0158 -19.1250- 
(0.1750) (0.0366) (0.0006) (0.0078) (5.9980) 
n= 927. R2 = 0.0524. F(4.9221 = 13.8108. BP(4) = 31.0835 
Notes: 
LN_MVi is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement. 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLP[; measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations. 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.3c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using Mean 
Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE, + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR; + u; 
ao a, a, a3 as 
Annual Earnings 
-1.0289" -0.0363 -0.0072 0.0106 -23.6280"' 
(0.4762) (0.1154) (0.0051) (0.0221) (3.8370) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0225, F[4,111 1=1.6612, BP(4) = 11.1973 
Interim Earnings 
-1.5927"' -0.0304 -0.0038 -0.0003 -1.9534 
(0.4907) (0.1072) (0.0049) (0.0240) (4.3630) 
n= 152, R2 = -0.0222, F(4,147] = 0.1815, BP(4) = 1.2418 
AGMs 
-2.8981*** 0.1872 -0.0024 0.0028 -4.4881 
(0.6715) (0.1268) (0.0077) (0.0352) (20.5700) 
n= 106, R2 = -0.0158. F[4,101] = 0.5922, BP(4) = 2.7534 
Board Changes 
-3.4224"' 0.1563"' 0.0005 0.0141 -6.7959 
(0.2093) (0.0420) (0.0024) (0.0112) (4.7410) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.0494, F[4,3821 = 6.0149, BP(4) = 6.2896 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.3426"' 0.0859" -0.00310.0164' -7.2921- 
(0.1758) (0.0384) (0.0012) (0.0084) (3.4150) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0263, F14,9221 = 7.2482, BP(4) = 18.8036 
Notes: 
LN_MV, is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPß measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20...., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
........ statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity. with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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5.4.1 Market Anticipation and the Net Value of Information Impounded 
LN ANN; 
Table 5.3 reports the regression results of the net value of information impounded over 
the announcement period, relative to the prior period. The coefficients are not always 
of their predicted sign, except when statistically significant, above the 5 per cent 
level. " Firm size (LN_MV) is significant at the 5 per cent level, and positive in 
sign, for both board changes and a change in shareholding. For both events, the joint 
explanatory power of the variables is highly significant, with the respective F-statistics 
exceeding the critical value of 3.12. The positive coefficient of LN_MV;, is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the length of the prior period does not capture the full 
anticipation process of larger firms (see section 3.7.3). However, it does confirm 
anticipation is an increasing function of firm size. 
The coefficient sign of the prior volatility of stock returns (VOLPR), is persistently 
negative for all information types and all expected return metrics. The negative sign 
of VOLPft; implies that larger values of prior volatility, leads to greater anticipation; 
ie. the benefits of being informed exceed the costs. However, VOLPtt; is only robust 
in the explanation of LN_ANN; for a change in shareholding. The reported coefficient 
signs for age (AGE; ) and the number of disclosures (NUM; ) are mixed, but due to 
their low significance we cannot reliably infer their correct sign. The high 
significance of the constant term for all information types, hints of possible model 
misspecification and hence of other explanations for the abnormal returns. 
10 Incorrect coefficient signs may be an indication of possible collinearity between explanatory 
variables, though this seems doubtful given the low level of correlation found in section 4.6.2. 
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Table 5.4a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST, = as + a, LN_MV, + a`, AGE, + a, NUM; + a4VOLPR+A; + a; 
ao a, a: a, a, 
Annual Earnings 
0.4943 -0.1981- -0.0035 0.0277" -14.8430" 
(0.3739) (0.0756) (0.0040) (0.0139) (7.3090) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0448, F[4.1111 = 2.3493, BP(4) = 2.0286 
Interim Earnings 
0.2940 -0.0017 -0.0025 0.0020 -6.1994 
(0.3048) (0.0755) (0.0039) (0.0152) (4.4530) 
n= 152, R2 = -0.0054, P14,147] = 0.7958, BP(4) = 2.6588 
AGMs 
0.0369 -0.0964 -0.0018 0.0294 -32.3050- 
(0.5147) (0.0934) (0.0051) (0.0247) (11.6900) 
n= 106. R2 = 0.0183, F14,1011 = 1.4902, BP(4) = 3.1845 
Board Changes 
0.4227 0.0099 -0.0041 -0.0125 -5.7521 
(0.2700) (0.0423) (0.0024) (0.0110) (6.2160) 
n= 387, RZ = 0.0037, F14,3821 = 1.3590, BP(4) = 3.2246 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.0073 0.0173 0.0018 0.0055 -16.8700"' 
(0.1669) (0.0339) (0.0007) (0.0075) (6.1870) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0276, F14,9221 = 7.5793, BP(4) = 14.3105 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
ACiE, measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+n; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.4b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST, = ao + a1LN_MV; + a-AGE; + ajVUM; + a4VOLPR+A; +U 
a, a, a, a3 a. 
Annual Earnings 
0.3076 -0.2326"' -0.0024 0.0412"' -9.2895 
(0.4553) (0.0929) (0.0047) (0.0167) (7.4530) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0352, F[4,1111 = 2.0485, BP(4) = 2.9019 
Interim Earnings 
-0.1737 0.0478 0.0012 0.0054 -7.4427 
(0.2925) (0.0885) (0.0032) (0.0151) (5.5770) 
n= 152, R' = 0.0140, F(4,1471 = 1.5370, BP(4) = 7.3468 
AGMs 
0.3295 -0.0462 -0.0054 0.0489" -56.6170- 
(0.4056) (0.0865) (0.0053) (0.0214) (11.6300) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.1355, F[4,1011 = 5.1135, BP(4) = 1.9585 
Board Changes 
0.4567' 0.0218 -0.0030 -0.0092 -12.2790" 
(0.2482) (0.0416) (0.0024) (0.0120) (6.1940) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.0086, F[4,3821 = 1.8415, BP(4) = 2.3917 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.0255 0.0230 -0.0003 0.0084 -17.7500"' 
(0.1740) (0.0376) (0.0008) (0.0074) (6.3120) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0313, F14,9221 = 8.4868, BP(4) = 14.0415 
Notes: 
LN_MVi is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.4c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN POST, ) Estimated Using Mean 
Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a)VUM, + a4VOLPR+A; +U 
ao a, a2 a, a4 
Annual Earnings 
0.3525 -0.1511 0.0010 0.0146 -17.5230- 
(0.3787) (0.0833) (0.0042) (0.0137) (6.8860) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0334, F(4,11 11 = 1.9949, BP(4) = 1.4276 
Interim Earnings 
-0.0580 -0.0740 -0.0009 0.0343" -8.0619 
(0.2871) (0.0835) (0.0037) (0.0164) (5.5120) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.0277, F[4,147] = 2.0743, BP(4) = 18.2521 
AGMs 
0.1393 -0.0945 -0.0028 0.0305 -39.5880- 
(0.5952) (0.1217) (0.0055) (0.0319) (14.7100) 
n= 106. R2 = 0.0295. F(4.1011 = 1.7978, BP(4) = 13.3726 
Board Changes 
0.5703" -0.0008 -0.0079"' -0.0046 -5.9127 
(0.2688) (0.0400) (0.0024) (0.0113) (6.0360) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.0233, F(4,382] = 3.3046, BP(4) = 10.9648 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0578 0.0026 -0.0004 0.0062 -16.0780- 
(0.1553) (0.0332) (0.0007) (0.0071) (6.0060) 
n= 927, RZ = 0.0263, F[4,9221 = 7.2637, BP(4) = 23.8057 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+,, measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
', "; " statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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LN POST, 
Table 5.4 reports the regression results of the net value of information impounded over 
the post-announcement period, relative to the prior and announcement periods. As 
with LN_ANN;, the coefficients are not always of their predicted sign, except when 
statistically significant. The volatility of prior stock returns (VOLPR+, °y) persists as 
a highly significant factor in the explanation of the reaction to a change in 
shareholding, and extends to AGMs. Beyond this, we find the significance of 
explanatory variables varied and haphazard, with a noticeable reduction in the 
importance of firm size over the post-announcement period. Nevertheless, relative to 
LN_ANN;, we find the significance of the constant term greatly reduced, coupled with 
an overall increase in the R2 values and F-statistics for annual earnings, interim 
earnings, and AGMs. Our model appears to explain post-announcement drift better 
than the price movement on the announcement day. This may indicate investors initial 
reactions are not based on informed judgements. 
Unclear Event Windows 
Allowing other disclosures within the event window, not only increases the available 
sample size and reduces the small firm bias, but also potentially increases the level 
of price activity in need of explanation (see section 4.6.1). In respect of LN_ANN;, 
Table 5.5 documents a significant increase in the explanatory power of firm size. 
Firm size is highly significant and of positive sign, for all information types and 
robust across all expected return metrics, with one minor exception. " Prior volatility 
(VOLPR) is significant in the explanation of the initial reaction to the announcement 
of a board change, and the annual earnings report. The use of unclear windows, 
significantly increases the explanatory power of the number of disclosures made by 
a firm (NUM; ), to 1 per cent for board changes. The positive sign of NUM;, implies 
increasing disclosure reduces the level of anticipation, perturbing the demand of 
information from alternative sources. The number of years a firm has been trading 
(AGE; ), remains insignificant in the explanation of anticipation. 
" For AGMs, based upon using market adjusted returns (MKT). 
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Table 5.5a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN ANN, ) Estimated Using Market 
Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR; + u; 
Qo Q, Qz ag a, 
Annual Earnings 
-1.6437"' 0.1203"' 0.0016 0.0114" -15.3580"` 
(0.1326) (0.0255) (0.0012) (0.0050) (3.2140) 
n= 1830, R2 = 0.0405, F14,1825) = 20.3184, BP(4) = 39.6397 
Interim Earnings 
-1.7686"' 0.1509"' 0.0011 0.0028 -5.5883 
(0.1429) (0.0291) (0.0015) (0.0059) (3.5300) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0289, F[4,14471 = 11.8005, BP(4) = 17.7515 
AGMs 
-2.8851"' 0.1609"' 0.0028 0.0163` -13.7990 
(0.2925) (0.0554) (0.0024) (0.0094) (8.6740) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0514, F[4.476) = 7.5022, BP(4) = 6.3891 
Board Changes 
-2.6045"' 0.0614"' 0.0009 0.0197"' -9.6839"' 
(0.1234) (0.0219) (0.0013) (0.0040) (2.3690) 
n= 1807, R2 = 0.0356, F[4,1802] = 17.6425, BP(4) = 10.7671 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.9110"` 0.1595"' -0.0010 0.0021 -8.1702- 
(0.0913) (0.0175) (0.0008) (0.0030) (1.5050) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.0361, F14,4349) = 41.7300, BP(4) = 14.7048 
Notes: 
LN_MVi is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M). as at Ist January in the year of announcement. 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR, measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20...... 1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.5b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using Market 
Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANNi = aO + al LN MVi + a2AGEi + a3NUMi + a4VOLPRi + ui 
ao a, a2 a3 as 
Annual Earnings 
-1.0459"` 0.0789"` 0.0012 0.0059 -18.2150"' 
(0.1166) (0.0235) (0.0012) (0.0044) (3.1160) 
n= 1830, RZ = 0.0363, F14,1825] = 18.2079, BP(4) = 27.9548 
Interim Earnings 
-1.3350"' 0.0864"' 0.0022 0.0045 -10.4080"` 
(0.1381) (0.0258) (0.0014) (0.0050) (4.3480) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0245, F[4,14471 = 10.0951, BP(4) = 10.8614 
AGMs 
-2.2335*'* 0.0433 0.0050" 0.0222"' -23.8980- 
(0.2624) (0.0466) (0.0022) (0.0076) (7.7580) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0449, F(4,476] = 6.6363, BP(4) = 8.3563 
Board Changes 
-2.0161 "' 0.0483"' -0.0010 0.0147"' -14.2410- 
(0.1218) (0.0207) (0.0012) (0.0039) (2.4260) 
n= 1807, R2 = 0.0.173, F14,18021 = 18.4939, BP(4) = 15.7021 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.2362"` 0.1063"' -0.0007 -0.0010 -14.5620- 
(0.0933) (0.0176) (0.0008) (0.0029) (1.8930) 
n= 4354. R2 = 0.0411. F[4,43491 = 47.5985, BP(4) = 66.1243 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPß measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
', ", "* statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.5c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN ANN, ) Estimated Using Mean 
Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE; + a/VUM; + a, VOLPR; + U. 
a, a, a2 a, a, 
Annual Earnings 
-1.7609"' 0.0890"` 0.0011 0.0157"' -16.0950- 
(0.1303) (0.0253) (0.0013) (0.0048) (3.2480) 
n= 1830, RZ = 0.0346, F[4,1825] = 17.3927, BP(4) = 22.4759 
Interim Earnings 
-1.9999"' 0.1152"' 0.0010 
0.0112' -5.9485 
(0.1533) (0.0276) (0.0018) (0.0058) (3.7800) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0256, F[4,1447] = 10.5292, BP(4) = 18.3446 
AGMs 
-3.1507"` 0.1597"' 0.0017 0.0113 -2.4704 
(0.2897) (0.0553) (0.0027) (0.0086) (8.2670) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0271.94,476] = 4.3470, BP(4) = 10.0046 
Board Changes 
-3.0191"' 0.0955"' 0.0004 
0.0201"' -6.6058- 
(0.1207) (0.0212) (0.0013) (0.0040) (2.3360) 
n= 1807, R2 = 0.0413.94.18021 = 20.4729, BP(4) = 2.5947 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.4808"' 0.1271*** -0.0005 0.0131- -4.5462"' 
(0.0904) (0.0174) (0.0009) (0.0029) (1.4030) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.0286, F14,4349] = 33.0750, BP(4) = 14.4134 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for beteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.6a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a1LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR+a; + u; 
ao a, a, ag ae 
Annual Earnings 
0.2334" -0.0361 0.0004 0.0048 -17.5580- 
(0.1112) (0.0213) (0.0011) (0.0040) (2.2660) 
n= 1830, R2 = 0.0355. F[4.1825) = 17.8133. BP(4) = 1.6604 
Interim Earnings 
0.2537" -0.0389 0.0001 0.0028 -11.4840'** 
(0.1222) (0.0234) (0.0012) (0.0045) (3.2000) 
n= 1452, RZ = 0.0163,94,1447) = 6.9976. BP(4) = 10.0421 
AGMs 
0.2331 0.0185 -0.0013 -0.0049 -20.7730- 
(0.2514) (0.0430) (0.0021) (0.0105) (6.7030) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0161,94,4761 = 2.9657, BP(4) = 7.1481 
Board Changes 
0.2749" -0.0115 -0.0024` 0.0015 -13.1280"' 
(0.1215) (0.0197) (0.0012) (0.0037) (2.2170) 
n= 1807, RZ = 0.0260, F[4,18021 = 13.0498, BP(4) = 5.4829 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0095 -0.0080 -0.0005 0.0062" -14.9800- 
(0.0850) (0.0158) (0.0007) (0.0027) (1.7430) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.0308, F[4,43491 = 35.6404, BP(4) = 24.7031 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement. 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+,, measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
," statistically significant at the 10%, 
5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.6b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE; + ayVUM; + a, VOLPR+A; + u; 
ao a, a2 a3 aA 
Annual Earnings 
0.2958""" -0.0283 -0.0015 0.0065 -20.3220'** 
(0.1241) (0.0222) (0.0011) (0.0050) (2.5240) 
n= 1830, R2 = 0.0438.94,18251 = 21.9609, BP(4) = 9.6159 
Interim Earnings 
0.0521 -0.0350 0.0022' 0.0034 -11.4710"' 
(0.1235) (0.0245) (0.0012) (0.0050) (3.2680) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0190, F[4,14471 = 8.0225, BP(4) = 13.7070 
AGMs 
0.3784 -0.0380 -0.0013 0.0085 -30.1910'** 
(0.2505) (0.0494) (0.0024) (0.0086) (6.6040) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0314, F[4,476] = 4.8960, BP(4) = 7.2068 
Board Changes 
0.3971`"" -0.0158 -0.0030"" -0.0000 -14.7030- 
(0.1204) (0.0200) (0.0012) (0.0040) (2.3000) 
n= 1807, R2 = 0.0323, F[4,1802] = 16.0643, BP(4) = 4.1745 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0317 0.0018 -0.0013 0.0044 -15.8960"' 
(0.0866) (0.0158) (0.0008) (0.0027) (1.7710) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.0370, F[4,43491 = 42.7554, BP(4) = 24.1150 
Notes: 
LN MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+Ai measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.6c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Net Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using Mean 
Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a, NUM; + a4VOLPR+A; + u; 
as a, a2 aj ae 
Annual Earnings 
0.2535" -0.0337 0.0003 0.0040 -18.5330- 
(0.1121) (0.0210) (0.0011) (0.0039) (2.3270) 
n= 1830, RZ = 0.0410, F[4,1825] = 19.5211, BP(4) = 3.7709 
Interim Earnings 
0.1567 -0.0324 0.0008 0.0015 -11.7950"' 
(0.1225) (0.0255) (0.0012) (0.0048) (3.3830) 
n= 1452, RI = 0.0177, F[4,14471 = 7.5181, BP(4) = 16.8644 
AGMs 
0.0438 0.0429 -0.0007 0.0006 -25.6640- 
(0.2583) (0.0440) (0.0022) (0.0085) (7.3400) 
n= 48 1, R2 = 0.0225, F(4,476) = 3.7629, BP(4) = 2.8902 
Board Changes 
0.3725""" -0.0146 -0.0027""" 0.0021 -15.0870""" 
(0.1149) (0.0188) (0.0011) (0.0036) (2.3610) 
n= 1807, RZ = 0.0355, F[4,1802] = 17.6313. BP(4) = 11.5325 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.0794 0.0219 -0.0006 0.0054" -14.5770"' 
(0.0849) (0.0159) (0.0007) (0.0027) (1.6920) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.0326, F[4,43491 = 37.6646, BP(4) = 15.3306 
Notes: 
LN MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
%-, - " statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.6 reports the results for LN_POST; for unclear windows. The tables clearly 
indicate the prior volatility of stock returns (VOLPR+A1) to be the main driving force 
behind post-announcement drift, for all information types. In all cases, VOLPR+A; is 
highly significant. Other than this, remaining variables are generally insignificant, 
with the minor exception of AGE; in the explanation of post-announcement activity 
of board changes. Using expected returns models market and mean adjusted (MKT 
and MN), AGE; is of 1 per cent significance and of negative sign. If unclear event 
windows are associated with greater activity, then it is not surprising to find an 
increase in the explanatory power of the volatility of stock returns. 
Previously, we hypothesised the variation in coefficient size between information 
types, proxies for the information characteristics of expected probability and expected 
precision (McNichols & Trueman 1994, and Demski & Feltham 1994). The high 
significance of VOLPR+A, across all five information types, allows one therefore (for 
the first time in this analysis) to reliably compare the relative coefficient sizes. For 
example, a high coefficient implies a given level of volatility gives rise to a smaller 
amount of post-announcement drift relative to other information types. The coefficient 
sizes reported in Table 5.6a, are decreasing in the order of AGMs (a4=-20.7730), 
annual earnings (a4=-17.5580), a change in shareholding (a4=-14.9800), board changes 
(a4=-13.1280), and finally interim earnings (a4=-11.4840). This pattern is consistent 
across return metrics. 
The expected probability of an AGM and the annual earnings report, are both equal 
to one. The difference in coefficient size between the two, therefore implies the AGM 
is of greater expected precision relative to the annual earnings report. The interim 
earnings report is also of the expected probability of one, therefore we can only infer 
the interim report is regarded to be of relatively low precision compared to the other 
information types examined. This result is in line with what we know about the 
importance of annual earnings in the determination of stock returns (Strong & Walker 
1993). Similarly, it fits in with what we know about the poor quality of interim 
earnings reporting in the UK (Hussey & Wolfe 1994). 
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Table 5.7a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN ANN) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a/VUM, + a4VOLpR, + u; 
ao a, a2 a3 as 
Annual Earnings 
-1.9322""" 0.0188 -0.0055 0.0006 -24.4260- 
(0.4524) (0.0799) (0.0042) (0.0164) (8.0330) 
n= 116. R2 = 0.0359, F[4,1111 = 2.0718, BP(4) = 15.7457 
Interim Earnings 
-2.1201"" -0.0949 -0.0021 -0.0253 -4.4949 
(0.4057) (0.1144) (0.0043) (0.0195) (3.2150) 
n= 152, RI = 0.0078, F(4,147) = 1.2958, BP(4) = 2.9247 
AGMs 
-3.1104"' -0.0115 -0.0043 0.0032 -33.9910" 
(0.4502) (0.0973) (0.0046) (0.0223) (15.9100) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.0146, F[4,1011 = 1.3895, BP(4) = 7.7781 
Board Changes 
-3.7164'"` 0.0152 0.0022 0.0138' -22.5690- 
(0.1698) (0.0326) (0.0018) (0.0084) (4.3560) 
n= 387, RZ = 0.0794, F[4,382] = 9.3197, BP(4) = 8.4797 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.7188**' 0.0350 -0.0007 0.0059 -17.4090""" 
(0.1440) (0.0305) (0.0006) (0.0067) (3.1460) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0439, F(4,922] = 11.6208, BP(4) = 7.3345 
Notes: 
LN MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring fine size (fM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement. 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR; measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.7b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE, + ayVUM; + a, VOLPR; + u; 
ap a, a2 a3 aq 
Annual Earnings 
-2.2898"` -0.1006 -0.0005 0.0194 -18.6260"' 
(0.4640) (0.0844) (0.0039) (0.0175) (7.3650) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0135, F[4,1111 = 1.3937. BP(4) = 18.7751 
Interim Earnings 
-1.9813"' -0.0047 -0.0032 -0.0350" -5.6690 
(0.3529) (0.0999) (0.0037) (0.0164) (3.5770) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.0243, F[4,1471 = 1.9403, BP(4) = 4.0031 
AGMs 
-3.0432"' -0.0042 -0.0012 0.0151 -25.3590' 
(0.4344) (0.0800) (0.0036) (0.0175) (14.7800) 
n= 106, R2 = -0.0072, F[4,101) = 0.8136, BP(4) = 6.2695 
Board Changes 
-3.6430"" 0.0528' 0.0002 0.0089 -24.0080"' 
(0.1912) (0.0308) (0.0019) (0.0086) (4.4240) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.0876, F[4,382] = 10.2632, BP(4) = 8.6958 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.6143"' 0.0328 0.0000 0.0063 -18.4800"' 
(0.1202) (0.0256) (0.0004) (0.0053) (3.9220) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0600, F[4,922[ = 15.7741, BP(4) = 43.1510 
Notes: 
LN MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.7c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN_ANN) Estimated Using Mean 
Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN, = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + aJVUM; + a, VOLPR; + u; 
ap a, a, aj a4 
Annual Earnings 
-1.4391"" -0.1102 -0.0055 
0.0105 -31.8410- 
(0.4505) (0.0848) (0.0043) (0.0178) (8.5370) 
n= 116. R2 = 0.0892, F14,1111 = 3.8165. BP(4) = 7.8511 
Interim Earnings 
-1.9274"` -0.0233 -0.0049 -0.0246 -7.6220 
(0.4193) (0.1046) (0.0044) (0.0213) (5.0140) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.0111. F[4,1471 = 1.4233, BP(4) = 1.9466 
AGMs 
-3.1279'** 0.1060 -0.0001 -0.0114 -25.0351 
(0.4977) (0.0869) (0.0059) (0.0294) (15.8800) 
n= 106, R2 = -0.0034, F(4,101] = 0.9120, BP(4) = 6.0260 
Board Changes 
-3.6059"' -0.0114 
0.0021 0.0115 -27.3430"' 
(0.1778) (0.0356) (0.0020) (0.0100) (4.7840) 
n= 387, R' = 0.0838, F[4.3821 = 9.8272, BP(4) = 4.9445 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.6469""" -0.0304 -0.0005 
0.0079 -20.4720`"' 
(0.1431) (0.0317) (0.0005) (0.0072) (3.3230) 
n= 927, R' = 0.0414, F[4,9221 = 10.9932, BP(4) = 27.9418 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring fine size (EM), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR1 measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (tom-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared teat for heteroscedasticity. with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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5.4.2 Market Anticipation and the Total Value of Information Impounded 
Measuring the value of information by the daily change in price only captures the net 
effect of information on security prices. This will occur if investors' beliefs are 
changing daily as to whether expectations are rising or falling. Therefore daily price 
movement over the event period will be offsetting when there is uncertainty in the 
market. To measure the total effect of information on security prices, we need to 
ignore the sign of daily price movement. The total value of the information is 
therefore estimated using the API metric by accumulating absolute abnormal returns. 
LN ANN: 
Table 5.7 reports the regression results of the total value of information impounded 
over the announcement period, relative to the prior period. As before, the coefficient 
signs are not always as predicted, except when statistically significant. The ability of 
firm size (LN_MV; ) in explaining the reaction to a board change or notification of a 
change in shareholding, is significantly reduced when compared to the net value of 
information impounded over the announcement period. Prior volatility of stock returns 
(VOLPR+a) is shown to be the only driving force behind the anticipation of the 
annual earnings report, board changes and a change in shareholding. VOLPR+A; is 
highly significant for all three expected return models, and of negative sign. None of 
the explanatory variables are found to be significant in the explanation of either 
interim earnings reports or AGMs. The low explanatory power of the models is 
substantiated by the high significance of the constant term. 
4 
LN POST 
Table 5.8 reports the regression results of the total value of information impounded 
over the post-announcement period, relative to the prior and announcement periods. 
The significant explanatory power of the prior volatility of stock returns for the initial 
response (LN_ANN; ) to the annual earnings report, board changes and a change in 
shareholdings, extends to AGMs. VOLPR+A persists as the main driving force behind 
the anticipation of all the information types examined, except interim earnings. For 
annual earnings however, firm size has incremental power in the explanation of drift; 
highly significant and of negative sign. Previously in section 3.7.3, we hypothesised 
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Table 5.8a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST, = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE, + a3VUM, + a`VOLPR+A; + u, 
ao a, a, a3 a, 
Annual Earnings 
0.2569 -0.0833""' 0.0004 0.0080 -13.5670" 
(0.1650) (0.0287) (0.0015) (0.0058) (3.9450) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.1473, F[4,1111 = 5.9652, BP(4) = 15.5712 
Interim Earnings 
0.1036 -0.0028 -0.0023 0.0027 -6.3279 
(0.1764) (0.0324) (0.0019) (0.0064) (4.1260) 
n= 152, RZ = 0.0528, F[4,147] = 3.1038, BP(4) = 13.9696 
AGMs 
-0.0199 0.0254 0.0003 0.0001 -20.0380- 
(0.2114) (0.0423) (0.0020) (0.0094) (5.6370) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.0932, F14,1011 = 3.6964, BP(4) = 19.7482 
Board Changes 
0.3038"' -0.0087 -0.0019" -0.0014 -17.2261"' 
(0.1241) (0.0164) (0.0009) (0.0046) (2.2790) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.1312, F14,382] = 15.5673, BP(4) = 66.2679 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.0318 0.0120 0.0006' 0.0048 -17.4010- 
(0.0750) (0.0147) (0.0003) (0.0030) (3.0830) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.1650, F[4,9221 = 46.7574, BP(4) = 129.085 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M). as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firth has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+, * measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
........ statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5. Sb 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN_POST) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + ayVUM; + a4VOLPR+A; + u; 
apa, a, aja, 
Annual Earnings 
0.2803' -0.0902"' -0.0001 0.0089' -13.2380"' 
(0.1559) (0.0267) (0.0013) (0.0053) (3.9010) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.1766, F14,11 11 = 7.1671, BP(4) = 27.3986 
Interim Earnings 
0.1693 -0.0253 -0.0025 0.0051 -6.5855' 
(0.1663) (0.0316) (0.0017) (0.0060) (4.0150) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.0846. F(4,147] = 4.4906, BP(4) = 35.0173 
AGMs 
-0.0402 -0.0051 0.0001 0.0090 -19.3910- 
n 
(0.0401) (0.0019) (0.0089) (05.2330) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.1010. F[4,101] = 3.9490, BP(4) = 25.7884 
Board Changes 
0.2701 -0.0112 -0.0011 -0.0006 -15.5410"' (0.0939) (0.0129) (0.0007) (0.0037) (1.9800) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.1637, F[4,1011 = 19.8947, BP(4) = 55.8257 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0289 0.0109 0.0004 0.0024 -15.6940'* 
(0.0581) (0.0121) (0.0003) (0.0025) (2.8670) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.2017.94,922) = 59.4949, BP(4) = 170.1950 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.8c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST, = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a, NUM; + a, VOLPR+A; +U 
I0 a, a2 a3 a, 
Annual Earnings 
0.3048 -0.0915'"' 0.0010 0.0072 -16.1120""" 
(0.2126) (0.0338) (0.0020) (0.0072) (4.8210) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.1375, F94,1111 = 5.5833, BP(4) = 8.6252 
Interim Earnings 
0.0870 0.0167 -0.0031 0.0022 -6.8466 
(0.1987) (0.0372) (0.0022) (0.0077) (4.5350) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.0458. F[4,1471 = 2.8135. BP(4) = 9.0757 
AGMs 
-0.0140 -0.0108 0.0008 0.0031 -21.1800- 
(0.2259) (0.0462) (0.0025) (0.0110) (5.9790) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.0565,94,101) = 2.5713, BP(4) = 8.0987 
Board Changes 
0.3772"' -0.0213 -0.0024" -0.0008 -19.1620- 
(0.1551) (0.0191) (0.0011) (0.0058) (2.8230) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.1114. F[4.382) = 13.1012, BP(4) = 64.6198 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.0461 0.0116 0.0009" 0.0066' -20.1980- 
(0.0927) (0.0182) (0.0004) (0.0037) (3.7720) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.1473, F14,922] = 40.9935, BP(4) = 92.0647 
Notes: 
LN_MV1 is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firth has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A, measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.9a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE, + a, NUM; + a, VOLPR; + u, 
ao a, a2 a3 ae 
Annual Earnings 
-2.0310"' -0.0091 -0.0002 0.0035 -22.9160- 
(0.1123) (0.0207) (0.0010) (0.0042) (2.9400) 
n= 1830, RZ = 0.0443. F[4,1825] = 22.1942, BP(4) = 70.0661 
Interim Earnings 
-2.4243"' 0.0080 0.0004 0.0007 -10.3690- 
(0.1259) (0.0244) (0.0013) (0.0049) (3.7560) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0089, F[4,1447) = 4.2548, BP(4) = 37.7564 
AGMs 
-3.4838"' 0.0180 0.0024 0.0120 -16.1480- 
(0.2270) (0.0463) (0.0020) (0.0077) (7.5090) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0123, F[4,476) = 2.4994, BP(4) = 15.6998 
Board Changes 
-3.2672'** -0.0484"` 0.0006 0.0135"' -15.5739- 
(0.1013) (0.0173) (0.0010) (0.0032) (2.3170) 
n= 1807. R2 = 0.0400, F(4,18021 = 19.8115, BP(4) = 30.5872 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.5788"' 0.0230 -0.0005 0.0010 -14.5870"` 
(0.0721) (0.0142) (0.0007) (0.0024) (1.2540) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.0394, F14,4349j = 45.7112, BP(4) = 27.4138 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPtt; measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-7A,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.9b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN, = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a., NUM; + a, VOLPR, + u; 
, to a, a2 a3 a. 
Annual Earnings 
-2.3136"' -0.0013 0.0004 0.0059' -16.5140- 
(0.0984) (0.0187) (0.0009) (0.0035) (2.6080) 
n= 1830, RZ = 0.0297. F(4,1825] = 14.9719, $P(4) = 59.3156 
Interim Earnings 
-2.5121 "`" 0.0039 0.0007 0.0013 -7.1432""" 
(0.1117) (0.0217) (0.0011) (0.0042) (2.9170) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0046,94,1447] = 2.6719, BP(4) = 27.5486 
AGMs 
-3.4618"' -0.0212 0.0043"' 0.0165"' -17.4480"' 
(0.2073) (0.0387) (0.0018) (0.0061) (6.4790) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0237, F14,476] = 3.9174, BP(4) = 26.6409 
Board Changes 
-3.2025"` -0.0300' -0.0016 
0.0123"' -14.5740"' 
(0.0991) (0.0161) (0.0010) (0.0029) (2.2030) 
n= 1807, R2 = 0.0396.94,1802) = 19.6368, BP(4) = 50.7144 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.4167"` 0.0178 -0.0004 -0.0001 -16.2530"' 
(0.0708) (0.0134) (0.0006) (0.0023) (1.4680) 
n= 4354, RZ = 0.0537, F(4,4349) = 62.7462, BP(4) = 115.539 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM, measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-220,...; 1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations. 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
RP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.9c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN ANN, ) Estimated Using Mean 
Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN, = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE, + a/VUM; + a4VOLPR; + u, 
ao a, a2 a3 a, 
Annual Earnings 
-1.8341""" -0.0472"" -0.0000 0.0065 -27.2110""' 
(0.1141) (0.0214) (0.0114) (0.0041) (3.2320) 
n= 1830, R2 = 0.0541, F[4,18251 = 27.1413, BP(4) = 52.3175 
Interim Earnings 
-2.1381"' -0.0216 -0.0002 
0.0003 -15.6420- 
(0.1328) (0.0245) (0.0013) (0.0051) (5.2650) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0201, F[4,14471 = 8.4560, BP(4) = 41.1307 
AGMs 
-3.3368"` -0.0381 0.0031 0.0118 -16.1280" 
(0.2453) (0.0440) (0.0022) (0.0068) (7.1880) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0053. F[4.476) = 1.6409, BP(4) = 13.0848 
Board Changes 
-3.2859`"" -0.0541... 
0.0002 0.0146' -16.5250'"' 
(0.1031) (0.0172) (0.0010) (0.0033) (2.3440) 
n= 1807, RZ = 0.0403, F[4,1802] = 19.9586, BP(4) = 23.0164 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.7219"' -0.0170 
0.0001 0.0057"' -14.0870- 
(0.0735) (0.0141) (0.0007) (0.0024) (1.2260) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.0297,94,4349] = 34.3183, RP(4) = 28.3062 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPtt; measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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firm size to be of positive sign. We hypothesised, the information content of large 
firm announcements to be largely anticipated well in advance of their release 
(Freeman 1987); ie. prior to (t=-20). Whereas, small firm stocks are more heavily 
traded as the release date approaches; ie. in this case, over the prior period. Any 
surprise, no matter how small, will appear disproportionately high for larger firms 
against a prior period of relatively little trade. Consequently, firm size (LN_MV) is 
expected to be positively related to the level of market anticipation, LN_ANN; and 
LN_POST;. A negative sign implies, the stocks of larger firms are more heavily 
traded over the announcement period. 
Unclear Event Windows 
Table 5.9 reports the results for LN_ANN;, for unclear event windows. The tables 
clearly demonstrate the ability of the volatility of prior stock returns (VOLPR) in the 
explanation of the total value of information impounded, in response to the average 
event. VOLPR; is of least 5 per cent significance and negative in sign. In addition, 
the number of disclosures made by a firm (NUM), is both positive and significant at 
the 1 per cent level, for board changes. The expected probability and precision of the 
individual events is less clearly determined than previously. Comparison between 
information types, shows the relative size of the coefficient (a4) varies according to 
the return metric. However, it is possible to infer the annual earnings report is on 
average, of greater precision than the interim earnings report. The interim report 
appears most often to be of the least precision. 
Table 5.10 reports the results for LN_POST; for unclear windows. The prior volatility 
of stock returns (VOLPR+A; ) is reported to be the dominant factor in explaining lagged 
impounding, for all information types. In all cases, VOLPR+A.; is highly significant 
at the 1 per cent level. Firm size (LN_MVi) is also significant and of negative sign 
for annual earnings, interim earnings and board changes. The negative sign again 
implies, contrary to previous intuition, of greater activity in large firms stocks post 
event, relative to smaller stocks. The explanatory power of NUM;, extends to the 
post-announcement period for board changes, but also for AGMs and a change in 
shareholding. For the first time, AGE; is significant across all return metrics, and 
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Table 5.10a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST, = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a, NUM; + a, VOLPR+A; + U1 
a0 a, a, a3 a, 
Annual Earnings 
0.3633"" -0.0283**' -0.0008' 0.0038" -17.5360"' 
(0.0500) (0.0080) (0.0004) (0.0017) (1.6460) 
n= 1830, R2 = 0.1907, F14,18251 = 108.7757, BP(4) = 346.669 
Interim Earnings 
0.1944"' -0.0294"' -0.0000 0.0016 -10.7800"' 
(0.0622) (0.0093) (0.0005) (0.0018) (2.6960) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0909, F14,1447) = 37.2607, BP(4) = 333.923 
AGMs 
-0.0967 0.0077 -0.0005 0.0055" -13.5660"' 
(0.1090) (0.0163) (0.0007) (0.0027) (3.3550) 
n= 481. R2 = 0.0623. F[4,4761 = 8.9739, BP(4) = 71.5172 
Board Changes 
0.2773"' -0.0253"' -0.0019"` 0.0040"' -13.6970'** 
(0.0552) (0.0076) (0.0004) (0.0015) (1.6010) 
n= 1807, R2 = 0.1517, F14,18021 = 81.7456, BP(4) = 377.207 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0055 -0.0011 -0.0002 0.0033"' -15.1950"' 
(0.0356) (0.0061) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.7929) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.1812, F[4,4349) = 241.7520, BP(4) = 379.207 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM,. measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period. 
VOLPtt+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.10b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a? AGE; + ayVUM; + a4VOLPR+A, + u; 
£10 a, a, aj as 
Annual Earnings 
0.2684"' -0.0229"' -0.0009"' 0.0040"' -14.6070"' 
(0.0398) (0.0069) (0.0003) (0.0014) (1.3740) 
n= 1830, R2 = 0.2021,94,1825] = 116.7843, BP(4) = 496.013 
Interim Earnings 
0.1544"' -0.0255"` 0.0001 0.0013 -9.4237- 
(0.0513) (0.0082) (0.0004) (0.0016) (2.3420) 
n= 1452, RZ = 0.1062, F14,1447] = 44.1044, BP(4) = 579.030 
AGMs 
-0.0247 -0.0034 -0.0008 0.0063"' -13.5940- 
(0.0972) (0.0147) (0.0006) (0.0023) (3.2020) 
n= 481. RZ = 0.07.17, F[4,476] = 10.5440. BP(4) = 84.9989 
Board Changes 
0.2620"` -0.0233"' -0.0015"' 0.0031 -12.7370- 
(0.0458) (0.0068) (0.0004) (0.0014) (1.5240) 
n= 1807, R2 = 0.1719, F14,18021 = 94.6993. BP(4) = 506.302 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0996"' -0.0048 -0.0002 0.0026"` -14.9640- 
(0.0290) (0.0053) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.7513) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.2336, F(4,4349J = 332.6701. BP(4) = 481.704 
Notes: 
LN_MV, is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firn has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
', ", '** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 5.10c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Total Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE; + ayVUM, + a, VOLPR+A; + u; 
ap a, a, a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
0.4440"' -0.0296"' -0.0005 0.0032' -20.4270"' 
(0.0604) (0.0950) (0.0005) (0.0019) (1.9340) 
n= 1830, R2 = 0.1820, F14,1825] = 102.7600, BP(4) = 237.466 
Interim Earnings 
0.2232"' -0.0330"` -0.0001 0.0015 -12.6000- 
(0.0744) (0.0109) (0.0006) (0.0021) (3.1790) 
n= 1452, R2 = 0.0848, F[4,1447] = 34.6092, BP(4) = 265.142 
AGMs 
-0.0490 -0.0100 -0.0005 0.0093"' -18.5270"' 
(0.1233) (0.0181) (0.0008) (0.0033) (3.8940) 
n= 481, R2 = 0.0783, F14,4761 = 11.1923, BP(4) = 54.0580 
Board Changes 
0.2972"` -0.0336"' -0.0002"' 0.0050"' -15.0230"' 
(0.0656) (0.0087) (0.0005) (0.0018) (1.8600) 
n= 1807, R2 = 0.1318, F(4,1802] = 69.5713, BP(4) = 328.999 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0416 0.0018 -0.0003 0.0041"' -16.8070- 
(0.0431) (0.0073) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.9310) 
n= 4354, R2 = 0.1570, F[4,4349) = 103.7055. BP(4) = 375.900 
Notes: 
LN_MVi is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the fine has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement. 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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negative in sign, for board changes. The negative sign implies, the older the firm the 
greater the anticipation of board changes. Supporting the notion, that there is less 
accessibility to information concerning younger firms (see section 3.4). Indeed, for 
board changes we find each of the explanatory variables have incremental power in 
the explanation of lagged impounding. A distinct feature of these three models 
reported in Table 5.10 is the notable increase in the R2 values. 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The Pattern of Stock Returns 
The preliminary analysis identified the impounding behaviour of security returns for 
the average event, for each class of information (see section 5.3). Several 
observations were made, including the sensitivity of the information metric, APIs, to 
the expected returns model employed. However, the overall trend was one of gradual 
anticipation, with the market continuing to adjust after the event's release, perhaps as 
the full implications become known. A higher level of anticipation and a higher level 
of drift is associated with annual and interim earnings reports, relative to other 
information types. This possibly indicates the greater relevance and precision of 
earnings information for security valuation. The corresponding high level of drift in 
security returns following the earnings release, is consistent with the notion that 
earnings reports contain information not available from alternative more timely 
information sources (Chambers & Penman 1984). However, the results must be 
viewed tentatively by the predominantly low significance of the daily average 
abnormal returns. One cannot therefore be certain that the average event for any class 
of information, causes a persistent positive or even negative impact on stock returns. 
The apparent drift in security returns, may therefore indicate possible model mis- 
specification in the calculation of unexpected returns. 
On the announcement day, there is a significantly larger price adjustment to the 
release of interim earnings, relative to the annual report. This implies the information 
content of interim earnings disclosures is less easy to anticipate. The significance of 
abnormal returns over many days of the event window surrounding a change in 
shareholding, is an indication of possible herding by investors. Over the prior period, 
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this implies a change in shareholding is more likely to occur after pronounced trading 
activity. Over the post-announcement period, this implies a change in shareholding 
is interpreted as a signal by the uninformed traders. 
The inclusion of other disclosures in the event window, noticeably reduces the overall 
significance of the daily abnormal returns. This reduction may in part reflect the 
small firm bias of examining isolated events, and in part reflect an increase in the 
level of noise present in prices from the inclusion of confounding events. Examining 
security returns around isolated events, allows one infer the relative information 
content of different information types. Whereas, examining security returns over event 
periods of more than one disclosure, allows one to observe the general market 
behaviour surrounding the average corporate disclosure; extending the general 
applicability of the results. 
Exulaining the Pattern of Stock Returns 
The second part of the analysis tried to explain the cross-sectional variation in the 
pattern of stock returns for each class of information, and tested the robustness of 
these findings employing the same three models of expected returns (see section 5.4). 
The idea is that, the greater the anticipation of an announcement, the lower the 
expected level of drift, ceteris paribus. Here anticipation and interpretation, are a 
function of the expected costs and benefits of being informed. Overall, the results are 
consistent with our expectations. Market anticipation is found to be an increasing 
function of firm size, the number of years a firm has been trading, and the volatility 
of prior stock returns. This in turn implies the cost of being informed is a decreasing 
function of firm size, age and other factors as proxied by the volatility of stock 
returns. However, the positive coefficient of NUM;, suggests increased voluntary 
disclosure by firms reduces the ability of investors to anticipate and interpret 
information. A possible explanation may be, increased disclosure by firms 
discourages investors from acquiring costly information, if they expect their 
expectations will soon again need to be revised on the release of new information 
(Trueman 1994). Or alternatively, increasing disclosure of imprecise information may 
confuse the expectations of investors. 
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However, the significance of these explanatory variables varies according to the 
information type, the event window under examination (ANN or POST), whether there 
is more than one event in the event window (clear or unclear windows), the measure 
of information (net or total value of information impounded), and the model of 
expected returns (MM, MKT or MN). 
Our model explains post-announcement drift better than the price movement on the 
announcement day, which may indicate investors initial reactions are not always based 
on informed judgements. The initial market reaction on the announcement day to the 
disclosure of both earnings and non-earnings information is predominately a function 
of firm size. However, the volatility of stock returns (prior to the disclosure) is the 
main driving force behind the explanation of post-announcement drift. We also find 
the stock return behaviour surrounding the announcement of interim earnings is least 
explained, relative to the other information types. This is surprising given the higher 
level of drift observed for interim reports, and would suggest investors are less 
informed about the implications of interim earnings news. Although this is consistent 
with finding a larger price adjustment to interim earnings on the announcement day, 
relative to other information types. 
Allowing other disclosures within the event window, noticeably reduces both the 
overall level of significance of the daily abnormal returns. This reduction may in part 
reflect the small firm bias of examining isolated events, and in part reflect an increase 
in the level of noise present in prices from the inclusion of confounding events. 
However, we assert the problem is one of small firm bias given the overall increase 
in the explanatory power of firm size for stock returns behaviour on the announcement 
day. Furthermore, allowing other events in the event window increases the 
explanatory power of the volatility of stock returns, which remains the main driving 
force behind the explanation of post-announcement drift. 
Besides prior volatility, the remaining variables are generally insignificant in the 
explanation of the anticipation of interim earnings. AGE, and NUM; are only 
significant in the explanation of anticipation of board changes. On the whole the R2 
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values are very low, though this is consistent with earlier UK evidence. The joint 
explanatory of the variables does not exceed 5 per cent, except in the explanation of 
the total value of information impounded over the post-announcement period, where 
the R2 values are occassionally found to exceed 20 per cent. Although this may be 
indicative of a relatively efficient market, in which one cannot explain a large 
proportion of future movements in price with historical data. 
190 
6. THE PATTERN OF ANTICIPATION AND INTERPRETATION: 
GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS 
6.1 THE OBJECTIVE AND MAIN FINDING 
This chapter extends the results of the previous chapter by addressing the issue of 
good and bad news. This is prompted by growing evidence that the market reaction 
to corporate disclosure varies according to the sign of the news. The chapter proceeds 
by 
 a brief review of the literature on the disclosure of good and bad news, 
  examining the impounding behaviour of stock returns surrounding the release 
of each event type, distinguishing between the sign of the news, 
  re-employing the model developed in chapter three, to examine whether the 
incentives to become informed varies between good and bad news. 
The chapter finds several indications of differential price behaviour by investors 
towards the release of good and bad news. 
6.2 INTRODUCTION 
The market reaction to new information is assumed to be identical for good and bad 
news of equal size; the price adjustment is assumed to be a linear function of the size 
of the news, regardless of its sign. However, the empirical literature documents 
increasing evidence that the price process, or rather investor behaviour, is far more 
complex than originally thought. Unexpected bad news increases the volatility of 
stock returns more than unexpected good news (French, Schwert & Stambaugh 1987, 
Engle & Ng 1993). Campbell & Hertschel (1992) found volatility is greater following 
stock market falls, than after stock market rises. ' Also, the papers of Chambers & 
Penman (1984), Brown, Harlow & Tinic (1988) and Skinner (1994), all reported a 
stronger price reaction to the release of bad news. 
' This has been explained as a leverage effect, which occurs when the market value of a firm 
declines (see Campbell & Henschel 1992). 
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There is reason to believe therefore, that the process of anticipation or interpretation 
is different for good and bad news. The more timely disclosure of good news by 
managers, and their apparent reluctance to disclose bad news, is well documented in 
the earnings literature (Chambers & Penman 1984, Penman 1984, McNichols 1988). 
Consequently, security prices in the pre-announcement period are argued to reflect 
more good news than bad news. Investors interpret the failure to report on time as 
a signal of bad news (Penman 1984), although they fail to anticipate the full extent 
of the bad news, from more timely information sources, until the late report finally 
arrives. Thus, by delaying bad news, managers prevent investors from inferring the 
worst (McNichols 1988). 
The approach taken for this chapter is the same as for chapter five, but involves 
partitioning the events into good and bad news. The chapter starts with a brief review 
of the literature on the disclosure of information, in section 6.3. The section 
discusses: how the pattern of disclosure coincides with the sign of the news; the 
various incentives to disclose early; the attributes of early disclosers; and lastly, 
alternative explanations for the seeming earlier arrival of good news. Section 6.4 
discusses the adjustment of prices to information. The empirical analysis commences 
with section 6.5, which identifies the impounding behaviour of average stock returns 
over the event period for each class of information, distinguishing between the sign 
of the news. In order to make initial inferences as to whether the rate of anticipation 
and interpretation differs according to the sign of the news. In section 6.6, the 
empirical model developed in chapter three, is re-applied to test whether the incentives 
to become informed varies between good and bad news. Section 6.7 concludes the 
chapter. 
6.3 THE DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
6.3.1 The Disclosure Pattern of Earnings Information 
There is evidence to suggest there is a weekly pattern in the disclosure of information, 
with coincides with the sign of the news. Patell & Wolfson (1982) report bad news 
is more likely to be disclosed after the market closes, and especially after the close 
of trade on a Friday. Penman (1984) similarly identifies more bad news arriving at 
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the market on a Monday and, to a lesser extent, prior to the close on a Friday. The 
release of bad news after the market closes on a Friday, transpires in negative price 
movements when the market re-opens on Monday. Both studies suggest managers try 
to conceal bad news from investors. Or perhaps by allowing investors the weekend 
to absorb the shock, relieves the fears of managers of possible overreaction. 
The tendency of managers to advance the announcement of favourable earnings news, 
while delaying unfavourable earnings news, is well documented (Beaver 1968, Givoly 
& Palmon 1982, Chambers & Penman 1984, Penman 1984). For instance, Penman 
(1984) finds earnings reports published in the first two weeks of calender quarters 2, 
3 and 4, not only on average convey good news but also coincide with the 
announcement of increased earnings. Reports published later within the quarter, more 
often than not carry bad news. 
Even when a disclosure is mandatory, there is still uncertainty associated with the 
exact timing of its release. The stock price reaction to an announcement is therefore 
also a function of the announcement's expected arrival. The longer the reporting lag 
(ie. the time from the end of the reporting period to the announcement date), the 
greater the opportunity for investors to anticipate the information content of the 
announcement from other more timely information sources. Consequently, the price 
reaction to earlier announcements (ie. those with shorter reporting lags), maybe 
significantly more pronounced than the reaction to later announcements. Chambers 
& Penman (1984) however, were unable to find a significant link between the 
reporting lag and the variability of stock returns associated with interim and annual 
earnings releases; with the exception of small firms bearing good news. Although, 
this is consistent with the notion that earnings reports contain information unavailable 
from alternative sources, regardless of the reporting lag. 
Earnings reports published earlier than expected, are associated with larger price 
movements than those published on time, or later than expected. Unexpectedly early 
reports are associated with, on average, positive abnormal returns over the 
announcement period (days 0 and +1). This further confirms that firms publish good 
193 
news early. The abnormal returns of firms reporting later than expected are, on 
average, negative; implying bad news is withheld. Although this relationship is 
significant, it is not overwhelming. Bad news is often released on time, or even 
earlier than expected, as good news is often announced later than expected. 
Firms which fail to report by the expected date, are characterised by negative returns, 
indicating investors interpret the failure to report on time as a forecast of bad news. 
The extent to which the market anticipates the size of the news is reflected by the 
diminished (negative) price response to its arrival. However, Penman (1984) observed 
a further reduction in price when the late report finally arrived. This implies, although 
investors may interpret no news as bad news, they appear unaware of the full extent 
of the news until it is announced. Thus, by delaying bad news, managers prevent 
investors from inferring the worst (McNichols 1988). 
6.3.2 Attributes of Early Disclosers 
Givoly & Palmon (1984), Chambers & Penman (1984) and Penman (1984), all show 
larger firms tend to report earlier than smaller companies; although the relationship 
is often weak. One explanation being, larger firms are more widely held, and as such 
more susceptible to pressure from shareholders and analysts alike, to produce more 
timely reports. Additionally, larger firms have the resources available to them to 
`purchase less delay' in the preparation of accounts (Givoly & Palmon 1982). 
Overall, the behaviour is one of regular predictable reporting by individual firms, 
where the report date can be predicted, on average, within a few days with a 
reasonable level of accuracy (Chambers & Penman 1984). However, a pattern of 
regular reporting conflicts with evidence of good news being reported earlier than bad 
news. If both relations exist, it would imply firms can be categorised consistently as 
good news firms or bad news firms. Though no such link is found by Chambers and 
Penman. 
Various incentives exist that encourage may managers to promptly disclose 
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information. 2 Managers may lose reputation if they fail to disclose in a timely 
manner (Skinner 1994). Alternatively, managers may wish to mitigate large price 
declines on earnings announcement dates when issuing unexpected bad news, to 
protect investors against large price fluctuations. In the US, under the Securities 
Exchange Act (1934), firms are under a legal obligation to correct previous statements 
that they later learn were materially misleading. Similarly, there are reasons to 
explain the delay of (bad) news, such as the desire of managers to defer the 
repercussions from shareholders, or the wish to continue current obligations and 
negotiations in the best possible light. The greatest incentive is the avoidance of 
investor overreaction to the news (Kasznik & Lev 1995). 
6.3.3 The Voluntary Disclosure of Information 
The apparent reluctance of managers to voluntarily disclose bad news is substantiated 
by the work of McNichols (1988). She finds the returns distribution to be more 
negatively skewed during earnings announcement periods, compared to non- 
announcement periods. Greater negative price revision is caused more by earnings 
announcements, than by discretionary disclosure, or through investors' own private 
information acquisition. Hence, security prices in the pre-announcement period 
therefore reflect more good news than bad news. 
Lev & Penman (1990) find managers release forecasts of good news more frequently 
than bad news. However, more recent papers find the likelihood of an early disclosure 
increases with the size of the news and the permanency of the earnings change, rather 
than the sign of the news (Skinner 1994, Kasznik & Lev 1995). Skinner (1994) 
provides evidence on the voluntary disclosure of earnings related news. In contrast, 
it is `large' negative earnings surprises that are preempted by managers more 
frequently than other earnings releases, and more often than not, relate to quarterly 
earnings news. Although it is still the case that bad news is not preempted very often. 
Skinner finds the prospect of warning investors ahead of earnings surprise, increases 
with the existence of a previous forecast. 
Z See Lang & Lundholm (1993) for a more thorough analysis of the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure. 
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Kasznik & Lev (1995) examined the discretionary disclosure policy of management 
who are facing a large earnings surprise in their fourth quarter. They investigate the 
ways in which managers alert investors to the forthcoming surprise. The earnings 
surprise, relative to a recent analyst's forecast, is large if it provoked a greater than 
1 per cent stock price adjustment. Over half the sample provided no disclosure, 
neither quantitative or qualitative. Of those who did, only 6 per cent of the positive 
surprise firms and 9 per cent of the negative surprise firms issued any quantitative 
information. Overall, the frequency of earnings disappointments was twice that of 
positive news. 
The likelihood of issuing a warning statement increases with the size of the earnings 
surprise. The greater the surprise, the harsher the warning, ie. the more quantitative 
and earnings related the warning will be. 3 The harsher the warning the stronger the 
reaction by investors. After controlling for the size of news, the combined reaction 
to the warning and subsequent earnings announcement is significantly more negative 
for firms that warned investors, than the reaction to the earnings announcement of the 
no warning firms. On further investigation, warnings were found more likely to be 
issued by firms with permanent earnings disappointments. Hence, investors may 
interpret harsh warnings as a long term indicator of future competitiveness and 
viability. Although investor response may explain why so many firms remain silent, 
due to the fear of overreaction by investors. 
6.3.4 Alternative Explanations for the Seeming Earlier Arrival of Good News 
Alternative explanations exist that may part explain the seeming arrival of good news 
in the market place before bad news, besides the actions of managers. There is 
anecdotal evidence that analysts prefer to promote `buy' recommendations rather than 
`sell' recommendations (Schipper 1991). If they have greater incentive to issue these 
recommendations during the pre-announcement period, this would explain the relative 
' The form of disclosure is found to vary between good and bad news according to various firm 
attributes (Skinner 1994). Overall, for bad news fans, the size of the earnings surprise, the existence 
of a prior prospective statement, membership in a high tech or regulated industry, and firm size appear 
to be the most consistent disclosure attributes. For good news firms, only firm size and a previous 
forecast are associated with disclosure form. 
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increase in the release of good news. Of course, this activity will be most pronounced 
for firms that are closely followed, and may explain the skewness effect in returns for 
smaller firms as observed by McNichols (1988). Diamond & Verrecchia (1986) offer 
a micro-structure explanation - short sell restrictions. They show when informed 
traders are precluded from going short, bad news is reflected in prices less rapidly 
than good news. 
6.4 THE ADJUSTMENT OF STOCK PRICES TO INFORMATION 
Previous sections discuss various factors which affect the anticipation of information. 
We also briefly commented on the stronger price reaction to the disclosure of bad 
news (Chambers & Penman 1984, Brown, Harlow & Tinic 1988 and Skinner 1994), 
and of possible overreaction to bad news (Kaszik & Lev 1995). Other studies have 
acknowledged unexpected bad news increases the volatility of stock returns more than 
unexpected good news (French, Schwert & Stambaugh 1987, Engle & Ng 1993). 
Campbell & Hentschel (1992) argue, if future volatility is expected to increase, the 
required rate of return will increase and subsequently lower the security's price. The 
volatility of stock returns thereby intensifies the negative impact of bad news. 
Studies that examine the differential adjustment of security prices to good and bad are 
sparse. Woodruff & Senchack (1988) studied the intraday adjustment of stock prices 
to the information content of earnings reports. Stocks with negative earnings surprises 
are found to experience the largest overall adjustment. Stocks declaring favourable 
earnings news had the quickest price adjustment, with ninety-one per cent of the 
adjustment completed within three hours. The adjustment to unfavourable earnings 
news was notably slower but similar, with the adjustment slower still to less extreme 
news. Lee (1992) similarly found `large' traders take longer to impound bad news, 
although with the adjustment completed within 90 minutes. 
A recent UK study by Sharkarway & Garrod (1995) found unfavourable earnings news 
to be largely ignored, while the reaction to favourable earnings news is representative 
of an overreaction. This response is argued to reflect the level of sophistication of the 
investors dealing in the company's securities. Unsophisticated investors are found not 
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to respond to bad news, whilst they react more than sophisticated investors to good 
news. 
6.5 THE PATTERN OF STOCK RETURNS FOR GOOD AND BAD NEWS 
The approach taken in this chapter is unchanged from chapter five, but involves 
partitioning the events into good and bad news. Various definitions have been 
employed by the empirical literature to classify disclosures as good or bad news. 
Simple expectation models are often used to determine the nature of earnings news, 
where for instance the announced figure is simply compared to the previous quarter's 
(see Patell & Wolfson 1982, Penman 1984). Expectation models based on the past 
time series of earnings, fail to consider the expectations of investors, and subsequently 
may overestimate the true information content of a news item. Furthermore, it is an 
inappropriate manner to determine the nature of qualitative announcements. An 
alternative specification is to use a price-based model which can take various forms. 
For instance, both Chambers & Penman (1984), and Penman (1984), identified the 
sign of the news by the sign of the residual return over the announcement period (days 
0 and +1). Alternatively, Skinner (1994) identified the sign of earnings news by the 
direction of the price change to its release. 
We adopt the price-based method, where the nature of the news is determined by the 
final value of API over the duration of the event window; i. e. twenty days after the 
report date, API20. The nature of the news is therefore conditioned on prior 
expectations. Announcements convey good news in the sense that they affect stock 
prices of reporting firms positively, and have an API20 value greater than 1.0. 
Announcements with an API20 value less than 1.0 are classified as bad news, and those 
with an API20 value equal to 1.0 contain no news. ' By observing price changes to 
signals, avoids the problem of the misspecification of investors' expectations. In 
addition, determining the nature of the news by the sign of the return over the duration 
of the event window, rather than the announcement period, reduces any potential bias 
of mis-classification. The return over the announcement period may capture an initial 
° Here no news is interpreted as having been wholly anticipated, or containing information of little 
importance. 
198 
under or overreaction to the news, which maybe later corrected. 
Figures 6.1 to 6.2 below, trace the value of API, over the event period (t=-20,..., +20) 
for each class of information, distinguishing between the average market response to 
both good and bad news. More detailed information of the price reaction to these 
separate events can be found in Tables 6.1 (a, b) to 6.5 (a, b); where the suffix a and 
b refers to good and bad news events, respectively. Together with reporting the daily 
average abnormal return (AAR) for the sample of firms, the tables also report the 
results of two-tailed t-tests used to evaluate the statistical significance of the daily 
AAR. If the average announcement conveys new information, then we can expect to 
observe abnormal returns in the direction of the sign of the news. 
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Briefly, the results show: 
The pattern of the APIs illustrates investors are able to anticipate the sign 
of the news by at least twenty days in advance. 
Both the level of anticipation and the level of drift is higher for good 
news events than bad. Possible explanations are that either (i) good news 
is more informative, or (ii) that bad news is more difficult to interpret. 
For both annual and interim earnings reports, the absolute size of the price 
adjustment on the announcement day, is greater for unfavourable earnings 
news than favourable news. This suggests that bad news is not as easily 
anticipated as good news. 
Greater daily sign reversal in the abnormal returns over the event period, 
for bad news. A possible explanation may be bad news is associated with 
greater uncertainty. 
As in chapter 5, a higher level of anticipation and post-announcement drift 
is associated with interim and annual earnings reports. 
The significance of abnormal returns over many days of the event 
window, surrounding a change in shareholding, is indicative of possible 
herding by investors. 
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Figure 6.1: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Annual Earnings Reports 













Figure 6.2: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Interim Earnings Reports 
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Figure 6.3: The Abnormal Performance Index Around AGMs for Good and Bad 
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Figure 6.4: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Board Changes for Good 
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Figure 6.5: The Abnormal Performance Index Around Changes in Shareholdings 
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6.5.1 The Comparison of Expected Return Models 
Figures 6.1 to 6.5 show a gradual anticipation of the information content of the 
average corporate disclosure by up to twenty trading days in advance of its release, 
for all expected return models. The pattern of abnormal returns follows in the 
direction of the sign of the news, and persists over the post-announcement period. 
The drift in returns is evidence of continued underreaction to new information, 
irrespective of its sign. An alternative explanation for the drift, maybe possible 
misspecification of unexpected returns. In contrast to Figures 5.1 to 5.5, which did 
not distinguish between the sign of the news, the partitioning of events notably 
reduces the divergence between the three return measures, with there being a 
noticeable increase in the level of drift associated with each event. As before, much 
greater anticipation and a higher level of drift is observed for earnings news, rather 
than non-earnings information. On closer inspection, the level of drift is greater for 
good news than for bad news. Without controlling for the size of the news however, 
we can not make any definite assertions. What is evident, it that not distinguishing 




Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Annual Earnings 
Day Market Model (n=84) Market Adjusted (n=67) Mean Adjusted (n=101) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 0.0034 1.7207' 0.0005 0.2801 0.0045 2.3030" 
-19 0.0051 2.9281"" 0.0028 1.4943 0.0077 3.2985"' 
-18 0.0027 1.2126 -0.0011 -0.4327 0.0036 1.9770" 
-17 0.0010 0.6883 -0.0024 -1.3148 0.0027 1.8250' 
-16 0.0057 2.6555""* 0.0015 0.6010 0.0069 3.5269"' 
-15 0.0039 1.9356' 0.0020 0.8480 0.0067 3.6701- 
-14 0.0062 1.0284 0.0043 2.1758" 0.0065 4.4953"' 
-13 0.0085 3.2679"' 0.0083 2.5649"' 0.0096 3.9241 "' 
-12 0.0090 1.0465 0.0028 1.1005 0.0101 3.5484"' 
-11 0.0052 2.2822" 0.0008 0.3430 0.0044 2.1145- 
-10 0.0049 1.6787' 0.0018 0.4866 0.0043 1.6025 
-9 0.0046 1.6356 0.0030 0.9286 0.0058 2.4957"' 
-8 0.0037 1.8599' 0.0010 0.5020 0.0060 3.2608"' 
-7 0.0078 2.0062" 0.0068 1.5159 0.0074 2.1935" 
-6 0.0048 1.1802 0.0007 0.1384 0.0041 1.1895 
-5 0.0079 2.6794"' 0.0022 0.8037 0.0099 4.1067- 
-4 0.0132 1.1022 0.0116 2.0499" 0.0153 3.8710- 
-3 0.0096 2.2348" 0.0073 1.3964 0.0077 2.1033" 
-2 0.0023 0.8299 0.0006 0.1872 0.0032 1.3980 
-1 0.0057 2.0637" 0.0007 0.2448 0.0067 2.9085- 
0 0.0195 2.5450'* 0.0282 3.1939"' 0.0199 3.0383- 
1 0.0154 2.7483"' 0.0149 2.3906"' 0.0135 2.8297- 
2 0.0067 1.7070' 0.0070 0.5949 0.0083 2.5861- 
3 0.0110 2.1652" 0.0091 1.4514 0.0114 2.6627- 
4 0.0097 3.0986"' 0.0080 2.2124" 0.0079 2.8197"' 
5 0.0024 0.6223 0.0026 0.6446 0.0034 1.0362 
6 0.0006 0.2318 -0.0020 -0.6578 0.0017 0.7221 
7 0.0004 0.1822 -0.0031 -1.1065 0.0019 1.0458 
8 0.0007 0.2114 0.0000 0.0113 0.0032 1.7283' 
9 0.0051 1.9600" 0.0036 1.1855 0.0036 1.5607 
10 0.0051 2.6536"' 0.0034 1.4761 0.0070 3.7084- 
11 0.0036 1.4013 0.0020 0.6728 0.0055 2.2910" 
12 0.0088 3.3690'"' 0.0063 2.1810" 0.0076 3.5138- 
13 0.0090 3.2753"' 0.0055 1.6898' 0.0076 3.2163- 
14 0.0087 2.4673`"' 0.0077 1.7891' 0.0081 2.6907"' 
15 0.0096 2.9717"' 0.0075 2.2879" 0.0091 3.5231"' 
16 0.0033 1.9181' 0.0014 0.7070 0.0048 3.0670"' 
17 -0.0001 -0.0417 -0.0015 -0.5945 0.0021 1.2375 
18 -0.0004 -0.2277 -0.0044 -1.7000' 0.0006 0.3810 
19 0.0074 2.0243" 0.0037 0.8987 0.0066 2.2607" 
20 0.0110 2.1963" 0.0082 1.3486 0.0104 2.4839"' 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '; '; " statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 6.1b 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Annual Earnings 
Day Market Model (n=33) Market Adjusted (n=50) Mean Adjusted (n=15) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 -0.0003 -0.0798 -0.0029 -1.0199 0.0005 0.2040 
-19 -0.0055 -0.6798 -0.0049 -0.9057 -0.0177 -1.3790 
-18 0.0008 0.3721 -0.0017 -0.8259 0.0034 1.0356 
-17 0.0033 0.8359 -0.0001 -0.0328 0.0109 1.5463 
-16 0.0018 0.8731 0.0017 0.8014 0.0026 1.9895- 
-15 -0.0010 -0.4437 -0.0057 -2.8450"' -0.0043 -1.1448 
-14 -0.0038 -1.2342 -0.0031 -1.6576' -0.0026 -0.7968 
-13 0.0022 0.6415 -0.0021 -1.0235 -0.0027 -0.7622 
-12 -0.0003 -0.1094 0.0041 0.9198 0.0017 0.3233 
-11 -0.0044 -1.3092 -0.0020 -0.6568 -0.0053 -1.1961 
-10 -0.0027 -0.6958 -0.0038 -1.3076 0.0039 0.7066 
-9 -0.0020 -0.8612 -0.0017 -0.8271 -0.0029 -0.7889 
-8 0.0016 0.7452 -0.0008 -0.3372 0.0005 0.3155 
-7 -0.0034 -0.9979 -0.0044 -1.5243 -0.0017 -0.7776 
-6 -0.0084 -1.1933 -0.0047 -1.0547 -0.0114 -0.8139 
-5 -0.0062 -1.2026 -0.0007 -0.1592 -0.0100 -0.9360 
-4 -0.0012 -0.4110 -0.0020 -0.9730 0.0000 -0.0068 
-3 -0.0062 -2.3354" -0.0035 -2.2251" -0.0002 -0.1646 
-2 -0.0059 -1.5811 -0.0075 -2.9081"' -0.0127 -1.9733- 
-1 -0.0066 -2.1805" -0.0014 -0.4910 -0.0066 -1.4059 
0 -0.0205 -1.3087 -0.0226 -2.1475" -0.0494 -1.6734' 
1 -0.0045 0.9290 -0.0036 -0.9184 -0.0044 -1.2397 
2 0.0051 1.8277' 0.0004 0.1532 0.0037 0.7857 
3 -0.0065 -1.3773 -0.0040 -1.1920 -0.0139 -1.5350 
4 -0.0079 -2.1691" -0.0058 -1.8376` -0.0149 -2.0104" 
5 -0.0005 -0.3991 -0.0074 -2.4598"' 0.0008 0.5400 
6 -0.0035 -1.1066 -0.0016 -0.6821 -0.0086 -1.4032 
7 -0.0020 -0.8540 -0.0020 -1.2396 -0.0041 -0.9289 
8 -0.0028 -1.7952' -0.0072 -1.7588' -0.0166 -1.3599 
9 -0.0054 -1.5172 -0.0050 -1.9019' -0.0032 -0.7303 
10 0.0013 0.1815 -0.0007 -0.1617 -0.0059 -0.4721 
11 -0.0020 -0.4699 -0.0014 -0.5034 -0.0028 -0.6457 
12 -0.0036 -3.0397"' -0.0030 -2.9150"' 0.0004 0.4161 
13 -0.0021 -1.6212 -0.0021 -1.3133 0.0015 2.9872"' 
14 -0.0004 -0.1535 -0.0013 -0.6733 0.0053 1.3168 
15 -0.0070 -2.0763" -0.0042 -1.5082 -0.0082 -1.5331 
16 0.0012 0.3460 -0.0033 -1.5019 0.0041 0.7536 
17 -0.0047 -1.4828 -0.0072 -3.7905"' -0.0062 -1.1895 
18 -0.0031 -2.1139" -0.0045 -3.6356" -0.0009 -0.5005 
19 -0.0013 -0.7727 -0.0017 -1.0985 0.0031 1.8207' 
20 0.0007 0.2233 0.0007 0.2771 0.0080 1.3305 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '; ', "' statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
205 
The sample sizes in Tables 6.1 to 6.5, show wide variation between the return models 
in determining the sign of the news. Mean returns (MN) measures the highest 
proportion of good news, then the market model (MM) and market (MKT) adjusted 
returns. Although this variation in sample sizes points to problems of mis- 
classification it also highlights the problem of relying on a single returns model. 
Unfortunately the available sample sizes do not allow us to partition the sample 
further into the size of the signal. As before, the frequency and size of significant 
returns varies across return metrics, and therefore, so will the probability of a Type 
I error. For reasons of clarity, only the results for the market model (MM) will be 
discussed, unless otherwise stated. 
6.5.2 Earnings Announcements 
Annual Earnings Reports 
By categorising the news according to its sign, the abnormal returns series is far more 
volatile, although the general trend is upward for good news, and downward for bad. 
The Tables 6.1 a and 6.1 b, show the frequency and size of significant returns is much 
higher for favourable annual earnings news than unfavourable news. Investors are 
able to anticipate the sign of the news up to twenty days in advance, but act less 
strongly towards prospective bad news. 
For favourable earnings news, we find the highest returns can be earned on event days 
-4,0 and + 1, for each return metric. With respective excess returns of 0.0132,0.0195 
and 0.0 154 (using the market model, MM); all are highly significant at the 1 per cent 
level. For MM, the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns, can also be rejected on 
event days -19, -16, -14 to -11, -7, -5 to -3, -1 to +1, +3, +4, +9, +10, +12 to +15, 
and on days +19 to +20; all above 5 per cent significance. The number of significant 
returns on days after the average release, is supportive of lagged impounding. 
Similarly, for unfavourable news, the lowest return occurs on day 0 across all three 
return metrics. With a return of -0.0205 (t-value of -1.3087), although insignificant, 
its size exceeds that for favourable earnings news. For unfavourable news, the general 
size and significance of the daily abnormal returns is much lower. In comparison, for 
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Table 6.2a 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Interim Earnings 
Day Market Model (n=92) Market Adjusted (n=69) Mean Adjusted (n=48) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 0.0028 1.1705 0.0005 0.2073 0.0035 1.5288 
-19 0.0058 1.9460" 0.0039 1.0178 0.0063 2.2705- 
-18 0.0085 2.2158" 0.0064 1.3240 0.0080 2.1254" 
-17 0.0079 2.9853"' 0.0046 1.3858 0.0071 2.8354- 
-16 0.0010 0.8146 -0.0016 -1.0546 0.0017 1.4844 
-15 0.0062 2.7758'** 0.0042 1.5104 0.0064 3.0521- 
-14 0.0050 2.5982'** 0.0006 0.2980 0.0052 3.0328"' 
-13 0.0058 2.3370"' 0.0015 0.5390 0.0057 2.4363- 
-12 0.0039 2.2311" 0.0014 0.7259 0.0046 3.0181"' 
-11 0.0086 2.5994"' 0.0060 1.5025 0.0087 2.8853- 
-10 0.0053 2.4006"' 0.0029 1.1595 0.0060 2.7145- 
-9 0.0067 2.1650" 0.0027 0.7991 0.0072 2.4454- 
-8 0.0043 1.7443' 0.0029 1.2086 0.0056 2.2328" 
-7 0.0015 0.7640 -0.0031 -1.2970 0.0027 1.4353 
-6 0.0059 2.2324" 0.0038 1.1707 0.0064 2.6419- 
-5 0.0061 1.9169' 0.0037 1.1938 0.0080 2.5667- 
-4 0.0012 0.5429 -0.0014 -0.5188 0.0017 0.7914 
-3 0.0103 3.6142"' 0.0103 2.9358"' 0.0105 3.9308- 
-2 0.0059 2.3231" 0.0029 0.9876 0.0064 2.5355"' 
-1 0.0077 3.0476'"' 0.0049 1.5350 0.0078 2.9605- 
0 0.0005 0.0758 0.0052 0.7991 -0.0035 -0.5260 
1 0.0068 1.1321 0.0071 0.9235 0.0060 1.0594 
2 0.0047 1.2595 0.0016 0.3378 0.0063 1.7607' 
3 0.0044 2.5917**' 0.0014 0.7103 0.0061 3.6656"' 
4 0.0124 3.6486"' 0.0112 2.6684'"' 0.0114 3.6196"" 
5 0.0042 2.4537"' 0.0032 1.5506 0.0054 3.7453- 
6 0.0047 1.7978' 0.0023 0.7572 0.0039 1.5847 
7 0.0035 2.1913" -0.0001 -0.0719 0.0053 3.7680- 
8 0.0076 2.2107" 0.0078 1.7755' 0.0078 2.3646"' 
9 0.0051 1.5522 0.0002 0.0408 0.0054 1.7685' 
10 0.0033 2.2133" 0.0008 0.4774 0.0055 3.0007- 
11 0.0053 2.5890"' 0.0026 0.9986 0.0054 2.7858"' 
12 0.0055 2.5628"' 0.0043 1.6412 0.0063 3.0159- 
13 0.0053 2.8507"' 0.0023 1.1296 0.0046 2.8411 
14 0.0044 1.2627 0.0031 0.7568 0.0048 1.4943 
15 0.0049 1.7842' 0.0023 0.6586 0.0052 2.0179" 
16 0.0054 1.5112 0.0033 0.8941 0.0067 2.0724" 
17 0.0060 1.6579' 0.0040 0.9553 0.0059 1.7497' 
18 0.0061 2.6838"' 0.0035 1.2856 0.0065 3.2627"' 
19 0.0117 2.5095"` 0.0095 1.6073 0.0107 2.3408- 
20 0.0039 1.1005 0.0031 0.6924 0.0042 1.1796 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '. V * statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 6.2b 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Interim Earnings 
Day Market Model (n=62) Market Adjusted (n=85) Mean Adjusted (n=54) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 -0.0013 -0.6705 -0.0043 -1.8711' -0.0013 -0.8216 
-19 -0.0097 -2.0493" -0.0090 -2.5307"' -0.0115 -2.2274" 
-18 -0.0041 -2.1114" -0.0041 -2.4433"' -0.0018 -0.8129 
-17 -0.0021 -0.6622 -0.0025 -1.0143 -0.0028 -0.7603 
-16 -0.0027 -0.8510 -0.0034 -1.3923 -0.0029 -0.8457 
-15 -0.0042 -1.2305 -0.0056 -1.9500' -0.0047 -1.2444 
-14 -0.0025 -0.6402 -0.0006 -0.1892 -0.0035 -0.8553 
-13 0.0024 1.4721 0.0012 0.6411 0.0023 1.5583 
-12 -0.0014 -0.7217 -0.0031 -1.8971' 0.0004 0.2084 
-11 -0.0044 -1.5811 -0.0051 -2.0291" -0.0046 -1.5499 
-10 -0.0107 -1.0149 -0.0093 -1.1561 -0.0113 -0.9702 
-9 0.0080 0.5470 0.0055 0.5058 0.0087 0.5453 
-8 0.0037 0.8812 -0.0005 -0.1590 0.0026 0.6081 
-7 0.0000 0.0063 -0.0005 -0.2655 -0.0013 -0.8469 
-6 0.0008 0.3425 0.0002 0.0968 0.0007 0.2683 
-5 -0.0007 -0.2533 -0.0024 -0.8247 -0.0030 -1.3730 
-4 -0.0034 -0.6982 -0.0052 -1.4246 -0.0036 -0.6906 
-3 -0.0049 -1.9205' -0.0051 -2.6218"' -0.0057 -2.3020" 
-2 -0.0041 -1.6259 -0.0029 -1.3683 -0.0048 -1.7734 
-1 -0.0016 -0.4166 -0.0028 -0.9282 0.0008 0.2002 
0 -0.0372 -2.8580" -0.0379 -3.6689"' -0.0342 -2.4998- 
1 -0.0069 -1.4996 -0.0072 -2.0710" -0.0053 -1.1009 
2 -0.0056 -1.1680 -0.0067 -1.7977' -0.0079 -1.5653 
3 -0.0079 -1.5750 -0.0083 -2.1315" -0.0092 -1.7267' 
4 -0.0082 -1.4289 -0.0081 -1.8218' -0.0096 -1.5195 
5 -0.0002 -0.0604 -0.0023 -1.0194 0.0017 0.5378 
6 -0.0030 -1.0912 -0.0039 -1.7453' -0.0023 -0.7710 
7 -0.0011 -0.2379 -0.0030 -0.9116 -0.0010 -0.2003 
8 -0.0014 -0.4367 -0.0033 -1.3165 -0.0041 -1.3210 
9 -0.0035 -1.1983 -0.0026 -0.9627 -0.0031 -0.9465 
10 0.0036 0.6960 0.0001 0.0187 0.0028 0.5482 
11 0.0024 0.7988 -0.0009 -0.3889 0.0026 0.8250 
12 0.0046 1.1733 0.0015 0.4911 0.0062 1.4611 
13 0.0036 0.7387 0.0020 0.5310 0.0064 1.1910 
14 0.0015 0.4917 -0.0008 -0.3074 0.0034 1.1396 
15 0.0008 0.2513 -0.0033 -1.4298 0.0028 0.8032 
16 -0.0064 -1.0226 -0.0058 -1.1486 -0.0068 -1.0013 
17 0.0017 0.8267 -0.0013 -0.5216 0.0016 0.7536 
18 -0.0148 -1.4539 -0.0124 -1.6519' -0.0140 -1.2891 
19 -0.0176 -1.8588' -0.0142 -1.9581' -0.0195 -1.8589' 
20 -0.0052 -0.9484 -0.0068 -1.6410 -0.0047 -0.8051 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; ', ", "' statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
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MM, the null can only be rejected on event days -15, -3 to -2,0, +5, +12, and +17 
to +18. In addition, there is greater sign reversal in daily returns over the event period 
for bad news. The figures demonstrate both the level of anticipation and the level of 
drift is much lower for bad news. However, for both favourable and unfavourable 
news, the most sizeable price movement occurs over the post-announcement period. 
So although the initial reaction to bad news is greater than for good news on the 
report date, bad news is associated with less anticipatory behaviour and lower drift. 
Without controlling for the size of the news, it is not possible to say whether this 
behaviour represents an initial overreaction but general underreaction to bad news, or 
if the average bad news event is of lower information content. 
Interim Earnings Reports 
From Tables 6.2a and 6.2b, the pattern for interim earnings is similar for annual 
earnings, though less pronounced. For good news, the APIA follows a continuous 
upward trend. The event days -3, +4 and +19 see the highest returns of 0.0103, 
0.0 124 and 0.0117 respectively, and all are highly significant and robust across all 
return models. However, the return on day 0 is relatively small (0.0005) though 
insignificant. As for annual earnings, the null can be rejected several times over the 
event window: on days -19 to -17, -15 until -9, -6, -3 to -1, +3 to +5, +7, +8, +10 to 
+13, and again on days +18 and +19. The announcement of disappointing interim 
news, on day 0, is met with a highly significant negative return of -0.0372 (t-value of 
2.8580). Much greater than that observed for good news. Beyond this, excess returns 
are generally insignificant, with the exception of event days -19 and -18. 
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Table 6.3a 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
AGMs 
Day Market Model (n=60) Market Adjusted (n=52) Mean Adjusted (n=66) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 0.0043 2.3156" 0.0020 0.8183 0.0065 2.6246'" 
-19 0.0043 1.8555' 0.0009 0.3018 0.0048 2.1814- 
-18 0.0036 1.4794 0.0045 2.1058" 0.0043 1.7937' 
-17 0.0053 2.1826" 0.0041 1.9248' 0.0055 2.3223" 
-16 0.0038 1.9243' 0.0024 1.2812 0.0050 2.8807"' 
-15 0.0033 1.8200' 0.0019 0.9405 0.0036 2.0263- 
-14 0.0067 3.5467"' 0.0057 2.6090'* 0.0064 3.6193"' 
-13 0.0048 2.0458" 0.0024 1.0945 0.0065 2.6530- 
-12 0.0039 2.1939" 0.0026 1.3647 0.0041 2.2946- 
-11 0.0048 1.9806" 0.0035 1.2700 0.0058 2.5890- 
-10 0.0063 3.1757"' 0.0040 1.7659' 0.0070 3.6891- 
-9 0.0084 2.7158"' 0.0083 2.5517"' 0.0094 3.0914"' 
-8 0.0040 1.7142' 0.0018 0.6583 0.0040 1.8737' 
-7 0.0043 2.1633" 0.0043 2.1090" 0.0043 2.1237" 
-6 0.0014 0.7275 0.0007 0.3166 0.0004 0.1966 
-5 0.0028 1.4925 0.0020 1.1542 0.0028 1.6130 
-4 0.0053 2.3904"' 0.0039 1.6626 0.0063 3.0537"' 
-3 0.0030 2.1819" 0.0019 1.1963 0.0029 2.0135" 
-2 0.0022 1.5320 0.0022 1.4782 0.0026 1.6513' 
-1 0.0046 1.6901' 0.0024 0.9142 
0.0038 1.4248 
0 0.0131 2.6641"' 0.0111 1.9819" 0.0128 2.8390"' 
1 0.0002 0.0982 0.0007 0.3905 0.0010 0.6363 
2 0.0035 1.4414 0.0039 1.6967' 0.0031 1.3308 
3 0.0076 2.4796"' 0.0033 1.9635" 0.0071 2.5102- 
4 0.0038 0.9471 0.0053 1.5518 0.0038 1.0539 
5 0.0048 2.3606"' 0.0013 0.8231 0.0044 2.3330"' 
6 0.0059 1.9084' 0.0036 1.9382' 0.0070 2.4868"' 
7 0.0027 1.1598 0.0004 0.1830 0.0024 1.0993 
8 0.0014 0.9419 0.0019 1.4354 0.0012 0.8525 
9 0.0034 2.1971" 0.0016 1.2160 0.0029 1.9919- 
10 0.0019 1.1885 0.0020 1.4184 0.0012 0.8967 
11 0.0046 2.0559" 0.0049 1.8902' 0.0041 2.0632" 
12 0.0045 3.0098"' 0.0045 2.4853"' 0.0033 2.3523"' 
13 0.0028 2.1481" 0.0012 0.7750 0.0015 1.3401 
14 0.0022 1.4271 0.0009 0.5462 0.0007 0.5124 
15 0.0023 1.3722 0.0006 0.3255 0.0018 1.2628 
16 0.0005 0.2845 -0.0010 -0.5513 0.0006 0.3969 
17 0.0048 2.4676"' 0.0015 0.8093 0.0034 1.6923' 
18 -0.0006 -0.2279 0.0019 1.6432 -0.0010 -0.4361 
19 0.0009 0.4690 0.0002 0.1422 0.0010 0.6245 
20 0.0010 0.6223 0.0017 0.9514 -0.0004 -0.2698 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; ', ' ; "' statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 6.3b 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
AGMs 
Day Market Model (n=46) Market Adjusted (n=54) Mean Adjusted (n=40) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 0.0007 0.3653 0.0014 0.7678 0.0012 0.6595 
-19 -0.0035 -1.2853 -0.0038 -1.6094 -0.0013 -0.4757 
-18 -0.0035 -1.7508' -0.0055 -2.4118- -0.0020 -0.9133 
-17 -0.0041 -1.5424 -0.0045 -1.5186 -0.0034 -1.2197 
-16 -0.0011 -0.4635 -0.0017 -0.7845 0.0000 0.0069 
-15 -0.0013 -0.5000 -0.0032 -1.4250 -0.0031 -1.1670 
-14 -0.0012 -0.8009 -0.0015 -1.0657 -0.0011 -0.6539 
-13 -0.0007 -0.1933 -0.0024 -0.8159 -0.0010 -0.2818 
-12 -0.0030 -1.4328 -0.0037 -2.0151" -0.0035 -1.6865' 
-11 0.0013 0.6419 -0.0014 -1.0036 0.0004 0.2587 
-10 -0.0001 -0.0475 0.0011 0.6641 0.0011 0.5709 
-9 -0.0016 -0.5048 -0.0048 -2.1692" -0.0011 -0.3669 
-8 0.0033 1.9740" 0.0025 1.7326` 0.0022 1.2602 
-7 -0.0012 -0.6281 -0.0023 -1.0795 -0.0013 -0.9463 
-6 -0.0049 -1.9228' -0.0064 -2.8149"' -0.0047 -1.8113' 
-5 -0.0019 -0.8759 -0.0034 -1.5405 -0.0028 -1.2235 
-4 -0.0005 -0.2941 -0.0006 -0.3669 -0.0007 -0.4418 
-3 -0.0014 -0.9100 -0.0013 -1.0036 -0.0016 -1.1706 
-2 -0.0015 -0.7948 -0.0026 -1.4155 -0.0031 -1.7000' 
-1 -0.0008 -0.4711 0.0006 0.2741 0.0018 1.1128 
0 -0.0071 -1.8321` -0.0035 -0.9679 -0.0096 -2.1853- 
1 -0.0058 -2.1927"" -0.0075 -3.3120"' -0.0070 -2.4890- 
2 -0.0035 -1.4426 -0.0063 -2.3153" -0.0031 -1.1548 
3 0.0004 0.2543 0.0029 0.8432 0.0005 0.2854 
4 -0.0019 -1.0137 -0.0059 -1.7022' -0.0020 -1.0649 
5 0.0003 0.2002 0.0014 0.6707 0.0009 0.5811 
6 -0.0031 -1.9780" -0.0006 -0.1700 -0.0042 -2.2542" 
7 -0.0061 -1.8090' -0.0066 -1.9497' -0.0082 -2.1495" 
8 -0.0068 -1.3031 -0.0069 -1.5674 -0.0066 -1.1012 
9 -0.0015 -0.5377 -0.0014 -0.5300 -0.0027 -0.9348 
10 -0.0023 -1.3748 -0.0040 -2.0105" -0.0031 -1.5947 
11 -0.0007 -0.4219 -0.0021 -1.6357 -0.0025 -1.5713 
12 -0.0035 -1.4073 -0.0029 -1.1892 -0.0042 -1.2077 
13 0.0017 0.8269 0.0012 0.7306 0.0005 0.1948 
14 -0.0029 -1.1390 -0.0016 -0.7198 -0.0005 -0.1924 
15 -0.0028 -1.5672 -0.0021 -1.3555 -0.0028 -1.4786 
16 -0.0005 -0.2605 0.0001 0.0829 -0.0001 -0.0727 
17 -0.0055 -2.6174""" -0.0021 -0.9431 -0.0039 -1.9584' 
18 -0.0047 -1.1713 -0.0079 -2.1130"' -0.0063 -1.5776 
19 -0.0070 -0.7951 -0.0065 -0.8758 -0.0118 -1.1460 
20 -0.0059 -2.1359" -0.0077 -3.0039'"" -0.0074 -2.3127" 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '. "' statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 6.4a 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Board Changes 
Day Market Model (n=219) Market Adjusted (n=163) Mean Adjusted (n=227) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 0.0078 3.1039"' 0.0058 1.9289' 0.0041 1.7815' 
-19 0.0035 1.7160' 0.0006 0.2528 0.0004 0.1846 
-18 0.0046 4.3532"' 0.0043 2.3962"' 0.0006 0.5601 
-17 0.0043 3.3525"" 0.0025 1.6100 0.0007 0.5721 
-16 0.0024 1.8592' 0.0018 1.5198 0.0001 0.0427 
-15 0.0025 2.3490"" 0.0017 1.4144 -0.0002 -0.2219 
-14 0.0030 1.0284 0.0012 0.8856 0.0005 0.4215 
-13 0.0033 2.7757'"' 0.0015 1.1888 -0.0001 -0.0897 
-12 0.0006 0.3421 0.0005 0.2776 -0.0013 -0.7684 
-11 0.0041 3.2064"' 0.0023 1.5673 0.0020 1.5536 
-10 0.0023 2.2889"' 0.0012 1.3267 0.0001 0.0471 
-9 0.0043 2.3305"' 0.0025 1.0403 0.0018 0.9977 
-8 0.0021 1.7526" 0.0015 1.0144 0.0004 0.3054 
-7 0.0021 2.9905""" 0.0015 1.9427' 0.0001 0.1775 
-6 0.0021 1.7046' 0.0032 3.1562"' 0.0011 1.0189 
-5 0.0033 2.6298"' 0.0033 2.2079" 0.0021 1.6789' 
-4 0.0033 4.4391"' 0.0032 3.8033"' 0.0013 1.7414' 
-3 0.0042 4.0878"' 0.0027 2.2836" 0.0022 2.2518- 
-2 0.0029 2.3817"" 0.0019 1.1854 0.0001 0.1159 
-1 0.0033 2.7505"'" 0.0019 1.3087 0.0007 0.5668 
0 0.0022 1.9448' 0.0015 1.4475 -0.0000 -0.0284 
1 0.0022 1.6017 0.0024 1.7088' 0.0003 0.2286 
2 0.0015 1.2082 0.0016 1.2302 0.0007 0.5768 
3 0.0032 2.8027'"` 0.0015 1.0570 0.0015 1.3288 
4 0.0017 1.2886 0.0017 1.2217 0.0000 0.0232 
5 0.0028 2.9982'"` 0.0008 0.8013 0.0004 0.4038 
6 0.0026 2.5158" 0.0003 0.2851 0.0006 0.5955 
7 0.0009 0.7600 0.0009 0.6737 -0.0011 -0.8898 
8 0.0046 2.9633"' 0.0031 2.0797" 0.0026 1.7490' 
9 0.0026 2.6273"' 0.0015 1.1776 0.0013 1.3756 
10 0.0023 2.5312" 0.0017 1.4169 0.0013 1.4210 
11 0.0036 3.8818- 0.0028 2.5348'"' 0.0015 1.5568 
12 0.0026 3.1434"' 0.0020 2.0049" 0.0011 1.3396 
13 0.0033 2.7871**' 0.0021 1.5561 0.0018 1.4540 
14 0.0040 2.5188"' 0.0026 1.4093 0.0022 1.5081 
15 0.0039 3.1694' 0.0031 2.0323" 0.0019 1.4809 
16 0.0043 3.9819'** 0.0024 1.9909" 0.0021 2.0064- 
17 0.0022 2.7001'** 0.0027 2.7853- 0.0002 0.1923 
18 0.0026 3.6537"" 0.0014 1.5359 0.0012 1.6583' 
19 0.0036 3.4657" 0.0016 1.5871 0.0024 2.3611"' 
20 0.0039 3.1024" 0.0031 2.4418"" 0.0031 2.7315"" 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; ''V " statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 6.4b 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Board Changes 
Day Market Model (n=171) Market Adjusted (n=227) Mean Adjusted (n=162) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 0.0002 0.0795 0.0006 0.3260 0.0008 0.3431 
-19 -0.0009 -0.4478 -0.0004 -0.2627 -0.0006 -0.3105 
-18 -0.0000 -0.0155 -0.0022 -1.8735 0.0004 0.2207 
-17 -0.0033 -1.7121' -0.0032 -1.9862" -0.0031 -1.4891 
-16 -0.0030 -1.5816 -0.0043 -2.5975' -0.0042 -2.1928`" 
-15 -0.0029 -2.8536"' -0.0037 -4.0222"" -0.0033 -3.1828- 
-14 -0.0038 -2.5664"" -0.0038 -2.9998"' -0.0046 -3.0197"' 
-13 -0.0019 -1.2764 -0.0021 -1.5492 -0.0013 -0.8593 
-12 -0.0055 -2.8776"" -0.0052 -3.1552"' -0.0049 -2.4239"' 
-11 -0.0025 -1.7177" -0.0012 -0.9738 -0.0022 -1.5384 
-10 -0.0018 -0.8585 -0.0022 -1.2830 -0.0020 -0.9459 
-9 -0.0025 -1.3181 -0.0026 -1.6931' -0.0036 -1.7595' 
-8 -0.0014 -1.4467 -0.0023 -2.8458"' -0.0022 -2.2370- 
-7 0.0000 0.0524 -0.0016 -1.9894" -0.0009 -1.0537 
-6 -0.0014 -1.3801 -0.0030 -2.4460'"" -0.0025 -1.8526' 
-5 -0.0027 -1.9359' -0.0032 -2.6414"" -0.0040 -2.7006- 
-4 -0.0000 -0.0307 -0.0015 -1.2654 -0.0008 -0.4789 
-3 -0.0039 -2.5021"' -0.0027 -2.1360" -0.0041 -2.4859"' 
-2 -0.0024 -1.8352' -0.0027 -2.5461"' -0.0023 -1.6691' 
-1 -0.0030 -2.4368"' -0.0030 -2.7204"" -0.0033 -2.4804'** 
0 -0.0029 -2.7056"' -0.0030 -2.7683"" -0.0023 -2.0538- 
1 -0.0039 -3.6291"' -0.0040 -3.4129"' -0.0036 -3.2313- 
2 -0.0008 -0.6460 -0.0017 -1.5005 -0.0018 -1.5551 
3 -0.0068 -3.2621'** -0.0054 -3.4242* -0.0081 -3.9060- 
4 -0.0051 -2.5275"' -0.0053 -3.1426'** -0.0056 -2.6764"" 
5 -0.0049 -2.5034"' -0.0047 -3.0440"" -0.0061 -3.0217- 
6 -0.0032 -1.9016' -0.0031 -2.1954" -0.0047 -2.6804- 
7 -0.0013 -0.7710 -0.0030 -2.1048" -0.0018 -1.0270 
8 -0.0029 -1.9579' -0.0031 -1.9589' -0.0045 -2.7230'"' 
9 -0.0030 -2.0955" -0.0033 -2.7155'"' -0.0050 -3.1985"" 
10 -0.0002 -0.1009 -0.0014 -1.1587 -0.0022 -1.3349 
11 -0.0034 -2.3673"" -0.0032 -2.7547"" -0.0038 -2.6982- 
12 -0.0049 -1.7826` -0.0047 -2.1903" -0.0060 -2.0492" 
13 -0.0031 -2.4962"' -0.0027 -2.2478" -0.0042 -3.1350"' 
14 0.0002 0.2244 -0.0003 -0.3143 -0.0010 -0.8746 
15 -0.0011 -0.9041 -0.0015 -1.2972 -0.0016 -1.2904 
16 -0.0030 -1.4910 -0.0023 -1.4540 -0.0036 -1.7366' 
17 -0.0041 -1.9688" -0.0053 -3.2763"' -0.0048 -2.2357" 
18 -0.0070 -2.5930"' -0.0057 -2.7679"' -0.0082 -2.9184- 
19 -0.0002 -0.0812 0.0007 0.3805 -0.0007 -0.2816 
20 -0.0070 -1.5195 -0.0053 -1.4615 -0.0086 -1.7415' 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '" statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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6.5.3 Annual General Meetings 
Table 6.3a reports a persistent upward trend in security returns for good news, and a 
more volatile downward trend in security returns for bad news. For favourable 
meetings (see Table 6.3a), the highest return of the event period follows the meeting 
on day 0. For MM, we observe a return of 0.0131 which is highly significant at the 
1 per cent level. Event days -20, -17, -14 to -9, -7, -4, -3,0, +3, +5, +9, +11 to +13, 
and +17 all witness significant positive returns. The most significant price movement 
is observed in the prior period, earned before the AGM. 
Similarly, for a disappointing AGM, the lowest return of the event period is reported 
in Table 6.3b on day 0, of -0.0071, which is much smaller than for good news and 
insignificant. Significant returns are few, arising only on days -8, +1, +6, +17 and 
+20. In comparison with earnings news, a lower level of anticipation and drift is 
observed for unfavourable news relative to favourable news (0.1050 and 0.1710, 
respectively). 
6.5.4 Board Changes 
The magnitude of the average daily return over the entirety of the event period, is 
noticeably lower for board changes, than those reported for either earnings or AGMs. 
However, for good news, the overall significance of the daily returns is considerably 
higher. Table 6.4a records significant returns for days -20, -18, -17, -15 to -13, -11 
to -9, -7, -5 to -1, +3, +5, +6, and from day +8 through to +20. This behaviour 
indicates significant anticipation of the forthcoming board change, but investors 
continue to adjust after the event. For bad news, the overall level of significance is 
much lower. Table 6.4b records significant negative returns for event days -15, -14, 
-12, -3, -1 to +1, +3 to +5, +9, +11, +13, and lastly +17 to +18. The most sizeable 
price movement occurs over the post-announcement period. 
214 
Table 6.5a 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Changes in Shareholdings 
Day Market Model (n=553) Market Adjusted (n=451) Mean Adjusted (n=584) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 0.0025 3.8662'"" 0.0014 2.1946" 0.0013 1.9649"' 
-19 0.0028 3.4774"' 0.0011 1.2042 0.0028 3.5889- 
-18 0.0022 3.1022"' 0.0009 1.3587 0.0023 3.3329- 
-17 0.0027 2.8928"' 0.0022 2.5977"' 0.0032 3.5368"" 
-16 0.0016 1.6862' 0.0017 1.7878' 0.0020 2.1122'" 
-15 0.0023 2.8721**' 0.0015 1.8531' 0.0030 3.7263- 
-14 0.0040 4.1047" 0.0033 3.0926"" 0.0044 4.6314- 
-13 0.0033 4.7444"' 0.0019 2.7219" 0.0034 4.7922'"" 
-12 0.0020 3.1003"" 0.0006 0.7586 0.0030 4.5588- 
-11 0.0029 4.6137"' 0.0019 2.9608"'" 0.0036 6.4350"' 
-10 0.0037 6.0613"" 0.0025 4.0091'** 0.0037 5.7373"' 
-9 0.0029 4.2394"' 0.0014 1.8675' 0.0035 5.2055- 
-8 0.0030 3.4989"" 0.0021 2.6407"' 0.0040 4.7071- 
-7 0.0039 5.5349" 0.0025 3.7328"' 0.0043 6.1904- 
-6 0.0048 5.0324'** 0.0042 3.9014'"` 0.0047 5.0152"' 
-5 0.0047 5.8929'"' 0.0042 4.8116"" 0.0056 6.6190- 
-4 0.0039 6.0860"' 0.0038 5.3197- 0.0045 7.0760- 
-3 0.0043 4.6081"' 0.0046 4.8186"' 0.0043 4.8222"' 
-2 0.0033 4.3889"` 0.0024 3.0435'"' 0.0030 3.9549"' 
-1 0.0049 5.8523"" 0.0044 5.1151'"" 0.0041 5.0014- 
0 0.0043 5.3611"" 0.0034 3.7773'** 0.0043 5.5494"" 
1 0.0033 4.2993"' 0.0022 2.6713" 0.0033 4.5816"' 
2 0.0027 3.9283"' 0.0014 1.7124' 0.0034 4.4796- 
3 0.0042 5.8416- 0.0033 4.0877"' 0.0044 6.5631'"' 
4 0.0040 4.6117'** 0.0031 3.1595"" 0.0047 5.5381"' 
5 0.0029 4.9066'** 0.0020 3.3589"' 0.0029 5.2059"' 
6 0.0027 4.4749'" 0.0020 2.9181"" 0.0032 5.0752- 
7 0.0039 5.6508"' 0.0030 4.0621"' 0.0042 6.6917- 
8 0.0029 4.1962"' 0.0021 2.7506"' 0.0033 4.8422- 
9 0.0026 3.4318"' 0.0014 1.6199' 0.0028 3.8377"' 
10 0.0025 3.9231- 0.0017 2.4417" 0.0030 4.8828"" 
11 0.0035 4.6749"' 0.0023 2.7163"" 0.0031 4.3041- 
12 0.0032 5.5565"` 0.0029 4.7711"' 0.0033 5.6741- 
13 0.0031 4.9981"' 0.0022 3.0601" 0.0026 4.0816' 
14 0.0032 5.5748"' 0.0018 2.8631"' 0.0033 5.1370'* 
15 0.0034 4.4630"' 0.0023 2.5752"' 0.0033 4.3591'"' 
16 0.0039 6.4354"' 0.0031 4.4173"' 0.0039 6.7767' 
17 0.0018 3.2839- 0.0017 2.8633"' 0.0018 3.2821- 
18 0.0011 1.4579 0.0002 0.2232 0.0016 2.0882- 
19 0.0043 4.3288"' 0.0031 3.9459" 0.0043 4.3499- 
20 0.0019 2.5612"' 0.0017 2.2073" 0.0026 3.2391" 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '; ; "' statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and I% critical level, respectively. 
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Table 6.5b 
Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the Abnormal Performance Index (API), 
Estimated using Market Model, Market and Mean Adjusted Expected Returns. 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
Changes in Shareholdings 
Day Market Model (n=376) Market Adjusted (n=478) Mean Adjusted (n=345) 
t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR 
-20 -0.0030 -2.6371""' -0.0034 -3.4569**' -0.0017 -1.5169 
-19 0.0001 0.0545 -0.0005 -0.2522 0.0006 0.2689 
-18 -0.0011 -1.1112 -0.0019 -2.0363" -0.0014 -1.5595 
-17 -0.0040 -3.7037"'" -0.0048 -4.2453'"' -0.0037 -3.2338- 
-16 -0.0028 -2.0142" -0.0039 -3.0295'** -0.0022 -1.4938 
-15 -0.0011 -1.8124' -0.0023 -3.2841'"' -0.0005 -0.8483 
-14 -0.0014 -2.0432'" -0.0023 -3.1345"" -0.0012 -1.5731 
-13 -0.0033 -2.9635"" -0.0032 -3.2384"' -0.0029 -2.5850'"' 
-12 -0.0031 -2.5248"`" -0.0028 -2.8470"' -0.0028 -2.2883" 
-11 -0.0030 -2.3781"" -0.0030 -2.8542"' -0.0032 -2.3309"' 
-10 -0.0030 -3.6342"'" -0.0032 -4.1077"" -0.0029 -3.4016- 
-9 -0.0029 -1.9621" -0.0032 -2.6078'** -0.0030 -1.9100' 
-8 -0.0021 -1.6842' -0.0020 -1.7368' -0.0025 -1.9499' 
-7 -0.0012 -1.2552 -0.0008 -0.9134 -0.0012 -1.1644 
-6 -0.0016 -1.8928' -0.0018 -2.2505" -0.0021 -2.3838- 
-5 -0.0007 -0.6011 -0.0011 -1.2272 -0.0021 -2.1295" 
-4 -0.0006 -0.7500 -0.0019 -2.5767"' -0.0017 -1.8921' 
-3 -0.0022 -1.9023' -0.0033 -3.1765"' -0.0025 -2.0631'" 
-2 -0.0047 -4.5981"' -0.0038 -4.1843"' -0.0042 -4.3077"' 
-1 -0.0046 -4.0544"' -0.0041 -4.0951"' -0.0045 -3.9531- 
0 -0.0012 -0.8679 -0.0010 -0.9308 -0.0022 -1.5291 
1 -0.0033 -2.1919" 0.9506 -2.3621"" -0.0033 -2.0055" 
2 0.0001 0.0693 -0.0002 -0.2397 -0.0012 -1.1906 
3 -0.0026 -3.3979"" -0.0028 -4.0656' -0.0033 -3.9378"' 
4 -0.0003 -0.2289 -0.0007 -0.7709 -0.0014 -1.1948 
5 -0.0015 -1.9884" -0.0019 -2.6661"' -0.0019 -2.4764"' 
6 -0.0021 -2.5526**' -0.0025 -3.2746"" -0.0014 -1.8699' 
7 -0.0025 -3.2683"' -0.0023 -3.2191"' -0.0029 -3.6040- 
8 -0.0037 -4.5215"' -0.0036 -4.7976**' -0.0040 -4.6569- 
9 -0.0022 -2.3154" -0.0027 -3.4557'** -0.0029 -2.8909"' 
10 -0.0026 -2.7455'"' -0.0023 -2.8263'** -0.0034 -3.3986- 
11 -0.0014 -1.5898 -0.0017 -2.2221" -0.0017 -1.9026' 
12 -0.0012 -1.3496 -0.0016 -2.0436" -0.0022 -2.4775'"' 
13 -0.0035 -3.2716'"' -0.0033 -3.8245- -0.0034 -3.2963"' 
14 -0.0030 -2.1902" -0.0031 -2.7350"" -0.0042 -3.1422- 
15 -0.0019 -2.2517" -0.0017 -2.4762"' -0.0021 -2.4192- 
16 -0.0029 -2.9019'** -0.0019 -2.2730"" -0.0028 -2.5145- 
17 -0.0031 -1.8295" -0.0041 -2.9890"' -0.0035 -1.8672' 
18 -0.0016 -1.3144 -0.0014 -1.3366 -0.0024 -1.9764" 
19 -0.0037 -3.1224- -0.0026 -2.0180" -0.0041 -3.1610- 
20 -0.0035 -1.7640' -0.0040 -2.4381" -0.0043 -2.0441" 
Notes: n represents the number of observations; '; ; "' statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
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6.5.5 Changes in Shareholdings 
As for board changes, the size of the average daily return for a change in 
shareholding, is below that of earnings or AGMs. The notable distinction from other 
event types, is the overwhelming significance of daily abnormal returns for good news 
(see Table 6.5a). For good news, with 1 per cent significance, we only fail to reject 
the null hypothesis on two occasions out of a possible 41 event days. The pattern of 
significant returns supports our earlier notion, that a large transaction is more likely 
after a period of pronounced activity. For instance, the likelihood of an investor of 
buying (or increasing) a large stockholding increases after a period of positive returns. 
The significant positive returns continue after the announcement, suggesting a larger 
shareholding change acts as an important signal to other, and perhaps less informed, 
investors. 
For bad news, ie. an investor selling or reducing a large stockholding, the overall 
significance of daily abnormal returns is lower than for good news. Table 6.5b reports 
significant returns on event days -20, -17, -16, -14 to -9, -2, -1, +1, +3, +5 to +10, 
days +13 to +16, and +19. Similarly, the likelihood of selling (or reducing) a large 
stockholding increases after a period of negative returns. The less significant returns 
for bad news after the announcement, suggest selling by large traders possibly acts as 
a less important signal than buying, unless selling is seen as a liquidity trade, as 
opposed to an informed trade. The nature of a change in shareholding, is different 
from the other event types examined, in that it represents information investors must 
respond to rather than anticipate. The pattern of significant returns suggests a 
mimicking behaviour and possible herding of actions by investors (Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer & Welch 1992). 
6.5.6 In Summary 
Overall, the Tables 6.1 to Tables 6.5 display how dissimilar investor behaviour is 
towards good and bad news. Emphasising the need to partition events according to 
their sign, to more fully appreciate the impounding of information. More interesting 
is the ability of investors to anticipate the sign of the news by twenty trading days in 
advance of its release. The general pattern of the APIA over the event period, is 
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upward for good news and downward for bad. Although there is gradual anticipation 
of the information content of the average event, investors only partially anticipate the 
event, as evidenced by the lagged impounding over the succeeding twenty days. The 
persistence of post-announcement drift is also indicative of underreaction as opposed 
to instant adjustment to the new information, irrespective of its sign. 
There is greater anticipation of earnings information relative to AGMs, board changes 
and a change in shareholding (Strong & Walker 1992, Brookfield & Morris 1994). 
This is perhaps indicative of the greater relevance and precision of earnings 
information for security valuation. The corresponding high level of drift in security 
returns following the earnings release, is consistent with the notion that earnings 
reports contain information not available from alternative more timely information 
sources (Chambers & Penman 1984). 
For each class of information, the overall level and significance of the daily abnormal 
returns for good news exceeds those of bad news. Without controlling for the size of 
the news, it is not possible to say whether the average bad news event contains less 
information than the average good news event. Or whether bad news is more difficult 
to anticipate and interpret. An alternative explanation maybe bad news is ignored by 
investors (Sharkarway & Garrod 1995). Maybe what we have captured is the liquidity 
trades of investors, rather than investors selling due to information; thereby giving the 
appearance that bad news is being ignored. Of course, it may also indicate bad news 
is anticipated well in advance of good news, from the actions of managers warning 
investors ahead of the bad news (Skinner 1994). 
However, for both annual and interim earnings, the absolute size of the market 
response to the average announcement of bad news on day 0, exceeds that of good 
news. Once again, we need to control for the size of the news before any assertions 
of under or overreaction can be made. Tables 6.1 to 6.5 also show greater sign 
reversal in the daily abnormal returns of bad news, indicative of possible daily 
overreaction to bad news, or increased volatility of stock returns (Engle & Ng 1993). 
Again, this suggests that bad news is more difficult to interpret than good news. 
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Although given the low significance of returns any inferences must be made with care. 
The pattern of significant returns witnessed for a change in shareholding, in Tables 
6.5a and 6.5b, is suggestive of possible herding by investors (Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer & Welch 1992). A large transaction is more likely after a period of 
pronounced activity. However, the significant returns continue after the 
announcement, suggesting a large transaction acts as an important signal to other, and 
perhaps less informed, investors. 
6.6 EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF STOCK RETURNS 
The preliminary analysis of the pattern of average stock returns surrounding the 
release of the five information types, displayed several differences in investor 
behaviour towards good and bad news. There is no reason to doubt therefore, that the 
incentives for investors to become informed also vary according to the sign of the 
news. 
The approach taken is the same as for chapter five, but involves partitioning the events 
into good and bad news, as defined above. The model takes the form of 
ANN; = ao + a1LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a4VOLPR; + u; (6.1) 
and, 
POST; = a0 + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a4VOLPR+A; + u; (6.2) 
For each class of information, we empirically test the relationship between the level 
of market anticipation (ANN; or POST) and (1) firm size as measured by market 
capitalisation, LN_MV;, (2) the number of years a firm has been trading, AGE;, (3) 
the number of disclosures made by a firm, NUM;, and (4) the volatility of stock 
S returns prior to the disclosure, VOLPR; or VOLPR+A;. Where, ANN; measures the 
I Where VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,...; 1) used to 
model ANN;. VOLPR+n; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement periods, 
where (t=-20,..., O) used to model POST;. 
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price impact of information impounded over the announcement period (t=0), relative 
to the prior period (t=-20,..., -1). POST; measures the price impact of information 
impounded following the event (t=+1,..., +20), relative to both the prior and 
announcement periods (t=-20,..., O). 
The dependent variables, ANN; and POST;, are both functions of the API metric (see 




(1 + e, ) (6.3) 
t-c 
Equation (6.3) estimates the value from investing one pound in security i over a given 
event window, which can be one of three periods (prior, ann, or post). Where e, 1 
represents the estimate of excess returns for company i, at period t. For each 
information type the sample of events are categorised into good news and bad news 
events according to the value of API20. Announcements convey good news in the 
sense that they affect stock prices of reporting firms positively, and have an API20 
value greater than 1.0. Announcements with an API20 value less than 1.0 are 
classified as bad news, and those with an API20 value equal to 1.0 contain no news. 
The expected signs of the coefficients are the same as in chapter 5. Specifically, if 
lagged impounding is an inverse function of anticipation, and the level of market 
anticipation is an increasing function of the explanatory variables, the coefficient signs 
are expected to be negative. However, if the event window fails to capture the full 
anticipation process of larger firms, we expect firm size to be of positive sign (see 
section 3.7.3 for an explanation). Similarly, increasing disclosure (NUM) can have 
either a positive or negative effect on anticipation. 
As before, the dependent variables ANN; and POST; (which take the form of ratios) 
were found to be highly skewed, giving rise to significant heteroscedasticity (see 
section 5.4). Transforming the dependent variable, by taking the natural log of ANN; 
or POST;, (ie. LN_ANN; or LN_POST; ) was successful in eliminating a substantial 
portion of the heteroscedasticity. However, in some cases the Breusch-Pagan 
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Chi-Squared test of heteroscedasticity was still significant at the 5 per cent level. Any 
remaining heteroscedasticity in the model is assumed to arise from cross-correlation 
between the independent variables. Accordingly, all the standard errors were adjusted 
using White's (1980) consistent estimator. ' 
The regression results of estimating equations (6.1) and (6.2), for each information 
type, are reported in Tables 6.6 to 6.9 for clear event windows. The analysis is then 
repeated, for unclear event windows, ie. examining the effect of other disclosures in 
the event window, on the pattern of investor anticipation and interpretation. For 
unclear event windows, the regression results of estimating equations (6.1) and (6.2), 
are reported in Tables 6.10 to 6.13. The significance of the explanatory variables in 
the explanation of market anticipation, varies considerably according to the model of 
expected returns. Therefore, for reasons of clarity we shall only focus on the 
regression results found to be robust across all three return metrics. ' 
6 The OLS standard errors are not reported, due to their similarity. 
Other variations to the above tests were conducted, excluding outliers and extending the event 
window to thirty trading days either side of the event. Neither procedure produced markedly different 
results, changing the significance of variables nor their sign, in any meaningful way. 
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Briefly, the results show that: 
The analysis distinguishes between event periods which exclude other 
disclosures from those that allow other disclosures. 
Results applicable to both conditions: 
As in chapter 5, the model explains post-announcement drift better than 
announcement returns. This may indicate investors initial reactions are 
not based on informed judgements. 
The model explains the behaviour of stock returns surrounding good news 
events better than for bad news events. A possible explanation may be 
that investors reactions to bad news are less informed. 
Allowing other disclosures within the event period: 
This increases the overall power of the model in the explanation of the 
behaviour of stock returns. The volatility of prior stock returns persists 
as the main driving force behind the explanation of post-announcement 
drift. 
Firm size explains announcement returns (ANN) for good news, but less 
so for bad news. However firm size does not explain post-announcement 
drift. A potential explanation is that bad news is difficult to anticipate 
and to interpret, for all classes of information. 
222 
Table 6.6a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN_ANN, = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE, + a3NUM, + a, VOLPR; + u, 
apa, a2 aq a, 
Annual Earnings 
-1.0603 0.1243 -0.0038 -0.0022 -23.9310- 
(0.6755) (0.1027) (0.0068) (0.0217) (9.0210) 
n= 78. R2 = 0.0342, F14.731 = 1.6822, BP(4) = 8.3946 
Interim Earnings 
-1.7323"' -0.0427 0.0005 -0.0000 -10.8570 
(0.5727) (0.1229) (0.0056) (0.0248) (10.4700) 
n= 95, RZ = -0.0332, F[4,90) = 0.2441, BP(4) = 0.6919 
AGMs 
-2.2099`" -0.0543 -0.0121 0.0498 -16.5680 
(0.9880) (0.2282) (0.0084) (0.0416) (22.8700) 
n= 71, R 2= -0.0200, F(4,661 = 0.6575, BP(4) = 6.9938 
Board Changes 
-3.1093- 0.0670 0.0042 0.0207 -13.5030 
(0.2824) (0.0637) (0.0032) (0.0127) (12.4300) 
n= 226, R2 = 0.0251, F[4,2211 = 2.4483, BP(4) = 38.4150 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.4227"' 0.1912"' -0.0016` 0.0168 -11.4770" 
(0.2243) (0.0498) (0.0008) (0.0110) (5.8000) 
n= 551, R2 = 0.0644, F[4,546) = 10.4698. BP(4) = 11.4056 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firth has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the fine over the sample period, 
VOLPE{ measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1), 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.6b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a, NUM; + a, VOLPR, + u, 
ao a, a2 a, a, 
Annual Earnings 
-1.5075"' -0.1187 0.0012 0.0126 -16.3890"' 
(0.6370) (0.1052) (0.0057) (0.0230) (5.9990) 
n= 67, R2 = -0.0158,94,621 = 0.7430, BP(4) = 16.4501 
Interim Earnings 
-0.4230 -0.1169 -0.0090 0.0076 -28.2060"' 
(0.5201) (0.1747) (0.0069) (0.0283) (9.9680) 
n= 64, R2 = 0.0532, F[4,59] = 1.8865, BP(4) = 12.2781 
AGMs 
-0.5706 -0.1085 -0.0093 0.0287 -56.6260- 
(0.7921) (0.1615) (0.0083) (0.0323) (20.5100) 
n= 58, R2 = 0.0523.94.531 = 1.7861, BP(4) = 1.1222 
Board Changes 
-2.2218"' 0.0648 -0.0006 
0.0180 -28.2200"' 
(0.3467) (0.0655) (0.0035) (0.0160) (8.9860) 
n= 164, R2 = 0.0325. F14,1591 = 2.3696. BP(4) = 2.5922 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.1901- 0.0605 -0.0005 
0.0126 -18.0310" 
(0.2656) (0.0548) (0.0007) (0.0116) (8.2260) 
n= 467. R2 = 0.0389, F(4,4621 = 5.7208, BP(4) = 14.1474 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM). as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE, measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period. 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., "1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
,, 
" statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.6c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN, = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE, + a3NUM, + a, VOLPR, + u, 
a0 a, a, aq a, 
Annual Earnings 
-1.2935- -0.0712 -0.0062 0.0146 -21.4150"' 
(0.5115) (0.1052) (0.0048) (0.0215) (8.4480) 
n= 85. R 2=0.0234. F[4,80] = 1.5024, BP(4) = 6.9805 
Interim Earnings 
-2.0292"` -0.1088 0.0010 0.0095 -20.6590" 
(0.5657) (0.1219) (0.0053) (0.0274) (10.1800) 
n= 90, R2 = 0.0019,94,85) = 1.0429, BP(4) = 5.9855 
AGMs 
-2.0590'** -0.0349 -0.0081 -0.0054 -3.4692 
(0.7438) (0.1842) (0.0088) (0.0427) (22.5700) 
n= 71, R2 = -0.0443.94,661 = 0.2573, BP(4) = 8.6048 
Board Changes 
-3.4351- 0.1504"' -0.0011 0.0231' -19.9220"' 
(0.2391) (0.0505) (0.0029) (0.0127) (8.4390) 
n= 236, RZ = 0.0630. F(4.2311 = 4.9523. BP(4) = 8.4538 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.1759"' 0.0159 -0.0032"' 0.0150 -11.0840"' 
(0.1993) (0.0484) (0.0013) (0.0103) (4.4370) 
n= 568, RZ = 0.0283.94,5631 = 5.1263, BP(4) = 41.1392 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM). as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period. 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-1A,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors. 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.7a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR+A; +U 
ao a, a, a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
0.3712 -0.1869" -0.0026 0.0275 -10.9120 
(0.3908) (0.0975) (0.0046) (0.0178) (8.1680) 
n= 84, R2 = 0.0028, F[4.791 = 1.0577, BP(4) = 8.0037 
Interim Earnings 
0.2234 -0.0671 -0.0004 0.0193 -17.2660" 
(0.3811) (0.0997) (0.0054) (0.0152) (7.9380) 
n= 92. R 2=0.0062, F[4.871 = 1.1416, BP(4) = 0.8876 
AGMs 
-0.8748 0.0869 0.0095 0.0037 -30.9080"' 
(0.6824) (0.1448) (0.0067) (0.0307) (12.6500) 
n= 60, R2 = 0.0447, F[4,551 = 1.6897, BP(4) = 1.2506 
Board Changes 
0.3503 -0.0015 -0.0071 -0.0067 -2.3167 
(0.3543) (0.0640) (0.0034) (0.0154) (8.3410) 
n= 219, R2 = 0.0016, F14,214] = 1.0883, BP(4) = 4.8999 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.1873 -0.0399 -0.0001 0.0065 -22.8160- 
(0.1929) (0.0405) (0.0005) (0.0085) (4.9120) 
n= 553, R2 = 0.0318,94.5481 = 5.5382, BP(4) = 2.9722 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement. 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors. 
%*% " statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity. with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.7b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a4VOLPR+A; + u; 
ao a, a2 a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
0.8533 -0.3494"' 0.0011 0.0351 -7.6390 
(0.6196) (0.1362) (0.0054) (0.0234) (9.2670) 
n= 67, R2 = 0.0625, F[4,62] = 2.1008, BP(4) = 3.7631 
Interim Earnings 
-0.3200 0.0265 0.0060 0.0101 -13.5290- 
(0.3709) (0.0991) (0.0048) (0.0171) (5.3330) 
n= 69, R2 = 0.0135.94,641 = 1.2333, BP(4) = 3.7890 
AGMS 
0.4315 0.0771 0.0026 -0.0041 -59.4870- 
(0.6911) (0.0980) (0.0073) (0.0266) (13.6500) 
n= 52. R 2=0.1858, F[4,47] = 3.9103, BP(4) = 4.4251 
Board Changes 
1.0393"' 0.0157 -0.0083" -0.0021 -14.4450 
(0.4219) (0.0608) (0.0039) (0.0186) (11.1300) 
n= 163, R2 = 0.0232, F14,158] = 1.9625, BP(4) = 1.4102 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.7268"' -0.0693 -0.0008 0.0003 -40.0920"' 
(0.2395) (0.0489) (0.0009) (0.0098) (5.6440) 
n= 451. RZ = 0.0907, F14,446) = 12.2183, BP(4) = 3.2407 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGEi measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement. 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.7c 
()LS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = as + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE, + a31VUM; + a4VOLPR+n, + u; 
a0 a, a2 a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
0.2483 -0.1677' 0.0004 0.0193 -14.6490' 
(0.4351) (0.0903) (0.0043) (0.0153) (7.9520) 
n= 101, R2 = 0.0154, F[4,96] = 1.3899, BP(4) = 3.8013 
Interim Earnings 
0.4259 -0.1465 -0.0018 0.0394' -26.6930- 
(0.4426) (0.1109) (0.0059) (0.0232) (10.8100) 
n= 98, R2 = 0.0531, F(4,931 = 2.3588, BP(4) = 10.2776 
AGMs 
-0.7775 0.0861 0.0063 0.0073 42.3650- 
(0.6940) (0.1238) (0.0052) (0.0292) (14.6400) 
n= 66, R2 = 0.1026, F[4,611 = 2.8573, BP(4) = 6.3490 
Board Changes 
0.5215 -0.0404 -0.0095"` -0.0010 -0.7863 
(0.3327) (0.0566) (0.0033) (0.0159) (7.5370) 
n= 227, R2 = 0.0271, F(4,2221 = 2.5712, BP(4) = 14.7758 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.2067 -0.0309 -0.0008 0.0029 -20.0330"' 
(0.1794) (0.0440) (0.0006) (0.0084) (5.1720) 
n= 584, R2 = 0.0247. F14,5791 = 4.6955, BP(4) = 6.9763 
Notes: 
LN_MV, is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NU K. measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-scat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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6.6.1 Good News Events 
LN ANN; 
Table 6.6 reports the regression results of the value of the information impounded over 
the announcement period, relative to the prior period, for good news events. The 
reported coefficient signs for firm size (LN_MV; ), age (AGE) and the number of 
disclosures (NUM; ) are mixed, and not always of their predicted sign. ' However, due 
to their low significance we can neither reliably infer their correct sign. Only the 
volatility of prior stock returns (VOLPtt; ), is found to be significant in the explanation 
of the initial reaction on day 0, to the release of good news. The coefficient sign of 
prior volatility (VOLPR), is consistently negative for all information types, and across 
all expected return metrics. The negative sign of VOLPR, implies that larger values 
of prior volatility, leads to greater anticipation. However, VOLPR; is only significant 
in the explanation of the anticipation of favourable annual reports, and preceding an 
increase in shareholding. Beyond this, only the constant term is significant. This 
hints of possible model mis-specification, and hence of explanations other than that 
captured by the above explanatory variables, for market anticipation. 
LN_POST; 
Table 6.7 reports the regression results of the value of information impounded over 
the post-announcement period, relative to the prior and announcement periods, for 
good news events. As for LN_ANN;, the coefficients are not always of their predicted 
sign, except when statistically significant. However there is a slight shift in the 
significance of the explanatory variables. The volatility of prior stock returns 
(VOLPR+A, ) persists as a highly significant factor in the explanation of the post- 
announcement reaction to an increase in shareholding. Though the explanation of 
VOLPR+A; for annual earnings, shifts to favourable interim news and AGMs. 
Firm size (LN_MV; ) is significant and negative in sign for annual earnings; although 
the expected sign is positive (see section 3.7). We hypothesised, the information 
content of large firm announcements to be largely anticipated well in advance of their 
$ Incorrect coefficient signs may be an indication of possible collinearity between explanatory 
variables, though this seems doubtful given the low level of correlation found in section 4.6.2. 
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release (Freeman 1987); ie. prior to (t=-20). Whereas, small firm stocks are more 
heavily traded as the release date approaches; ie. in this case, over the prior period. 
Any surprise, no matter how small, will appear disproportionately high for larger firms 
against a prior period of relatively little trade. Consequently, firm size (LN_MV; ) is 
expected to be positively related to the level of market anticipation, LN_ANN; and 
LN_POST;. A negative sign therefore implies, the stocks of larger firms are more 
heavily traded over the announcement period. 
The number of years a firm has been trading (AGE), is significant in the explanation 
of post-announcement drift following a welcomed board change. The negative sign 
is consistent with expectations, that the accessibility of information is an increasing 
function of a firm's age. Beyond this, the significance of the constant term is greatly 
reduced, suggestive of improved model specification. In short, we are able to partially 
explain the drift following the average announcement for each event type. Depending 
on the returns models, we explain between 0.3(MM) to 6.3(MKT) per cent of the drift 
following the average annual earnings report, as measured by the R2 value. And 
similarly, between 0.6(MM) to 5.3(MN) per cent for interim earnings, 4.5(MM) to 
18.5(MKT) per cent for AGMs, and between 2.5(MN) to 9.1 (MKT) per cent for a 
change in shareholding. 
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Table 6.8a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a`, AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR, + u; 
a0 a, a2 a3 a, 
Annual Earnings 
-2.4674"' 0.3055 -0.0060 -0.0103 14.9010 
(0.9396) (0.2432) (0.0122) (0.0547) (22.2300) 
n= 39, RZ = -0.0231,94,341 = 0.7851, ßP(4) = 2.3191 
Interim Earnings 
0.1532 0.07566 -0.0169" -0.0412 -2.1344 
(0.7780) (0.2194) (0.0085) (0.0446) (3.0440) 
n= 59, RZ = -0.0035, F[4,54] = 0.9489, BP(4) = 1.5418 
AGMS 
-2.5033"' 0.0700 0.0042 0.0523` -47.9740"' 
(0.7299) (0.1017) (0.0067) (0.0304) (19.8600) 
n= 35. R2 = 0.0159,94,30) = 1.1372, BP(4) = 2.11203 
Board Changes 
-2.8609"` 0.1697"' 
0.0024 0.0063 -9.1847' 
(0.4309) (0.0660) (0.0038) (0.0203) (4.7510) 
n= 164, R2 = 0.0550, F14,1591 = 3.3705, BP(4) = 4.0544 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.7031"` 0.1343"' -0.0017 0.0032 -4.4022"` 
(0.0913) (0.0175) (0.0008) (0.0030) (6.3890) 
n= 373, R2 = 0.0103, F14,3731 = 1.9794. BP(4) = 3.2523 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring fine size (EM), as at ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGEi measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUK measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.8b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN; ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR; + U. 
a0 a, a2 a3 as 
Annual Earnings 
-1.8875"' -0.0977 -0.0115' 0.0793"' -1.4126 
(0.6891) (0.1541) (0.0070) (0.0337) (12.3900) 
n= 50, R2 = 0.0582,94.451 = 1.7573. BP(4) = 3.1827 
Interim Earnings 
-0.6503 0.1359 -0.0011 -0.0519" -0.1559 
(0.5333) (0.1312) (0.0055) (0.0259) (2.2210) 
n= 90, R2 = 0.0023, F14,851 = 1.0507. BP(4) = 2.2426 
AGMs 
-3.3733"' 0.4130"` -0.0064" 0.0393 -7.8132 
(0.6198) (0.1347) (0.0075) (0.0381) (30.9000) 
n= 48, R2 = 0.1179, F14.431 = 2.5709, BP(4) = 2.7427 
Board Changes 
-2.4121"' 0.2038"' 0.0021 -0.0106 -17.1380- 
(0.3460) (0.0558) (0.0032) (0.0164) (5.6310) 
n= 226, R2 = 0.0860, F[4,221] = 6.2913, BP(4) = 1.3389 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.5352"` 0.1503"' -0.0005 0.0099 -21.2340"` 
(0.2266) (0.0485) (0.0009) (0.0102) (7.2330) 
n= 462, R2 = 0.0623,94,4571 = 8.6619, BP(4) = 15.3028 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR, measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20..... -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors. 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.8c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN MV, + a, AGE; + a3NUM, + a, VOLPR, + u; 
a0 a, a2 a3 aq 
Annual Earnings 
-1.2323 0.1045 -0.0026 0.0310 -31.9330 
(1.2810) (0.2324) (0.0122) (0.0580) (29.2800) 
n= 31, R2 = -0.0863, F[4,261 = 0.4040, BP(4) = 3.9614 
Interim Earnings 
-0.6084 0.0215 -0.0086 -0.0076 -1.3035 
(0.7516) (0.1552) (0.0084) (0.0383) (2.5790) 
n= 62, RZ = -0.0521, F[4,57] = 0.2450, BP(4) = 1.3720 
AGMs 
-3.5589"' 0.3234"` 0.0010 0.0234"' 5.0677 
(0.2897) (0.0553) (0.0027) (0.0086) (8.2670) 
n= 35, R2 = -0.0488, F[4.301 = 0.6046, BP(4) = 2.4416 
Board Changes 
-3.2313"` 0.1547" 0.0025 0.0043 -2.5279 
(0.3856) (0.0724) (0.0041) (0.0213) (5.4930) 
n= 151. R2 = 0.0218. F[4,146] = 1.8369. BP(4) = 1.5258 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.6623"' 0.1708"' -0.0023 0.0229 -1.0305 
(0.3458) (0.0647) (0.0029) (0.0141) (6.5490) 
n= 359, RZ = 0.0297, F14,354) = 3.7375, BP(4) = 2.5932 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring fine size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR1 measures stock return volatility over the prior period, where (t=-20,..., -1) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors. 
statistically significant at the 1090,5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
RZ is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.9a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE; + a, NUM, + a4VOLPR+A; + U, 
a0 a, aZ a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
0.7987 -0.1738 -0.0076 0.0184 -25.7160' 
(0.7943) (0.1245) (0.0078) (0.0260) (15.1400) 
n= 33, R2 = 0.0389, F(4,281 = 1.3242, BP(4) = 4.8732 
Interim Earnings 
0.7540 0.0496 -0.0060 -0.0224"' -4.4821 
(0.4920) (0.1163) (0.0050) (0.0029) (3.6250) 
n= 62, R2 = -0.0170, F(4.57] = 0.7454. BP(4) = 4.2947 
AGMs 
1.2349 -0.3088"' -0.0150"' 0.0420 -0.9614 
(0.6249) (0.1282) (0.0052) (0.0295) (17.2600) 
n= 46, RZ = 0.1508, F14,411 = 2.9985. BP(4) = 1.2192 
Board Changes 
0.8333' 0.0141 -0.0004 -0.0295' -15.1150"' 
(0.1215) (0.0197) (0.0012) (0.0037) (2.2170) 
n= 171, R2 = 0.0155, F[4,166] = 1.6687, BP(4) = 0.5616 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.3147 0.0757 0.0021 0.0069 -12.1120 
(0.3196) (0.0580) (0.0025) (0.0133) (8.4840) 
n= 376, R2 = 0.0266, F[4,3711 = 3.5658, BP(4) = 6.2407 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
', " statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
RZ is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.9b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN POST; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR+n; +a 
ao a, az a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
-0.0555 -0.0688 -0.0070 
0.0461" -18.9550' 
(0.7053) (0.1245) (0.0077) (0.0228) (11.4500) 
n= 50, R2 = 0.0183, F[4,451 = 1.2287, BP(4) = 1.6138 
Interim Earnings 
0.0848 0.0471 -0.0021 0.0007 -7.0498 
(0.3995) (0.1297) (0.0041) (0.0213) (5.7650) 
n= 85, R2 = -0.0064,94,801 = 0.8660, BP(4) = 4.8061 
AGMs 
0.4396 -0.1873 -0.0153"' 0.0948"' -49.9510" 
(0.5045) (0.1410) (0.0063) (0.0367) (24.0400) 
n= 54, R2 = 0.1181, F[4,491 = 2.7736, BP(4) = 3.3404 
Board Changes 
0.0985 0.0192 0.0009 -0.0013 -12.0930" 
(0.3064) (0.0567) (0.0029) (0.0157) (6.0070) 
n= 227, R2 = -0.0032,94,2221 = 0.8200, BP(4) = 4.6158 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.5444 0.1011 0.0008 0.0149 -7.5855 
(0.2244) (0.0538) (0.0009) (0.0105) (5.9290) 
n= 478, R2 = 0.0258. F14,473] = 4.1578, BP(4) = 6.8550 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
RZ is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.9c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN POST, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST, = ao + a1LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a, JVUM; + a, VOLPR+A, + U, 
a0 a, a2 a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
-0.1376 0.3190" 0.0200 -0.0385 -38.0610- 
(0.3979) (0.1506) (0.0146) (0.0326) (10.6400) 
n= 15, R2 = 0.2394, F14,101 = 2.2903, BP(4) = 7.0353 
Interim Earnings 
-0.1934 0.0280 -0.0022 0.0235 -3.4331 
(0.3158) (0.0918) (0.0037) (0.0181) (2.8310) 
n= 54, R 2=0.0272, P14,491 = 1.3707, BP(4) = 1.4437 
AGMs 
1.3216 -0.3630 -0.0188` 0.0472 23.1920 
(0.8882) (0.2269) (0.0101) (0.0478) (29.6200) 
n= 40, R2 = 0.1141, F[4,35] = 2.2554, BP(4) = 3.5147 
Board Changes 
0.6320 0.0478 -0.0055` -0.0078 -14.5880' 
(0.4232) (0.0528) (0.0032) (0.0136) (7.8290) 
n= 162, R2 = 0.0240, F14,157] = 1.9898, BP(4) = 2.5424 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.2660 0.0182 0.0020 0.0201"' -12.6590 
(0.2832) (0.0514) (0.0023) (0.0012) (12.6590) 
n= 345, RZ = 0.0373, F(4,3451 = 4.3298, BP(4) = 16.2072 
Notes: 
LN_MV, is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE, measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A, measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
', ", "' statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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6.6.2 Bad News Events 
LN ANN 
Table 6.8 reports the regression results of the value of the information impounded over 
the announcement period, relative to the prior period, for bad news events. The 
significance of the explanatory variables is varied and haphazard, with little 
consistency in the results across the return metrics. In contrast to good news, firm 
size (LN_MV) is found to be robust across return metrics with 5 per cent significance, 
for both unpopular board changes and a reduction in shareholding. Depending on the 
returns model, the model explains between 2.2(MN) and 8.6(MKT) per cent of the 
response on day 0 to the release of the average board change, and between 1. O(MM) 
and 6.2(MKT) for a change in shareholding. The positive coefficient of LN_MV;, is 
consistent with the idea that the length of the prior period does not capture the full 
anticipation process of larger firms (see section 3.7.3). Thereby confirming 
anticipation is an increasing function of firm size. Beyond this, only the constant term 
is significant and negative for AGMs, board changes and a change in shareholding. 
LN POST, 
Table 6.9 reports the regression results of the value of the information impounded over 
the post-announcement period, relative to the prior and announcement periods, for 
bad news events. The tables show a further reduction in the significance of the 
explanatory variables for bad news over the post-announcement period. However, 
with 10 per cent significance, the prior volatility of stock returns is robust across 
return measures, in the explanation of post-announcement drift after disappointing 
annual results and unpopular board changes. Similarly, age is significant (above 10 
per cent) and negative, in the explanation of drift ensuing the average board change. 
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Table 6.10a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN ANN) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a24GE; + ayVUM; + a, VOLPR; + u; 
ao a, a2 aj a4 
Annual Earnings 
-1.7676"' 0.1942"` 0.0010 0.0066 -18.8660"' 
(0.1634) (0.0320) (0.0015) (0.0061) (4.2510) 
n= 1118, R2 = 0.0643. F[4.11131 = 20.1903, BP(4) = 21.6259 
Interim Earnings 
-2.2152"' 0.2675"' 0.0007 -0.0045 -3.3142 
(0.1824) (0.0366) (0.0021) (0.0079) (5.1970) 
n= 810. R2 = 0.0646,94,8051 = 14.9690, BP(4) = 1.2992 
AGMs 
-2.8310"' 0.1212 0.0019 0.0191 -22.0210' 
(0.4048) (0.0861) (0.0038) (0.0135) (12.3300) 
n= 265, R2 = 0.0328, F[4,2601 = 3.2350, BP(4) = 4.1540 
Board Changes 
-2.7407"' 0.1066"' -0.0005 0.0159"' -10.5300- 
(0.1634) (0.0294) (0.0016) (0.0060) (4.3050) 
n= 1002, R2 = 0.0419, F[4,997] = 11.9471, BP(4) = 22.3264 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.0451"' 0.1915"` -0.0012 -0.0005 -8.5366- 
(0.1200) (0.0234) (0.0011) (0.0043) (2.4200) 
n= 2502, R2 = 0.0422, F(4,24971 = 28.5482, BP(4) = 17.1101 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
A(3Ei measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement. 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors. 
', ", "' statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.10b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR; + u; 
as a, a2 a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
-0.6924' 0.0612` 0.0018 0.0010 -25.9240- 
(0.1659) (0.0330) (0.0017) (0.0062) (3.8460) 
n= 987, R2 = 0.0471, F[4,9821 = 13.1873, BP(4) = 10.6310 
Interim Earnings 
-1.2831"` 0.1412"' 0.0009 -0.0022 -16.8740- 
(0.2023) (0.0414) (0.0021) (0.0082) (5.7640) 
n= 668, R2 = 0.0339,94,663) = 6.8537, BP(4) = 8.3588 
AGMS 
-2.0822"` -0.0102 0.0047 0.0277"` -34.2660- 
(0.3922) (0.0678) (0.0031) (0.0104) (11.5600) 
n= 231. RZ = 0.0484, F14,226} = 3.9242, BP(4) = 10.1984 
Board Changes 
-1.9151"" 0.0532' -0.0020 0.0131" -16.0170"' 
(0.1991) (0.0295) (0.0018) (0.0058) (5.1090) 
n= 834, R2 = 0.0290, F[4,8291 = 7.2260, BP(4) = 13.7682 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.0144'"' 0.0893"` -0.0014' -0.0026 -19.1370'* 
(0.2656) (0.0548) (0.0007) (0.0116) (8.2260) 
n= 2176, R2 = 0.0407, F[4,2171] = 24.0652, RP(4) = 24.7394 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity. with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.10c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., 0) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR; + u; 
üp O1 a, Q3 Q4 
Annual Earnings 
-1.7328"' 0.1188"' 0.0002 0.0094' -19.4170"' 
(0.1540) (0.0298) (0.0016) (0.0057) (3.5700) 
n= 1163, R2 = 0.0419,94,1158) = 13.7148, BP(4) = 17.3160 
Interim Earnings 
-2.3086"' 0.1825"' -0.0005 0.0062 -7.3706 
(0.1615) (0.0331) (0.0019) (0.0075) (5.1240) 
n= 845, R2 = 0.0475,94.840) = 11.5174, BP(4) = 3.2338 
AGMS 
-3.1925"' 0.1067 0.0029 0.0089 -3.0984 
(0.3499) (0.0675) (0.0030) (0.0102) (10.5000) 
n= 291, R2 = 0.0105,94.2861 = 1.7686, BP(4) = 4.4620 
Board Changes 
-2.9638"' 0.1060**' -0.0009 0.0138"' -8.0434" 
(0.1523) (0.0259) (0.0016) (0.0054) (3.9500) 
n= 1059, R2 = 0.0342, F14,10541 = 10.3793, BP(4) = 6.3858 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-3.4216"" 0.0915""" -0.0005 0.0140""' -6.9129'*' 
(0.1086) (0.0223) (0.0011) (0.0038) (2.0590) 
n= 2633, R2 = 0.0221,94,2628] = 15.8992, BP(4) = 19.8776 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE, measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPtt; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.11a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN POST) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST, = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE; + a, NUM; + a, VOLPR+A; + U, 
ap a, a, a3 as 
Annual Earnings 
0.0399 -0.0579 0.0009 0.0081 -15.6790- 
(0.3908) (0.0975) (0.0046) (0.0178) (8.1680) 
n= 1098, R2 = 0.0219. F[4,1093] = 7.1315, BP(4) = 1.7278 
Interim Earnings 
0.0142 -0.0489 0.0023 0.0098 -14.3710- 
(0.1596) (0.0337) (0.0017) (0.0065) (3.5600) 
n= 811, R2 = 0.0154, F[4,806} = 4.1579, $P(4) = 4.4154 
AGMs 
-0.0837 0.1050' -0.0007 -0.0178 -15.4200 
(0.3745) (0.0630) (0.0030) (0.0161) (9.7750) 
n= 256. R2 = 0.0166. F(4,251) = 2.0729. BP(4) = 9.9783 
Board Changes 
0.3766" -0.0271 -0.0040" 0.0013 -15.2190- 
(0.1724) (0.0272) (0.0017) (0.0053) (3.9860) 
n= 991, R2 = 0.0193, F[4,986] = 5.8624, BP(4) = 5.8838 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.1443 -0.0527"' -0.0019' 0.0104"` -20.3560"' 
(0.1112) (0.0207) (0.0010) (0.0037) (2.2820) 
n= 2541, R2 = 0.0341, F[4,2536) = 2.3439, BP(4) = 9.6891 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement. 
AGE, measures the number of years the firn has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity. with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.11b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST, = ao + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a)VUM; + a4VOLPR+a; + u; 
ao a, a2 a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
0.5463"' -0.0794"' -0.0015 -0.0000 -24.2130- 
(0.1760) (0.0341) (0.0016) (0.0064) (3.6810) 
n= 889, RZ = 0.0484. F[4,884] = 12.2841, BP(4) = 6.3607 
Interim Earnings 
0.0354 -0.0656' 0.0052*'* 0.0072 -19.3830"' 
(0.1964) (0.0389) (0.0019) (0.0075) (4.1970) 
n= 666, R2 = 0.0344, P14,6611 = 6.9233, BP(4) = 4.7847 
AGMs 
0.4694 0.0245 -0.0001 -0.0051 -42.6320- 
(0.4194) (0.0705) (0.0034) (0.0129) (10.1200) 
n= 243, R2 = 0.0516, F[4,2381 = 4.2884, $P(4) = 11.6145 
Board Changes 
0.8402'** -0.0271 -0.0057"' -0.0085 -22.8880- 
(0.4219) (0.0608) (0.0039) (0.0186) (11.1300) 
n= 796, R2 = 0.0439, F[4,7911 = 10.1295, BP(4) = 3.1549 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.4075'** -0.0568"' -0.0022" 0.0056 -28.0650"' 
(0.1264) (0.0227) (0.0010) (0.0039) (2.4900) 
n= 2146, R2 = 0.0646, F14,2141) = 38.0133, BP(4) = 6.2456 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firth size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement. 
AGE; measures the number of years the firth has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors. 
', ", "' statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
RZ is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.11c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Good News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST; = ao + a, GN_MV; + a2AGE; + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR+A; + u; 
ao a, a2 a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
0.1676 -0.0827"' 0.0008 0.0072 -17.8980- 
(0.1371) (0.0258) (0.0014) (0.0046) (2.7920) 
n= 1195, R2 = 0.0321. F[4,1190] = 10.8973, BP(4) = 2.7630 
Interim Earnings 
0.0427 -0.0789" 0.0028 0.0087 -15.9930- 
(0.1574) (0.0344) (0.0172) (0.0668) (3.9030) 
n= 861, R2 = 0.0217.94,856] = 5.7592, BP(4) = 8.6150 
AGMs 
-0.1234 0.0560 -0.0010 -0.0044 -27.0420- 
(0.3755) (0.0572) (0.0028) (0.0123) (10.9100) 
n= 286, R2 = 0.0222, F14,2811 = 2.6186, BP(4) = 8.4522 
Board Changes 
0.5940"' -0.0479` -0.0036" -0.0020 -18.0940"' 
(0.1552) (0.0254) (0.0016) (0.0050) (4.1080) 
n= 1044, RZ = 0.0306, F[4,1039] = 9.2345, BP(4) = 9.7338 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0340 -0.0118 -0.0018` 0.0060 -18.0110- 
(0.1110) (0.0219) (0.0010) (0.0039) (2.1670) 
n= 2697, R2 = 0.0272, F[4,26921 = 19.8479, BP(4) = 3.4392 
Notes: 
LN MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPP+A; measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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6.6.3 Unclear Event Windows 
Good News 
Table 6.10 reports the regression results of the value of the information impounded 
over the announcement period, relative to the prior period, for good news events. The 
use of unclear windows results in a significant increase in the explanatory power of 
firm size (LN_MV; ). The tables report firm size as an important factor in the 
anticipation of favourable annual and interim earnings news, welcomed board changes 
and a the purchase of a large stockholding. This increase more than likely reflects the 
small firm bias of examining isolated events. The volatility of prior stock returns 
(VOLPR) persists as an important factor in the explanation of the response to good 
news events. In comparison to Table 6.6, VOLPR, is significant in the explanation of 
annual earnings and a change in shareholding, and extends to board changes for 
unclear windows. Furthermore, the use of unclear windows significantly increases the 
explanatory power of the number of disclosures made by a firm (NUM; ), for board 
changes. The positive sign of NUM;, implies increasing disclosure reduces the 
demand investors for information by investors from alternative sources. The constant 
term persists as highly significant and negative, across all event types. 
Table 6.11 reports the regression results of the value of the information impounded 
over the post-announcement period, relative to the prior and announcement periods, 
for good news events. Prior volatility (VOLPR+A; ) persists as the main driving force 
behind post-announcement drift, for all information types. In all cases, VOLPR+A; is 
high significantly with one minor exception. Other than this, AGE; is above 5 per 
cent significance in the explanation of the average board change. 
We hypothesised the variation in coefficient size between information types, proxies 
for the information characteristics of expected probability and expected precision 
(McNichols & Trueman 1994, and Demski & Feltham 1994). The high significance 
of VOLPR+A across all five information types, allows us to reliably compare the 
relative coefficient sizes. A high coefficient implies a given level of volatility gives 
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Table 6.12a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a, NUM, + a, VOLPR; + u; 
ap a, a2 a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
-1.4694"' 0.0167 0.0028 
0.0201- -12.3960'" 
(0.2259) (0.0415) (0.0020) (0.0082) (4.7010) 
n= 718, R2 = 0.0201, F[4,7131 = 4.6833, BP(4) = 24.7138 
Interim Earnings 
-1.0414"' -0.0215 0.0010 0.0016 -9.3952` 
(0.2276) (0.0467) (0.0021) (0.0083) (5.2170) 
n= 644, R2 = 0.0080, F14,6391 = 2.2933, BP(4) = 28.6439 
AGMs 
-2.5425"' 0.1326` 0.0029 0.0111 0.5210 
(0.4249) (0.0726) (0.0028) (0.0117) (10.7700) 
n= 217, R2 = 0.0228,94,212) = 2.2585, BP(4) = 6.6046 
Board Changes 
-2.3143"` -0.0076 
0.0024 0.0247"` -11.3370- 
(0.1972) (0.0336) (0.0019) (0.0055) (2.9640) 
n= 812. R2 = 0.0324, F[4,807) = 7.7925. BP(4) = 11.7931 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.6315'** 0.0985"' -0.0003 
0.0055 -8.9422"' 
(0.1419) (0.0264) (0.0013) (0.0041) (1.9550) 
n= 1863, R2 = 0.0262, F14,18581 = 13.5140, BP(4) = 6.5055 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement. 
AGE, measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors. 
statistically significant at the 10ßb, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
245 
Table 6.12b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN ANN) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE, + a3NUM; + a, VOLPR; + u; 
ap a, a, aj a. 
Annual Earnings 
-1.3774"`" 0.0879"" 0.0011 0.0106' -12.0410- 
(0.1576) (0.0327) (0.0016) (0.0061) (4.4520) 
n= 849, R2 = 0.0289. F[4,8441 = 7.3184, BP(4) = 20.0628 
Interim Earnings 
-1.3541'** 0.0465 0.0033' 0.0097 -8.2163' 
(0.1817) (0.0323) (0.0019) (0.0062) (4.4980) 
n= 786, R2 = 0.0188, F14,7811 = 4.7647, BP(4) = 10.0090 
AGMs 
-2.3003*" 0.0965 0.0049 0.0129 -10.9300 
(0.3500) (0.0649) (0.0031) (0.0106) (9.5150) 
n= 251, R2 = 0.0276. F[4,246] = 2.7718. BP(4) = 3.4078 
Board Changes 
-2.0857"' 0.0426 -0.0000 
0.0162"' -13.6840"' 
(0.1555) (0.0283) (0.0017) (0.0053) (2.7780) 
n= 980, R2 = 0.0409.94,9751 = 11.4376, BP(4) = 11.8674 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.6315"' 0.0985"' -0.0003 0.0055 -8.9422- 
(0.1419) (0.0264) (0.0013) (0.0041) (1.9550) 
n= 462. R2 = 0.0623, FI4,4571 = 8.6619, BP(4) = 15.3028 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.12c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_ANN, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., O) 
LN ANN; = ao + a, LN MV; + a2AGE, + a3NUM; + a4VOLPR; + u; 
ao a1 a, a3 a4 
Annual Earnings 
-1.7317"` 0.0239 0.0024 0.0284"` -13.4500"' 
(0.2392) (0.0463) (0.0024) (0.0086) (5.4500) 
n= 667. R2 = 0.0264, F(4,662] = 5.5111. BP(4) = 13.6055 
Interim Earnings 
-1.3510"' -0.0233 0.0026 0.0221"' -8.5263- 
(0.7516) (0.1552) (0.0084) (0.0383) (2.5790) 
n= 607, RZ = 0.0109, F14.6021 = 2.6638, BP(4) = 25.6563 
AGMs 
-2.7668"' 0.1495 0.0004 0.0149 3.5527 
(0.5017) (0.0937) (0.0052) (0.0142) (12.9400) 
n= 190, R2 = 0.0074, F[4,1851 = 1.3518, BP(4) = 8.3526 
Board Changes 
-2.9517- 0.0641' 0.0021 
0.0029"' -8.1494'** 
(0.2057) (0.0368) (0.0020) (0.0061) (3.0570) 
n= 748, R2 = 0.0488, F[4,743] = 10.5755, BP(4) = 8.0637 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-2.3998"' 0.1162- 0.0001 0.0007 -12.3010- 
(0.1217) (0.0234) (0.0011) (0.0039) (2.4080) 
n= 2189, R2 = 0.0428, F[4.21891 = 25.4732. BP(4) = 48.7792 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGE; measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at 1st January in the year of announcement. 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period, 
VOLPR measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.13a 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_POST) Estimated Using 
Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST; = a,, + a, LN MV; + a2AGE, + a, NUM, + a4VOLPR+A; + u; 
ao a, a2 a3 a, 
Annual Earnings 
0.6084"' -0.0450 -0.0006 0.0039 -20.1160- 
(0.1675) (0.0319) (0.0015) (0.0059) (3.7100) 
n= 738. R2 = 0.0632, F[4,7331 = 13.4251, BP(4) = 7.4439 
Interim Earnings 
0.6699"' -0.0505 -0.0026 -0.0042 -10.7680"' 
(0.1748) (0.0323) (0.0016) (0.0062) (3.9280) 
n= 643, R2 = 0.0284, F[4.638] = 5.6956, BP(4) = 5.4200 
AGMs 
0.7222"' -0.1153" -0.0020" 0.0118 -22.4530- 
(0.2904) (0.0551) (0.0028) (0.0086) (9.5060) 
n= 226, R2 = 2.5878, F[4,2211 = 2.4943, BP(4) = 11.6162 
Board Changes 
0.2916` -0.0097 -0.0009 0.0018 -13.2610"' 
(0.1747) (0.0287) (0.0016) (0.0052) (2.7390) 
n= 823, R2 = 0.0373, F[4,8181 = 8.9691, BP(4) = 7.6901 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0025 0.0144 0.0011 0.0025 -12.2450- 
(0.1320) (0.0245) (0.0010) (0.0039) (2.2200) 
n= 1824, R2 = 0.0354, F[4,18191 = 17.7466. BP(4) = 17.3002 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M), as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGEi measures the number of years the fian has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firth over the sample period, 
VOLPR+Ai measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.13b 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN POST, ) Estimated Using 
Market Adjusted Returns (MKT), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST, = ao + a, LN_MV, + a2AGE; + a3NUM, + a, VOLPR+A, + u, 
a0 aS a2 a3 a, 
Annual Earnings 
0.0837 0.0237 -0.0017 0.0135"' -18.1900"' 
(0.1738) (0.0288) (0.0015) (0.0074) (3.0750) 
n= 947, R2 = 0.0502, F14,9421 = 13.5006, BP(4) = 10.0916 
Interim Earnings 
0.1595 -0.0125 -0.0004 -0.0006 -8.8374- 
(0.1504) (0.0312) (0.0014) (0.0066) (3.3120) 
n= 788, R' = 0.0122, F14.7831 = 3.4351, BP(4) = 7.2813 
AGMS 
0.5170' -0.1134" -0.0024 0.0173' -20.9710- 
(0.2876) (0.0673) (0.0032) (0.0105) (7.7970) 
n= 239, R2 = 0.0197, F[4,2341 = 2.1941. BP(4) = 14.5781 
Board Changes 
0.1582 -0.0060 -0.0009 0.0056 -13.1590.. (0.1481) (0.0258) (0.0015) (0.0051) (2.5890) 
n= 1018, R2 = 0.0335,94,10131 = 9.8017, BP(4) = 3.7594 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.1478 0.0372' -0.0003 0.0037 -11.1090' (0.1157) (0.0220) (0.0011) (0.0037) (2.0150) 
n= 2219, R2 = 0.0283, F[4,2214) = 17.1412. BP(4) = 11.2503 
Notes: 
LN MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (EM), as at Ist January in the year of announcement. 
AGE; measures the number of years the firn has been in operation as at I st January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the firm over the sample period. 
VOLPR+Ai measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 6.13c 
OLS Regression Results, of the Value of Information (LN_POST, ) Estimated Using 
Mean Adjusted Returns (MN), Against The Explanatory Variables 
Bad News - Unclear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
LN_POST, = as + a, LN_MV; + a2AGE; + a, NUM; + a4VOLPR+A, + u, 
ap a, a2 a3 a, 
Annual Earnings 
0.4363"' 0.0195 -0.0005 0.0024 -19.1390"' 
(0.1875) (0.0336) (0.0017) (0.0072) (3.5880) 
n= 636, R2 = 0.0592, F[4,6311 = 10.9924, BP(4) = 3.8254 
Interim Earnings 
0.4257"' 0.0075 -0.0019 -0.0071 -9.9397- 
(0.1758) (0.0365) (0.0017) (0.0067) (3.9210) 
n= 591, R2 = 0.0241, F[4,5861 = 4.6439, BP(4) = 11.7463 
AGMs 
0.5135 -0.0320 0.0001 0.0072 -20.3210" 
(0.3384) (0.0634) (0.0333) (0.0954) (8.9020) 
n= 196, R2 = -0.0023, F[4,1911 = 0.8903, BP(4) = 2.2564 
Board Changes 
0.1666 0.0255 -0.0012 0.0066 -14.6690- 
(0.1713) (0.0273) (0.0016) (0.0051) (2.9540) 
n= 769, R2 = 0.0611, F14,7641 = 13.4874, BP(4) = 6.3228 
Changes in Shareholdings 
-0.1056 0.0345 0.0015 0.0066' -12.8610"' 
(0.1298) (0.0227) (0.0010) (0.0036) (2.2470) 
n= 1668, R2 = 0.0501, F14,1663] = 22.9858, BP(4) = 16.3720 
Notes: 
LN_MV; is the natural log of market capitalisation measuring firm size (£M). as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
AGES measures the number of years the firm has been in operation as at Ist January in the year of announcement, 
NUM; measures the number of disclosures made by the fine over the sample period, 
VOLPR+A, measures stock return volatility over the prior and announcement period, where (t=-20,..., 0) 
Figures in parentheses are White's standard errors, 
, statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
n represents the number of observations. 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(4) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity. with 4 degrees of freedom. 
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rise to a smaller amount of post-announcement drift relative to other information 
types. For example, the coefficient sizes reported in Table 6.11 b, are decreasing in 
the order of AGMs (a4=-42.6320), a change in shareholding (a4=-28.0650), board 
changes (a4=-22.8880), annual earnings (a4=-21.4130), and finally interim earnings 
(a4=-19.3830). 
The expected probability of an AGM and earnings announcements, are all equal to 
one. The difference in coefficient sizes therefore implies the average AGM is of 
greater precision relative to earnings announcements. However it also appears non- 
earnings information is of greater precision than earnings information, with respect to 
good news events. Though consistent with previous evidence, is the average annual 
report is of greater precision than the average interim report (Hussey & Wolfe 1994). 
Bad News 
Table 6.12 reports the regression results of the value of the information impounded 
over the announcement period, relative to the prior period, for bad news events. As 
for good news events, the volatility of prior stock returns (VOLPR+i) is highly 
significant in the explanation of the response on day 0, to the announcement of 
unfavourable annual earnings news, disappointing board changes, and a reduction in 
shareholding. Unlike good news, firm size is only important in the explanation of 
selling large stockholdings. Age remains highly significant in the anticipation of 
disappointing board changes. 
Table 6.13 reports the regression results of the value of the information impounded 
over the post-announcement period, relative to the prior and announcement period, for 
bad news events. The volatility of prior stock returns (VOLPR+A, ) is the main driving 
force behind post-announcement drift. VOLPR+A, explains partially the post- 
announcement drift following the announcement of all the information types. Other 
than this, the other variables have no incremental power in the explanation of drift. 
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6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The Pattern of Stock Returns for Good and Bad News 
The preliminary analysis of section 6.5, identified the impounding behaviour of 
security returns for the average event, for each class of information, distinguishing 
between the reaction to good and bad news. The pattern of security returns 
highlighted several differences in investor behaviour, in the anticipation and 
interpretation of good and bad news. The findings emphasise the need to partition 
events according to their sign, to more fully appreciate the process of impounding 
information by investors. The analysis demonstrates the ability of investors to 
anticipate the sign of the news by up to twenty trading days in advance of its release. 
The general pattern of security returns, is upward for good news and downward for 
bad, a pattern suggestive of underreaction. For each class of information, the overall 
level and significance of the daily abnormal returns for good news exceeds those of 
bad news. Without controlling for the size of the news, it is not possible to say 
whether the average bad news event is less informative than good news, or that bad 
news is generally more difficult to anticipate and interpret. An alternative explanation 
maybe that bad news is ignored by investors (Sharkarway & Garrod 1995). Or maybe 
what we have captured is not investors selling due to information, but instead the 
liquidity trades of investors, and qmm thereby giving the appearance of bad news 
being ignored. Of course, it may also indicate bad news is anticipated well in advance 
of good news, from the actions of managers warning investors ahead of the bad news 
(Skinner 1994). 
On the other hand, the initial market reaction on the announcement day to 
unfavourable earnings news exceeds the response to favourable earnings news, 
suggestive of possible under or overreaction. The finding of greater anticipation for 
earnings information relative to AGMs, board changes and a change in shareholding, 
is consistent with previous evidence (Strong & Walker 1992, Brookfield & Morris 
1994). This may indicative of the greater relevance and precision of earnings 
information relative to other information types, for security valuation. 
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Explaining the Pattern of Stock Returns 
In section 6.7, we re-employed the model previously used in chapter 5. Though this 
time, we examine whether the incentives to become informed/vary according to the 
sign of the news. Collectively, the results reported in Tables 6.6 to 6.13 are very 
similar to those reported in chapter 5 (see Tables 5.3 to 5.6). The results are highly 
sensitive to the information type, the event window under examination, whether there 
is more than one disclosure in the event window, and the model of expected returns 
employed. 
As in chapter 5, the model explains post-announcement drift better than announcement 
returns. This further suggests investors' initial reactions are neither informed for good 
or bad news events. Our model also explains the behaviour of stock returns 
surrounding good news events better than for bad news events. A possible 
explanation may be that investors reactions to bad news are less informed in general, 
and supports our earlier notion that bad news is more difficult to interpret. 
Allowing other disclosures within the event period, increases the overall power of the 
model in the explanation of the behaviour of stock returns. Firm size explains 
announcement returns (ANN) for good news, but less so for bad news. A potential 
explanation for this is that bad news is difficult to anticipate and to interpret for all 
classes of information, regardless the sign of the news. In particular, firm size is 
significant in the explanation of price movement on the release of annual and interim 
earnings, board changes and a change in shareholding. However firm size does not 
explain post-announcement drift. The volatility of prior stock returns persists as the 
most prominent explanation of post-announcement drift. 
The number of disclosures reduces the ability to interpret information regarding both 
welcome and unwelcome board changes, and similarly for disappointing earnings 
news. Beyond this, only age has any incremental explanation for drift after the 
announcement of favourable board changes, and the buying of a large stockholding. 
The number of years a firm has been trading (AGE) is significant in the anticipation 
of welcome board changes and disappointing AGMs. Firm size only has partial 
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explanation for the drift following favourable AGMs. 
Finally, the joint explanatory power of the variables for market anticipation, is very 
low. Generally, the R2 values do not exceed 9 per cent, with exception for AGMs. 
This may be indicative of a relatively efficient market, in which one cannot explain 
a large proportion of future movements in price with historic information. Or 
alternatively, it may reflect the use of inappropriate proxies for the information 
environment. 
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7. IS PRICE MOVEMENT A RESPONSE TO INFORMATION? 
7.1 THE OBJECTIVE AND MAIN FINDING 
In chapter 6, we made a number of inferences regarding investor behaviour, in regard 
to the possible differential anticipation of, and differential response to, the 
announcement of good and bad news. It has thus far been assumed the market 
response is equivalent towards good and bad news, ceteris paribus. It has similarly 
been assumed, that all price movement is in response to information; whether this be 
in response to investors' own information, or information inferred from the actions of 
others. The objective of this chapter is to determine the validity of these observations 
and underlying assumptions. Although the results are unable to statistically support 
a differential price response towards good and bad news, post-event volatility of stock 
returns is found to be more pronounced for bad news. We infer from the trade-off 
between prior and post-event volatility of stock returns, that market anticipation is 
largely based on information as opposed to uninformed trading. 
7.2 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 6 examined the issue of good and bad news, and made a number of tentative 
observations as to the differential price behaviour surrounding the release of both good 
and bad news events. Figures 6.1 to 6.5 show the market appears to anticipate part 
of the information content of the average corporate disclosure, but continues to adjust 
after the report date. This suggests that the market is unable to fully anticipate the 
information content of both earnings and non-earnings news, from more timely 
information sources. More important is the observation that investors are able to 
determine the sign of the news by at least twenty days in advance of its release. 
However, the market continues to adjust to the news over the post-event period, 
indicating possible market underreaction to public information. 
Both the level of anticipation and the level of drift is higher for good news events 
than bad. Without controlling for the size of the news, it is not possible to say 
whether the good news is more informative than the bad news. Or alternatively, 
255 
whether the implications of bad news are more difficult to determine. Sharkarway & 
Garrod (1995) suggest that bad news is ignored by investors. Of course, it may also 
indicate that bad news is anticipated well in advance of good news, from the actions 
of managers warning investors in advance (Skinner 1994). 
For both annual and interim earnings reports, the absolute size of the price adjustment 
on the announcement day, is greater for unfavourable earnings news than for 
favourable news. For example, using market model adjusted returns, on the release 
of disappointing annual results we observe a negative return of 2.05 per cent. This 
compares to a positive return of 1.95 per cent on the release of favourable annual 
results. The divergence in the price response to good and bad news is even greater 
for interim results. The release of unfavourable interim results is associated with a 
negative return of 3.72 per cent compared to 0.05 per cent for favourable news. This 
suggests that bad news is not as readily anticipated as good news, and consequently 
the market is surprised by the content of bad news events. 
Tables 6.1 to 6.5 show greater daily sign reversal in the abnormal returns over the 
event period, for bad news. A possible explanation maybe that bad news is associated 
with greater uncertainty than good news (Engle & Ng 1993). However it also 
suggests, that on a daily basis there is overreaction to both earnings and non-earnings 
news; in particular for bad news. If this is the case, it would also explain why a 
lower level of anticipation and drift is associated with bad news. 
Throughout this thesis, all price movement is presumed to be in response to 
information, whether this be the investors' own information, or information inferred 
from the actions of others. However in chapters 5 and 6, the model explains post- 
announcement drift far better than price movement on the announcement day. This 
may indicate that investors' initial reactions to all classes of information, are not based 
on informed judgements. The financial markets literature certainly implies stock 
return volatility captures more than information (Roll 1988, Cutler, Poterba & 
Summers 1989). The actions of liquidity traders is one example. For instance, the 
average returns behaviour surrounding a change in shareholding, reported in Table 6.5, 
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is suggestive of possible herding by investors (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch 
1992). This implies a shareholding change is more likely to occur after a period of 
pronounced trading activity. For example, the likelihood of an investor buying 
(selling) a large stockholding, increases after a period of positive (negative) returns. 
The significant positive returns continue after the announcement, suggesting that a 
larger shareholding change acts as an important signal to other, and perhaps less 
informed investors. 
If investors are informed traders, for expected events, we expect to see a trade-off 
between prior and post-event uncertainty; as measured by the volatility of stock 
returns. An increase in post-event uncertainty would suggest prior anticipation was 
uninformed. However, the extent of the trade-off between prior and post-event 
volatility is also dependent on the actual precision of the announcement (Kim & 
Verrecchia 1991a and 1991b, Demski & Feltham 1994, and McNichols & Trueman 
1994). 
These observations provide the basis for further investigation into the differential 
market reaction between good and bad news. The analysis begins with a brief 
discussion of the literature in section 7.3, which documents conflicting evidence of 
both under and overreaction to information. Section 7.4 evaluates the price response 
to the announcement of both good and bad news. The average pattern appears to be 
one of underreaction to both good and bad news. However, on a daily basis we also 
question the possibility of overreaction to information. Section 7.5 investigates the 
ideas of previous studies, that unfavourable news increases post-event volatility of 
stock returns to a greater extent than favourable news (see French, Schwert & 
Stambaugh 1987, Engle & Ng 1993). Section 7.6 examines the extent to which 
uncertainty is resolved by the disclosure. This will in part depend on the precision of 
the information released. Section 7.7 concludes the chapter. 
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7.3 EVIDENCE OF UNDER AND OVERREACTION TO INFORMATION 
Brown, Harlow & Tinic (1988) (hereafter BHT) develop and test the uncertain 
information hypothesis (UIH), in a bid to explain the response of investors to 
unanticipated information. BHT argue, that with incomplete information the market 
reaction to new information is unlikely to be instantaneous. UIH assumes rational 
investors will initially set stock prices below their expected values, before the full 
implications of the event are known. Security prices will gradually adjust as the full 
effects of the event are resolved with time. In the aftermath of the event, while 
uncertainty remains, the UIH predicts both the expected return and risk of the security 
will systematically increase. ' 
More specifically, they examine the price reaction to `major' surprises. To qualify as 
a major surprise, the residual return for any given day, must be at least 2.5 per cent; 
i. e. events dates are defined numerically by the size of the residual return rather than 
using specific event days. Market model parameters are used to calculate the day 0 
residual return, which are estimated using the 200 day period directly preceding this 
arbitrary date. This procedure is repeated for each day, for the 200 largest firms in 
the S&P 500 index, and produces more than 9100 `events' over the period July 1962 
to December 1985. BHT argue the advantage of defining an event in this manner, 
numerically rather than using specific event dates, allows the UIH to be tested without 
the introduction of bias as to what type of information should cause investors to 
respond. The events are further divided into good and bad news depending on the 
sign of the residual on the event day, producing 4788 positive events and 4319 
negative events. 
The test of UIH relies on a number of assumptions. However the hypothesis remains 
that a market comprised of risk averse investors will lead to prices being set below 
' The LJIH is in similar vein to the uncertainty resolution hypothesis of Ball & Kothari (1991). 
Routine announcements are assumed to resolve uncertainty about a security's future cash flows. 
Though the increased flow of information will initially increase the variability of returns, risk and 
therefore expected return, during the announcement period. 
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their expected values in anticipation of the event. ' As the uncertainty is resolved, 
price changes will tend to be positive, on average, regardless the sign of the news. 
The theory works on the premise that price will continue to adjust after the event, only 
if the news affects the security's unsystematic risk. For example, on the arrival of bad 
news when the full extent of the news is certain (i. e. systematic risk remains 
unchanged), price will immediately adjust downwards to its pre-event expected rate 
of return, reflecting the definite known decrease in the stock's expected future cash- 
flows. The adjustment is completed on the event day and with no abnormal price 
response after day 0. Alternatively, if the news effects the security's systematic risk 
as well as its expected future cash flows, the additional uncertainty will cause price 
to adjust accordingly to compensate for the increased risk. The price will adjust back 
to its pre-event expected rate of return on k days after the event, as and when the 
uncertainty is resolved. 
In short, in response to an unfavourable surprise the initial price change will therefore 
resemble an overreaction; i. e. the initial price decrease is reversed. To a favourable 
surprise, the price pattern would give the appearance of an underreaction; i. e. the 
initial price increase is followed by a further increase. Thus, the UIH predicts the 
price response following an event will on average always be positive, regardless of 
whether the news is favourable or not. 
The described price behaviour is contrary to that implied by alternative evidence. 
DeBondt & Thaler (1985) found extreme price movement in one direction is followed 
by extreme price movement in the opposite direction; i. e. investor overreaction. So 
in the event of extreme good news, the overreaction theory of DeBondt and Thaler 
predicts a price response in the opposite direction to that predicted by the UIH. For 
extreme bad news, both theories predict a price response in the same direction; i. e. 
upwards. However, the work of BHT and DeBondt and Thaler, both fail to 
differentiate between the type of information the market either under or overreacts to. 
'The assumptions being: (i) investors are utility maximisers and form rational expectations; (ii) they 
are risk-averse; (iii) all available information is impounded into stock prices quickly; and (iv) major 
surprises can be distinguished as good or bad news, but the full extent of their impact is uncertain. 
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Many authors report findings of either under or overreaction to earnings information. 
Both Ou & Penman (1989a) and Bernard & Thomas (1989) find investors impound 
the full implications of financial statement information for future earnings only with 
a lag; i. e. investors underreact to financial statements. More recent work has studied 
the pattern of analyst forecast revisions to earnings news, and found conflicting 
results. DeBondt & Thaler (1990) noticed analysts were prone to overreaction, by 
being excessively optimistic in the face of price declines. Whereas, Butler & Lang 
(1990) found analysts were either persistently optimistic or persistently pessimistic. 
In contrast, the papers of Abarbanell (1991), Mendenhall (1991) and Abarbanell & 
Bernard (1992), all reported examples of analyst underreaction to earnings 
information, when revising their forecasts. 3 UK evidence is inconclusive, finding 
both overreaction (Lonie, Lonie & Powers 1989) and underreaction (O'Hanlon & 
Whiddett 1991) by analysts. 
Other studies distinguish between the sign of the news, and point towards both a 
stronger price reaction to the release of bad news (Chambers & Penman 1984, Skinner 
1994), and even possible overreaction (Kasznik & Lev 1995). In contrast, a recent 
UK study by Sharkarway & Garrod (1995) suggests that bad news is ignored, whilst 
good news results in an overreaction. Nevertheless, the finding of either investor 
overreaction or underreaction, has different implications for investor behaviour. Both 
patterns of behaviour show investors are unable to learn from past mistakes, and are 
therefore irrational in their evaluation of new information. But underreaction also 
implies investor behaviour is rational in the sense that, investors can correctly deduce 
the sign of the news, with the price adjustment being a gradual process rather than an 
instantaneous reaction. Nevertheless, evidence of one does not negate the existence 
of the other. The two effects may reflect different reactions to different types of 
information. 
' Stock prices appear to underreact to even a greater extent (Mendenhall 1991, Abarbanell & 
Bernard 1992). 
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7.4 EVALUATION OF THE POST-EVENT PRICE RESPONSE 
In chapter 6, the pattern of security return behaviour displayed in Figures 6.1 to 6.5, 
seems to challenge the uncertainty information hypothesis (UIH), that prices are on 
average positive after an event, regardless the sign of the news. Over the duration of 
the event period, prices continue on an upward drift for good news, and downward for 
bad news. This implies although there is gradual anticipation of the event, the market 
continues to underreact to the information even after its release. The level of drift is 
greatest for earnings, a possible interpretation may be the market underreacts to 
earnings information to a greater extent than non-earnings information. Or perhaps, 
the market ignores non-earnings information (Brookfield & Morris 1992). 
The conflicting results of Brown, Harlow & Tinic (1988) (BHT), may in part reflect 
the techniques they employed. Defining events numerically may have advantages, but 
could also introduce certain biases. Firstly, the price movement may capture increased 
volatility or excess returns unrelated to an event or piece of news, (see Roll 1988, 
Cutler, Poterba & Summers 1989). We can only allege investors over or underreact, 
if its in response to information. BHT try to control for this by only looking at major 
price movements. Secondly, by not distinguishing between expected from unexpected 
events, will increase the probability of a Type I error. Their findings may also be 
subject to sample bias, applicable only to major information surprises of relatively 
large companies. Furthermore, by grouping all events we learn little about how the 
market responds to differential information, and hence lose potential information. It 
tells us little, and policymakers alike, as to the type of information investors either 
over or underreact to. 
To gain more of an understanding of how the release of new information alters 
investors' expectations, we firstly examine the changing returns profile over the event 
window, for each class of information. We then measure the degree of sign reversal 
in security returns, as an indicator of possible overreaction. Finally, we test the 
relationship between the pattern of post-event stock returns and the initial price 
response to the announcement. 
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Briefly, the results show that: 
The prior period is associated with more positive returns than negative, 
possibly indicating the greater anticipation of good news than bad news 
by investors. 
The announcement of interim and annual earnings information is 
associated with the release of more bad news than good news. 
The sign of the post-event pattern of stock returns cannot be predicted by 
the sign of the initial price change on the announcement day. 
We are unable to find supporting evidence of a differential price response 
over the post-event period, between good and bad news. 
7.4.1 The Descriptive Statistics of Security Returns 
Table 7.1 below, reports the descriptive statistics of the changing returns performance 
over the duration of the event period, for all announcing securities. Returns 
performance is measured as the net return earned from investing £1 over the relevant 
event window (i. e. API;, wi d,,, -1). 
For example, (APt...., -1) measures the returns 
performance of the ith security over the prior period; where the prior period covers 
the event days (t=-20,..., -1). 
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Table 7.1a 
Descriptive Statistics of the Changing Returns Performance (API, Mndow 1) of 
Announcing Securities, Estimated using Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM) 
Clear Event Window 
Event Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Window 
Annual Earnings (n=116) 
Prior 0.0495 0.1658 0.699 6.617 -0.5215 0.6876 
Ann -0.0117 0.0772 -2.030 18.246 -0.5158 0.2526 
Prior+Ann 0.0375 0.1884 0.839 6.808 -0.5626 0.7531 
Post 0.0501 0.2208 1.031 7.872 -0.6209 0.9525 
Total 0.0942 0.3127 1.362 11.240 -0.7733 1.8950 
Interim Earnings (n=152) 
Prior 0.0514 0.1742 0.884 6.442 -0.5215 0.6876 
Ann -0.0146 0.0843 -2.071 15.511 -0.5158 0.2526 
Prior+Ann 0.0385 0.2054 0.764 6.768 -0.7030 0.7943 
Post 0.0477 0.2036 1.108 8.486 -0.6209 0.9526 
Total 0.0916 0.3156 1.446 10.165 -0.7733 1.8950 
AGMs (n=106) 
Prior 0.0425 0.1078 1.360 6.778 -0.1604 0.5486 
Ann 0.0047 0.0358 2.347 19.076 -0.1026 0.2308 
Prior+Ann 0.0481 0.1226 1.504 6.973 -0.1613 0.5683 
Post 0.0108 0.1053 -1.275 11.402 -0.5885 0.2826 
Total 0.0636 0.1921 0.584 4.958 -0.6288 0.6774 
Board Changes (n=387) 
Prior 0.0186 0.1140 2.573 27.894 -0.4172 1.1640 
Ann -0.0001 0.0159 -2.544 28.399 -0.1574 0.6939 
Prior+Ann 0.0187 0.1180 2.934 34.317 -0.4337 1.2760 
Post 0.0048 0.1190 -0.640 9.707 -0.7157 0.4938 
Total 0.0253 0.1754 0.470 8.265 -0.7542 1.1100 
Changes in Shareholdings (n=927) 
Prior 0.0227 0.1169 1.248 15.587 -0.6434 1.0730 
Ann 0.0021 0.0226 5.187 77.985 -0.1377 0.3501 
Prior+Ann 0.0249 0.1204 1.333 14.176 -0.5418 1.0820 
Post 0.0200 0.1128 0.706 10.655 -0.7342 0.6247 
Total 0.0460 0.1707 0.642 6.144 -0.7635 0.7983 
Notes: 
n represents the number of observations, 
Prior window - the value of (API;, --O. where 
(t=-20,...; 1), 
Ann window - the value of (APIA,, -1), where (t 
0), 
Prior+Ann window - the value of (APl,, ,, 1), where 
(t=-20,..., 0), 
Post window - the value of (APL,,, -1), where (t=+1... +20), 
Total window - the value of (API;, 1), where (t=-20,..., +20), 
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Table 7.1b 
Descriptive Statistics of the Changing Returns Performance (API,, ',,,,, -1) of Announcing Securities, Estimated using Market Adjusted Returns (MKT) 
Clear Event Window 
Event Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Window 
Annual Earnings (n=116) 
Prior 0.0100 0.1247 1.083 7.020 -0.2870 0.5721 
Ann 0.0052 0.0799 -1.702 15.886 -0.5003 0.2417 
Prior+Ann 0.0164 0.1558 0.558 6.949 -0.5464 0.7173 
Post 0.0186 0.1661 2.142 10.028 -0.2804 0.8417 
Total 0.0326 0.2164 1.245 7.655 -0.5738 1.0700 
Interim Earnings (n=152) 
Prior -0.0053 0.1498 0.010 7.502 -0.6474 0.5704 
Ann -0.0183 0.0846 -2.118 15.243 -0.5181 0.2353 
Prior+Ann -0.0213 0.1775 -0.059 6.939 -0.7453 0.5820 
Post -0.0104 0.1830 0.883 9.256 -0.6864 0.8109 
Total -0.0320 0.2275 -0.276 6.127 -0.8243 0.7364 
AGMs (n=106) 
Prior 0.0102 0.0904 0.693 4.708 -0.2081 0.3386 
Ann 0.0038 0.0358 2.285 18.826 -0.1083 0.2296 
Prior+Ann 0.0145 0.1042 1.238 6.631 -0.2050 0.4929 
Post -0.0109 0.0993 -1.830 13.011 -0.5920 0.2532 
Total 0.0058 0.1576 -0.090 5.436 -0.6241 0.5057 
Board Changes (n=387) 
Prior -0.0106 0.0993 1.358 18.327 -0.4263 0.8585 
Ann -0.0010 0.0159 -2.459 28.119 -0.1598 0.0697 
Prior+Ann -0.0115 0.1014 1.652 22.600 -0.4431 0.9425 
Post -0.0203 0.1114 -1.297 11.657 -0.7729 0.3916 
Total -0.0310 0.1432 -0.874 8.144 -0.7861 0.5869 
Changes in Shareholding (n=927) 
NOT -0.0017 0.1057 0.078 12.184 -0.7028 0.7687 
Ann 0.0011 0.0222 4.792 74.812 -0.1478 0.3382 
Prior+Ann -0.0007 0.1084 0.237 11.090 -0.6023 0.7737 
Post -0.0014 0.1004 0.044 10.649 -0.7186 0.5521 
Total -0.0029 0.1366 -0.640 6.464 -0.7407 0.4728 
Notes: 
n represents the number of observations, 
Prior window - the value of (API;,,. 1), where (t=-20 
Ann window - the value of (API, _-1), where 
(t 0), 
Prior+Ann window - the value of (API;,,,,; 1). where (t=-20,..., 0), 
Post window - the value of (APL"; P,,, -1), where 
(t=+I, ". ", +20), 
Total window - the value of (AP! ,,. P; 1). where 
(t=-20,.. ", +20). 
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Table 7.1c 
Descriptive Statistics of the Changing Returns Performance (API,.,,,,., -1) of 
Announcing Securities, Estimated using Mean Adjusted Returns (MN) 
Clear Event Window 
Event Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Window 
Annual Earn ings (n=116) 
Prior 0.1137 0.1859 1.799 9.215 -0.2231 1.1000 
Ann 0.0094 0.0800 -1.759 16.563 -0.5045 0.2596 
Prior+Ann 0.1263 0.2203 1.393 8.972 -0.5323 1.2970 
Post 0.1083 0.2338 2.692 11.529 -0.2071 1.2030 
Total 0.2553 0.4066 2.337 10.554 -0.5126 2.3670 
Interim Earnings (n=152) 
Prior 0.0644 0.1895 1.160 7.359 -0.5472 0.9622 
Ann -0.0142 0.0844 -2.029 14.951 -0.5039 0.2472 
Prior+Ann 0.0517 0.2211 1.062 7.053 -0.6797 0.9726 
Post 0.0652 0.2277 1.958 12.965 -0.6198 1.4470 
Total 0.1201 0.3269 1.264 7.399 -0.7537 1.6350 
AGMs (n=106) 
NOT 0.0566 0.1170 1.661 8.611 -0.1452 0.6635 
Ann 0.0047 0.0360 2.254 18.201 -0.1015 0.2290 
Prior+Ann 0.0624 0.1333 1.800 8.550 -0.1638 0.6778 
Post 0.0075 0.1097 -0.959 9.047 -0.5725 0.2671 
Total 0.0742 0.2037 0.923 5.427 -0.5747 0.8631 
Board Changes (n=387) 
Prior 0.0239 0.1162 2.166 23.061 -0.4080 1.1240 
Ann 0.0005 0.0162 -2.246 29.103 -0.1604 0.0700 
Prior+Ann 0.0245 0.1192 2.557 28.591 -0.4241 1.2330 
Post 0.0099 0.1258 -0.311 9.503 -0.7202 0.7120 
Total 0.0360 0.1794 0.360 7.137 -0.7218 1.0460 
Changes in Shareholding (n=927) 
Prior 0.0306 0.1244 1.322 14.286 -0.6234 1.1100 
Ann 0.0019 0.0228 5.003 76.387 -0.1495 0.3468 
Prior+Ann 0.0326 0.1285 1.392 13.196 -0.5336 1.1180 
Post 0.0230 0.1204 0.712 10.762 -0.7406 0.7907 
Total 0.0576 0.1845 0.616 6.342 -0.7719 0.9381 
Notes: 
n represents the number of observations, 
Prior window - the value of (API; ,;,, -1), where 
(a-20,..., -1). 
Ann window - the value of (API;., -1), where 
(t--0), 
Prior+Ann window - the value of (APL,. _.; 
1), where (t=-20,..., 0), 
Post window - the value of (API; p,,; 
1), where (i=+1,..., +20), 
Total window - the value of (API;, o_,,, ý,,; 
1), where (t=-20,..., +20), 
265 
The table highlights the sensitivity of the API metric to the model of expected returns 
applied, nevertheless a pattern emerges. The expected return models are inconsistent 
regarding the sign of the mean return for the separate event windows. Though the 
findings are consistent with the API patterns depicted in chapter 5 (see Figures 5.1 to 
5.5). For mean adjusted returns (MN), the average return is always positive regardless 
of the event window or the information type examined; apart from one exception. The 
announcement of interim earnings, on average bears bad news (a negative return - 
0.0142), however this initial reaction is offset by mean return of 0.0652 earned over 
the post-announcement period. Similarly, for market model adjusted returns (MM), 
the initial response to the announcement of annual earnings, interim earnings and a 
board change is on average negative, which then reverses over the post-event period. 
Otherwise, returns performance is always positive. In contrast, for market adjusted 
returns (MKT), returns performance is on average negative, with the exception of 
annual earnings and AGMs. Here the dissimilarity ends, though for reasons of clarity 
we will only discuss market model estimations (MM). 
An important finding is that, all the return distributions are positively skewed in the 
prior period, indicating positive returns are more frequent than negative returns. This 
possibly indicates greater anticipation of good news than bad news by investors. 
However, the price adjustment on day 0 on the announcement of annual earnings, 
interim earnings and board changes, is generally negatively. This implies the 
announcement of earnings information or a change in board members, conveys more 
bad news than good news relative to prior expectations. A higher proportion of bad 
news released in earnings reports is consistent with McNichols (1988). After the 
event day, returns performance remains negatively skewed for board changes, but is 
positive for earnings. Sign reversal is also reported for AGMs. This hints at possible 
overreaction to earnings information, board changes and AGMs, while an 
underreaction to a change in shareholding. 
The level of kurtosis indicates the number of extreme observations in the tails of the 
returns distribution. Therefore, the higher the level of kurtosis, the higher the 
proportion of extreme returns performance. One possible interpretation is, that the 
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higher the return associated with a certain information type, the greater the uncertainty 
of its implications for security valuation, due to its relative imprecision. The highest 
level of kurtosis in the prior period is reported for board changes (27.894), followed 
by a change in shareholding (15.587), AGMs (6.778), annual earnings (6.617) and 
lastly interim earnings (6.442). The most extreme returns performance of the event 
period, is witnessed on the report day, regardless the type of information. This is 
consistent with the event releasing new information, previously unexpected. Suitably, 
the most extreme behaviour is associated with a change in shareholding, with a level 
of kurtosis of 77.985. This is followed by board changes, AGMs, annual earnings and 
lastly interim earnings. The level of uncertainty is resolved to pre-announcement 
levels for both board changes (9.707) and a change in shareholding (10.655). The 
greatest consensus of opinion, is associated with earnings news. 
7.4.2 The Pattern of Sign Reversal in Security Returns 
In chapter 6, Figures 6.1 to 6.5 illustrate that the market responds positively to good 
news, and negatively to bad news, over the duration of the event period, regardless the 
type of information. This implies, that on average investors underreact to information. 
Whereas sign reversal in security returns (e. g. a price decrease followed by a price 
increase), is an indication of possible investor overreaction. Tables 6.1 to 6.5, report 
daily sign reversal for both good and bad news events. The sign reversal is greater 
however for bad news. On a daily basis investors generally overreact to information, 
whereas over the duration of the event period, investors tend to underreact. 
Table 7.2 below, documents the number of instances of under and overreaction, over 
the event period, for each class of information. Table 7.2 abbreviates for the sign of 
the return by: a positive sign (+) to depict good news, a negative sign (-) to depict bad 
news, and zero (0) to depict no news. In all, seven different scenarios were identified, 
which can be broadly categorised as an overreaction, underreaction or no reaction. 
An overreaction is identified as a change in the sign of the return between two event 
windows. For example, where a security earns positive return in the prior period, 
which is reversed on the report day to a negative return; i. e. (+ -). In addition, where 
a security earns a negative on the announcement day, which is reversed over the post- 
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Table 7.2 
The Number of Under or Overreactions, Estimated using Market Model Adjusted (MM), 
Market Adjusted (MKT) and Mean Adjusted (MN) Expected Returns. 
Clear Event Window (t=-20,..., +20) 
MM MKT MN MM MKT MN 
Event Window Change from Prior to Ann Change from Ann to Post 
Annual Earnings 



































Notes: see over 
7 0 8 4 0 5 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 25 12 17 29 11 
46 39 63 53 33 65 
25 29 16 23 26 21 
28 32 26 27 37 22 
1.23 1.05 1.79 1.37 0.98 1.73 
8 0 9 2 0 3 
1 0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 2 
30 57 25 33 52 29 
53 37 64 64 26 67 
26 29 30 30 47 37 
48 44 38 36 42 28 
1.12 1.29 1.29 1.46 0.88 1.46 
1 0 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 17 16 24 33 25 
52 34 62 43 36 43 
22 35 18 12 16 11 
21 26 15 32 27 32 
1.58 0.84 2.36 1.52 1.60 1.58 
16 0 19 5 0 5 
1 0 1 3 0 3 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
77 117 58 93 125 80 
154 91 178 142 72 155 
86 115 97 79 115 79 
80 91 61 92 91 91 
1.38 1.01 1.48 1.35 0.91 1.38 
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Table 7.2 contd. 
MM MKT MN MM MKT MN 
Change from Prior to Ann Change from Ann to Post 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0 0 no reaction 25 
0 - over 0 
0 + under 0 
- - under 168 
+ + under 379 
- + over 228 




0 26 7 0 7 
0 0 1 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 
221 152 205 259 185 
259 441 353 249 375 
272 217 190 228 192 
226 142 221 242 217 
0.96 1.65 1.36 1.08 1.37 
1.00 1.61 1.38 1.04 1.41 
Notes: 
0 represents no news, + represents good news, - represents bad news, 
Under/Over represents the ratio of the total number of underneactions relative to the number of overreactions. 
announcement period to earn a positive return; i. e. (- +). An underreaction is therefore 
identified as a continuation in the sign of return between two event windows; i. e. (- - 
) or (+ +). The sign of the return is determined by the sign of the net return earned 
from investing £1 over the relevant event window (API;, j dOW 1). 
Due to the high level of inconsistency between the expected return models, only 
tentative observations can be made. Few events cause no change in investors' 
expectations, either in anticipation of, or after their release; i. e. (0 0). Rarer still are 
periods of activity, preceded by periods of no activity; i. e. (0 -) and (0 +). The 
number of instances of each scenario vary across each event window, indicating 
investors' initial response may occasionally be incorrect. The relative number of 
overreactions to underreactions varies noticeably between expected return models, 
where the market model (MM) and mean adjusted (MN) returns classifies the majority 
of responses as overreactions. However, for market adjusted returns (MKT), the 
number of over and underreactions are nearly equivalent. 
7.4.3 The Relation Between the Post-event Response and the Initial Price Change 
Irrespective of the sign of the news, the size of the response is generally assumed to 
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be a linear function of the size of the news, if investors' preferences display constant 
absolute risk aversion. However, in chapter 6 we observed a stronger price response, 
on day 0, to unfavourable news. This instead implies, investors' preferences display 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, and therefore we predict the average price change 
to be larger following bad news than good news. To evaluate the pattern of post- 
event returns we employ a dummy variable regression, 
(APItý, ý, s, - 
1) = ao + a, (DG1 . ARo) + a2 (DB; . ARo) + u; (7.1) 
Where 
(API;. 
P, S1 - 
1) = the net return from investing £1 in the ith security over the 
post-event period (t=+1,..., +20), 
ARa = the residual return on the event day, day 0, 
DG; =1 for good news, if the residual return on the event day is positive, and 
zero otherwise, 
DB; =1 for bad news, if the residual return on the event day is negative, and 
zero otherwise. 
The dummy variables, DG and DB, separate the price responses to good news from 
bad news, respectively. In contrast to chapter 6, the sign of the news is instead 
determined by the sign of the event day residual; as opposed to the sign of (APl -1). 
To control for the size of the news, the dummy variables in effect adopt both the 
magnitude and sign of the residual return on the event day. Hence, the coefficient a, 
measures the impact on post-event returns of the release of good news, and similarly 
a2 measures the impact of bad news. This regression is applied to each information 
type, whereby residual returns are estimated using the same three expected return 
models as previously defined. 
In the absence of the release of new information (i. e. where (API;, - 1) is equal to 
zero), investors' expectations should not change, and therefore nor should price. Thus, 
the intercept is hypothesised to be zero. In addition, the sign of the coefficients a, and 
a2, will all depend on whether investors under or overreact to information. If investors 
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underreact, and the same sign of return continues over the event window, we predict 
a positive coefficient for al. If however investors overreact, and there is sign reversal, 
we predict a negative coefficient for a2. A Wald test is employed to test the null 
hypothesis, that for a given size of news, the price response is equivalent between 
good and bad news; i. e. that the coefficients are of equal size (a, =a2). The results are 
presented in Table 7.3 below. The analysis is then repeated for `major' news events, 
where the dummy variables only take the value of one, when the event day residual 
if at least of the magnitude of I per cent. This is to control for potential 
misclassification of the sign of the news. It also allows us to infer whether the 
relationship between the size of the news and the price response, is non-linear. This 
may be implied if the size of the coefficient, a, or a2, varies between regressions 
according to the size of the news. These results are presented in Table 7.4 below. 
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Table 7.3a 
The Relation between Post-event Stock Returns and the Residual Return on the Event Day, 
Estimated Using Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM) 
Clear Event Window 
(API,,, - 1) = ao + a, (DG; . ARo) + a2 (DB, . ARo) + u, 
ao a, a2 Wald X'(1) 
ar =a: 
Annual Earnings 
0.0682"' -0.8524` 0.2865 0.8057 
(3.079) (-1.722) (0.593) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0089. F12,1131 = 1.5660, BP(2) = 4.6937 
Interim Earnings 
0.0569"' -0.6951 -0.0100 0.0018 
(3.060) (-1.783) (-0.025) 
n= 152, RZ = 0.0061, F(2,1491 = 1.5131, BP(2) = 10.5525 
AGMs 
0.0065 0.4804' 0.1709 0.0931 
(0.556) (1.780) (0.245) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.0008, F[2,1031 = 1.0423, BP(2) = 0.3916 
Board Changes 
0.0020 0.9356 0.2961 0.3507 
(0.300) (1.404) (0.525) 
n= 387, RZ = 0.0011, F12,384) = 1.2269, BP(2) = 5.0203 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0193"' 0.3656 0.3634 1.2339 
(4.813) (1.560) (0.756) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0033, F[2,924) = 2.6161, BP(2) = 20.2996 
Notes: 
(APIA,, -1) measures the net return of £1 invested in jib security, over the post period where (t=+1,..., +20), 
DG; equals the event day residual, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
DB, equals the event day residual, if the residual is negative, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients aI and a2, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stet is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 7.3b 
The Relation between Post-event Stock Returns and the Residual Return on the Event Day, 
Estimated Using Market Adjusted Returns (MKT) 
Clear Event Window 
(AP/1,,,, - 1) = a0 + a, (D(i, . 
ARO )+ a2 (DBi . 
AR, )+u, 
ao a, a2 Wald X2(1) 
Annual Earnings 
0.0047 0.3788 -0.2305 0.7388 
(0.273) (0.796) (-0.481) 
n= 116, R2 = -0.0015, F[2,113] = 0.9070, $P(2) = 40.3159 
Interim Earnings 
0.0071 -0.9619"` 0.1668 0.6845 
(0.408) (-2.817) (0.495) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.0276, F(2.1491 = 3.3565, BP(2) = 8.9265 
AGMs 
-0.0148 0.3861' 0.0388 0.0055 
(-1.283) (1.663) (0.081) 
n= 106, R2 = -0.0061. F[2.103) = 0.6652, BP(2) = 2.9982 
Board Changes 
-0.0194"' -0.0477 0.1213 0.0645 
(-2.756) (-0.061) (0.308) 
n= 387, R2 = -0.0047, F[2.3841 = 0.0323, BP(2) = 0.5049 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0018 -0.2220 0.4332 2.3320 
(0.486) (-1.473) (1.294) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0014.92.9241 = 1.6964, BP(2) = 2.5963 
Notes: 
(API;,,,, -1) measures the net return of £1 invested in ith security, over the post period where (t=+1,..., +20), 
DG, equals the event day residual, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise. 
DB; equals the event day residual, if the residual is negative, and zero otherwise. 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients aI and a2, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 7.3c 
The Relation between Post-event Stock Returns and the Residua! Return on the Event Day, 
Estimated Using Mean Adjusted Returns (MN) 
Clear Event Window 
(API; a, 0s, - 
1) = ao + a, (DG; . ARo) + a2 (DB, . AR, ) + u, 
ao a, a2 Wald X2(1) 
ar=a., 
Annual Earnings 
0.0846"` 0.5929 -0.4392 1.3408 
(3.427) (0.934) (-0.701) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0056, F[2,1131 = 1.3514, BP(2) = 23.9411 
Interim Earnings 
0.0738"` -0.8010" -0.0892 0.1209 
(3.542) (-2.201) (-0.201) 
n= 152, Rx = 0.0090, F(2,1491 = 1.7536, BP(2) = 7.7321 
AGMs 
0.0044 0.4074 0.2253 0.1529 
(0.358) (1.281) (0.318) 
n= 106, R2 = -0.0043, F12,1031 = 0.7623, BP(2) = 0.1302 
Board Changes 
0.0073 0.6862 0.0809 0.0234 
(0.991) (0.769) (0.165) 
n= 387, R2 = -0.0021, F12,3841 = 0.5693, BP(2) = 6.7113 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0023"' 0.5017' 0.6530 3.8882" 
(5.473) (1.894) (1.241) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0088, F[2,9241 = 5.3387. BP(2) = 30.2076 
Notes: 
Wk,. - 1) measures the net return of £1 invested in ith security, over the post period where (t=+1,..., +20), 
DG; equals the event day residual, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
DB; equals the event day residual, if the residual is negative, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively. 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients a, and a=, 
it represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heterosceduticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 7.4a 
The Relation between Post-event Stock Returns and the Residual Return on the Event Day, 
for Major News Events, Estimated Using Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM) 
Clear Event Window 
(AP/;,, a - 1) = ao + a, (DG; . AR, ) + a2 
(DB; . AR, ) + u, 
ao a, a2 Wald X2(1) 
a, =a2 
Annual Earnings 
0.0665"' -0.8182' 0.2642 0.6911 
(3.037) (-1.645) (0.541) 
n= 116, RI = 0.0071, F12,1131 = 1.4449, BP(2) = 4.7643 
Interim Earnings 
0.0559"' -0.6818' -0.0225 0.0097 
(3.058) (-1.760) (-0.056) 
n= 152, RZ = 0.0058, F12,1491 = 1.4849, BP(2) = 10.4323 
AGMs 
0.0076 0.4574' 0.1980 0.1276 
(0.672) (1.747) (0.288) 
n= 106, R2 = -0.0002, F[2,103] = 0.9892, BP(2) = 0.8559 
Board Changes 
0.0038 0.8374 0.3977 0.6614 
(0.595) (1.280) (0.685) 
n= 387. R2 = 0.0008, F12,3841 = 1.1174, BP(2) = 1.4550 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0192"' 0.3824 0.2619 0.6597 
(5.128) (1.625) (0.556) 
n= 927. RZ = 0.0028, F[2,9241 = 2.2928, BP(2) = 19.9859 
Notes: 
(API;,,; 1) measures the net return of £1 invested in ith security, over the post period where (t=+1,..., +20). 
DG; equals the event day residual, if the residual is positive and greater than I%, and zero otherwise, 
DB; equals the event day residual, if the residual is negative and greater than 1%. and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients a, and a2. 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity. with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 7.4b 
The Relation between Post-event Stock Returns and the Residual Return on the Event Day, 
for Major News Events, Estimated Using Market Adjusted Returns (MKT) 
Clear Event Window 
(API;,, m ,- 1) = ao + a, (DG;. 
ARo) + a2 (DB;. ARo) + u, 
ao a, a2 Wald X'(1) 
a, =a2 
Annual Earnings 
0.0054 0.3655 -0.2309 0.7501 
(0.324) (0.777) (-0.484) 
n= 116, R2 = -0.0018, F12.1131 = 0.8878, BP(2) = 40.6924 
Interim Earnings 
0.0054 -0.9324"' 0.1642 0.6755 
(0.318) (-2.783) (0.491) 
n= 152, RZ = 0.0263, F12,1491 = 3.2438, BP(2) = 7.0417 
AGMs 
-0.0140 0.3586' 0.0359 0.0048 
(-1.269) (1.650) (0.077) 
n= 106, RZ = -0.0073, F(2,1031 = 0.5961. BP(2) = 3.0013 
Board Changes 
-0.0198"' 0.0210 0.1464 0.1015 
(-3.157) (0.028) (0.385) 
n= 387. R2 = -0.0046, F[2,384] = 0.0531, BP(2) = 0.8292 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0006 -0.1442 0.5189 3.4466' 
(0.188) (-0.903) (1.568) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0019, F[2,9241 = 1.9688, BP(2) = 1.7325 
Notes: 
(API; ,,, -1) measures the net return of 
£1 invested in ith security, over the post period where (t-+1,..., +20). 
DG, equals the event day residual, if the residual is positive and greater than 1%. and zero otherwise, 
DB; equals the event day residual, if the residual is negative and greater than I%, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients aI and ar 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 7.4c 
The Relation between Post-event Stock Returns and the Residual Return on the Event Day, 
for Major News Events, Estimated Using Mean Adjusted Returns (MN) 
Clear Event Window 
(API; r,,, - 1) = ao + of (DG;. ARo) + a2 (DB;. ARo) + u, 
ao a, a2 Wald X2(l) 
Annual Earnings 
0.0862"` 0.5525 -0.4417 1.3657 
(3.524) (0.873) (-0.706) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0045, F[2,1131 = 1.2797, BP(2) = 23.7183 
Interim Earnings 
0.0728"' -0.8018" -0.0957 0.1400 
(3.547) (-2.235) (-0.216) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.0094, F[2,149) = 1.7906, BP(2) = 7.8685 
AGMs 
0.0051 0.3824 0.2252 0.1550 
(0.426) (1.228) (0.321) 
n= 106, R2 = -0.0056, F12,1031 = 0.6883, BP(2) = 0.8062 
Board Changes 
0.0093 0.3258 0.0955 0.0332 
(1.336) (0.385) (0.187) 
n= 387, RZ = -0.0041, F[2,384] = 0.1507, BP(2) = 0.3962 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0229"" 0.4299' 0.5132' 2.4090 
(5.784) (1.727) (1.998) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.0053,92,9241 = 3.5985, BP(2) = 26.1652 
Notes: 
(APIA,,, -1) measures the net return of £1 invested in ith security, over the post period where (t=+I,..,, +20), 
DG, equals the event day residual, if the residual is positive and greater than 1%, and zero otherwise, 
DB; equals the event day residual, if the residual is negative and greater than 1%, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
Wald )2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients a, and ar, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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The results reported in Table 7.3 are sensitive to the model of expected returns 
employed, but are generally found to be statistically insignificant, with one exception. 
The post-event response in stock returns for interim earnings, is significantly 
negatively related to the initial response to favourable news. This implies investors 
initially overreact on the event day, to the announcement of favourable interim 
earnings news. Given the overall low significance, we therefore cannot reliably 
predict the direction of post-event returns by the sign of the initial price change on 
day 0. The low significance of the results, is reflected accordingly by the low 
explanatory power of the regressions. The R2 values generally fail to exceed I per 
cent. This implies the post-event pattern of stock returns is generally unrelated to the 
price change on the report date. This is true for both good and bad news. 
Beyond this, the t-statistics indicate that post-event responses tend to be more 
pronounced for positive news than for negative news. Note also, the magnitude of the 
coefficient for positive news, a,, is generally larger than the corresponding coefficient 
for negative news, a2. Nevertheless, the results of the Wald test show we unable to 
reject the null hypothesis that a, =a2; with a single exception. Hence, for a given 
signal size, we find no supporting evidence of a differential price reaction between 
good and bad news. 
For both MM and MN, the intercept term is both positive and highly significant for 
annual and interim earnings, as well as a change in shareholding. For MKT, the 
intercept is both negative and highly significant for board changes. This implies in 
some instances, there is price activity regardless or not whether there is the release of 
new information. This however is consistent with the existence of liquidity traders. 
The picture changes little in Table 7.4, which reports the post-event response to 
`major' news; i. e. where the residual return on the event day exceeds 1 per cent. The 
signs and relative significance of the coefficients remain unchanged. ` However, this 
4Tests were also conducted for news with a residual return of at least 2.5 per cent on the event day. 
But typically the results were relatively unchanged from those reported in Tables 7.3(a, b, and c) and 
7.4(a, b and c). Results are available upon request. 
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may partly be explained by a small sample bias. In sum, the results must be viewed 
tentatively given their generally low level of significance. However, it is possible to 
infer that the direction of post-event returns cannot reliably be predicted by the sign 
of the initial price change on the event day. 
However these results do have implications for the manner in which the sign of the 
news is determined. In that they question the reliability of defining the sign of a news 
event, by the sign of the residual return on the event day, as frequently employed by 
other studies (see Chamber & Penman 1984 and Brown, Harlow & Tinic 1988). Thus 
providing support for the method employed in chapter 6, by determining the sign of 
the news by the sign of the net return over the duration of the event period. 
7.5 EVALUATION OF POST-EVENT VOLATILITY OF STOCK RETURNS 
The previous section, examined the price effect of the announcement of both good and 
bad news. However, this section investigates the effect of favourable and 
unfavourable news upon the volatility of stock returns over the post-event period. The 
motivation for this comes from the evidence of a greater increase in the volatility of 
stock returns following the disclosure of unexpected bad news, than the disclosure of 
unexpected good news (French, Schwert & Stambaugh 1987, Engle & Ng 1993). 
Similarly, Campbell & Hertschel (1992) find that market volatility is greater after 
stock market falls than after stock market rises. 
To investigate the cross-sectional variation in the volatility of stock returns after the 
release of good and bad news, we employ the dummy variable regression, 
VOLPosT.; = ao + a, DG; (API;,, 03, - 
1) + a2DB; (API;,.,,,, - 1) + u, (7.2) 
Where 
(API; 
' P., - 
1) = the net return of investing £1 in the ith security over the post- 
event period, on event days (t=+1,..., +20), 
DG; = 1, if (API;,, A - 1) is positive, and zero otherwise, 
DB; = 1, if (API;,, A - 1) is positive, and zero otherwise. 
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Dummy variables, DG and DB, separate the volatility response to good news from bad 
news, respectively. Where, the sign of the news is determined by the net return over 
the post-event window, (API - 1). Hence, announcements convey good news in the 
sense that they affect stock prices of reporting firms positively, and have an API2, 
value greater than 1.0. Announcements with an (API - 1) value less than 1.0 are 
classified as bad news, and those with an (API; - 1) value equal to 1.0 contain no 
news. We control for the size of the news by letting the dummy variable, in effect 
adopt the size of the signal, as measured by (API - 1). Hence, the coefficient a, 
measures the impact on post-event volatility of the release of good news, and similarly 
a2 measures the impact of bad news. This regression is applied to each information 
type, whereby residual returns are estimated using the same three expected return 
models, as previously defined. 
In the absence of the release of new information (i. e. where (APý, p., - 1) is equal to 
zero), there should be no change in investors' expectations, and subsequently no 
change in price. Thus, the intercept is hypothesised to be zero. Post-event volatility 
is also hypothesised to be an increasing function of the size of the news, and thus also 
predict a positive coefficient for a,, and negative for a2. A Wald test is employed to 
test the null, that for a given size of news, the volatility response is equivalent 
between good and bad news; i. e. (a, =-a2). The results are presented in Table 7.5 
below. Briefly, the results show that: 
The volatility of stock returns following the release of information, is an 
increasing function of the size of the news, except for annual earnings. 
After controlling for the size of the signal, the post-event volatility of 
stock returns is more pronounced for bad news. 
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Table 7.5a 
The Relation between the Volatility of Post-event Stock Returns, VOLPOST and 
the Sign of the News, Estimated Using Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM) 
Clear Event Window 
VOLPosT1 ;= ao + a, DG; (API1 p,,,, - 1) + a2DB, (API,.,,., - 1) + u, 
ao a, a2 Wald X2(l) 
a, =-a2 
Annual Earnings 
0.0162"' 0.0414" -0.0393 0.0072 
(5.612) (2.211) (-1.045) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.0566, F(2,113) = 4.7513, BP(2) = 15.1978 
Interim Earnings 
0.0054"' 0.1067"' -0.1805"' 26.0292- 
(3.310) (6.969) (-7.335) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.6175. F12,1491 = 135.004, BP(2) = 74.6164 
AGMs 
0.0040"' 0.1006"' -0.1337"' 4.2095" 
(3.182) (2.959) (-14.208) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.5223, F[2,103] = 61.6732, BP(2) = 136.7270 
Board Changes 
0.0056"' 0.0800"' -0.1466'° 60.4759'- 
(8.822) (7.341) (-16.833) 
n= 387, RZ = 0.5353,92,3841 = 238.8445, BP(2) = 57.8510 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0055"' 0.0800"' -0.1276"' 57.1343- 
(12.755) (10.398) (-19.369) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.4027, F12,924] = 330.3257, BP(2) = 229.9650 
Notes: 
DGi equals (API; 1), if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
DB; equals (API;, m- 1), if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients aI and &2, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for beteroseedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
281 
Table 7.5b 
The Relation between the Volatility of Post-event Stock Returns, VOLPOST and 
the Sign of the News, Estimated Using Market Adjusted Returns (MKT) 
Clear Event Window 
VOLPOST,; = ao + a, DG; (API;,,,., - 1) + a2DB; (API;,,,,, - 1) + u, 
as a, a2 Wald X2(1) 
a, =-a, 
Annual Earnings 
0.0236"' -0.0084 0.0316 0.3473 
(6.999) (-0.544) (1.080) 
n= 116, R2 = -0.0109, F[2,113] = 0.3271, BP(2) = 2.8932 
Interim Earnings 
0.0054"' 0.1395"' -0.1546"' 1.1449 
(3.356) (7.119) (-7.517) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.623 1. F12,1491 = 138.1989, BP(2) = 68.4987 
AGMs 
0.0043"` 0.1084"' -0.1216"' 0.4148 
(4.709) (4.084) (-12.672) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.4510, F[2,1031 = 46.5872, BP(2) = 40.3477 
Board Changes 
0.0050"' 0.1139"' -0.1336'** 3.8379- 
(7.895) (9.037) (-15.997) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.5378, F[2,3841 = 241.2435, BP(2) = 33.9740 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0048"` 0.1086"' -0.1267"' 7.9551 "' 
(12.432) (13.310) (-19.113) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.4350, F[2,924] = 377.1160, BP(2) = 162.2630 
Notes: 
IX3; equals (API; 1), if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
DB; equals (API; x- 1), if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients a, and a2, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breuseb-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 7.5c 
The Relation between the Volatility of Post-event Stock Returns, VOLPOST and 
the Sign of the News, Estimated Using Mean Adjusted Returns (MN) 
Clear Event Window 
VOLPOST,; = ao + a, DG; (API;,., - 1) + a2DB; (API;,,., - 1) +u 
ao a, a2 Wald X2(1) 
a, =-as 
Annual Earnings 
0.0241*** -0.0068 0.0815' 1.4980 
(7.003) (-0.757) (1.661) 
n= 116, R2 = -0.0021, F12,1131 = 0.8692, BP(2) = 6.4654 
Interim Earnings 
0.0063"' 0.0891- -0.1819"' 41.2250- 
(4.491) (9.257) (-6.984) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.6196, F(2,149] = 136.1710, BP(2) = 48.7758 
AGMS 
0.0040"` 0.0936"' -0.1265"' 4.1431" 
(3.207) (2.875) (-10.725) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.4826, F[2,103] = 52.7680, BP(2) = 123.8580 
Board Changes 
0.0055"' 0.0776°' -0.1399"' 57.6149- 
(7.890) (7.793) (-13.108) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.5218, F12,384] = 226.3485, BP(2) = 59.6816 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0052 0.0819"' -0.1175"' 38.6829- 
(12.018) (11.957) (-13.207) 
n= 927, RI = 0.4296, F12,9241 = 368.9446, BP(2) = 348.7020 
Notes: 
UGC equals (APIix- 1), if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
DB; equals (API;, - 1), if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients a, and a2, 
o represents the number of observations, 
RZ is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
283 
The results are robust across the three measures of expected returns, and consistent for 
all information types with the exception of annual earnings. The following discussion 
will therefore initially refer only to interim earnings, AGMs, board changes and a 
change in shareholding. The signs of the coefficients are all as predicted, positive for 
good news, and negative for bad. Supporting the intuition that the volatility of post- 
event stock returns, is an increasing function of the size of the news. The size of the 
coefficient for negative news, a2, is correspondingly larger than the coefficient for 
positive news, al. The t-statistics are all significant, and indicate that post-event 
responses tend to be more pronounced for bad news than for good. With the 
exception of market adjusted returns (MKT), the calculated Wald test values exceed 
the 0.05 critical value of 3.84, for all information types. Thus, the null hypothesis that 
the post-event volatility response is equivalent between good and bad news (ie. a, =-a2), 
can be rejected in the majority of cases. Therefore we can reliably report, that post- 
event volatility of stock returns is more pronounced for bad news. 
The R2 value implies the sign of the news explains 62 per cent of the volatility in 
stock returns, after the release of the interim earnings report. The ability of the sign 
of the news in explaining the volatility response to interim earnings, is substantiated 
by the larger coefficients associated with interim news than for other event types. For 
the other events, depending on the returns model, 52 to 54 per cent of the activity for 
board changes, 45 to 52 per cent for AGMs, and between 40 to 44 per cent following 
a change in shareholding. 
With respect to annual earnings, the value of the coefficients a, and a2, is equivalent 
to zero. The low explanatory power of the sign of the news for post-event volatility 
is supported by an RZ value no greater than 6 per cent. However in chapter 5, we 
reported a higher level of drift for annual earnings than for the other information 
types. High drift coupled with low volatility implies annual earnings is a clearer 
signal. Therefore, it appears as though investors are confident as to the implications 
of annual earnings, but take time to impound the information. In addition, the 
intercept term is positive and statistically significantly different from zero. Here the 
size of the intercept is relatively small, no greater than 0.006; with the exception for 
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annual earnings. This implies security prices are volatile even in the absence of 
information. However, a plausible explanation which is not inconsistent with an 
efficiency explanation, maybe the activity reflects the actions of liquidity traders 
In brief, the results thus far support the hypothesis that the variability of stock returns 
following the release of information, is an increasing function of the size of the news, 
with the exception of annual earnings. However, by controlling for the size of the 
signal, post-event volatility is even greater for bad news. This is consistent with the 
earlier observation in chapter 6, of greater sign reversal in daily excess returns for bad 
news. Such a response by investors, would imply bad news is associated with greater 
uncertainty than good news. 
7.6 THE RESOLUTION OF PRIOR UNCERTAINTY 
The relative increase in the volatility of stock returns surrounding the announcement 
of earnings, compared to non-announcement periods, is well documented. 5 Where the 
increase in volatility is interpreted as an indicator of more information arriving at the 
market, during periods when earnings are reported than at other times, on average. 
So far throughout this thesis, all price movement is presumed to be in response to 
information, whether this be the investors' own information, or information inferred 
from the actions of others (see Bikchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch 1992, Trueman 1992 
and 1994). The volatility of stock returns is therefore presumed to measure the extent 
to which investors trade on their (newly) acquired information. 
The financial markets literature implies stock return volatility captures more than 
information (Roll 1988, Cutler, Poterba & Summers 1989). The actions of liquidity 
traders is one example. While the average returns behaviour surrounding a change in 
shareholding, reported in Table 6.5 in the previous chapter, is suggestive of possible 
herding by investors (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch 1992). A shareholding 
change is more likely to occur after a period of pronounced activity. For example, the 
likelihood of an investor buying (selling) a large stockholding, increases after a period 
'See Beaver (1968), Patell & Wolfson (1979), Brookfield & Morris (1992), and Pope & Inyangete 
(1992). 
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of positive (negative) returns. The significant positive returns continue after the 
announcement, suggesting a larger stockholding change acts as an important signal to 
other, and perhaps less informed investors. In addition, in both chapters 5 and 6, we 
find our model explains post-announcement drift far better than price movement on 
the announcement day. This may indicate that investors' initial reactions to both 
earnings and non-earnings news, are not based on informed judgements. 
We argue in chapter 3, that the volatility of stock returns prior to an event (VOLPR), 
measures the extent to which investors have chosen to be informed, in anticipation of 
the forthcoming event. The higher the volatility of prior stock returns (VOLPR; ), the 
higher the expected anticipation. The level of prior volatility reflects the markets' 
uncertainty as to the implications of available information, as well as to the expected 
outcome of the event. The extent to which uncertainty is resolved by the disclosure, 
will in part depend on the precision of the information released. For instance, 
disclosure of the earnings figure will reduce one source of uncertainty, but depending 
on the quality of the information, could either increase or decrease uncertainty as to 
the future payoffs of the security. 6 
Hence, if investors are informed traders, for expected events, we expect to see a trade- 
off between prior and post-event uncertainty, as measured by the volatility of stock 
returns. An increase in post-event uncertainty would suggest prior anticipation was 
uninformed. However, the extent of the trade-off between prior and post-event 
volatility is also dependent on the actual precision of the information announced (Kim 
& Verrecchia 1991a and 1991b, Demski & Feltham 1994, and McNichols & Feltham 
1994). 
If the quality of the announcement is so precise, it will cause individual beliefs to 
converge, and reduce the level of volatility in stock returns. ' If the announcement 
6 There two further sources of uncertainty associated with an announcement's release: (i) there is 
always a measure of error involved, and so the true implications are never certain; and (ii) the surprise 
associated with the unexpected timing of its release. 
' There is always some level of volatility reflecting the actions of liquidity traders. 
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is so imprecise, the information will be ignored by investors. Post-event volatility 
(VOLP0sT), therefore measures the extent to which prior uncertainty has been 
resolved, and the need to acquire further information is reduced. Hence, according to 
the precision of the information, an event can either increase or reduce the divergence 
in beliefs across investors. Hence, post-event volatility is a function of both prior 
anticipation and the precision of the information disclosure. 
Table 7.6 below, reports the descriptive statistics of the changing level of volatility 
over the duration of the event period, for each class of information. The mean values 
indicate only AGMs and a change in shareholding reduce the volatility of stock 
returns to below pre-event levels. However if we condition post-event volatility on 
prior volatility, as measured by (VOLPOST; / VOLPR), on average all information 
types increase post-event uncertainty to varying degrees. Where an event is defined 
as increasing uncertainty when (VOLPOST; / VOLPR) has a value greater than 1. For 
an event to resolve uncertainty, we therefore assume there to be trade-off between pre- 
announcement and post-announcement volatility. 
However, we do not interpret our measure of a change in volatility (VOLPOST; / 
VOLPP, ), as a measure of information content, for which we would need to scale the 
event period volatility by pre-event period volatility (Patell 1976). Although VOLPRi 
does to some extent control for the level of pre-disclosure information it may be 
argued it does not cover a period for which there is a `normal' level of unsystematic 
risk caused by information arrival and noise traders (Strong 1992). Instead the 
measure (VOLPOST; / VOLPR) is interpreted as the extent to which the public signal 
acts as a substitute for the acquisition of private information, over the event period. " 
'A similar technique is employed by Brown, Harlow & Tinic (1993), who instead use the measure 
calculated by equation (7.1) as a proxy for risk, which captures not only potential changes in systematic 
risk but also changes in parameter uncertainty over the event period. They find that abnormal post- 
event returns can be explained by a considerable by the post-event volatility of stock returns, for both 
positive and negative events. 
287 
Table 7.6 
Distribution Properties of the Volatility of Stock Returns 
over the Event Period, for Each Class of Information 
Event Mean Std. Dev Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Window 
Annual Earnings (n=116) 
Prior 0.0196 0.0359 
Prior+Ann 0.0236 0.0365 
Post 0.0218 0.0275 
Post/Prior 1.0306 1.3937 
Interim Earnings (n=152) 
Prior 0.0189 0.0327 
Prior+Ann 0.0225 0.0334 
Post 0.0221 0.0265 
Post/Prior 1.1655 2.7690 
AGMs (n=106) 
Prior 0.0130 0.0095 
Prior+Ann 0.0140 0.0106 
Post 0.0121 0.0130 
Post/Prior 1.0946 0.9157 
Board Change (n=387) 
Prior 0.0144 0.0151 
Prior+Ann 0.0144 0.0148 
Post 0.0144 0.0152 
Post/Prior 1.1271 1.4255 
Change in Shareholding (n=927) 
Prior 0.0135 0.0157 
Prior+Ann 0.0137 0.0158 
Post 0.0127 0.0134 
Post/Prior 1.2343 1.4795 
7.823 76.338 0.0000 0.3742 
6.933 64.393 0.0000 0.3686 
2.742 12.031 0.0000 0.1605 
3.551 22.591 0.0000 10.9300 
7.924 84.754 0.0000 0.3742 
6.921 69.998 0.0000 0.3686 
2.490 10.969 0.0000 0.1605 
9.024 99.415 0.0000 32.4700 
1.131 3.925 0.0000 0.0449 
1.341 4.897 0.0000 0.0552 
3.614 19.692 0.0000 0.0887 
1.506 4.847 0.0000 4.2430 
3.734 27.544 0.0000 0.1595 
3.710 27.145 0.0000 0.1558 
2.735 13.978 0.0000 0.1256 
5.207 44.434 0.0000 16.2000 
6.104 74.956 0.0000 0.2631 
5.858 68.107 0.0000 0.2569 
3.063 16.867 0.0000 0.1193 
4.137 28.713 0.0000 16.1600 
Notes: 
n represents the number of observations, 
Prior window - the value of VOLP[t;, where (t=-20,..., -1), 
Prior+Ann window - the value of VOLPR+A;, where (t=-20,..., 0), 
Post window - the value of VOLPOST,, where (t=+1..., +20). 
Post/Prior - the ratio of VOLPOST, relative to VOLPR. 
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The extent to which the announcement resolves prior uncertainty, reflects the quality 
of the information announced, and is measured by the trade-off between prior and post 
volatility. Where, volatility prior to an event is assumed to measure the extent which 
investors are informed about the forthcoming disclosure, conditional on the pre- 
disclosure environment. To provide an empirical test, we employ the dummy variable 
regression 
VOLPOsT; = ao + a, (DG,. VOLPR; ) + a2(DB;. VOLPR, ) + u; (7.3) 
Where 
VOLposr; = the volatility of stock returns for the ith security over the post 
period, where (t=+1,..., +20), 
VOLPR = the volatility of stock returns for the ith security over the prior 
period, where (t=-20,...; 1), 
DG; =1 for good news, and 0 otherwise, 
DB; =1 for bad news, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variables, DG and DB, are again used to separate the volatility response to 
good news from bad news, respectively. The dummy variables, in effect adopt the 
value of prior volatility, VOLPR;. Hence, the coefficient a, measures the trade-off 
between post-event volatility and the prior anticipation of good news. Similarly, a2 
measures the trade-off between post-event volatility and the prior anticipation of bad 
news. The sign of the news is determined as before, by the sign of the net return of 
investing £1 in the ith security over the duration of the event window (API;, -1). If 
pre-event volatility measures the extent to which investors are informed, we assume 
greater anticipation leads to lower uncertainty in the post period, ceteris paribus. If 
there is perfect anticipation, or the quality of the event is so precise, investor beliefs 
will converge. Consequently, the coefficients a, and a2 will equal zero. 
It is improbable there will be either perfect anticipation, or that the event will be so 
precise to resolve uncertainty completely. However, the greater the precision or 
anticipation of the event, the greater the trade-off between prior and post volatility of 
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stock returns (i. e. VOLPOS ,/ VOLPR; < 1). Accordingly, if there is a trade-off 
between prior and post-event volatility, we expect the coefficients a, and a2 to take a 
value less than one. If the coefficients take a value greater than one, this may suggest 
prior activity was not in response to information. By controlling for the level of prior 
anticipation, the relative precision of the different information types can be inferred 
by the relative size of the coefficients. The lower the size of the coefficient, the 
greater the trade-off (i. e. the resolution of prior uncertainty), and therefore the greater 
the precision of the information. 
We can also test a earlier notion from chapter 6. If, on average, there is greater 
anticipation of good news than bad, we expect there to be less uncertainty after the 
announcement of good news in comparison to bad news. Accordingly, we expect the 
coefficient of good news, a,, to exceed the coefficient of bad news, a2. The results 
are presented in Table 7.7 below. The main finding is: 
Higher volatility in stock returns in the prior period leads to lower 
volatility in the post-announcement period. This suggests volatility 
reflects the impounding of information, as opposed to uninformed trading. 
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Table 7.7a 
The Relation between the Volatility of Post-event Stock Returns (VOLPOST), and 
Prior Stock Returns (VOLPR), Estimated Using Market Model Adjusted Returns (MM) 
Clear Event Window 
VOLPOST; = ao + al(DG;. VOLPR; ) + aa(DB;. VOLPR; ) + u; 
ao a, a2 
Annual Earnings 
0.0151"' 0.41110.2231 
(6.780) (12.136) (1.630) 
n= 116, R2 = 0.2632, F12,113] = 23.3215, BP(2) = 1.0341 
Interim Earnings 
0.0131*** 0.5732"` 0.3862*.. 
(6.174) (3.449) (14.691) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.2456, Fj2,1491 = 28.0222. BP(2) = 9.8639 
AGMs 
0.0031 0.6490"' 0.7458- 
(1.625) (2.664) (3.995) 
n= 106. R2 = 0.2400. F(2,103) = 18.5227, BP(2) = 87.0362 
Board Changes 
0.0078"' 0.3133"' 0.6120- 
(8.079) (3.844) (6.329) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.2453, F[2,384] = 68.1137, BP(2) = 122.5160 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0080"" 0.3393"' 0.3610"` 
(9.258) (5.479) (3.417) 
n= 927, Rz = 0.1687, F12.9241 = 100.0992. BP(2) = 566.0610 
Notes: 
DG, equals VOLPR, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
DB; equals VOLPR;, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level. respectively, 
Wald X2(1) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients a, and ar, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance. 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 7.7b 
The Relation between the Volatility of Post-event Stock Returns (VOLPOST, ), and 
Prior Stock Returns (VOLPR), Estimated Using Market Adjusted Returns (MKT) 
Clear Event Window 
VOLPOST, = ao + a1(DG,. VOLPR, ) + a2(DB,. VOLPR; ) + u; 
ao a, a2 
Annual Earnings 
0.0138"' 0.4402"` 0.3902- 
(5.618) (4.001) (12.031) 
n= 116. R2 = 0.2546, F12,1131 = 22.3425, BP(2) = 3.3496 
Interim Earnings 
0.0125"' 0.7151"' 0.3800- 
(6.275) (3.898) (13.282) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.2612,92,1491 = 30.3409, BP(2) = 12.3363 
AGMs 
0.8713' 0.7492"' 0.6247- 
(1.678) (2.671) (3.955) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.2425, F12,1031 = 18.7637, BP(2) = 76.6773 
Board Changes 
0.0077"' 0.3371*** 0.5688- 
(7.630) (3.810) (5.953) 
n= 387, RZ = 0.2269, F(2,384) = 61.6061, BP(2) = 133.2860 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0078"' 0.4118- 0.3262 
(9.829) (5.333) (4.479) 
n= 927, R2 = 0.1721, F[2,924[ = 102.5228, BP(2) = 418.9190 
Notes: 
DG; equals VOLPR;, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
DBi equals VOLPR;, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise, 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
'; ' "' statistically significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
Wald X2(l) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients a, and a2, 
n represents the number of observations. 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for beteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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Table 7.7c 
The Relation between the Volatility of Post-event Stock Returns (VOLP0sT, ), and Prior Stock Returns (VOLPR)., Estimated Using Mean Adjusted Returns (MN) 
Clear Event Window 
VOLPOST, = ao + a, (DG,. VOLPR; ) + a2(DB;. VOLPR, ) + u; 
a0 Qý a2 
Annual Earnings 
0.0153"" 0.3969"' 0.1705 
(6.886) (13.450) (1.395) 
n= 116, RZ = 0.2474, F12,113) = 21.5492, BP(2) = 0.0445 
Interim Earnings 
0.0127"' 0.5893"' 0.3817"' 
(5.850) (3.696) (14.737) 
n= 152, R2 = 0.2483, F[2,149) = 28.4160, BP(2) = 10.4914 
AGMs 
0.0031 0.6508"' 0.7313- 
(1.642) (2.569) (4.066) 
n= 106, R2 = 0.2389, F[2,103) = 18.4223, BP(2) = 87.0608 
Board Changes 
0.0079"' 0.3358°' 0.5991"' 
(7.823) (3.974) (5.773) 
n= 387, R2 = 0.2356, F[2,384] = 64.6585, BP(2) = 146.908 
Changes in Shareholdings 
0.0080"' 0.3442"' 0.3564- 
(9.502) (5.608) (3.394) 
n= 927, Rz = 0.1685. F12,9241 = 99.9632, BP(2) = 546.9180 
Notes: 
DG; equals VOLPR, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise. 
DB; equals VOLPR;, if the residual is positive, and zero otherwise. 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical level, respectively, 
Wald X2(l) tests the statistical equivalence of coefficients a, and a, 
n represents the number of observations, 
R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, 
F-stat is a joint test of statistical significance, 
BP(2) is the Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared test for heteroscedasticity, with 2 degrees of freedom. 
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With two exceptions, the coefficients a, and a2 are all significantly different from zero. 
This implies post-event volatility of stock returns is positively related to prior 
volatility. However, it also implies that the average event is not perfectly anticipated. 
Or alternatively, the average event is not precise enough to converge all investors' 
future expectations. The coefficients a, and a2, also always take a value less than one. 
There is therefore a trade-off between the level of prior and post-event volatility of 
stock returns. This suggests, that on average, investors trade on information prior to 
a forthcoming disclosure. However, it could also imply that the average corporate 
disclosure, is precise enough to partially resolve prior uncertainty. 
By controlling for the level of prior uncertainty, the relative size of the coefficient 
between information types will indicate their relative precision. The smaller the 
coefficient, the greater the precision of the information. For good news events, the 
relative pattern of coefficient sizes is consistent across return metrics. For example 
using market adjusted returns (MKT), the respective coefficient sizes are as follows: 
0.3371 for board changes, 0.4118 for a change in shareholding, 0.4402 for annual 
earnings, 0.7175 for interim earnings, and 0.7492 for AGMs. This implies the average 
board change resolves prior uncertainty to the greatest extent, and the average AGM 
the least. For bad news events the pattern is not robust across return metrics, although 
AGMs generally appear to be the least precise. 
If there is greater anticipation of good news, we predict the bad news coefficient to 
exceed the good news coefficient; i. e (a2>a, ). Table 7.7 shows the results are sensitive 
to the returns model. However for earnings information, the opposite to what we 
predict holds true; the coefficient for favourable earnings news exceeds that for 
unfavourable earnings news. Favourable earnings news would appear to resolve prior 
uncertainty to a lesser extent than unfavourable earnings news. One possible 
interpretation is therefore, bad earnings news is more precise than good news. Or 
alternatively, maybe unfavourable earnings news provokes less interest. This would 
be consistent with recent UK evidence, that finds investors ignore bad news (see 
Sharkaway & Garrod 1995). This also fits with the lower level of anticipation and 
drift identified in chapter 6, for bad news relative to good news. 
294 
For non-earnings events, the picture is less clear. However, the explanatory power of 
prior volatility for post-event volatility (as measured by the R2 values), varies between 
23 to 26 per cent for earnings, AGMs and board changes. For a change in 
shareholding, the RZ value is no greater than 17 per cent. This implies post-event 
volatility is less associated with prior volatility for a change in shareholding. However 
this is to be expected given that a shareholding change is more unexpected than the 
other events. 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter addresses the issues of both under and overreaction to the release of 
information, and also examines the volatility of post-event stock returns, distinguishing 
between the sign of the news. The main tests involve using dummy variable analysis 
which test the equivalence of the market reaction (i. e. both price and volatility) 
between the sign of the news. The following observations are made. 
The period prior to the announcement is associated with more positive returns than 
negative, possibly indicating the greater anticipation of good news than bad news by 
investors. However, the initial price adjustment to the announcement of earnings 
reports is associated with the release of more bad news than good; as identified by the 
skewness of returns. This is consistent with the work of McNichols (1988), who 
similarly finds the release of earnings reports is associated with more bad news than 
good news. 
The empirical literature documents many instances of both under and overreaction to 
information (Brown, Harlow & Tinic 1988, Kasznik & Lev 1994). Although few 
studies determine the type of information the market either under or overreacts to, and 
fewer still determine the sign of information. The pattern of stock return behaviour 
depicted in chapter 6, is suggestive of underreaction to both earnings and non-earnings 
information, over the duration of the event window, regardless the nature of the news. 
However, on a daily basis investors appear to overreact to information. When we 
control for the size of the news, we are unable to statistically confirm either scenario. 
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However, it can be confirmed that the direction of the post-event pattern of stock 
returns cannot reliably be predicted by the direction of the initial price change on the 
announcement day. This holds for both good and bad news, and for all classes of 
information. This has implications for the manner in which the sign of the news is 
measured. Determining the sign of the news by the return over the announcement 
period is therefore inappropriate, although it is an approach which is nevertheless 
adopted in many studies (Chambers & Penman 1984, Brown, Harlow & Tinic 1988). 
We find supporting evidence that the volatility of stock returns following the release 
of information, is an increasing function of the size of the news; with the exception 
of annual earnings. The relatively high level of drift and low level of volatility 
associated with annual earnings, implies that annual earnings is a clearer signal than 
the other information types. It appears as though investors are confident as to the 
implications of annual earnings, but take time to impound the information. 
After controlling for the size of the signal, post-event volatility of stock returns is 
more pronounced for bad news. This is consistent with the results of Brown, Harlow 
& Tinic (1988). Such a response by investors, would imply bad news is associated 
with greater uncertainty than good news. This would certainly agree with the 
observations made in chapter 6 of the greater daily sign reversal in abnormal returns 
for bad news, and indications of the lower anticipation of bad news, for instance. A 
possible explanation is that bad news is perhaps more difficult to anticipate and 
interpret, relative to good news. 
The trade-off between the level of prior and post-event volatility of stock returns, 
suggests that on average, investors trade on information prior to an event as opposed 
to noise. It could also imply that the average corporate disclosure is precise enough 
to partially resolve prior uncertainty. For earnings news, the results indicate a greater 
trade-off between prior and post-event volatility for bad news than good. This 
suggests that unfavourable earnings news is more precise than favourable earnings 
news. A more likely explanation, maybe unfavourable earnings news provokes less 
interest by investors. This would be consistent with recent UK evidence, that finds 
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investors ignore bad news (see Sharkaway & Garrod 1995). The picture is less clear 
cut for non-earnings information. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
There is evidence of both market anticipation (Ball & Brown 1968, Kothari & Sloan 
1992), and lagged impounding (Bernard & Thomas 1989, Ou & Penman 1989) of 
value relevant information. An efficiency explanation for this apparent anomaly is 
that investors choose not to be informed, and consequently not all information will be 
impounded into security prices. The papers by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980), Kim & 
Verrecchia (1991 a and 1991 b), Demski & Feltham (1994) and McNichols & Trueman 
(1994) all identify conditions under which the search for information will take place. 
Grossman and Stiglitz were among the first to suggest that prices in equilibrium are 
unlikely to fully reflect all information, because the expected costs of information 
exceed the expected benefits of being informed. 
The objective of this research is therefore to identify the conditions under which 
investors choose to be informed, in anticipation of and in response to, different types 
of information. More specifically, we attempt to explain the behaviour of stock 
returns in terms of the expected costs and expected benefits which investors must 
consider when faced with the decision of whether to acquire and interpret information. 
Both firm-specific characteristics and different information types are chosen to proxy 
for the associated costs and benefits of being informed. The chosen proxies are firm 
size, the number of years a firm has been trading, the number of disclosures a firm 
makes, and the volatility of stock returns prior to the announcement under 
examination. Different types of information are chosen to specifically examine 
whether the anticipation and the interpretation of an event varies according to its 
expected probability and expected precision of the released information. The 
information types examined are the annual earnings report, the interim earnings report, 
the annual general meeting, notification of a board change and of a change in 
shareholding. In all, this research is an attempt to further our understanding of how 
and why investors react to new information, and may provide a further explanation for 
post-announcement drift. 
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The Anticipation and Interpretation of Information 
Chapter 5 initially examines the pattern of average stock returns over the event period, 
for each class of information, and identifies the impounding behaviour of investors. 
The market appears to anticipate part of the information content of the average 
corporate disclosure, but continues to adjust after the report date perhaps as the full 
implications become known. The average earnings report, in particular the annual 
report, is associated with a much higher level of anticipation and drift relative to non- 
earnings news. This possibly indicates the greater relevance and precision of earnings 
information for security valuation. The corresponding high level of drift in security 
returns following the earnings release, is consistent with the notion that earnings 
reports contain information not available from alternative more timely information 
sources (Chambers & Penman 1984). However, the results must be viewed tentatively 
due to the predominantly low significance of the daily average abnormal returns. One 
cannot therefore be certain that the average event, for any class of information, causes 
a persistent, positive or even negative impact on stock returns. The apparent drift in 
security returns, may therefore indicate possible model mis-specification in the 
calculation of unexpected returns. 
The objective has been to try and explain this pattern of stock return behaviour for 
each information type, in terms of the factors hypothesised in chapter 3 to explain the 
process of anticipation and interpretation of information. The results are generally 
consistent with our expectations. Market anticipation is found to be an increasing 
function of firm size, the number of years a firm has been trading, and the volatility 
of prior stock returns. This in turn implies the cost of being informed is a decreasing 
function of firm size, age and other factors as proxied by the volatility of stock 
returns. However, the increasing voluntary disclosure by firms appears to reduce the 
ability of investors to both anticipate and interpret information. A possible 
interpretation may be that increased disclosure by firms discourages investors from 
acquiring costly information, if they expect their expectations will soon again need to 
be revised on the release of new information (Trueman 1994). Or alternatively, 
increased disclosure of imprecise information may confuse the expectations of 
investors. 
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The model explains post-announcement drift better than the price movement on the 
announcement day, which may indicate investors initial reactions are not always based 
on informed judgements. The initial market reaction on the announcement day to the 
disclosure of both earnings and non-earnings information is predominately a function 
of firm size. However, the volatility of stock returns (prior to the disclosure) is the 
main driving force behind the explanation of post-announcement drift. We also find 
the stock return behaviour surrounding the announcement of interim earnings is least 
explained, relative to the other information types. This is surprising given the higher 
level of drift observed for interim reports, and would suggest investors are less 
informed about the implications of interim earnings news. 
Allowing other disclosures within the event window, noticeably reduces both the 
overall level of significance of the daily abnormal returns. This reduction may in part 
reflect the small firm bias of examining isolated events, and in part reflect an increase 
in the level of noise present in prices from the inclusion of confounding events. 
However, we assert the problem is one of small firm bias given the overall increase 
in the explanatory power of firm size for stock returns behaviour on the announcement 
day. Furthermore, allowing other events in the event window increases the 
explanatory power of the volatility of stock returns, which remains the main driving 
force behind the explanation of post-announcement drift. 
Good and Bad News 
Chapter 6 extends the results of the previous chapter by addressing the issue of good 
and bad news. This is prompted by growing evidence that the market reaction to 
corporate disclosure varies according to the sign of the news, and therefore so may the 
process of anticipation and interpretation of good and bad news. As in chapter 5, this 
chapter proceeds by firstly identifying the pattern of average stock returns over the 
event period for each class of information, distinguishing between the sign of the 
news. We find initial indications of differential price behaviour towards the release 
of good and bad news. The results emphasise the need to partition events according 
to their sign, to more fully appreciate the process of impounding information by 
investors. The analysis also demonstrates the ability of investors to anticipate the sign 
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of the news by up to twenty trading days in advance of its release. 
The general pattern of security returns, is upward for good news and downward for 
bad; a pattern suggestive of underreaction. Both the significance of daily abnormal 
returns, and the level of anticipation and the level of drift, is higher for good news 
events than bad. Without controlling for the size of the news, it is not possible to say 
whether the average good news event is more informative than bad news, or that bad 
news is generally more difficult to anticipate and interpret. An alternative explanation 
is that bad news is ignored by investors (Sharkarway & Garrod 1995). Or maybe 
what we have captured is not bad news but instead the liquidity trades of investors, 
and investors selling due to information; and thereby giving the appearance of bad 
news being ignored. 
On further investigation, we find for both annual and interim earnings reports, the 
absolute size of the price adjustment on the announcement day, is greater for 
unfavourable earnings news than favourable earnings news. This further suggests that 
bad news is not as easily interpreted as good news. This is substantiated by the 
greater daily sign reversal in the abnormal returns observed for bad news. The level 
of anticipation and level of drift associated with earnings announcements, is again 
higher than for the other information types, for both good and bad news events. In 
addition, the significance of the abnormal returns over many days of the event 
window, surrounding a change in shareholding is indicative of possible herding by 
investors. 
The objective then is to explain the stock return behaviour surrounding the different 
disclosures of information, separately for good and bad news. As in chapter 5, the 
model explains post-announcement drift better than announcement returns. This 
further suggests investors' initial reactions are neither informed for good or bad news 
events. Our model also explains the behaviour of stock returns surrounding good 
news events better than for bad news events. A possible explanation may be that 
investors reactions to bad news are less informed in general, and supports our earlier 
notion that bad news is more difficult to interpret. 
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As before, allowing other disclosures within the event period, increases the overall 
power of the model in the explanation of the behaviour of stock returns. Firm size 
explains announcement returns (ANN) for good news, but less so for bad news. 
However firm size does not explain post-announcement drift. A potential explanation 
for this is that bad news is difficult to anticipate and to interpret for all classes of 
information, regardless the sign of the news. The volatility of prior stock returns 
persists as the most prominent explanation of post-announcement drift. 
Is Price Movement in Response to Information? 
It is generally assumed that the market response is equivalent towards both good and 
bad news, ceteris paribus. However, in the previous chapter we made a number of 
indications of how investors both anticipate and respond differently to the 
announcement of good and bad news. It has similarly been assumed, that all price 
movement is in response to information; whether this is in response to investors' own 
information, or information inferred from the actions of others. However in both 
chapters 5 and 6, we found indications that investors' initial reactions to earnings and 
non-earnings information may be uninformed. The objective of chapter 7, is to 
determine the validity of these observations and our underlying assumptions. 
In general, bad news appears to be associated with greater uncertainty than good news. 
A possible explanation is that bad news is perhaps more difficult to anticipate and 
interpret, relative to good news. Subsequent tests find further indications of the earlier 
anticipation of good news relative to bad news. For instance, we show the release of 
interim and annual earnings is associated with more bad news than good news. This 
is consistent with work of McNichols (1988). Such a response by investors, would 
imply bad news is associated with greater uncertainty than good news. This would 
certainly agree with the observations made in chapter 6 of the greater daily sign 
reversal in abnormal returns for bad news, and indications of the lower anticipation 
of bad news, for instance. Supporting the explanation that bad news is perhaps more 
difficult to anticipate and interpret, relative to good news. 
Furthermore, the sign of the post-event pattern of stock returns cannot be predicted by 
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the sign of the initial price change on the announcement day. This holds for both 
good and bad news, and for all classes of information. This has implications for the 
manner in which the sign of the news is measured. Determining the sign of the news 
by the return over the announcement period is therefore inappropriate, although it is 
an approach which is nevertheless adopted in many studies (Chambers & Penman 
1984, Brown, Harlow & Tinic 1988). 
We find supporting evidence that the volatility of stock returns following the release 
of information, is an increasing function of the size of the news; with the exception 
of annual earnings. The relatively high level of drift and low level of volatility 
associated with annual earnings, implies that annual earnings is a clearer signal than 
the other information types. It appears as though investors are confident about the 
implications of annual earnings, but take time to impound the information. 
The trade-off between the level of prior and post-event volatility of stock returns, 
suggests that on average, investors trade on information prior to an event as opposed 
to noise. It could also imply that the average corporate disclosure is precise enough 
to partially resolve prior uncertainty. For earnings news, the results indicate a greater 
trade-off between prior and post-event volatility for bad news than good. This 
suggests that unfavourable earnings news is more precise than favourable earnings 
news. A more likely explanation, maybe unfavourable earnings news provokes less 
interest by investors. This would be consistent with recent UK evidence, that finds 
investors ignore bad news (see Sharkaway & Garrod 1995). The picture is less clear 
cut for non-earnings information. 
Implications for UK Corporate Disclosure 
Whether investors can anticipate information and whether information can be 
impounded in price quickly are important characteristics of corporate disclosure. They 
relate not only to the efficiency of the stock market, but also have important practical 
implications for financial reporting. If the market is not exploiting publicly available 
information including earnings reports (Bernard & Thomas 1989), then how does the 
market interpret and impound information that is less well publicised? If the market 
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can anticipate information, then disclosure is restricted to a confirmatory role. If the 
market takes time to impound information, then the Stock Exchange and the 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) may wish to suggest alternative forms of 
disclosure to ensure that investor expectations are updated in a more timely way. 
The `information set' approach which the ASB is now taking to many reporting issues, 
assumes that a substantial part of users needs can be served by more disclosure. They 
justify increased disclosure as a way to `level the playing field' by providing equal 
access to information across investors. This is an attractive route to take when there 
is no consensus on measurement methods. But we find investors are limited in their 
ability to interpret the extra disclosure, and therefore this strategy of the ASB needs 
further investigation. Research by Indjejikian (1991) demonstrates as investors 
become less sophisticated they require increasing disclosure. This is consistent with 
Cready & Mynatt (1991) who find little evidence of a price or volume response on 
the annual reports release, although the number of transactions in small stockholdings 
increases significantly a couple of days after it's release, suggesting annual reports are 
more important to the smaller less sophisticated and poorer investor. In a recent UK 
study by Wild (1992), he addresses the argument that increased disagregation of data 
leads to a decrease in the quality and effectiveness of financial communications to 
shareholders, but found the greater the disclosure the greater the informativeness 
One may argue that the ability to earn abnormal returns can never be a valid basis for 
assessing the value of information. One cannot conclude from the presence of any 
pre- or contemporaneous announcement effects, and the absence of any post- 
announcement effect that the market is informationally efficient. Similarly, no 
reaction does not necessarily imply no information content. Price reaction only 
measures the actions of investors who trade on the information immediately. 
However, surely what is relevant in the future must therefore be relevant now. In this 
regard, the speed of impounding does measure the success of disclosure. 
Our results indicate there is greater anticipation of large firm events relative to small 
firms. We argue this is in response to the relative unavailability of information for 
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small firms, and promotes the idea of increasing the disclosure of small firm 
information. However, there exists a conflict of interest between disclosure 
requirements and firm size. Without doubt it is costlier for smaller firms to meet the 
same disclosure requirements as their larger counterparts, and so for this reason it is 
argued they should face less restrictive requirements. Although it the shareholders of 
the small firms that have most to lose from reduced disclosure, for it is for the small 
firms that incremental information is most important (Firth 1981, Lang 1991, Wild 
1992). 
Future Research 
The joint explanatory power of the variables for market anticipation is very low, and 
generally the R2 values do not exceed 9 per cent. This may be indicative of a 
relatively efficient market, in which one cannot explain a large proportion of future 
movements in price with historic information. Or alternatively, it may reflect the use 
of inappropriate proxies to the measure the availability of pre-disclosure information. 
Given there is not a direct measure of the level of pre-disclosure information, and the 
lack of any formal theory concerning the relationship between firm specific factors 
and information flows, it may be difficult to conclude that our explanatory variables 
cause cross-sectional differences in returns behaviour. The inclusion of other omitted 
variables might provide alternative explanations for the results. Similarly, the results 
would be strengthened with a more accurate measure of investors' expectations. 
Another modification would be to address the volume reaction to information, in 
conjunction with the price reaction. The price reaction measures the average change 
in investors' beliefs, whereas trading volume reflects the accumulated reaction of all 
investors. Hence, there may be an increase in volume following an announcement, 
but no observed price change. Addressing the price reaction alone therefore favours 
the hypothesis of no information content. Kim & Verrecchia (1991a and 1991b) show 
analytically that trading volume is not only an increasing function of the absolute 
change in price, but also reflects the level of information asymmetry prevailing before 
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the announcement. ' The greater the information asymmetry across investors, the 
greater the expected volume reaction due to the extent of belief revisions. 
' See Kim & Verrecchia (1991a) (p312) for proof. 
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APPENDIX 1: FORTRAN PROGRAM 
This program is designed to read the cd-rom output and identify the news announcements of interest, 
and to check if the event window is clear from other news announcements. If clear, then find and 
match with the relevant share price data, the market index data, and company characteristics, from the 
separate data files. 
C declare variables and their respective dimensions 
CHARACTER*30 NAME 
CHARACTER*7 AGE91 
INTEGER IND, DAY(100), YEAR(100), IMONTH(100), NEWS 
CHARACTER* 1 SLASH 




REAL MV91, MV92 
C for the price data 
CHARACTER*80 PLINE 
INTEGER PDAY, PMONTH, PYEAR 
INTEGER DATE301(1000) 
CHARACTER* 14 PRICE301(1000) 
INTEGER DAYSBEFORE, DAYSAFTER, FOUNDI3 
C for the market data, FT 
INTEGER FTDATE301(1000) 
CHARACTER* 14 FTPRICE 301(1000) 
C for variance calculations 
REAL RETURN (1000), FTRETURN(1000) 
REAL PRICEREAL (1000), INDEXREAL(1000) 
REAL EXRET(1000), SUM, VAR 




C open input and output files 
OPEN (UNIT=4, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\ft. dat') 
OPEN (UNIT=S, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\WATFOR\agm. dat') 
OPEN (UNIT=9, FILE='H\RAWDATA\WATFOR\agm. chk') 
C clean and check datastream output for the market index, and keep in memory 
KFT=O 
LOOP 
READ(4,201, END=301) PLINE 
IF (PLINE(4: 4) EQ. '/' ) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=8, FIL. E='H: \RAWDATA\WATFOR\TEMPI') 
WRITE(8,204) PLINE(2: 3), PLINE(5: 6), PLINE(8: 9) 
CLOSE (UNIT=8) 
OPEN (UNIT=8, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\WATFOR\TEMPl') 
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READ(8. *) PDAY, PMONTH, PYEAR 
CLOSE (UNIT=8) 
C check for overlap in dates 
IF (KFI'. EQ. O) THEN 
QUIT 
ELSEIF 




















UNTIL (PLINE(2: 9) . EQ. '27/ 
7/92') 
C eliminate any blank records in FT data 
J=0 
DO 23 I=1, KFT 
J=J+1 
FTPRICE301(J) = FTPRICE301(I) 
FTDATE301(J) = FTDATE301(I) 
IF (FTPRICE301(I) 
. EQ. 





C check the continuity of the index 
DO 21 I=1, KFT-1 
IF ( (FTDATE301(I+1)-FTDATE301(I)) 
. 
GT. 3 ) THEN 
WRITE (9, *) 'Index is not continuous' 




C read all the news announcements for each company 
C IFILE is the number of the news data file, ICOMP is the number of the company in the file 
IFIL1r0 
ICOMP=O 
C MAIN LOOP **************************** 
C read the news data files, file by file, where the company data is kept alphabetically 
LOOP 
IFILE=IFILE+ 1 
WRITE(9 *) 'The number of the data file is', IFILE 
IF (IFILE. EQ. 1) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. A') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. A') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\A. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 2) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. B') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. B') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\B. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFIL. E. EQ. 3) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTSWAMES. C') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWSWEWS. C') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICESCC. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 4) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H \RAWDATA\LISTSWAMES. D') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. D') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\D. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 5) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA'LISTS\NAMES. E') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. E') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\E. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 6) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. F') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. F') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\F. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 7) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, F1LE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. G') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. G') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H \RAWDATA\PRICES'G. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 8) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTSWAMES. H') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. H') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\H. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 9) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. I') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWSWEWS. I') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\I. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 10) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. J') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. J') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICESV. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 11) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. K') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATAWEWSWEWS. K') 
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OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\K. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 12) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. L') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. L') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\L.. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 13) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\L. ISTS\NAMES. M') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. M') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RA)VDATA\PRICES\M. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 14) THEN 
OPEN (UMT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. N') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATAWEWS\NEWS. N') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\N. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 15) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. O') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. O') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\O. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 16) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. P') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. P') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\P. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 17) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\I. ISTS\NAMES. Q') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWSWEWS. Q') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\Q. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 18) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. R') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWSWEWS. R') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\R. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 19) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. S') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. S') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\S. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 20) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. T') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWSWEWS. T') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\T. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 21) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. U') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. U') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\U. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 22) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. V') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. V') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\V. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 23) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\LISTS\NAMES. W') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. W') 
OPEN (UNIT=7, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\PRICES\W. DAT') 
ELSEIF (IFILE. EQ. 24) THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=3, FILE='H: \RAWDATA'LISTS\NAMES. XYZ') 
OPEN (UNIT=6, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\NEWS\NEWS. XYZ') 




C read the news file, company by company 
C find the first announcement for the company (if EOF, then open new files) 
LOOP 
READ (6,201, END=102) LINE 
201 FORMAT (A80) 
UNTIL (LINE(5: 8). EQ. 'Date') 




READ (6,202) DAY(I), SLASH, MONTH(I), YEAR(I), HEADLINE(I), 
1 XPRICE(I) 
202 FORMAT (14, A1, A3,1X, I2,1X, A33, A5) 
UNTIL (SLASHNE. '/') 
C all the announcements for the company are now in program's memory, 
C the program will have read the next line after the announcements, 
C therefore need to remind it to go back one line I-1 
LEND = (I-1) 
ICOMP=ICOMP+1 
WRITE(9, *) '' 
WRITE(9, *) 'Company number', ICOMP 
C change the format of the date, ie. name of month to numbers, 
DO 122 KM=1, IEND 
IF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Jan') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=1' 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Feb') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=2 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Mar') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=3 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Apr') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=4 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'May') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=5 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Jun') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=6 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Jly') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=7 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Aug') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=8 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Sep') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=9 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Oct') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=10 
ELSEIF (MONTH(KM). EQ. 'Nov') THEN 
IMONTH(KM)=1 I 






C find the company's characteristics from the names file, and keep in memory 
READ (3.200, END=303) NAME, IND, MKT, MV91, MV92, AGE91 
200 FORMAT (A30,1X, I2, IX, A3, IX, 2F10.2, IX, A7) 
WRITE(9 *) 'Company name from names file is ', NAME 
C find the share price data 
C clean and check datastream output for the share price data, and keep in memory 




READ(7,2O1, END=302) PLINE 
IF (KNAME. EQ. O) THEN 
IF (PLINE(4: 4). NE. '/') THEN 




IF (PLINE(4: 4) . EQ. '/' ) 
THEN 
OPEN (UNIT=8, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\WATFOR\TEMPl') 
WRITE(8,204) PLINE(2: 3), PLINE(5: 6), PLINE(8: 9) 
204 FORMAT (A2,1X, A2,1X, A2) 
CLOSE (UNIT=8) 
OPEN (UNIT=8, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\WATFOR\TEMPl') 
READ(8, *) PDAY, PMONTH, PYEAR 
CLOSE (UNIT=8) 
C check for overlap in dates 
IF (KK. EQ. O) THEN 
QUIT 
ELSEIF 





















UNTIL ( PLINE(2: 9) EQ. '27/ 7/92') 
C eliminate the blank records in price data 
J=0 
DO 28 I=1, KK 
J=J+1 
PRICE301(J) = PRICE301(I) 
DATE301(J) = DATE301(I) 
IF (PRICE301(I) EQ. '') 
J=J-1 
ENDIF 







C check the continuity of the price data 
DO 20 I=1, KK-1 
IF ( (DATE301(I+1)-DATE301(I)) . 
GT. 3 ) THEN 
WRITE (9, *) 'Prices not continuous: skip this company' 




C now with all the data in memory, return to the announcements to check if the window is clear 
C match with all the relevant data and write to output file 
C count the number of announcements after 1/1/91, for the company 
INEWS=o 
DO 125 KN=I, IEND 




C find the event of interest, in this case AGMs 
K=O 
DO 123 K=1, IEND 
IF (HEADLINE(K)(1: 3). EQ. 'AGM') THEN 
C check that the window is clear: ICLEAR =1 if true 
ICLEAR=O 
C ignore the first or last events for each company, as can not check to see if the window is clear 
CI is before, 2 is after, 3 is announcement day 
IF ((K. NE. 1). AND. (K. NE. IEND) )THEN 
NI =IDATE(DAY(K-1), IMONTH(K-1), YEAR(K-1)) 
N2=IDATE(DAY(K), IMONTH(K), YEAR(K)) 
N3=IDATE(DAY(K+ 1), IMONTH(K+1), YEAR(K+1)) 
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IF ( ((N2-N 1). GT. DAYSBEFORE) . AND. 




C if not clear, search for next occurrence 
IF (ICLEAR. EQ. 0) THEN 
WRITE(9 *) 'Window not clear' 
WRITE(9, *) 'SKIP this obs' 
WRITE(9,406) DAY(K), MONTH(K), YEAR(K), HEADLINE(K) 
406 FORMAT (I4,1X, A3,1X, I2,1X, A33) 
GOTO 123 
ENDIF 
C the window is clear, and the event date is 
13=IDATE(DAY(K), IMONTH(K), YEAR(K)) 
C- -_ - -'- __ C find the share price data for the event period, but first find the event data 
C when the event day is found, this is marked in the price array with IPRICE301 
FOUNDI3=0 
C IPRICE301=0 when theres not enough data 
IPRICE301=0 
DO 206 JJ=1, KK-1 
IF (FOUNDI3 EQ. 0) THEN 
IF (13 EQ. DATE301(JJ)) THEN 
C write the price data to the output file, if available 
IF ( (DATE301(JJ)-DATE301(1) GE. DAYSBEFORE). AND. 
1 (DATE301(KK)-DATE301(JJ) GE. DAYSAFTER) ) THEN 
WRITB(5, *) 'Price variables' 
DO 24 I=(-DAYSBEFORE), (+DAYSAFfER), 1 




WRITE(9, *) '1: Announce found, but not enough prices either side' 
WRITE(9, *) 'SKIP this obs' 
GO TO 123 
ENDIF 
304 FORMAT(I20, A14) 
FOUNDI3=1 
ELSEIF ( (13 EQ. DATE301(JJ+1)). OR. 
1 ((I3. GT. DATE301(JJ)). and. (I3. LT. DATE301(JJ+1))) ) THEN 
IF ( (DATE301(JJ+1)-DATE301(1) GE. DAYSBEFORE). AND. 
1 (DATE301(KK)-DATE301(JJ+1). GE. DAYSAFTER)) THEN 
WRITE(5, *) 'Price variables' 
DO 25 I=(-DAYSBEFORE), (+DAYSAFTER), 1 





WRITE(9, *) '2: Announce found, but not enough prices either side' 
WRITE(9, *) 'SKIP this obs' 






IF (FOUNDI3 EQ. 0) THEN 
WRITE (9, *) '3: Cannot find announcement price date 
WRITE(9, *) 'SKIP this obs' 
GO TO 123 
ENDIF 
C===-- 
C find the market index data for the event period, but first find the event data 
C when the event day is found, this is marked in the price array with IFT301 
FOUNDI3=0 
C IFT301=0 when theres not enough data 
IF r301=0 
DO 207 JJ=I, KFT-1 
IF (FOUNDI3 EQ. 0) THEN 
IF (13 . EQ. FTDATE301(JJ)) 
THEN 
C write the data to the output file, if available 
IF ( (FI'DATE301(JJ)-FTDATE301(1) . GE. DAYSBEFORE). AND. 
1 (FTDATE301(KFT)-FTDATE301(JJ) BE. DAYS AFTER) ) THEN 
WRITE($, *) 'FT variables' 
DO 26 I=(-DAYSBEFORE), (+DAYSAFTER), 1 




WRITE(9, *) '4: Announce found, but not enough FT either side' 
WRITE(9, *) 'SKIP this obs' 
GO TO 123 
ENDIF 
FOUNDI3=1 
ELSEIF ((I3 EQ. FTDATE301(JJ+1)). OR. 
1 ((I3. GT. FTDATE301(JJ)). and. (13. LT. FTDATE301(JJ+1))) ) THEN 
IF ((FTDATE301(JJ+1)-FTDATE301(1). GE. DAYSBEFORE). AND. 
1 (FTDATE301(KFT)-FTDATE301(JJ+1). GE. DAYSAFTER)) TI EN 
WRITE(5, *) 'FT variables' 
DO 27 I=(-DAYSBEFORE), (+DAYSAFTER), 1 




WRITE(9, *) '5: Announce found, but not enough FT either side' 
WRITE(9, *) 'SKIP this obs' 
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IF (FOUN DI3 EQ. 0) THEN 
WRITE (9. ") '6: Cannot find announcement FT date 
WRITE(9. ") 'SKIP this obs' 
GO TO 123 
ENDIF 
C rec ll: if IPRICE301 =0 then no price series 
C recall: if IFT3OI =0 then no FT series 
C IPRICE3OI= event day in price file PRICE301 
C IFT30I = event day in FT file FTPRICE301 
C match up with company characteristics and write to output file 
IF ( (IPRICE301 GT. 0) . AND. (IFT301 GT. 0)) THEN WRITE (5.400) NAME(1: 20). IND. MKT, MV91, MV92, AGE91, 
I [NEWS. IDATE(DAY(K), IMONTH(K). YEAR(K)) 
400 FORMAT (A20. IX. 12.1X, A3, IX. 2F10.2,1X, A7,1X, 
1 I3.2X, I6) 
WRITE(5,405) DAY(K), MONTH(K), YEAR(K), HEADLINE(K), XPRICE(K) 
405 FORMAT (I4,1X, A3,1X, I2,1X. A33,1X, A5) 
C- 
C calculate returns and the variance of returns 
C re-read price as a real variable 
DO 399 JJ= I JPRICE301 
OPEN (UNIT=8, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\WATFOR\TEMPI') 
WRITE(8,404) PRICE301(JJ) 
404 FORMAT (A 14) 
CLOSE (UNIT=B) 
OPEN (UNIT=8, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\WATFOR\TEMPI') 
READ(8, ") PRICEREAL(JJ) 
CLOSE (UNIT=8) 
399 CONTINUE 
C re-read index as real 
DO 401 JJ=1 JFr30l 
OPEN (UNIT=8, FILE='H: \RAWDATA\WATFOR\TEMPI') 
WRITE(8,404) FTPRJCE301(JJ) 
CLOSE (UNIT=8) 
OPEN (UNIT=8, FILE='H: \RA)NDATA\WATFOR\TEMP1') 




C calculate returns for company, 2 ... IPRICE301 DO 402 JJ=2, IPRICE301+DAYSAFTER 
RETURN(JJ) = (PRJCEREAL(JJ) - PRICEREAL(JJ-1)) 
1/ PRICEREAL(JJ-1) 
402 CONTINUE 
C calculate returns for index, 2 ... IFT301 DO 403 JJ=2, IFT301+DAYSAFTER 
FTRETURN(JJ) = (INDEXREAL(JJ) - INDEXREAL(JJ-1)) 
1/ INDEXREAL(JJ-1) 
403 CONTINUE 
C Calculate mean returns, over daysbefore excl. the event day 
MEAN=0.0 
DO 135 KL=IPRICE301-DAYSBEFORE, IPRICE301-1 
MEAN=MEAN+RETURN(KL) 
135 CONTINUE 
MEAN = (MEAN/DAYSBEFORE) 
C Calculate variance of returns over daysbefore 
VAR=0.0 
DO 136 KL=IPRICE301-DAYSBEFORE, IPRICE301-1 
VAR=VAR+(RETURN(KL)-MEAN)**2 
136 CONTINUE 
C Calculate the standard deviation of returns 
VAR=(V AR/DAY S BEFORE) **0.5 
C write var to file 
WRITE(5,137) VAR 
137 FORMAT (50X, F 10.4) 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
C END of loop within each datafile 
C go here when: prices not continuous 
C insufficient prices data 









C END OF MAIN LOOP 
UNTIL (IFILE. EQ. 24) 
GO TO 300 
301 WR1TE(9, *) ' stopped: not all FT price data is available' 
GO TO 300 
317 
302 WRITE(9, *) ' stopped: not enough company price data is available' 
GO TO 300 
303 WRITE(9, *) ' stopped: company characteristics data not available' 
GO TO 300 






C SUBROUTINE to convert announcement date into a number 
FUNCTION IDATE (D, M, Y) 
INTEGER D, M, Y, X 
C to calculate the days from 1/1/80 
C number of days for each year 
IF (Y. EQ. 80) THEN 
IDATE--O 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 81) THEN 
IDATE=366 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 82) THEN 
IDATE=366+365 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 83) THEN 
IDATE=366+365+365 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 84) THEN 
IDATE=366+365+365+365 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 85) THEN 
IDATE=366+365+365+365+366 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 86) THEN 
IDATE=366+365+365+365+366+365 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 87) THEN 
1DATE=366+365+365+365+366+365+365 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 88) THEN 
IDATE=366+365+365+365+366+365+365+365 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 89) THEN 
IDATE=366+365+365+365+366+365+365+365+366 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 90) THEN 
IDA'I=366+365+365+365+366+365+365+365+366+365 
ELSE IF (Y. EQ. 91) THEN 
IDATE=366+365+365+365+366+365+365+365+366+365+365 




C remember for a leap year 





C number of days for each month 
IF (M. EQ. 2) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31 
ELSE IF (M. EQ. 3) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X 
ELSE IF (M. EQ. 4) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31 
ELSE IF (M. EQ. 5) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31+30 
ELSE IF (M. EQ. 6) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31+30+31 
ELSE IF (M. EQ. 7) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31+30+31+30 
ELSE IF (M. EQ. 8) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31+30+31+30+31 
ELSE IF (M. EQ. 9) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31+30+31+30+31+31 
ELSE EF (M. EQ. 10) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31+30+31+30+31+31+30 
ELSE IF (M. EQ. 11) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31+30+31+30+31+31+30+31 
ELSE IP (M. EQ. 12) THEN 
IDATE=IDATE+31+X+31+30+31+30+31+31+30+31+30 
END IF 





Distribution Properties of the Abnormal Performance Index for each 
Information Type 
Clear Event Window 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Annual Earnings (n=116) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
APIP,; 
o, 1.050 
0.166 0.699 6.617 0.479 1.688 
AP1 
,m0.988 
0.077 -2.030 18.246 0.484 1.253 
API 
,, 1.038 
0.188 0.839 6.808 0.437 1.753 
APIA,, 1.050 0.221 1.031 7.872 0.379 1.953 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
AP11, 1.010 0.125 1.083 7.020 0.713 1.572 
API,  1.005 
0.080 -1.702 15.886 0.500 1.242 
APIp,; o, + 1.016 
0.156 0.558 6.949 0.454 1.717 
APIA, 1.019 0.166 2.142 10.028 0.720 1.842 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
APIP,,., 1.114 0.186 1.799 9.215 0.777 2.100 
API 1.009 0.080 -1.759 16.563 0.496 1.260 
APIm,,,,. 1.126 0.220 1.393 8.972 0.468 2.297 
APIA, 1.108 0.234 2.692 11.529 0.793 2.203 
Interim Earnings (n=152) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
APIm., 1.051 0.174 0.884 6.442 0.479 1.688 
API. 0.985 0.084 -2.071 15.511 0.484 1.253 
AP11 1.039 0.205 0.764 6.768 0.297 1.794 
AP1, , 1.048 0.204 
1.108 8.486 0.379 1.953 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
APIm,,, 0.995 0.150 0.010 7.502 0.353 1.570 
API. 0.982 0.085 -2.118 15.243 0.482 1.235 
APImo, w, m 0.979 0.178 -0.059 
6.939 0.255 1.582 
AP1  0.990 0.183 0.883 
9.256 0.314 1.811 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
APIP,; o, 1.064 0.189 1.160 
7.359 0.453 1.962 
API. 0.986 0.084 -2.029 14.951 0.496 1.247 
APIMo .. 1.052 0.221 1.062 7.053 
0.320 1.973 
API,,, 1.065 0.228 1.958 12.965 0.380 2.447 
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Appendix 2a contd. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
AGMs (n=106) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
AP17;., 1.043 0.108 1.360 6.778 0.840 1.549 
APIs= 1.005 0.036 2.347 19.076 0.897 1.231 
API,. 1.048 0.123 1.504 6.973 0.839 1.568 
API 1.011 0.105 -1.275 11.402 0.412 1.283 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
APIP, 
, 1.010 0.090 0.693 4.708 
0.792 1.339 
API. 1.004 0.036 2.285 18.826 0.892 1.230 
API. 
P,, O+, o, 
1.015 0.104 1.238 6.631 0.795 1.493 
APIA, 0.989 0.099 -1.830 13.011 0.408 1.253 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
APII, ;., 1.057 0.117 1.661 8.611 0.855 1.664 
API. 1.005 0.036 2.254 18.201 0.899 1.229 
API,. 1.062 0.133 1.800 8.550 0.836 1.678 
API 1.008 0.110 -0.959 9.047 0.428 1.267 
Board Changes (n=387) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
APIA, 1.019 0.114 2.573 28.399 0.583 2.164 
API. 1.000 0.016 -2.544 27.894 0.843 1.069 
API. 1.019 0.118 2.934 34.317 0.566 2.276 
APL, 1.005 0.119 -0.640 9.707 0.284 1.494 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
APIA 0.989 0.099 1.358 18.327 0.574 1.858 
APL 0.999 0.016 -2.459 28.119 0.840 1.070 
APIý, 
, m 
0.988 0.101 1.652 22.600 0.557 1.943 
APIA, 0.980 0.111 -1.297 11.657 0.227 1.392 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
APIA,;,, 1.024 0.116 2.166 23.061 0.592 2.124 
AP1 
,m 1.001 
0.016 -2.246 29.103 0.840 1.070 
APIm., r, m 1.025 
0.119 2.557 28.591 0.576 2.233 
APIV, 1.010 0.126 -0.311 9.503 0.280 1.712 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Changes in Shareholdin gs (n=927) 
Using Market Model Adj usted Excess Returns, MM 
APIpno, 1.023 0.117 1.248 15.587 0.357 2.073 
API. 1.002 0.023 5.187 77.985 0.862 1.350 
APIPo,. 1.025 0.120 1.333 14.176 0.458 2.082 
APIA, 1.020 0.113 0.706 10.655 0.266 1.625 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
API,,., 0.998 0.106 0.078 12.184 0.297 1.769 
API, 
m 
1.001 0.022 4.792 74.812 0.852 1.338 
APIv.,. 0.999 0.108 0.237 11.090 0.398 1.774 
API 
I,., 0.999 
0.100 0.044 10.649 0.281 1.552 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
APIpi; 
r 
1.031 0.124 1.322 14.286 0.377 2.110 
API. 1.002 0.023 5.003 76.387 0.851 1.347 
APIm., 
+ 1.033 0.128 
1.392 13.196 0.466 2.118 
APIs, 1.023 0.120 0.712 10.762 0.259 1.791 
Notes: 
n represents the number of observations, 
APLj, is the value of f1 invested in the prior period for (t=-20,..., -1), 
API,,,,, is the value of £1 invested in the announcement period for (t--0), 
APIA ._ is the value of £1 invested in the announcement period 
for (tc-20,.... 0). 
API,,, is the value of £l invested in the announcement period for (t=+I,..., +20). 
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APPENDIX 2b: 
Distribution Properties of the Abnormal Performance Index for each 
Information Type 
Unclear Event Window 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Annual Earnings (n=1830) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
APIpo, 1.032 0.135 1.651 19.822 -0.072 2.487 
API. 1.005 0.077 -4.929 87.747 -0.478 1.421 
APIm,,,. 1.037 0.158 0.846 18.260 -0.372 2.714 
APIA, 1.026 0.143 3.376 36.347 0.087 2.822 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
APIA,;,, 1.004 0.115 0.211 14.894 -0.071 1.876 
API. 1.004 0.077 -4.984 87.123 -0.477 1.422 
AP1m,,, 
m 1.009 0.139 -0.501 
14.886 -0.357 2.017 
APIA, 0.997 0.117 1.429 17.727 0.076 2.298 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
APIp,; 
o, 1.044 0.144 
1.455 14.870 -0.074 2.254 
API, 
, 1.006 0.077 -4.837 
85.591 -0.476 1.419 
APIm.,,. 1.051 0.169 0.823 14.183 -0.380 2.398 
APIA, 1.036 0.146 2.447 22.163 0.104 2.752 
Interim Earnings (n=1452) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
APIA;,, 1.020 0.120 1.094 17.295 0.047 2.230 
API. 0.996 0.073 -2.952 33.694 0.193 1.474 
API P,,.,. 1.015 0.138 0.216 
10.466 0.062 1.794 
APIP. 1.020 0.137 0.723 12.897 0.108 1.998 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
APIA,;,, 0.996 0.112 0.845 26.464 0.049 2.408 
API, m 0.995 0.073 -2.984 
33.852 0.192 1.473 
APIA;,, . 0.989 0.127 -0.684 10.663 0.063 1.700 APIA,, 0.995 0.124 -0.005 13.008 0.105 1.820 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
API1, 
, 1.030 0.133 1.992 27.203 0.046 2.735 API. 0.996 0.073 -2.895 33.298 0.194 1.476 
API,,, 1.025 0.146 0.539 10.862 0.060 2.010 
APIP., 1.025 0.145 1.304 16.502 0.109 2.447 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
AGMs (n=481) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
APIma, 1.028 0.113 2.621 22.942 0.675 2.139 
API, 
m 
0.999 0.041 -1.693 22.078 0.665 1.231 
APIP_,,. 1.028 0.130 2.080 16.774 0.643 2.158 
API,,, 1.011 0.108 0.866 16.001 0.412 1.915 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
APIA, 
r 
1.002 0.092 1.186 12.607 0.629 1.743 
API. 0.998 0.041 -1.693 22.180 0.665 1.230 
AP1 
m;, rm 1.001 
0.107 0.899 9.762 0.631 1.748 
APIA, 0.995 0.098 -0.884 10.999 0.408 1.581 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
APIv; 
0, 1.046 
0.121 2.428 20.665 0.678 2.196 
API. 0.999 0.042 -1.738 21.928 0.661 1.229 
APiý,, 
=. 1.046 
0.139 1.968 15.371 0.634 2.216 
API., 1.010 0.114 0.755 13.408 0.428 1.921 
Board Changes (n=1807) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
APIm., 1.014 0.149 0.840 24.485 -0.081 2.703 
API 0.996 0.068 -8.720 - -0.359 1.364 
APIm,,,. 1.011 0.163 0.048 22.345 -0.411 2.744 
APIA, 1.010 0.154 -0.403 33.248 -1.039 2.706 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
API 
m, 0.986 
0.143 1.267 41.156 -0.071 3.065 
API,,, 0.995 0.068 -8.754 - -0.361 1.342 
APIT,, 
. 
0.981 0.154 0.171 34.252 -0.390 3.117 
APIA, 0.982 0.142 -0.496 37.819 -0.850 2.838 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
APIp,; 
or 
1.024 0.167 2.850 51.477 -0.074 3.700 
APL 0.997 0.068 -8.623 - -0.358 1.354 
APIA;,,, = 1.021 0.179 
1.830 43.394 -0.387 3.789 
APIA, 1.015 0.163 0.630 40.386 -1.010 3.286 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Changes in Shareholdings (n=4354) 
Using Market Model Adjusted Excess Returns, MM 
API,., 1.025 0.152 0.169 14.809 -0.485 2.139 
API, 
, 1.002 
0.031 1.037 - 0.315 1.562 
API,,,,, 1.027 0.158 0.315 14.430 -0.490 2.326 
APIA, 1.020 0.132 1.412 23.805 0.031 2.930 
Using Market Adjusted Excess Returns, MKT 
APIp,; 
o, 
0.998 0.137 -0.803 15.625 -0.472 1.958 
APL 1.001 0.031 0.830 - 0.315 1.564 
APIA 
. 
0.999 0.141 -0.701 14.745 -0.465 1.974 
APIA, 0.997 0.116 0.129 16.425 0.008 2.313 
Using Mean Adjusted Excess Returns, MN 
API1,,;,, 1.033 0.157 0.160 13.832 -0.496 2.196 
API. 1.002 0.031 0.902 - 0.312 1.565 
APIp,; 
o,. 1.036 
0.163 0.291 13.359 -0.499 2.258 
API,, 1.024 0.139 1.234 19.414 0.003 2.831 
Notes: 
n represents the number of observations, 
AP" is the value of fI invested in the prior period for (t=-20...., -1), 
API,,,, is the value of El invested in the announcement period for (t=0), 
APIwi.. is the value of £1 invested in the announcement period for (t=-20,..., 0), 
APIr,. is the value of fl invested in the announcement period for (t=+1,..., +20). 
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